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A B S T R A C T
This document addresses the nuclear safety aspects of future long duration manned space
missions in low earth orbit. Such missions must safely accommodate radiation from the
natural space environment and from on-board or interfacing vehicle nuclear sources such as
power reactors and isotope heat sources. Nuclear hazards of a typical low earth orbit Space
Base mission have been identified and evaluated. Some of the principal nuclear safety design
and procedural considerations involved in the launch and orbital operations of such missions
are presented. Areas of investigation include radiation interactions with the crew, subsys-
tems, facilities, experiments, film, interfacing vehicles and the nuclear hardware. Results
of the analysis indicate (1) the natural space environment can be the dominant radiation source
in a low earth orbit where reactors are effectively shielded, (2) with implementation of safety
guidelines the reactor can present a low risk to the crew, support personnel, flight hardware
and the mission, (3) ten year missions are feasible without exceeding integrated radiation
limits assigned to flight hardware, and (4) crew stay-times up to one year are feasible with-
out storm shelter provisions.
The nuclear safety guidelines resulting from the study should be considered in subsequent
phases of NASA's manned space program to increase mission effectiveness and overall sys-
tem safety.
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The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research. ?
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications. .' - .i ,
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those~of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
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Part 1
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This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1. 1 GENERAL
This study addresses the radiological safety aspects of manned space missions employing
nuclear reactors for prime electrical power and involving extended stay times in low earth
orbit. A Manned Space Base employing pertinent safety related features from both>the
McDonnell Douglas and North American Rockwell Phase A studies (Reference 1-1, 1-2) was
utilized for reference mission purposes. Results of the study are considered applicable for
future design and development phases of manned space programs.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this preliminary nuclear safety analysis is to identify potential and
inherent radiological hazards of a representative Space Base program and to recommend
approaches for hazard elimination or reduction to acceptable risk levels. The specific study
objectives are listed in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1. Specific Study Objectives
1. Perform a comprehensive, qualitative nuclear safety evaluation of a Space Base program
2. Perform gross hazard and failure mode and effects anahscs, and establish failure prob-
abilities for those nuclear related situations that could lead to risk to the general populace,
the ecological system, the crew, and am Space Base program equipment including experi-
mental equipment.
3. Determine the impact of the radiological hazards on a Space Base program and the Earth's
populace and ecology
4. Determine the influence of a Space Base program safety requirements on the design and
operation of nuclear hardware.
5. Evaluate the impact of the nuclear safety criteria, guidelines, and requirement* developed
during the study on the nuclear power system and the Space Base mission.
6. Investigate the effects of radiation on operational and experimental equipment associated
with the Space Base program.
7. Develop design and operational criteria, procedures, guidelines, and requirements
governing radiological system safety for a Space Base program.
8. Prepare Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports covering the reactor power system and
Space Base in two separate volumes.
9. Prepare applicable portions of a Svstem Safety Plan (SSP) covering nuclear safety for a
Space Base program.
10. Prepare inputs to NASA's ASRDI data bank for all pertinent reference material used in
the study and the final study documents.
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A Space Base program encompasses a diversity of support equipments and a broad experiment
program. Therefore, it is expected that results from this safety evaluation will be applicable
not only to a Space Base, but to the general class of advanced, manned, earth-orbital space
missions. Performing this type of evaluation at the early stages of a program, permits de-
sign and procedural safety features to be evolved concurrently with the evolution of an overall
program resulting in effective and timely implementation for maximum safety.
1.3 SCOPE
This document, Volume II, addresses the identification and evaluation of radiological hazards
associated with a Space Base mission. The potential effects of these hazards on mission
operations, support activities, crew, subsystems, experiments and interfacing vehicles are
presented. Design, operation and procedural considerations which reduce or eliminate these
radiological hazards are identified. The evaluation of the effects Space Base nuclear reactors
have on terrestrial nuclear safety is contained in a separate document, Volume in entitled
"Preliminary Safety Analysis Report-Reactor System. "
Safety related guidelines and requirements resulting from the overall study are identified in
the main body of the reports and are formally identified and described in Volume V. The
nuclear safety requirements of a System Safety Plan for a Space Base Program are contained
in Volume VI.
The basic ground rules employed in the study are summarized in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2. Study Ground Rules
• The baseline mission definitions studied in this program are the Space Base mission designs bj McDonnell-Douglas
and North American Rockwell as prepared for MSFC and MSC, respect!veh.
• The experiment program anah zed is that outlined in the OMSF publication, "Candidate Experiment Program for
Manned Space Stations" and its subsequent iterations.
• The baseline Space Base povrer s\stem consists of a zirconium-h\dnde reactor(s) coupled with a Bra} ton c\cle
conversion s\stem.
• The stud> considers the total Space Base s\stem nuclear safet\ concept including crew /personnel safeu, mission
success, safet} of the ecological s\ stem and of the general populace.
• Means for effecting all normal and in-flight maintenance and repair of nuclear s\ stems necessar\ for crew survival
and mission continuation were part of this stud}.
• ReliabiliU and maintainabilih aspects of critical (nuclear) s\stems, like the reactor power s\stem, received
special emphasis.
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1.4 ORGANIZATION
In order to facilitate the location of results and supporting information, the intent and inter-
relation of the various sections of this volume are presented below:
• Section 2 Summary - A brief summary of key conclusions regarding nuclear safety
derived from the analyses of manned space flight nuclear system safety.
• Section 3 Reference Space Base Program - A definition of the mission, and significant
systems and design features of a Space Base program including key assumptions and
models used in the analyses.
• Section 4 Nuclear Radiation Exposure Limits Summary - A summary of the nuclear
radiation exposure limits for personnel, subsystems and experiments which were used
in the radiological hazard evaluations.
• Section 5 Mission Support Operations Radiological Hazard Analysis - The analysis of the
impact of radiological hazards on Space Base Program mission support equipment and
personnel is contained in this section. It is organized by mission phase (Prelaunch,
Launch/Ascent, Orbital, End of Mission). Topics covered include packaging, trans-
porting, handling, checkout, launch pad activities, facility requirements, recovery/
disposal operations, etc. Design, operational and procedural considerations which
would minimize radiological hazards associated with the mission support functions,
are identified.
• Section 6 Space Base Operations Radiological Hazard Analysis - This section addresses
the effect of radiological hazards on the flight crew and hardware elements of a Space
Base Program including subsystems, the experiment program and interfacing vehicles.
The potential hazards associated with the various mission phases are defined and the
rationale used in identifying these hazards is discussed. The hazards are analyzed to
determine their effect on Space Base Program elements. Design, operational and pro-
cedural considerations which are presently incorporated or should be incorporated to
minimize the radiological hazards are presented. The emphasis in this section is on
the flight hardware associated with a Space Base Program, as opposed to the Mission
Support Requirements which are discussed in Section 5. 0.
• Section 7 Special Studies - This section contains the results of several design and oper-
ations studies of the reactor power module and radiological control programs.
• Section 8 Research and Technology Requirements - This section identifies areas which
require further investigation or techniques which require development.
• Appendixes - Appendix A contains the detailed results of the radiation limit investigation.
Appendixes B, C, D and E contain other supporting data. Appendix F is contained under
separate cover (Volume n, Part 1A) due to classification.
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1.5 REFERENCES
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SECTION 2
SUMMARY
2.1 GENERAL
Safety analyses oriented to radiological safety of a program such as a Space Base were
applied in the Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study. The overall study, development of
data and principal conclusions are intended as a point of departure for subsequent phases of
manned space flight programs where similar radiological hazards will be encountered.
2.2 REFERENCE MISSION
A reference mission was established to allow identification and analysis of potential hazards
and to provide a reference design against which the guidelines and recommendations result-
ing from the study could be established and evaluated. The reference mission incorporated
significant aspects related to nuclear safety from the Phase A Space Base studies of North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas (Reference 2-1, 2-2). Several of the mission
features are listed in Table 2-1. Basic elements of the hybrid vehicle are common modulesi
10 m (33 ft) in diameter comprising artificial and zero gravity habitation and work areas.
Several subsatellites in near proximity orbits are serviced by the Base. When "built-up",
the nominal Base can accommodate 50-man crews in low earth orbit for a 10-year mission.
Such a facility requires large amounts of electrical power. Nuclear reactors are the prime
candidates.
The study reference design employs two Zirconium Hydride (ZrH) thermal reactors, coupled
with redundant Brayton cycle conversion systems, to provide a total power output of 100 kWe.
Capability of a single reactor to provide the entire load for short periods is assumed. Nomi-
nal lifetime of the reactor is assumed to be five years with lifetimes of the power conversion
systems somewhat shorter. Repair and/or replacement of the reactor and power conversion
systems is therefore a necessity during a 10 year mission. A reactor power module disposal
system is provided to obtain separation of the "spent" or damaged power module from the
Base and a subsequent boost into a high earth orbit.
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Table 2-1. Space Base Mission Features
Reactor System
Configuration
Orbit
Launch Vehicle
Launch Trajectory
Lifetimes
Crew Size
Experiments
Logistics
Power Module Disposal
Reactor Shield
Space Base Definition
2-ZrH reactor-Brayton power modules, each with 330 kWt
(50 kWe) nominal rating-600 kWt maximum
Power modules on extendable booms of zero-g core. Arti-
ficial-g rotating hubs.
500 km (273 nm), 55° inclination
Saturn INT-21 (launch of 1 or 2 power modules)
46 launch azimuth from KSC; Eurasian over-fly
Mission - 10 years, reactor - nominally 5 years, power
conversion system - nominally 2.5 years
50 (nominal) with 90 to 180 day crew rotation cycle
Extensive on-board and orbiting subsatellite program
Space Shuttle - primary logistics vehicle, Space Tug - final
rendezvous and docking of power module
Boost by integral Disposal System to 990 km high altitude
disposal orbit.
\
Shaped 4ir lithium hydride neutron shield, 1 mrem/hr
tungsten gamma shield J> at nearest
habitable
interface
North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas Phase A
studies.
The mission was divided into four phases: (1) Prelaunch, (2) Launch/Ascent, (3) Orbital
Operations, and (4) End of Mission. Launches of prime hardware utilize Saturn INT-21's
and Space Shuttles. The ten-year operational phase incorporates an extensive experimental
program with resupply and logistic support by Space Shuttles. The End of Mission Phase is
characterized by the safe disposal and/or recovery of the nuclear hardware.
2.3 MISSION NUCLEAR HAZARDS
The nuclear hazards associated with the mission were identified as either inherent to the
mission or caused by "accident" situations. The reactors constitute an inherent "normal"
hazard during most phases of the mission. The reactor was assumed to undergo low power
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criticality checks prior to arrival at the launch center and consequently the fission product
inventory prior to reactor orbital start-up was held to a minimum. Several nuclear sources,
in addition to the power reactors, may be a part of, or interface with a Space Base. Solar
flare events, galactic cosmic and earth trapped radiation are significant radiation contribu-
tors in low earth orbits. Interfacing vehicles such as a Reusable Nuclear Shuttle were also
considered along with isotopic sources located within the Base modules. The expected radi-
ation environments of on-board nuclear sources and the natural environment were classified
as "normal", whereas for example, a reactor excursion or inadvertent operation of an X-ray
machine was termed an "accident" situation. A summary of the potentially hazardous situations
considered for each mission phase is shown in Table 2-2. In addition to the nuclear hazards,
attention was also directed to the handling of the liquid metal inventory and the potential ther-
mal hazards the nuclear sources exhibit.
Table 2-2. Hazard Identification
HAZARD SOURCES
REACTOR
POWER
MODULES
MATERIAL
PROCESS ING LAB
BIOSCIENCE
LAB
NATURAL
ENVIRONMENT
NUCLEAR SHUTTLE
NUCLEAR
PROP DEPOT
REACTOR
PRIMARY LOOP
ACTIVATED COMPONENTS
X-RAY MACHINE
RADIOACTIVE TRACERS
EARTH TRAPPED RADIATION
GALACTIC COSMIC RADIATION
SOLAR RADIATION
REACTOR
REACTOR
MISS ION PHASES
PRELAUNCH
A
A
A
LAUNCH
AND
ASCENT
A
A
OPERATION
BUILD-UP/
N. A
N. A
N, A
N, A
N. A
N
N
N
REPLACE
N, A
N. A
N, A
N. A
N
N
N
OPER.
N. A
N, A
N/A
N, A
N. A
N
N
N
N, A
N. A
EOM
N, A
N, A
N, A
N. A
f
0-NORMAL [A] -ACC IDENT
s
p
A
C
E
B
A
S
E
I
N
T
E
R
F
A
C
E
S
POTENTIAL ADDITIONS
ISOTOPE BRAYTON POWER SYSTEM
ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCES
N, A
N.A
A
A
N,A
N,A
N,A
N,A
N,A
N,A
N,A
N,A
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2.4 MISSION RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS
In order to evaluate the effects of radiation on a Space Base mission, a reference set of ex-
posure limits for personnel, typical subsystems and experiments were compiled. The detailed
listings are contained in Appendix A of this volume. Limits assigned to personnel were based
on currently accepted or proposed agency guidelines prescribed for crewmen, ground support
personnel, and the general populace. Maximum radiation limits for the crewmen under closely
controlled conditions were set higher than those for ground radiation workers (e. g., yearly
dose to skin (0.1 mm depth) for a crewman is 225 rem whereas 30 rem is specified as the
maximum for ground radiation workers).
The sensitivity of subsystem electronic components and other materials to radiation was
described in terms of bulk damage and ionization effects. Damage levels are primarily total
dose dependent. In general, film, emulsions and solid state electronics were shown to have
the lowest tolerance levels.
Experiments are comprised of electronics and materials similar to that used in various sub-
systems. However, in addition to considering the total dose limitations, dose rates affecting
experiment data degradation due to "noise" were considered. Bioscience experiments exhibited
a wide range of sensitivity to total accumulated dose, dependent on the stage of development
of the organism. In most cases, biological experiments are considered more resistant to
radiation than man, this being particularly true of the invertebrates.
A wide range of subsystem and experiment sensitivities were obtained, indicative of the im-
portance of specifying the objectives of the subsystems and experiments to be used in the
mission prior to establishing radiation limits, which, if not evaluated adequately, could lead
to overly stringent and unrealistic requirements.
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2.5 NUCLEAR SAFETY IN MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
2. 5. 1 THE MISSION SUPPORT HAZARD
Nuclear hardware operations during prelaunch, abort and recovery phases of the mission
constitute the principal mission support radiological hazards, whereas the environment must
also be considered during orbital operations. Isotopes continuously emit radiation and pro-
duce thermal energy. Preoperational cooling, anti-criticality containment and special
shielding are required to enable ground support personnel area accessibility and maintain
support and prime hardware integrity. Nuclear reactors present a considerably different
situation. Preoperational checks of a clean non-operating reactor can be planned to provide
minimum radiation hazards. What may prove to be a more difficult ground support operation
problem is the presence of rather extensive quantities of liquid metals in the primary and
intermediate coolant loops.
2. 5.2 MISSION SUPPORT HAZARDS ANALYSES
A summary of key results obtained in an analyses of the hazards during mission support
operations is presented below.
OPERATIONS AT THE LAUNCH CENTER
The reactor can be designed to present minimum hazards during prelaunch operations.
Fission product inventories will be negligible when minimum power level criticality tests
are performed at the point of manufacture and no such tests are performed at the launch
center. Radiation levels above 0.15 rem, due to a 100 MW-sec excursion (considered a
worst case and improbable condition) can be confined to within 5 km (3 miles) from the
launch site and would have relatively no effect on personnel stationed in the vicinity of the
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) or immediate fall-back areas. As a reference, the normal
sea level yearly radiation background is noted to be 0.15 rem.
A universal reactor power module transport and storage trailer provided with environmental
protection and status monitoring can serve in transport, storage, checkout and integration
operations to minimize handling functions and potentially hazardous situations.
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Liquid metal fire protection is incompatible with present fire suppression at the launch
center. Modifications in present fire protection techniques are required, including the
addition of liquid metal fire suppressants, isolation barriers, sumps, etc. Liquid metal
fire hazards can be reduced by minimizing the liquid metal inventory (e. g., by use of non-
liquid metal radiators), provision of double wall containment, and the use of inert gas blankets
during storage or transport.
The necessity and desirability of integrating and testing the reactor power module within the
VAB is questionable. Consideration should be given for a direct transfer of the power module
from the Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) to the Launch Pad. A power module simulator
could be used for system integration tests within the VAB.
Isotope heat sources require redundant prelaunch cooling and should be integrated with the
launch vehicle and Space Base modules as late in the countdown sequence as feasible.
FACILITIES
Extensive use can be made of existing facilities at the John F. Kennedy Space Center. Special
facilities which would be required to support the extensive nuclear hardware of the reference
Space Base Program include (1) a controlled area Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) where
reactor and isotope nuclear hardware would be received, stored and checked-out, and (2) a
liquid metal servicing facility providing, as a minimum, a capability to render safe a damaged
and possibly leaking liquid metal component such that it could be shipped back to the factory
for repair.
The special and existing facilities designated to support a nuclear power module must provide
nuclear radiation protection and monitoring,' environmental protection and liquid metal fire
suppression capability.
RANGE SAFETY
The launch of nuclear materials necessitates a new look at range safety procedures, particu-
larly in regard to destruct options and launch trajectories which traverse populated areas
such as the Eurasian continent. To minimize potential fragmentation damage to nuclear
2-6
hardware and the subsequent release of nuclear material and/or fission products on popu-
lated territories, consideration should be given to (1) safiug the destruct system over the
territory or (2) release of the nuclear hardware moments before destruct initiation. Timing
is critical and the effects of destruct delays must be carefully evaluated. Alternatives to
these procedures include the incorporation of fragmentation shields or rather extensive
launch escape systems.
«i
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
Radiological control at KSC and at potential impact points can be most effectively adminis-
tered by (1) the establishment and rigid control of radiation designated work and exclusion
areas and (2) the prompt use of impact/recovery teams and location devices. Quick response
recovery and decontamination teams are required at KSC. A mobile team coupled with ad-
vance warning of impending impact zones can minimize the potential hazards to the general,
world populace.
j
Mission control can provide assistance in the on-board radiological monitoring and control
of the crew. Cumulative radiation dose records can be kept. Periodic Shuttle logistic flights
can bring to the earth radiation emulsions and urine specimens which would be processed on
the ground. Special packaging and radiation shielding arrangements are required in trans-
*.port to allow for an accurate^record of radiation doses received. Based on records received
from orbit and ground data systems, crew assignement and rotation schedules would be pre-
pared or adjusted.
2.6 NUCLEAR SAFETY IN ORBITAL OPERATIONS
2.6. 1 ORBITAL OPERATIONS RADIATION HAZARDS
The space environment in low earth orbit is the major radiation contributor to the Base,
2
providing a nominal 3 mrem/hr through 1.6 g/cm module shielding. The trapped radiation
belts provide a majority of this dose in the reference 500 km (273 nm) 55 degree inclination
orbit. In addition, the depth dose from a single high intensity solar flare can result in at
least 4 rem. Due to the ability to adequately shield a reactor, its contribution at the nearest
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habitable area can be kept quite low. In the reference Space Base, the dual reactor contri-
bution is 1 mremAr. The yearly percentage attributed from all sources for a typical Space
Base is shown in Table 2-3. As is shown, the use of nuclear reactors on a Base is a minor
contributor to the total annual radiation dose.
Table 2-3. Estimated Yearly Dose Percentage Contributions
Source
Natural Radiation
Solar Flares
Nuclear Reactors
Other Sources
Percent
60
26
12
2
2.6.2 ORBITAL OPERATIONS HAZARD ANALYSIS
A summary of key results obtained in an analysis of the hazards during orbital operations
is presented below."
GENERAL ORBITAL OPERATIONS
The analysis has shown that ten-year orbital missions with crew stay-times of one year are
feasible. Predicted solar flare activity and practical Space Base Module shielding necessi-
tate storm shelter provisions for crew stay-times of over one year.
The natural space radiation environment in typical Space Base earth orbits can present
a more severe hazard to the crew and space subsystems than a well shielded operating
reactor. Lighter reactor shields and higher operating thermal power levels would increase
the radiation levels and likewise increase the hazards to the crew, subsystems and experi-
ments.
In addition to the nuclear power reactors and the natural environment, there are several
additional potential sources of radiation (i. e., isotope heat sources, tracers, X-ray
emitters, etc). It is important that the isotope heat sources and tracers be adequately
shielded and contained to prevent contamination within the Base and reduce doses to the
crew and sensitive equipment.
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Several potential, however remote, accidents involving the reactor in orbit can present a
considerable radiation hazard to the crew. A reactor excursion and/or disassembly in
orbit can result in highly radioactive debris around the Base. Emergency plans may require
a rapid response orbit change of the Base and/or the ejection of the damaged power module
away from the Base followed by a disposal into high earth orbit. A collision or impact of
debris with the reactor shield in orbit can result in a shield leak (loss of H ) and therefore
M
increased radiation with time. A compartmentalized shield and/or increased shield cladding
combined with leak detection instrumentation can minimize the hazard and allow time for
repair or replacement.
CREW EFFECTS
Although radiation levels of 3 to 4 mrem/hr are relatively low, when one considers the inte-
grated doses for a 6-month crew stay-time and 10-year mission lifetimes, radiation limits
on the crew and hardware must be considered. The eye dose limits as defined by the
National Academy of Sciences appears to make the eyes the limiting organ. The integrated
dose to the eye as a function of flight time has been calculated and shown in Figure 2-1.
The doses are shown with and without solar flare events. The solar flare data includes the
possibility of an event on the first day and another event occurring 250 days later. Increased
shielding in headgear can help to reduce the dose to the eyes, however consideration should
be given to the provision of a storm shelter for crew stay-times of over one year or to pre-
vent the necessity of replacing the entire crew should a major solar flare event occur.
SUBSYSTEM EFFECTS
The effects of the radiation environments on the subsystems of the Base exclusive of the
reactor power module were determined. The principal radiation considerations are bulk
(crystal) damage and ionization (surface) effects associated with semiconductor electronics,
ionization effects in materials and dynamic interference effects in sensors. A summary of
the equivalent 1 Mev neutron bulk damage effects on typical Space Base subsystems is shown
in Figure 2-2. Figure 2-3 shows the ionization effects. The most sensitive components to
bulk damage are light emitting diodes in solid state displays and high power semiconductors.
Organic materials subjected to oxygen environments, semiconductors - particularly MOS
devices, and film - are most sensitive to ionization.
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Figure 2-1. Crew Exposure
The expected 10-year reactor and natural radiation environment integrated doses have been
superimposed on the figure to indicate potential subsystem incompatibilities. It is recognized
that film will be periodically resupplied and would not normally be subject to the long term
environments. However, where threshold damage to electronics may be indicated, radiation
hardening techniques such as piece part selection can be employed to provide hardware
relatively insensitive to the total radiation environment expected for a 10-year mission.
EXPERIMENT EFFECTS
Integral or detached modules will contain a multi-disciplined set of experiments capable of
taking precise measurements. Radiation particle flux rates above some threshold level
could cause "dynamic interference" where noticeable degradation of data quality results (a
signal to noise ratio of 10 to 1 is assumed). Interference is frequently present where the
environmental radiation spectrum has components (gamma rays, etc.) identical to those
sought in the experiment. Permanent experiment damage can also result, but generally
dynamic interference would occur prior to severe damage and subsequent failure of experi-
ment hardware.
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Several of the experiments identified in the "NASA Blue Book" used as reference experiments
in the study are susceptible to dynamic interference in certain portions of the orbit, particu-
larly through the South Atlantic anomaly. Especially sensitive are devices such as the air-
glow photometer (FPE 5.6), the nuclear gamma ray spectrometers for high energy stellar
astronomy (FPE 5. 5) and grazing incidence X-ray telescopes (FPE 5.1). Where interference
is attributed to the natural environment, temporary curtailment of the experiment operation
may be advisable. Radiation interference from the reactors may be reduced by shielding or
changing the experiment location. The latter approach is recommended for the two astronomy
packages (FPE 5.1, 5. 5) where detached "free-flying" modules should be considered. Typical
minimum approach distances from the reactor for free-flying modules range from over 1 to
100 kilometers to prevent dynamic interference.
Biological specimens used in space experimentation programs have a wide range of radiation
sensitivities ranging from a few Eads to thousands of Rads. The radiation protection required
^
is dependent on the specimen type age and experiment objective. Monitoring the radiation
/
dose to sensitive bioscience experiments, such as fertilization and embryolic processes, is
recommended.
FILM EFFECTS
Photographic film and special emulsions, apart from special radiation detectors and a limited
class of biological specimens, are perhaps the most sensitive material to the radiation environ-
ment. Film deterioration during storage and use in space may present one of the most fre-
quent resupply requirements. High speed film (ASA 400-800) stored or contained within 20
2
g/cm shielding must be used and developed within 25 to 50 days after delivery to a Space
Base in order to insure minimal fogging effects. A solar flare could eliminate the entire on-
board film supply.
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES
C;
Isotope heat sources and tracers could be contained within the habitable Space Base modules.
i
It is particularly important that sealed sources (capsules) and open sources (isotope tracers)
be operated in areas that can be completely isolated to prevent contamination of large areas
in the event of a release. Ventilation and waste management systems must be carefully designed.
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INTERFACING VEHICLE CONSIDERATIONS
Module buildup, logistic resupply and experiment support activities require frequent inter-
face with various supporting vehicles. The normal Space Base reactor environment allows
for Space Shuttle and Tug rendezvous at any view angle if loiter times are minimized and
braking gate velocities are maintained within currently planned specifications. A crewman
flying a maximum orbit rendezvous mission with the flight path directly head-on to the
power module (worst case) was calculated to receive a maximum integrated dose of approxi-
mately 24 mrem of which only 4. 7 mrem is attributed to the reactor power modules.
Detached free-flying subsatellites and logistic vehicles which employ film must be restricted
in their operations and movement in the vicinity of the reactors in order to avoid reducing
useful film life or degradation of data. However, at distances of greater than 3 km, the
natural environment is usually the limiting radiation source.
The nuclear reactor radiators reject considerable quantities of heat from the Brayton cycle
conversion system in the range of 350 to 500 K. This condition poses a potential hazard
to EVA activities in the area of the radiators and also may interfere with IR scanners used
in rendezvous vehicles.
Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS) fly-by requirements limit doses at the Base to 0.1 rem per
pass. Separation distances of over 125 km should be considered during the RNS reactor
propulsion operations where maximum dose rate view angles could be attained. Shutdown
(loiter) distances during RNS and Base logistic operations allow approaches within a few
kilometers without experiencing experiment dynamic interference of the Base experiments.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
Maintenance and repair operations within the Base are generally not directly affected by the
nuclear environment unless operations are in near proximity to nuclear sources. EVA
operations, however, are outside the module shielding which increases the dose to the skin
by a factor of two, the corresponding increase to the depth dose being substantially less.
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The dose to the rear of the reactor power modules is highly dependent on shield configuration
and reactor power level. In the reference configuration, the dose only becomes a significant
factor when near the reactor, the dose at 8 m from the reactor being less than 43 mrem/hr
with both reactors operating. The power modules themselves can provide a reasonable
maintenance capability of the power conversion system and associated components within a
protected and possibly pressurized "engine room" located in the rear of the power module.
This is an important feature since the repair frequency within the engine room could be at
least twice a year. Repair of a previously operated reactor, shield and NaK lines is con-
sidered impractical if not impossible due to high radiation levels around these components.
However, the Manned Shuttle or Tug installation of a "cold" reactor can be accomplished
without shut-down of the other reactor in the reference design, as radiation levels at the
docking interface are about 13 mrem/hr. Replacement by manned vehicle of a "spent"
reactor should only be accomplished a minimum of 10 days after its shutdown, to allow for
radiation decay to tolerable levels.
RADIATION MONITORING AND CONTROL
\.
Knowledge of the status of the crew's radiation exposure (accumulated and instantaneous
doses) throughout the Space Base is a necessary part of the mission. The system must not
only measure the absorbed dose and relative biological effectiveness of protons, electrons,
photons and neutrons, but also measure these quantities at both skin and critical organ
depths. Obviously no one monitoring system can meet all these criteria. Four separate
systems appear to be required: (1) Passive Dosimetry, (2) Active Dosimetry, (3) Health
Physics Instrumentation, and (4) Biological Dosimetry.
Frequent readout is required necessitating some readout in space. A reasonable system
would require each crewman to have a Thermo-Luminescent Dosimeter rod connected with
an identification card. Insertion into a special reader would give a daily readout on each
individual which could be tabulated and analyzed by the on-board data management system.
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Radiation control would be implemented by the use of several radiation instruments connected
to alarms which can be programmed to signal the closing of doors and isolate ventilation sys-
tems. Decontamination techniques must be developed for application in zero-g and artificial-
g modules.
An effective radiological monitoring and control program must incorporate a complement of
trained personnel. It is estimated that in a crew of 50, an average time of at least 3 men
are required to support the entire radiological control program. Personnel include a radi-
t
ation safety officer assisted by the astronaut crew who have been crosstrained to allow them
to make valid risk judgements and to function effectively in radiation emergencies. The
presence of the reactors on a Space Base mission requires a minimum of additional support,
the direct support of the reactors accounting for only 1/2 of a crewman out of the total of 3
required for the entire program.
2.7 SPACE BASE HAZARD SUMMARY
The specific potential radiological sources and hazards evaluated are summarized in Table 2-4
and are categorized in accordance with NASA Office of Manned Space Flight Safety Program
Directive No. 1, Revision A.
2.8 REACTOR POWER MODULE STUDIES
Qualitative studies of nuclear safety implications concerned with reactor power module con-
figurations and operation were performed. Configuration can be an important factor in pro-
viding nuclear safety. The servicing, replacement and operating characteristics of multiple
reactor power modules are enhanced by providing adequate separation distances between
power modules and between the Space Base core modules.
Several Power Conversion System (PCS) features can increase nuclear safety. The Brayton
and organic Rankine cycles permit relatively low temperature operation which allows the
use of non-liquid metal radiators. Toxic, corrosive and explosive coolants should be avoided
where feasible. Multiple operating PCS units are preferred for safe shutdown and to mini-
mize temperature transients. A separable heat exchanger at the reactor/PCS interface, allows
for modular assembly and permits significant increases in the reentry ballistic coefficients,
S
extending reactor orbital lifetimes by as much as a factor of 9.
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Table 2.4. Space Base Radiation Hazard Categorization
(Ground and Flight Personnel and Mission Hardware)
NORMAL CONDrTONS
Hazard tare*
Natural Radiation
Environment
CeomagneaeaUy
Trapped Protons.
Electrons sad
Galactic Connie Ray*
Solar Radiation
Reactor Power Module ,
Interfacing Vehicle.
•Reusable Nuclear
Shuttle
•Orbital Propellant Storage
Depot (Reactor
Power System
Experiment Laboratories
X-ray Equipments
Open Radlolsofope
Sou rce« /Tracers
Clamed Isotope
Sources/Capsules
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
Spice Baie Reactor
Power Module \
Interfacing Vehicles
•Reusable Nuclear
tOmttlf
•Orbital Propellant
Storage Depot »
Experiment Laboratories
X-ray Equipment/
Dynamic Ceneraton
Uotope Tracer*/
Open Sources
Closed Sources/
Uotope Capsules
Source Condition
Varylnf Decree of
Intensity Depending
on Orbit Posldon
Solar Hare
Shutdown (No Operating
History)
Shutdown (Poet
Operation)
Normal Operating
Power
Emergency Operating
Power
Shutdown (Port
Ooeratlon)
Normal Power
(Thrusting)
Shutdown (Post
Operation)
Normal Operating
Puwer
As Installed
Stored
In Use
As Installed
As Installed
Damaged Reactor
Shield
NaK Coolant Release
Fission Product and
NaK Coolant Leak
Non~ Destructive
Excursion
Destructive
Excursion
Fission Products In
Plume
Reactor Disassembly
Loss of Attitude Control
(Same as Space Base
Reactor Power System)
Inadvertent Turn-On
Release to Space
Base Environment
Shielding Failure/
Removal
Encapsulation
Failure
Potential Hazard
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Thermal Interference
Excessive Radiation
Thermal Interference
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Tritium Release
Excessive Radiation
(Activated NaK)
Structural Corrosion
Equipment Contamination
Personnel Contamination
Excessive Radiation
Structural Corrosion
Equipment Contamination
Personnel Contamination
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Structural Corrosion
Equipment Contamination
Radioactive Debris
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
Excessive Radiation
(Same as Space Base
Reactor Power System)
Excessive Radiation
Internal Exposure of
Critcal Body Organs
Excessive Radiation
Internal Exposure of
Critical Body Organs
PFfllm&cfe
N/A
N/A
Nag
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N«g
Neg
N/A
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Marg
Crtt - Cat
Crit - Cat
Crlt - Cat
Crit - Cat
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Neg -Marg
N/A
Neg -Marg
N/A
MBBIO
Launch/ Accent
Neg
Neg -Marg
Neg
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Neg
N/A
Neg
Neg
Nog
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Marg
Crlt - Cat
Crit - Cat
Crlt- Cat
Crlt- Cat
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Neg- Marg
N/A
N PHASES
Orbital Oper
Neg
"eg- Marg
Neg
Neg
Neg
Neg- Marg
Neg- Marg
Neg- Marg
Neg
Neg
N/A
Neg
Neg
Neg
NCR
Neg
Neg
Crlt.
Marg
Neg- Marg
Neg - Crtt
Neg- Crit
Neg - Crlt
Neg- Crlt
Neg - Crlt
Neg- Crlt
Neg- Crlt
Marg
Crtt -Cat
Crtt -Cat
Crtt -Cat
Crtt -Cat
Neg
Marg
Marg
Marg
Neg- Marg
Neg -Cat
Neg -Marg
Neg -Marg
Ead-of-Mlaeion
Neg
nog Marg
N/A
Nag
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Neg
N/A
Neg
Neg
Crtt
Marg
Neg - Marg
Neg- Crlt
Neg - Crtt
Neg - Crlt
Neg - Crtt
Neg - Crit
Neg - Crtt
Neg- Crtt
Marg
Crit -Cat
Crit -Cat
Crit -Cat
Crtt -Cat
Neg
N/A
N/A
N/A
Neg -Marg
Neg -Cat
Neg -Marg
Neg- Marg
•Prelaunch sad launch of these vehicles is not Included.
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Legerat N/A - Not Applicable
Net - Negligible
Marg -Marginal
Crlt -Critical
Cat - Catastrophic
The Zirconium Hydride (ZrH) thermal reactor exhibits several inherent safely features
which may not be available in a fast reactor. These include: (1) a desirable negative temper-
ature coefficient providing a means of self shutdown, (2) compact (minimum) void space, re-
r>
ducing fuel load susceptibility to core compaction accidents and (3) release of hydrogen within
the core upon a temperature excursion providing inherent shutdown capability. Conversely,
however, the ZrH reactor is moderated by hydrogen and immersion in hydrogeneous materials,
such as water, can cause reactivity increases resulting in potential excursions or quasi-steady
state operation. Positive and permanent shutdown after operation has been recommended.
Neutron poison injection coupled with control drum lockouts are feasible techniques.
2.9 SAFETY GUIDELINES
A number of guidelines have resulted from the study and are delineated in Vol V, Part 1.
Reference shall be made to this document and supporting data in the implementation of
nuclear safety guidelines for subsequent phases of the Manned Space Flight program. Several
of the significant guidelines are summarized in Table 2-5.
2.10 TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
Areas for further study and where technological improvements are required include:
V
• Launch support requirements for the handling, processing and storage of
nuclear hardware.
• Liquid metal support requirements at the launch center including launch complex
fire protection.
• Nuclear reactor/power module separation techniques.
• The impact and contingency actions required for nuclear debris around a Space
Base and in space.
• Analyses and test program to determine adequacy of a LiH shield as a reentry
material before and after operation in a space and radiation environment.
• Methods of dissipating reactor waste heat without degradation of shield
material (loss of hydrogen).
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Development of blast and fragmentation models and protection schemes for pro-
tection of nuclear hardware (particularly isotope systems) during a launch
vehicle explosion at the launch pad.
Definition of permanent reactor shutdown systems.
Development of in-orbit decontamination techniques for zero-g and artificial-g
applications.
Development of space qualified in-orbit radiation monitoring equipment.
Standardization of Safety Analysis techniques.
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Provide personnel dosimetry, radiation monitoring, warning signs and instr
mentation in all areas where nuclear hardware is present
Provide proper escort and warnings during transportation
Provide rapid response fire alarm and detection systems for liquid metal fir
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USAF Range Safety Manual
Keep nuclear hardware operations at the launch pad to a minimum
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Maintain control drum lockouts in position dunng prelaunch operations Res
control drum movement to a single drum
Conduct thorough evaluation of the necessity and desirability of integration an
ing of nuclear reactor power modules within the VAB
Prohibit smoking and eating in designated radiation and liquid metal areas
Maintain current administratively controlled areas with a minimum radius of
approximately 13 km and exclusions areas of 4 km radius
Consider limiting flight termination impact areas to outside the continental s]
\
Provide continuous attended support by the MCC for warning, radiological co
and fault diagnosis
Establish crew rotation procedures in conformance with career and periodic
guidelines
Restrict EVA during orbits intercepting the South Atlantic Anomaly
Restnct approach paths of vehicles employing IR (infrared) sensors to avoid
ference from high temperature sources.
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vehicles employing nuclear power systems to minimize exposure of crew
Provide experiment data screening procedures for experiments sensitive to £
Atlantic Anomaly interference,
Minimize power level on operating reactors dunng reactor replacement.
Restrict repairs to NaK lines in space (repair is not considered feasible)
'
-
t
 
C
M
 
C
O
*
)
<
 
i
n
t
o
 
t
-
 
C
O
O
5
 
O
 
T
-
l
 
C
M
C
O
r
-t
 
r
-t
 
T
—
l
f
H
 
I
—
 IT
—
 
t
 
r
-t
 
r
-t
 
r
-l
 
C
M
 
C
M
 
C
M
C
M
s
 
2
«
 
-i
£
 
S
 
c
o
 
3
 
-3
 
'
i
 
>
 
tJJ
 
S
 
C
O
 
L 2
 
g
 
&
 
M
 
§
i
 
S
 
<
u
 
a
 
&
3
 
S
 
1
 
a
 
1
CO
 
t5
 
X
 
O
 
C
g
 
o
f
f
 
s
 
j3
o
 
a
'
s
s
.
c
o
i
4
 
£
.3
 
-
a
 
B
 
§
 
I
S
^
g
-
0
S
 
x
 
.
2
 
o
 
S
w
^
a
^
S
 
*
^
«
»
B
^
O
^
 
|>
£
-
a
0
S
3
t
 
£
>
^
S
6
d
^
-
3
 
S
S
r
t
-
a
i
'
s
in!
 
!
 !
 1
 
•
 i
 1
 i
 |H
 !
 i
 l
1
 1
 5
 l
 i
 ii
 
f
 i
 i
 MM
 M
 i
!
 I
 
f
 
1
 I
 1
 
1
 
1
 1
 IS
 U
 
«
 i
l
g
.
8
-
0
 
£
 
|g
 
s
 
a
 
5
 
«
.
 
-s
 e
 
t
,
 
g
 
£
•
 
*
S
 
t
,
 
43
 
"2
 
£
 
«
,
,
,
 
rth
ft
 
c3
 
=5
 
3
 T
,
 
0
 
S
 
0
 
X
nil
 
I
 II
 ;
.
 I
 !
 M
il!
 !
 i
i
 i
 i
 !
 i
 !
 1
 !
 i
 !
 1
 ii
 i
 !
 !
 S
1
 i
 i
 I
 
i
 
15
 
is
 
i
 
i
 
-s:
-
 I
 a
 i
 
I
!
 i
 !
 11
 1
 !
 1
 g
 s
 !
 1
 !?
 1
 !
 !
 1
f
i
l
l
s
 
§
 1
 
I
 
f«
 
°
 
"s
 
s
•»
 
s
 
«
,|
 |
 | i
 
-
~
~
1
 
i
^
 
o
 
g
S
f
l
"
^
 
"
^
W
 
§
 
'2
i
.
c
o
'c
o
a
!§
 
§
.S
 
•§
r?
 
CO
 
CO
 
CO
 
COg
 
O
 
CO
 
C
O
J5
 
QJ
 
COO
 
073
 
CO
 
COO
 
CO
 
CO
 
C
0
t
_
.
 
CO
g
 1
 1
 1
 Ii
 11
 1
 IS
 1
 U
 1!
 !
 11
 I
 !
 11
 !
Q
 
^
 
^
 
°
 
r
v
S
/
v
 
^
 
®
 
Q
 
^
^
 
M
 
^
S
^
 
^
 
^
 
*
^
S
 
^
^
*
H
I
H
M
C
C
^
 
1
0
 
t
o
 
t
-
 
o
o
c
i
 
o
 
'
"
'C
'
a
 
c
o
^
i
o
 
t
o
P4
 
*
~
w
i-t
 
iH
 
rH
 
iH
 
fH
 
iH
2-19/20
SECTION 3
REFERENCE SPACE BASE PROGRAM
KEY CONTRIBUTORS
L. L. DUTRAM
E. E. GERRELS
D. M. TASCA
SECTION 3
REFERENCE SPACE BASE PROGRAM
3 1 GENERAL
The primary purpose of using a reference Space Base program is to establish configuration
and characteristics which allow identification, analysis and evaluation of potential nuclear
related hazards and means of reducing or eliminating these hazards. In addition, this
reference definition provides a design against which the guidelines and considerations,
resulting from the study, can be evaluated and applied for future missions.
A Space Base is defined to be a centralized earth-orbital facility for the conduct of multi-
disciplinary research, development and operations. The vehicle is envisioned to be oper-
ational over a period of ten (10) years. The crew will consist of nominally 50 men whose
tour of duty may be up to one year.
A Space Base program includes the complete operation of a Space Base, including orbital
logistic support, interfaces with other orbiting vehicles and mission support.
The following sections summarize those aspects of a Space Base program which are of
particular importance to the evaluation of the nuclear hazards as well as the interpretation
of the results. The key assumptions and data sources used in establishing this reference
program are presented in the following sections.
3.2 SPACE BASE VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
3.2.1 SPACE BASE CONFIGURATION
The Space Base configuration used in the study was based on the Phase A conceptual designs
developed by McDonnell Douglas for NASA-MSFC and North American Rockwell for NASA-MSC.
These designs are described in References 3-1 and 3-2, respectively. Figure 3-1 illustrates
the respective Space Base configurations. Both configurations are similar; however, the
counter-rotating artificial "g" sections allow the MDAC configuration to assume any
3-1
orientation with respect to the orbit plane. It was assumed that the reference design has
this capability and, therefore, interfacing vehicles could be exposed to a variety of reactor
nuclear radiation environments. (See Section 3. 8.2)
Both configurations are similar in overall dimensions, subsystems, and experiments employed.
Therefore, for purposes of the study, it was feasible to define a single reference Space Base
program which incorporates those features of both concepts that are significant from the
standpoint of nuclear system safety. The Space Base configuration and its key dimensions
usedsin the study are shown in Figure 3-2. This figure also indicates docking locations for
attached and detached (free flying) experiment modules as well as logistic vehicles. -"-"
REACTOR POWER MODULES
ARTIFICIAL "G" MODULES
NAR CONFIGURATION
ZERO "G" SECTION
MDAC CONFIGURATION
Figure 3-1. Space Base Configurations
3.2.2 SPACE BASE SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS
The systems used to implement the Space Base are of interest from the standpoint of their
susceptibility to damage from nuclear radiation and also the nuclear hazard sources they
might contain. Since the Space Base Electrical Power System includes nuclear reactors,
this system is of particular interest. The nuclear sources and their locations are listed in
Table 3-1.
3-2
110M
(360 FT)
COSMIC RAY
FACILITY
DETACHED
MODULE OR SS
DOCKING PORT
TELESCOPES
EARTH SURVEY
MODULE
RCS-QUAD
ENGINES
4 PLACES
SHUTTLE
PAYLOAD
DOCKING
50 KW NOMINAL
NUCLEAR POWER MODULE
2 PLACES
Figure 3-2. Representative Space Base
Configuration Characteristics
~r
EXTENDIBLE 32M
BOOMS (104 FT)
STOWED
SOLAR ARRAYS THERMAL
SHROUDS
PERSONNEL/LABORATORY
ACCOMMODATION MODULE
4 PLACES
RCS-SPIN/DBS PIN
UNIT, 2 PLACES
23M
(76 FT)
_|_35.5M
(117 FT)
10M
(33 FT)
X-RAY SURVEY
TELESCOPE
HR X-RAY OBJECT
TELESCOPE
ASTRONOMY
SENSOR TEST
PLATFORM
KEY CONFIGURATION AND MISSION CHARACTERISTICS
CONFIGURATION
POWER REQUIREMENT
REACTOR SYSTEM
LAUNCH VEHICLE
LOGISTIC SUPPORT •
LAUNCH TRAJECTORY
ORBIT
LIFETIME
CREW SIZE
EXPERIMENTS
POWER MODULE DISPOSAL-
REACTOR SHIELD-
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT •
INTERFACING VEHICLES
ZERO-G AND ARTIFICIAL G 10M (33 FT)
DIA MODULES. POWER MODULES ON
EXTENDABLE BOOMS OF ZERO-G CORE.
100 KWe
2-ZH REACTOR-BRAYTON POWER
MODULES, EACH WITH 330 KWT (50 KWE)
NOMINAL RATING EMERGENCY OPERATION
- 600 KWT EACH
SATURN INT-21, KICKSTAGE AND SPACE
SHUTTLE
SPACE SHUTTLE AND SPACE TUG
46° LAUNCH AZIMUTH FROM KSC,
EURASIAN OVERFLY
500 KM (273 NM) 55° OR 30° INCLINATION
ALTERNATE
10 YEAR-MISSION, 5 YEAR-REACTOR
DURATION, 2.5 YEARS-POWER CONVER-
SION SYSTEM
50 (NOMINAL) WITH 90 TO 180 DAY CREW
ROTATION
MUTIDISCIPLINED ON-BOARD AND FREE
FLYING SUBSATELLITE PROGRAM
BOOST BY INTEGRAL DISPOSAL SYSTEM
TO 990 KM HIGH ALTITUDE ORBIT
SHAPED 47T LITHIUM HYDRIDE NEUTRON
SHIELD, TUNGSTEN GAMMA SHIELD
1 MREM/HR MAX. FROM REACTORS PLUS
NATURAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
SUBSATELLITES, SPACE SHUTTLE, TUG,
RNS, OPSD.
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Table 3-1 Space Base Program Nuclear Sources
Nuclear Sources Remarks
Baseline Reactor(s)
Radioactive Tracers
X-Ray Equipment
Natural Environment
Space Base
Nuclear Shuttle (Interfacing Vehicle)
Orbital Propellant Depot (Interfacing Vehicle)
Experiment Laboratories (On-Board)
Experiment Laboratories (On-Board)
Earth Trapped/ Cosmic Radiation, Solar Flare
Potential
Additions
Isotope Brayton Power
Radioisojet Thrusters
Isotope Heated Waste
Management System
Back-up Electrical Power Candidate (On-Board)
Orbit Adjust System (On-Board)
Advanced Technology Experiment and/ or
Operational System (On-Board)
3.2.2.1 Electrical Power System
The primary Electrical Power System of the Space Base is required to provide lOOkWe. The
Electrical Power System includes the Reactor/Brayton Cycle energy conversion equipment,
reactor disposal equipment, associated power conditioning equipment, radiators, thermal
shrouds and back-up electrical power supply. With the exception of the power distribution
equipment and the back-up power supply the electrical power system is packaged in two
separate "power modules" located at the end of ;extendable booms approximately 60 meters
from the habitable Space Base core modules.
Figure 3-3 shows the Reactor Power Module configuration used in the study analyses.
Figure 3-4 shows the schematic of the Brayton cycle energy conversion equipment and
indicates the cycle characteristics (temperature, power level, coolant, etc.). The reactor
thermal power level during operation is one of the most important characteristics of the
energy conversion system since this parameter affects the shielding required, coolant
activation and fission product inventory. For this analyses it has been assumed that each
reactor normally operates at 330 kWt to provide 50 kWe from each module. It has also been
assumed that an alternate (contingency) power mode is available whereby a single reactor is
3-5
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operated at 600 kWt, producing the total electrical requirement of 100 kWe for short periods.
This mode could be utilized when one reactor had been shut down for replacement or main-
tenance (Reference 3-2).
A more detailed description of the Reactor Power Module, its Brayton cycle energy conversion
system and disposal system can be found in Volume HI, Part 1. The characteristics of the
nuclear hazards associated withthe reactor power modules are discussed in Section 3. 8.2 of
this Volume. Consideration of Reactor Power Module maintenance and repair, and disposal
techniques are found in Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4.
The back-up electrical power subsystems considered include solar cell and fuel cell energy
conversion. The possibility of using an isotope-Brayton power system is also considered in
this study (Reference 3-3 and 3-4).
/
3.2.2.2 Other Systems
The other systems of the Space Base are not defined in detail in this section because they do
not contain large nuclear sources but are of interest due to the effects radiation has on their
V
operation during the mission.
Table 3-2 shows the nomenclature adopted for designation of the Space Base systems and the
corresponding nomenclature used in the Phase A design definition studies (References 3-1
and 3-2). This nomenclature is used in referring to the respective systems/ subsystems
for evaluation of radiation exposure sensitivity in Section 4, and in establishing design,
operational and procedural considerations in Section 6. Section 4.3 contains a breakdown
of generic components associated with each subsystem. Appendix A of this Volume,
"Radiation Exposure Limts," contains a further discussion of system and subsystem components.
3.3 EXPERIMENT PROGRAM
The experiment program used in the analyses is based primarily on Reference 3-5 and is
supplemented with data from Reference 3-6. These experiments are considered representative
of the types of endeavors that would be undertaken in the various scientific disciplines associated
3-8
Table 3-2. Equivalent System Nomenclature
Reference System
Nomenclature
Electrical Power
Environmental Control
Communications and
Data Management
Navigation and Control
Protection
Docking
NAR Nomenclature
• Electrical Power
• Environmental Control and
Life Support
• Information
• Guidance and Control
• Propulsion and Reaction
Control
• Crew and Habitability
• Environmental Protection
• Docking
MDAC Nomenclature
• Electrical Power
• Environmental Control and
Life Support
• Communications
• Data Management
• On-Board Checkout
• Stabilization and Attitude Control
• Guidance and Navigation
• Propulsion
• Crew Habitability and
Protection
• Mechanical
with a Space Base program. Information concerning radiological hazard sources within the
detached experiment modules and the on-board experiment laboratory is contained in Sections
3. 8.3.3 and 3. 8.4, respectively.
3.4 SPACE BASE CREW
The nominal Space Base configuration described in Section 3.2 is capable of accommodating
48 to 60 crewmen. The nominal tour of duty is 90 to 180 days. Crew rotation of up to 12
months as affected by radiological considerations is treated parametrically in the analysis of
Sections 6.3.1.2 of this Volume.
3.5 INTERFACING VEHICLES
Figure 3-5 illustrates the mission interrelationships of the interfacing vehicles with the
Space Base and other space programs.
3.5.1 SPACE TUG
The Space Tug interfaces with all vehicles in the Space Base program. Although the Space Tug
contains no nuclear sources, it is a candidate vehicle to assist in reactor disposal and replace-
ment (see Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4) and in deployment of nuclear hardware delivered by the
Space Shuttle. A preliminary defintion of a representative Tug configuration and operation
can be found in Reference 3-7. 3-9
3-10
3 5.2 SPACE SHUTTLE
The Space Shuttle is the logistic vehicle for the Space Base. In this capacity it may be
employed to deliver replacement reactor power modules and dispose of spent modules. The
shuttle will also serve as a means for disposal of isotope systems during End-of-Mission
Operations. The nuclear safety implications of these Shuttle missions are addressed in
Volume IV. References 3-8 and 3-9 describe candidate Shuttle configurations and operations.
3 5 . 3 REUSABLE NUCLEAR SHUTTLE
The Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS) is the logistic vehicle which could service other space
facilities from earth orbit such as the Lunar Orbiting Space Station. It may also serve as the
propulsion system for interplanetary missions. A Space Base could provide an orbital support
facility for RNS payload assembly and maintenance operations. The RNS (Reference 3-10)
is powered by a Nerva nuclear rocket engine and is therefore a potential radiation source when
in the vicinity of the Space Base. (See Section 3. 8.3.)
354 ORBITAL PROPELLANT STORAGE DEPOT
The Orbital Propellant Storage Depot (OPSD) may be required to store propellant to service
the RNS and other vehicles. Although definition of this vehicle is not complete, it is presumed
that one of the concepts employs a nuclear reactor in its Electrical Power System. Therefore, ,-t
the OPSD represents a potential nuclear source to be considered. (See Section 3. 8. 3.)
3.5.5 DETACHED EXPERIMENT MODULES
Detached Experiment Modules carry experiment equipment which must be located away from
the Space Base due to such considerations as stringent stability requirements, the need to
achieve an unobstructed view of space or avoidance of Space Base effluents and Space Base
interactions. An additional consideration is the sensitivity of these experiments to the
radiation environment created by the Space Base (See Section 6. 3.1.4.) Such "free flying"
modules may serve several of the Space Base experiment disciplines and may vary considerably
in electrical power requirements (Reference 3-11). The reference power supply for these
vehicles is the solar array; however, radioisotope generators have been considered as
candidate power sources for some applications and would represent an additional radiation
source associated with the Space Base Program. (See Section 3. 8. 3.)
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3.6 LAUNCH FACILITY
i
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Launch Complex 39, is the reference launch facility
(Reference 3-12) which is assumed to include the Industrial Area, the Vehicle Assembly Building,
Launch Pad A and B and supporting facilities and servicing equipment.
3.7 SPACE BASE PROGRAM MISSION
The Space Base program mission is defined to begin with the arrival of the flight hardware at
the launch facility and culminates with the disposal of the program nuclear hardware at its end
of life or completion of the Space Base mission.
3 7 . 1 LAUNCH/ TRAJECTORY/ ORBIT PARAMETERS
The launch vehicle for Space Base modules is the INT-21 (a two stage Saturn V with a modified
instrumentation unit). Both direct ascent and Hohman transfer techniques have been considered
for final orbit insertion. Table 3-3 shows the launch and orbit parameters for candidate orbits.
The mission orbit inclination is 55 degrees. An alternate orbit of 30 degrees inclination is
also considered to indicate the variation in the natural radiation environment with inclination.
(See Section 3. 8.1.)
3.7.2 MISSION PHASES
In order to evaluate the varied conditions and operations of the Space Base program, four
mission phases have been defined, as shown in Table 3-4. Each phase has been broken down
into appropriate subphases and operations. Appendix B of this volume presents a detailed
description of the various phases. The following sections identify the major assumptions or
conditions of each phase.
Table 3-3. Launch and Orbit Parameters
Altitude
Inclination
Launch Azimuth
Launch Complex
Hohman Parking Orbit
Mission Orbit
500 km (273 nm)
50°
Possible 46° (TBD)
KSC
185 x 500 km
(100 x 273 nm)
Alternate Orbit
500 km (273 nm)
30°
77° to 103°
KSC
185 x 500 km
(100 x 273 nm)
3-12
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3 7.2.1 Prelaunch
The Prelaunch Phase encompasses the period from arrival of the flight hardware at the launch
facility through to completion of the countdown which terminates in initiation of first stage
boost. In evaluating radiological hazards associated with a reactor it is important to know the
reactor operating history prior to receipt at the launch complex. This history determines the
radiation field around the reactor and the fission product inventory. For this study it is assumed
that operation of the reactor is restricted to low level criticality checks such that total energy
release is approximately 30 kW-hour at a thermal power level of about 100 watts. Section 3. 8.2
further discusses the radiological characteristics of the reactor after low level criticality
checks.
3.7.2.2 Launch/Ascent
The Launch/ Ascent Phase is assumed to cover that period from the initiation of the first stage
boost, through rendezvous and docking with the Space Base. Vehicles which rendezvous with
an operational Space Base will be exposed to radiation from the Reactor Power Modules. In
order to assess the potential degree of radiation exposure (integrated dose), it is necessary to
know the approach path and the velocity relative to the Space Base as a function of position
from the final docking area. Figure 3-6 shows the normal terminal rendezvous braking gates
used in this study (Reference 3-1). These gates are assumed to apply to all vehicles which
I
dock with the Space Base as previously discussed in Section 3.5.
3.7.2.3 Orbital Operations
The Orbital Operations Phase begins with the build-up of the Space Base, continues through
attainment of full operating potential and terminates at the close-out of the Space Base.
During this phase the Space Base operations are carried out which implement the experiment
program, maintain operational capability and support activities with other programs (e. g.,
interplanetary, lunar space station, etc.). This orbital operations phase covers a period of
approximately 10 years. During this time it will be necessary to replace the reactor power
modules and periodically resupply expendables, update prime hardware and rotate the crew.
Reactor replacement is assumed to be required after five years of operation at the 330 kWt power
level. Space Shuttles will provide the necessary logistic support.
3-14
= 460M (1500 FT) TARGET ORBIT
r = 150M (500 FT)4
r = 1830M (6000 FT)
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4 (10 FT/SEC)
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Figure 3-6. Terminal Rendezvous Braking Gates
3.7.2.4 End-of-Mission
The End-of-Mission Phase deals with shut-down of the Space Base facility and/ or disposal
or recovery of nuclear hardware. Disposal and/or recovery of the reactor power modules
and the isotope sources are the prime considerations in this study.
The prime power module disposal technique employed in the study is boosting the power module
to a long-life, earth orbit. Reactor power module disposal is discussed in Section 7.3.4.
The handling of isotopes is treated in Section 7.3.2.
3.8 RADIOLOGICAL SOURCE CHARACTERISTICS
Major sources of radiation associated with a Space Base program as shown previously in
Table 3-1 eminate from: (1) The Natural Environment, (2) The Space Base (Reactor) Power
Modules, (3) Interfacing Vehicles, and (4) Experiment Laboratories within the Space Base.
The following sections define the source characteristics used in Section 6.3 to evaluate
3-15
biological exposure, subsystem and equipment degradation, and experiment interferences.
The natural environment data is presented for the reference 55 degree inclination orbit.
Section 3.8.1.4 discusses the variation that would be encountered at the 30 degree inclination
orbit.
3.8.1 NATURAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
The natural radiation environment encountered in the 55 degree inclination orbit is due primarily
to geomagnetically trapped protons and electrons, galactic cosmic radiation and solar flares.
Note: Although natural environment data in precisely the reference orbit altitude was not
always available in the literature, the data utilized in the study is within 15 km of reference
altitudes and introduces negligible error.
3.8.1.1 Biological Exposure
Figure 3-7 shows the combined daily radiation dose rate as a function of the vehicle cylindrical
wall thickness due to the combination of geomagnetically trapped protons, electrons, and
galactic cosmic radiation (Reference 3-13). This is the averaged hourly dose rate that would
be experienced continuously by the crew and biological specimens while on board the Space
Base. The averaged rate includes the contribution from the geomagnetically trapped radiation
in the South Atlantic Anomoly where the peak flux could be as high as 36 rem/hour. The
galactic cosmic radiation contribution is considered a constant, and not a function of cylinder
wall thickness, since the shielded dose including secondary radiation, is small compared to
the geomagnetically trapped radiation (Reference 3-14).
/
Figure 3-8 shows the expected dose again as a function of cylinder wall thickness, from a
single solar flare event. These events may last from a few hours to several days with peak
intensities of~ 3 rem/hour. The model for solar flare event occurrence is shown in Figure 3-9.
Both of these figures are derived from Reference 3-13. A crewman performing EVA without
2
the added protection of the nominal 1.6 g/cm wall thickness would experience dose rates to the
skin at least a factor of 2 higher. Reference should be made to Section 6.3.1.2 for an analysis
of this situation.
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Figure 3-9. Expected Number of Major Solar Particle Events Versus Mission Duration
3.8 1.2 Subsystem Exposure
Table 3-4 shows the environment to which subsystems and equipments would be exposed. The
2
data is presented in units of equivalent 1 Mev neutrons/ cm and rads ionization dose. The
neutron dose level given for the natural radiation environment is actually the "equivalent 1 Mev
neutron dose", which would cause the same,damage as the actual electron, proton and alpha-
particle environments encountered. These equivalent doses were developed using the relative
damage effects characteristics discussed in Section A. 2 of Appendix A.
3.8.1.3 Experiment Exposure
f A radiation flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the experiment signal-to-noise ratio
at maximum sensitivity for electronic detectors) causes noticeable dynamic interference (data
degradation) in space experiments. Threshold damage was assumed to occur when a signal-to-
noise ratio of 10 to 1 was encountered. Doses above some threshold similarly cause permanent
damage, however, the threshold for dynamic interference is usually the limiting factor.
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Evaluation of dynamic interference in the experiment program due to earth trapped radiation,
was based on the flux contours in Reference 3-15 (See Section 6.3.1.4), Table 3-5 shows
the particle fluxes associated with the solar flare events and galactic cosmic radiation.
3.8.1.4 Alternate Orbit Inclination Effects
The alternate 30 degree inclination orbit will present a somewhat different radiation environment
due primarily to the characteristics of the earth magnetic field encountered at this inclination.
In relation to the 55 degree inclination orbit, the trapped proton component will decrease by as
much as 50 percent while the trapped electron component will increase. Also the galactic
cosmic radiation component will be reduced to approximately 1/3 of the 55 degree inclination
dose rate (Reference 3-14).
Of major significance, however, is the fact that for the orbit altitude considered (500 km),
the solar flare environment is essentially negligible at the 30 degree inclination because of the
shielding provided by the geomagentic field (Reference 3-14).
Table 3-4. Equivalent 1 Mev Neutron and lomzation Doses from Natural
Radiation Environments
Radiation Dose Equivalent Radiation Dose
1 g/ cm Shielding 10 g/ cm Shielding
Equivalent 1 Mev Neutrons/ cm
Geomagnetically Trapped
Solar Flare Events
Rads, lomzation
Geomagnetically Trapped
Solar Flare Events
Galactic Cosmic Ray
g
7 x 10 /year
10 ,4.2 x 10 /10 years
(4.2 x!09/year)
2,4.8 x 10 /year
2 ,7.68 x 10 /10 years
(7.68 x loVyear)
3/ year
9,2 x 10 /year
Q
5.4 x 10 / 10 years
(5.4x lOYyear)
4.8 x 10 /year
4.8 x 10 /10 years
(4. 8/year)
3/ year
Note- 472 km (255 nm) 55° inclination
circular orbit
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Table 3-5. Particle Flux From Galactic Cosmic Radiation
and Solar Particle Events
Radiation Source
Galactic Cosmic Radiation
Peak Solar Particle Event
Particle Flux
2
2.5 - 5 particles/cm -sec
with energy >100 Mev
4 22 x 10 protons/cm -sec
with energy > 30 Mev
Note:
472 km (255 nm) 55°
inclination circular orbit
(Reference 3-13)
3.8.2 SPACE BASE REACTOR POWER MODULE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
The reactor power modules represent a source of gamma photon raditaion when shut down
(or prior to full power operation) due to accumulated fission product inventory and activation
of the NaK coolant in the primary loop (Section 3.2.2 I). During operation, the reactors are
primarily sources of both gamma photons and neutrons due to the fission process, as well as
gamma photons from the activated NaK coolant. The reactor is surrounded by a shield to
attenuate the radiation.
3.8.2.1 Reactor/Shield Configuration
Figure 3rlO shows the shaped 47T reactor shield configuration generated by Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (Reference 3-16) in accordance with the shielding requirements (References 3-1
and 3-2). The neutron shield consists of a maximum of 79 cm of lithium hydride at the forward
portion of the shield (a. =0°) tapering to 56 cm at the rear of the shild (a = 180°). The gamma
shielding consists of a maximum of 16 cm of tungsten at a = 0° tapering to 8.5 cm at a = 180°.
As shown in Figure 3-10, the Lithium Hydride and Tungsten are arranged in alternate layers.
3.8.2.2 Radiation Environment at Operating Power Levels
The dose rate distribution around each reactor is shown in Figure 3-11 (Reference 3-17) for
normal operation at 330 kWt.
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Figure 3-10. Reactor - Shield Configuration
It should be noted that the dose rates from this reactor shield configuration are considerably
less than from other manned space reactor shield configurations such as the Space Station
shield (Reference 3-18) especially at view angles greater than 30 degrees. (For example,
the dose rate at 90 degrees is approximately 1/1000 the dose from the Space Station reactor
shield configuration.) Scattered radiation from the power module radiator and the adjacent
power module is negligible when employing a shield (Figure 3-10) of the Space Base con-
figuration as shown in Figure 3-3.
3.8.2.2.1 Biological Exposure
Figure 3-12 shows isodose plots in the vicinity of the Space Base for the condition where both
reactors are operating at the nominal 330 kWt power level. The dose rate over the habitable
area of the base ranges from 0 3 to 1.0 mrem/hour. The dose rate, both internal and
external to the Space Base is essentially equal since the vehicle structure provides negligible
shielding for gamma rays and neutrons.
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3.8.2.2.2 Subsystem Exposure
Table 3-6 shows the equivalent environments due to both reactors to which Space Base Program
subsystems and equipments will be exposed. (See Section 4. 0 and Appendix A.) The positions
at the outer line of the Base core modules with £ = ±30° cover the habitable portion of the Space
Base vehicle Doses within the ±30° subtended angle at a specified distance from the reference
point are equal. The doses at j9 = 180° include the contribution from the activated coolant in
the primary loop gallery. (See Figure 3-10.)
3.8.2.2.3 Experiment Exposure
Figures 3-13 and 3-14 indicate the shielded reactor flux spectra while operating at 330 kWt.
(Reference 3-19). Experiment sensitivity is dependent on quantity and energy levels of the
radiation emitted. Figure 3-13 shows the flux spectra within the subtended ±30° angle whereas
the flux spectra 61m (200 ft) away from the reactor power module and 180° from the Space
Base centerlme is shown in Figure 3-14. The latter figure includes the contribution from the
reactor as well as the activated NaK coolant in the gallery primary loop.
Table 3-6. Equivalent 1 Mev Neutron and lonization Doses from Space
Base Reactor Power Modules
Position
£
ft ~ ±30°
at 61 m (200 ft)
at 107 m (350 ft)
li - 180°, 61 m (200 ft)
Equivalent 1 Mev
Neutron Dose
1 Mev n/cm2-Year
1 x 10
3.5x10°
lonization Dose
Rads/year
8
2.5
l .Sx lO 3
61 m
(20Q ft)
i
PT \
1^
61 in ^
(200 ft) \
1 \
•^
ft = 180°
W/
J^+30°
1 JL N
— • \107 m -— -H-^(350 ft) •
* •
SPACE BASE
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3.8.2.3 Radiation Environment for Preoperation and Accident Modes
3.8.2.3.1 Preoperation
A ZrH thermal reactor presents a negligible fission product inventory prior to testing and
operation. The assumption was made that preoperation low power criticality tests will be
limited to 100 watt operation for a maximum of 12 days (~ 30 kW/hour). Based on this mode
of operation, Table 3-7 shows the gamma dose rates immediately after shutdown. Actual
dose rates during prelaunch activities (several days after shutdown) would be lower due to
the decay of fission products in the core. Figure 3-15 shows the potential fission product
inventories and associated body dose that could be released from a damaged reactor as a
function of time after low power testr
10
10
10
,.-1
10
-3
,,-4
10.-6
-7
10
10
-8
1 YEAR
NATURAL BACKGROUND
AT SHUTDOWN
(100W 12 DAYS)
354 CURIES
AT SHUTDOWN
(1W 24 HR)
3 3 CURIES
-4 WEEKS
AFTER SHUT
DOWN 0 004
CURIES
8 WEEKS
AFTER SHUTDOWN
2 17 CURIES
1 WEEK
0 01 CURIES
I I I I J
10 -i 10 1010 10 10
DOWNWIND DISTANCE - KM
Figure 3-15. Total Body Dose and Fission Products from Damaged Reactor
3.8.2.3.2 Excursion
The radiological characteristics of a reactor excursion are dependent on the fission product
inventory within the core and the size of the excursion. Based on ZrH reactor design and
SNAPTRAN tests (Reference 3-20) it was assumed that a worst case excursion could produce
3-26
an energy equivalent of up to 100 MW-sec. This occurrence is characterized by a prompt
gamma and neutron dose and a fission product dispersion. The prompt unshielded dose as
a function of distance from the excursion is shown in Figure 3-16. The fission product
dispersion from such an excursion is quite limited in area. The envelope of isopleth areas,
with radiation levels above the normal yearly background levels of 0.15 rem are confined to
within 5 km (3 miles) from the excursion.
ioo,ooor
NO SHIELD
CLEAN CORE
100 MW-SEC
100 200 300 400 500
DISTANCE, METERS
600 700 800
Figure 3-16. Integrated Prompt Dose from Reactor Excursion
3.8.2.3.3 Criticality and Quasi-Steady State Operation
Inadvertent reactor criticality and quasi-steady state operation are also potential hazards.
The prime mechanisms which could lead to such events with the ZrH reactor are control drum
rotation and/ or core moderation due to the presence or injection of sufficient amounts of
hydrogeneous material. In these cases, the radiation levels will be relatively low due to the
low power level of the reactor during quasi-steady state operation, and/or the presence of
the shield or equivalent shielding material. The dose rates from a reactor during quasi-
steady state operation is shown in Table 3-8.
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3.8.3 INTERFACING VEHICLES
Three interfacing vehicles may carry radioactive sources: the Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS),
Hie Orbital Propellant Storage Depot (OPSD), and Detached Experiment Modules (See Section 3. 5).
3.8.3.1 Reusable Nuclear Shuttle
The RNS is powered by the NERVA engine which incorporates a nuclear reactor (Reference 3-10).
Two operating modes are of interest: (1) The nuclear shuttle thrusting, i.e., the reactor
operating, and (2) The engine shutdown after thrusting.
Figure 3-17 'Shows the biological exposure dose rate at a separation distance of 30 m from an
operating (thrusting) RNS at a nominal power level of 1575 MWt. The marked decrease in
dose rate as the view angle approaches zero, reflects the shielding on-board the RNS provided
for the crew and payload. The dose rate from the shutdown RNS as a function of time after
shutdown is shown in Figure 3-18. The effect of view angle on the dose rate is presented in
Figure 3-19.
Table 3-9 shows the operating RNS particle fluxes used to evaluate subsystem degradation and
experiment dynamic interference. The flux data for a shutdown RNS reactor as a function of
time after shutdown, is shown in Figure 3-20.
Table 3-9. Particle Fluxes from the RNS at 30m (100 ft) Separation Distance
r-\
rVV>
/
Zi.
/30 m
/
View
Angle
30°
90°
180°
Equivalent 1 Mev
2
cm -sec
1.22 x 10
1.14 x 10
1.47 x 10
Neutron Flux
n/cm -sec
>1 Mev
6.2 xlO9
5.9x 1010
7.6xl010
Photon Flux
2
Photon/cm -sec
>1 Mev
6.4 x 1010
3.2 x 1011
l.SxlO11
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3.8.3.2 Orbital Propellant Storage Depot (OPSD)
Since the power system for this vehicle is not yet defined, it has been assumed that it employs
a Zirconium Hydride thermal reactor with characteristics similar to those employed in the
Space Base Power Modules.
3.8.3.3 Detached Experiment Modules
The detached experiment module power requirements range from approximately 2 kWe to as
high as 7.5 kWe. The reference power system selected to meet this range of requirements
is a solar array/Ni-Cd battery system (References 3-11 and 3-21).
Consideration has been given to using an array of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
(RTG) (Reference 3-22) to supply the lower power levels ~ 2kWe, and an Isotope-Brayton
Power System (Reference 3-23) to achieve the higher power levels ~ 7.5 kWe.
3.8.3.3.1 Isotope Heat Sources
Current isotope heat source concepts for experiment module power systems use plutonium-238
or curium-244 in various fuel forms. Heating from these isotopes is due primarily to alpha
particle decay and absorption in the fuel and fuel capsule. The radiation field produced by
these sources consists of the more penetrating particles, gammas and neutrons. The
specific nature of this field is determined by the shielding required by, and incorporated in
the actual designs for this application. Table 3-10 identifies characteristics of some of the
isotopes which may be used in future heat source applications.
Typical radiation environments associated with several Pu-238 heat sources are shown in
Table 3-11. The radiation dose rate as a function of distance from the center of the radiating
surface of an unshielded depleted Pu-238 large heat source is shown in Figure 3-21.
3.8.4 EXPERIMENT LABORATORIES
The specific radiological sources associated with the Space Base experiment laboratories are
not yet defined. The generic types of equipment may, however, be grouped into three
categories: (1) Dynamic generators such as x-ray machines, ion beams, lasers, etc.,
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ISOTOPE REENTRY VEHICLE
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT(MREI\YHR.)-
S 678 9 10 II 12 13
SIDE-ON POSITION/ DISTANCE IN METERS
HEAT SOURCE
Figure 3-21. Isotope Reentry Vehicle Radiation Environment (mrem/ hour)
(2) Open isotope sources such as isotope tracers which could be used in the laboratories
without intrinsic containment, (3) Closed sources such as isotope capsules, used as particle
sources, heaters, etc., where the source is used in its own container.
Since the location, quantity, and type of these equipments are undefined in the Space Base
documentation (References 3-1 and 3-2) and also in the reference experiment program definition
(References 3-5 and 3-6) these radiological sources are treated in a qualitative manner with
respect to generic types of equipment. Section 7-3 treats considerations in the handling and
operation of these sources.
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4.1 GENERAL
In order to analyze and evaluate the effect of radiation on the Space Base program, a reference
set of exposure limits has been compiled. These limits indicate:
o Exposure established and recommended for crew, radiation workers and general
populace.
o Subsystem and equipment damage tresholds.
o Experiment degradation (dynamic interference) thresholds.
In compiling the exposure limits, effects of the various radiations from the nuclear sources
described in Section 3. 8 were considered. The limits are based on a broad literature search
and a comprehensive investigation of the types of materials, equipments and detectors likely
to be associated with a Space Base program. Appendix A contains the detailed nuclear radia-
tion exposure limits data and discussion including reference sources of data and a discussion
of relative effects. The following sections summarize the key exposure limits used in the
hazard evaluations of Sections 5 and 6.
4.2 PERSONNEL EXPOSURE LIMITS
The radiation exposure limits for personnel associated with the Space Base program have
been grouped according to those making up the flight crew of the Space Base and those in-
volved in ground support operation Exposure limit criteria for the general populace can be
found in Section 5 of this Volume and in Volume in of this report.
4. 2.1 SPACE BASE CREW
Table 4-1 shows the Radiation Exposure Limits for manned space flight (Reference 4-1 and
4-2). These data are based on Reference 4-3 which was subsequently amended to eliminate
the testes reference 'dose as a primary design criteria. The dose and dose rate limits apply
to all sources of exposure and therefore apply to natural as well as man-made sources of
radiation.
4-1
Table 4-1. Radiation Exposure Limits for Manned Space Flight
Reference 4-1, 4-2
Constraints in rem
1 yr. avg. daily rate
30 day max.
Quarterly max.
Yearly max.
Career limit
Bone
(5 cm)
0.2
25
35
75
400
Skin
(0. 1 mm)
0.6
75
105
225
1200
Eye
(3 mm)
0.3
37
52
112
600
2Testes
(3 cm)
0.1
13
18
38
200
1. May be allowed for two consecutive quarters followed by six months of restric-
tion from further exposure to maintain yearly limit.
2. These dose and dose rate limits are applicable only where the possibility of
oligospermia and temporary infertility are to be avoided. For most manned
space flights, the allowable exposure accumulation to the Germinal Epithelium
(3 cm) will be the subject of a risk/gain decision for the particular program,
mission, and individuals concerned.
Further discussion of radiobiological dose considerations on humans can be found in Appendix
A, Section A. 5.
4.2.2 GROUND SUPPORT PERSONNEL
*"
Table 4-2 indicates the dose limits for ground radiation workers. This data is based on re-
commendations by the Federal Radiation Council and the National Committee for Radiation
Protection (Reference 4-4 and 4-5). Additional detail on permissible concentrations of
various radionuclides is given in Appendix A, Section A. 5.
4.3 SUBSYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
The sensitivity of Space Base subsystems to the radiation environment can be discussed in
terms of effects on electronic components and effects on other spacecraft material. The ef-
fects on semiconductor electronics may be described in relation to two mechanisms: bulk
damage effect which is the disruption of the crystal lattice, and ionization effects which re-
sult from interactions of ionized gases with ionized semiconductor surface impurities. Other
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subsystem materials respond in different manners to radiation environments ranging from
loss of flexibility and outgassing in plastics to very insensitive materials to ionization such
as dry lubricants.
Three levels of damage have been defined as follows:
• Threshold damage—Specific effects occur which would likely require consideration
in design to insure proper operation.
• Moderate damage—Significant degradation of component performance occurs requir-
ing special design considerations.
• Severe damage—Operation seriously impaired, possibly requiring new design
approaches and/or use of different materials.
Table 4-2. Dose Limits for Ground Radiation Workers.
Currently in Use (10 CFR 20) Reference 4-4
Exposure
• WHOLE BODY - Head, trunk,
active blood forming organs,
gonads, lens of eye
• SKIN - of whole body
• HANDS - and forearms, feet
and ankles
Condition
Accumulated
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18 yr)
1.25
30.00
7.50
75.00
18.75
Recommended (NCRP-39) Jan. 15, 1971 Reference 4-5
Exposure
• WHOLE BODY
• SKIN
• HANDS, FEET & ANKLES
• FOREARMS
• OTHER ORGANS
Condition
Long Term
Accumulated
Year
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18 yr)
5/year
15
75
25
30
10
15
5
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Figure 4-1 and 4-2 show the subsystem and equipment damage thresholds for bulk damage
effects (normalized to equivalent 1 MeV neutron effects—see Appendix A, Section A. 2) and
ionization effects, respectively. The damage levels are based on the total integrated dose
received. In general, radiation dose rate effects are not considered to be of significance for
the anticipated radiation environments; an exception being the use of star trackers for navi-
gation and control. The threshold dose rate for such startrackers could be approximately one (1)
to 1000 rad/hr depending on the particular detector characteristics. Other components would
exhibit a tolerance to greater than a megarad/hr dose rate.
Section A. 2 of Appendix A specifies component sensitivity and comments on availability of data
and susceptibility to bulk effects or ionization effects.
4.4 EXPERIMENT EXPOSURE LIMITS
Experiments will use electronic and other equipment similar to that used to implement the
Space Base subsystems. Therefore, the exposure limits discussed in Section 4. 2 would
apply in evaluating their susceptibility to bulk damage and ionizing radiation. However, two
other types of radiation exposure must be considered for the experiment program. These
are (1) limits to the exposure of bioscience experiments and (2) data degradation (dynamic
interference) due to "noise" generated by radiation effects in particle sensitive equipment,
i. e., experiment interference.
4.4.1 BIOSCIENCE EXPEHIMENTS
In most cases organisms associated with the Space Base experiment program (see Section
3.3) are more resistant to radiation than man. This is particularly true of the invertebrates.
However, the stage of genetic development may have a pronounced effect on the sensitivity of
animals and plants to radiation. An example of an organism which exhibits a wide range of
resistance is the fruit fly. The adult fly has an LD_- , (dose required to kill 50 percent in5U-1
one day) of 60 to 200 kilorads depending on age. The LD50 of fruit fly eggs is less than 200
rads.
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Figure 4-3 illustrates the wide range of experiment sensitivity for specimens which may be
associated with the Space Base experiment program. As can be seen, the experiment objec-
tives and the condition of the specimen are particularly important in assessing sensitivity.
Additional data for specific specimens and biologically important compounds are contained
in Section A. 4 of Appendix A.
4. 4. 2 EXPERIMENT DYNAMIC INTERFERENCE
The term interference is explicitly meant to describe a rate-sensitive noise component which
degrades the results (data) of the experiment. Examples are airglow photometer saturation
(Reference 4-4) in the Van Allen belts and dynamic interference in sensitive gamma ray
spectrometers due to the use of on-board nuclear sources.
Figure 4-4 shows an example of the sensitivity of some of the experiments and instruments
associated with the astronomy discipline. The threshold particle flux that would cause inter-
ference is shown for each of the various particles (protons, p; electrons, e; gamma rays, y;
neutrons, n) which could be encountered. The permanent damage threshold is also indicated.
The dynamic interference threshold values indicate the radiation flux that would cause a noise
level of l/10th the maximum signal sensitivity for the experiment.
Selected environments may be superimposed on Figure 4-4 to illustrate an approach to evalu-
ating the sensitivity of the various experiments to the specific particle environment. This
technique is applied in Section 6. 3.1.4 where a discussion of the specific susceptibility of
the experiment program to the natural environment and the Space Base induced environment
is presented.
Section A. 3 of Appendix A presents a comprehensive discussion of the experiment program
sensitivity and details the approach to sensitivity evaluation including important assumptions
made.
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SECTION 5
NUCLEAR SAFETY IN MISSION
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
5.1 GENERAL
Operations associated with nuclear flight hardware and support equipment of future manned
space programs shall be safety implemented to minimize the risk to personnel and the
ecology and provide assurance of mission success. Nuclear safety at the launch and flight
support facilities can be provided through safety oriented planning and analysis of mission
operations followed by implementation of design, operational, and procedural safeguards
during the design and development phases of a program.
The largest nuclear hardware launched to date has been the 5 kWe SNAP-10A reactor from
the Western Test Range (WTR) and the 0.07 kWe SNAP-27 Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generator employed on recent Apollo flights from the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
As power requirements and mission durations increase, nuclear reactors of 25-100 kWe">
may be employed. The 50 kWe ZrH reactors used in this Space Base study are typical
of large nuclear powerplants of the future. Additional radiation sources on-board the Space
Base include X-ray equipment and small amounts of isotope tracers in the experiment
laboratories. Future missions may alsoemploy isotope heat sources for waste management,
reaction control and various experiment systems in addition to providing 10 to 25 kW of
electrical power.
This section is primarily concerned with the nuclear safety analysis and recommendations
to minimize or eliminate potential nuclear hazards associated with supporting operations
involved in the Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent and the End of Mission/Recovery Phases of a
mission. (Sections 6 and 7 contain the nuclear safety considerations for the orbital phase
of the mission.) Most of the supporting operations are performed at KSC. As the mission
progresses, the operations are spread to several locations around the world and the Mission
Control Center, but are reduced in scope due to the increased role assumed by the crew in
the operational phase. It must be recognized that logistic activities such as the replacement
5-1
and disposal/recovery of nuclear hardware again necessitate extensive launch center and
mission support.
Specific recommendations identified from the analysis of mission support operations form
the basis for guidelines and requirements specified in Volume V, Part 1, "Nuclear System
Safety Guidelines - Space Base Nuclear Safety".
5.2 PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS SUPPORT
The Prelaunch Phase of the mission provides extensive interfaces of nuclear hardware with
supporting personnel, facilities and other flight hardware at the launch complex. The
launch complex environment can be substantially different and in some cases more hostile
than that provided within a controlled nuclear facility. Adherence to procedures and imple-
mentation of safeguards for the protection of flight hardware, facilities and personnel are
required to assure a minimum impact on prelaunch operations and schedules.
The Prelaunch Phase starts with the arrival of the hardware at the KSC and terminates
with lift-off of the booster from the launch pad. A typical prelaunch ground flow plan is
presented in Figure 5-1. It should be noted that the reactor power module is shipped to
KSC, complete with the exception of disposal ordnance and rocket motors. The nuclear
hardware (power modules) arrive by air, truck, rail or barge and are immediately trans-
ported to a Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) designated for storage and checkout of nuclear
hardware. Only air or barge transportation is considered feasible with large power modules
(Figure 3-3), due to their size. Receiving inspection, checkout, subsystem and integration
tests and storage take place in the NAB. When ready for mating to the launch vehicle or
Space Base core modules, the reactor power module is moved from the NAB to the Vehicle
AssemblyBuilding (VAB) or the Launch Complex by transporter. After vehicle integration,
launch and range checks, and overall acceptance tests are complete, ordnance installation and
fuel loading are commenced; culminating in the terminal countdown and liftoff. The cycle
just described, exclusive of storage, is anticipated to require about 90 days. Storage
of specific nuclear hardware may be at least one year, replacement hardware necessitating
the longest shelf life, possibly up to 5 years.
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The principal facility and supporting system interfaces with mission nuclear hardware
during prelaunch operations are identified in Table 5-1. The nuclear safety interactions
and support involved during prelaunch operations are addressed in the analysis.
5.2.1 RADIATION HAZARDS
5.2.1.1 Isotopes
The principal nuclear radiation hazards during prelaunch emanate from reactor and isotopic
sources as defined in Section 3.
\
The most common hazards associated with the handling of isotopic heat sources are the
thermal environment and the nuclear radiation field around the source. Typical radiation
environments associated with several Pu-238 heat sources were shown in Table 3-H
Section 3. Adherence to safety regulations and operating procedures combined with proper
handling equipment can practically eliminate the risk to personnel and equipment. Poten-
tially serious, but relatively remote prelaunch hazards involved with isotope sources are
the release of fuel into the environment and the development of critical masses as a result
of prelaunch accidents. Key design features essential in the prevention of these hazards
include:
1. Cooling provisions - to lower capsule temperatures to prevent fuel clad ruptures
and reduce ignition potential.
.2. Packaging for storage - to prevent the assembly of a critical mass.
3. Shielding provisions - to reduce the radiation dose received by ground personnel.
4. Fuel capsule containment - to prevent release of fuel under all possible normal
and abort environments, and
5. Fragmentation shielding - to reduce fuel capsule rupture due to explosive accidents.
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The advancement of fuel capsule encapsulation and fabrication technology is vitally impor-
tant to isotope safety since the principal hazards result from the release of inhalable and
ingestible fuel in the form of fines of less than ty. The development of new and improved
fuel forms and refined encapsulation techniques combined with integral reentry materials
is currently being pursued by the Atomic EnergyCommission.
5.2.1.2 Reactors
The radiological hazard characteristics of a nuclear reactor can be quite different from
those of an isotope heat source (Reference Section 3). The performance of final assembly
and low power criticality checks prior to delivery to KSC permit pre-operational checks
of a relatively clean reactor in a low radiation environment during prelaunch activities.
This is due to the very low fission product inventory of the reactor prior to operation at
or near full power. Based on previous SNAP-8 and 10A reactor experience, it is reason-
able to assume that 100 to 1000 watt hours of operation is sufficient to verify control
drum operation, criticality margins and integrity of a flight reactor. Extensive engineer-
ing and qualification tests of non-flight reactors should be planned to verify conformance
with design and operational performance specifications. Based on 12 days operation at
100 watts, the worst case radiological hazards (see Section 3) exclusive of a reactor excur-
sion would result from a complete loss of vessel containment and would present a "safety
marginal" (Reference 5-1) hazard to personnel and hardware.
Reactor excursions can also present potential hazards. The detailed effects of excursions
on personnel are analyzed in Volume in, Parts 2 and 3. The mechanisms by which such an
event can occur appear to be remote. Based on ZrH reactor design and SNAPTRAN tests
it has been assumed that a "worst case" excursion during prelaunch could produce an energy
equivalent of up to 100 MW-sec (Reference 5-2). Radiological characteristics of such an
excursion are presented in Section 3. Where precautions, such as the implementation of
controlled r. cess areas are adhered to, the number of personnel affected would be very
low. Accidents of this nature would be categorized "safety marginal to critical".
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Inadvertent reactor criticality and quasi-steady-state operation are also potential hazards
during the prelaunch phase. Radiological characteristics of these conditions are presented
in Section 3. The radiation levels surrounding the reactor are considerably lower than those
associated with an excursion. However, the indefinite duration of a condition such as quasi-
steady-state operation requires that a means be provided to render safe a reactor in such a
condition. A "safety marginal" category has been assigned.
The implementation of safety design features, such as control drum lockout devices, pro-
tective containment, and the strict adherence to procedures will essentially eliminate inadver-
tent criticality accidents. The use of "render safe and hazard isolation" emergency teams can
provide additional nuclear safety during the prelaunch activities.
*
5.2.1.3 Other Hardware
Radiation hazards to personnel and equipment may emanate from other than the nuclear material
just discussed. The operation of X-ray sources, laser beams, and electro-magnetic radiation
emanating from telemetry equipment must be controlled and the proper warnings displayed. No
additional attention is given these devices in the prelaunch evaluation. For the most part, these
devices are radiation emitters only while operating and preventative operating procedures can
be applied effectively.
5.2.2 NON-NUCLEAR HAZARDS
Nuclear hardware operations involve not only nuclear hazards, but also several non-nuclear
hazards. Of particular interest during prelaunch are the thermal hazards associated with
isotope heat sources and the reactive and corrosive characteristics of liquid metals utilized
as coolants in reactor power modules.
5.2.2.1 Liquid Metal Hazards
What may prove to be a more difficult problem during prelaunch operations than the radiation
hazards of a reactor power module is the presence of rather significant quantities of liquid
metals within the coolant loops. A 330 kWt ZrH Brayton cycle power module employing a
liquid metal radiator contains a NaK-78 inventory of over 240 kg (530 Ib). Figure 5-2 illus-
trates the liquid metal loops of a typical ZrH Brayton Cycle power module. It is assumed
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that the complete reactor power module would be assembled before shipment to KSC. All
NaK loops would be filled before final acceptance tests at the factory and would remain filled
throughout all subsequent operations including all activities at KSC (Reference 5-3 and 5-4).
Prelaunch operations require special precautions and handling to prevent leaks, liquid metal
fires, corrosion and oxidation. The liquid metal, NaK-78, reacts with a number of metals,
gases and liquids, including water and oxygen (Reference 5-5). Opening and repairing of
coolant lines and heat exchangers containing liquid metal must only be accomplished in
closely controlled inert environments under strict procedures and regulations. At present,
major repair should be confined to the factory environment where adequate facilities are
available. In addition, special double containment design with an inert cover-gas environment
should be provided the power module where feasible, to prevent the presence of moisture
and other oxygen sources during prelaunch operations and possible failure conditions. Non-
liquid metal radiators should be considered where performance and configuration require-
ments permit. Where NaK is only used in the primary coolant loop, NaK quantities are
substantially reduced and provisions for double containment are simplified.
' iV^
Where liquid metal is present, it is mandatory that proper fire 'fighting equipment be provided. V
The normal fire extinguishers such as water, CO and carbon tetrachloride are incompatible
with liquid metal systems. Dispensing devices containing calcium carbonate, impregnated
sodium chloride or their equivalent must be provided (Reference 5-5). A thorough study and
experimental program is recommended to provide suitable substances and procedures in
suppressing liquid metal fires in the vicinity of booster/spacecraft combustibles and
propellants. Additional discussion concerning liquid metal handling and fire protection is
contained in Section 5.2.6.2.
5.2.2.2 Thermal Hazards
In general, ^actor power modules do not present potential thermal hazards prior to
operation. A discussion of the operational and post-operational thermal hazards is presented
in Section 6.3.1.
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Figure 5-2. Simplified Reactor Power Module NaK Loop Diagram
Isotopes differ from a reactor in that they are a continuous source of thermal radiation
energy as well as nuclear radiation. The thermal hazard is largely dependent on the
quantity and type of isotope and the inherent heat transfer characteristics associated with
packaging. The thermal output of several isotopes and heat sources is shown in Table 3-10
and 3-ll in Section 3-8. Equilibrium operating temperatures are on the order of 1500 K
(e. g., the Multi-Hundred Watt fuel capsule). However, most isotopes require cooling to
below 420 K (300 F) in the natural open air environment to prevent capsule corrosion and
reduce ignition potential of propellants such as hydrazine. Isotope sources with high surface
temperatures present a hazard to personnel and surrounding materials. Therefore, design,
handling and procedural provisions are required to reduce the potential hazards. Packaging
and handling of isotopes are discussed in Section 5.2.3.1.
5-10
5.2.3 PACKAGING, TRANSPORTING AND HANDLING '
The transporting and handling of nuclear hardware at the launch center can be simplified
with proper consideration given to design, packaging and shipping techniques at the point of
manufacture and final assembly.
Shipping containers must be designed in accordance with AEC Manual Chapter 0529, Safely
Standards for Packaging of Radioactive and Fissile Materials (Reference 5-6), and with the
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations in Volume 33, Number 194 of the Federal
Register (Reference 5-7). A DOT Special Permit must also be obtained for the shipment of
all nuclear material.
Shipping regulations classify NaK as "non-exempt flammable-solid. " As a result, the
transportation of NaK in interstate commerce by land or water is subject to the "Dangerous
Articles" regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Transportation of liquid
metals in civil aircraft is regulated by the FAA and is presently restricted to quantities of
11 kg (25 Ib) or less in non-passenger aircraft.
5.2.3.1 Isotopes
The shipment and storage requirements of isotope heat sources differ depending on their size
and heat source encapsulation technique. Radioisotopes continuously produce thermal energy
and their temperatures rise until equilibrium is reached with the external environment.
When sufficient isotope mass densities exist, a means of cooling is required (passively finned,
air circulation, flowing liquid, etc.). At prelaunch conditions, it is generally advisable to
keep capsule surface temperatures down below 420 K (300 F) to prevent capsule creep,
minimize ignition sources and simplify handling and accessibility. Recent capsult designs
employing refractory metal encapsulation necessitate the use of an inert gas environment to
prevent oxidation at elevated temperatures. In addition to the cooling and inert gas provisions,
container dc~';3i should also prevent critical mass accidents under all conceivable stacking
and packing situations.
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Two examples of shipping and storage techniques representing different approaches are
illustrated in Figures 5-3 and 5-4. Each provides for cooling, penetration protection to
prevent breaching the capsules and prevention of critical mass accidents from packing or
stacking of multiple units too close together. Figure 5-3 shows the handling and transportation
technique proposed in the analysis of the shipment of the Large Heat Source Brayton cycle
power system as defined in a recent study performed by NASA and the AEC (Reference 5-8).
A specially equipped railroad car was to be provided for the shipment of a number of
PuO fuel capsules. The final assembly of the capsules into the heat source would be done
^ \
in a Nuclear Assembly Building at KSC. Each shipping and storage container would hold
three fuel capsules with provisions for adequate separation distances for prevention of a
critical mass. Cooling units were provided on the railroad car to circulate cooling fluid
through the shipping containers. Such a system could also serve as a storage facility if the
need arose.
 f
Back-up electrical power systems for a Space Base or prime power systems for a 25 kWe
Space Station may utilize the Isotope Brayton power system. Particular attention should be
given to the technique just described.
Individual heat sources such as those provided for a potential waste management system
could be shipped and packaged similar to the procedure utilized in the SNAP-27 fuel capsule
containment shown in Figure 5-4. The SNAP-27 heat source was passively cooled within a
finned cask and like other heat sources, when integrated with the spacecraft, required pad
cooling to reduce ignition source potential.
Tracer isotopes used on a Space Base provide no significant radiological hazard, but
adequate protection must be given to insure against breakage and spillage. Double walled
containers and self sealing covers have potential application. Containers must be
appropriately marked and stored in isolated areas. The use and handling of liquid tracers
in the space environment is discussed in Section 7.3.2.
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The handling of individual isotope heat sources generally requires the use of long handled
tools to reduce the possibility of burns and minimize the radiation environment. Temporary
shields can further reduce radiation doses to workers involved in isotope assembly and pre-
launch operations. No standard universal procedures apply to all situations as the radiation
levels, allowable work times and thermal environments are dependent on fuel makeup and
238quantity. PuO fuel capsules are particularly adaptable to ground handling solutions.
Lt
However, when handling Curium-244 or other similar isotopes, additional precautions must be
observed as the radiation levels can be significantly higher. Under all circumstances
radiation monitoring and individual personnel dosimetry are required.
5.2.3.2 Reactor Power Modules
The packaging, transportation, storage and handling of reactor power modules will be quite
different from isotope systems. Assuming low power critical tests were performed several
weeks prior to shipment to the launch center, the normal reactor radiation and thermal
hazards at KSC are low. Cooling provisions and special radiation shields are not required.
However, considerable attention must be given to the safe handling of the liquid metal
coolant within the reactor and coolant loops. The transportation and prelaunch operations are
conducive to the development of liquid metal leaks which can conceivably lead to fires and
reactor power module damage. The principal and most effective safeguards that can be
provided involve safe and simplified handling techniques which incorporate maximum
environmental protection. Where design and performance requirements permit, non-liquid
mental coolant loops should be considered. Double containment of liquid metal loops can
greatly increase the environmental protection.
It is anticipated that the reactor power module will be shipped and completely loaded with
NaK-78 liquid metal coolant. This procedure does not necessarily eliminate the necessity
for a liquid ~"etai servicing facility at the launch center. Discharging and rendering safe a
leaking or damaged power module prior to shipment back to the point of manufacture may be
required. Further discussion regarding the requirements and use of such a facility at the
launch center is presented in Section 5.2.7.3.
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Transporting and handling of a power module is somewhat complicated due to the large size
and mass of the structure, and the desirability of continuous environmental protection. The
Space Base power modules are large structures approximately 6.6 m in diameter, 12 m in
length, comprising a mass of over 30 t (65 Klb) each. Most of foe mass is in the reactor
and shield which are located at one end of the module (see Figure 5-2). Vertical handling,
transporting and storing is preferred, but this mode requires a complex carrier vehicle,
facility and ground support equipment. Horizontal handling and transporting lessens the
impact on the carrier and facilities, but imposes rather severe structural requirements to
support the reactor and shield within the power module. An adaptation of the horizontal to
vertical erection technique used with the Titan H stages at the Eastern Test Range (ETR)
could be considered. Using this procedure, the power module would be shipped and checked
out in a horizontal cradle and erected vertically within the cradle prior to integration with
the launch vehicle at the launch site or within the VAB. (This cradle could also be used as, or
in conjunction with a "transfer module" recommended for use with the Space Shuttle in
Volume IV Part 1.)
Figure 5-5 illustrates the application of the horizontal to vertical technique incorporated into
an integral transportation trailer and storage container "transporter". The power module
would be supported by a transfer cradle within the transporter. The transfer cradle would
provide the added support required of the power module in the horizontal position and would
only be removed after vertical integration with the booster. The transporter must be equipped
to monitor radiation, humidity, temperature and pressure and must provide the necessary
inert cover gas environment, fire protection, alarms and warnings. Depending on the power
module size, the transporter would be used for transport by airplane, barge, rail and roadway.
It would also serve as the storage container and provide accessibility for checkout and
component assembly. A somewhat similar device has been successfully used by NASA in
transporting, handling and storing the NIMBUS spacecraft from the point of manufacture to
the launch complp-. The Air Force employs a similar technique in the transporting and
handling of the operational Minuteman missiles. The reduced handling and increased
environmental protection possible with the transporter concept provides significant safety
advantages.
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Table 5-2. Guidelines for Packaging, Transporting
and Handling Nuclear Hardware
GENERAL
• Provide shipping containers and procedures in accordance with AEC Manual, Chapter 0529 and The Department of Trans-
portation Regulations in Volume 33 No 194 of the Federal Register
• Provide personnel dosimetry and radiation monitoring wherever nuclear material is present
• Select routes to avoid heavily traveled and populated areas
• Provide escorts and warning devices during ransportation
• Use cross-trained personnel experienced in handling nuclear material
• Endure strict adherence to procedures, warnings and controlled access areas
• Provide secure tie-downs and proper positioning of nuclear hardware on transportation beds to prevent the compaction of fuel
into critical masses and possible separation from the carrier
o Provide emergency equipment and personnel who can quickly render safe and supervise the handling of damaged nuclear
hardware
REACTOR
• Consider provision of a modular reactor powerplant design by the addition of a separable heat exchanger in the primary loop
and a separable disposal package
• Consider vertical module stacking and mating
• Provide integral transport and storage containers which combine shock protection, environmental protection, status and
radiation monitoring, fire protection and bouyancy in a single unit
• Provide double containment of liquid metal components where feasible
• Provide control drum lock-out devices
• Minimize use of liquid metal coolant loops where design and performance requirements permit
• Provide special fire fighting capability for liquid metal systems
ISOTOPE
• Provide redundant and back-up cooling systems where auxilliary cooling is required
• Provide structural spacing to prevent criticality and provide container rigidity for penetration free containment
• Provide double wall containment for isotope tracers
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A somewhat different and practical solution to the transportation and handling problem is a
design which features separation of the reactor powerplant into modules which can be mated
(stacked) vertically on the booster. Three basic modules: (1) Reactor/Shield, (2) Radiator
and Power Conversion System, and (3) Disposal System, constitute the powerplant as shown
in Figure 5-6. This configuration requires a separable primary heat exchanger to avoid'
breaking into liquid metal lines during assembly or replacement. Transportation, handling
and environmental protection concepts can be simplified since the reactor and shield can be
separately packaged within a relatively small envelope. Therefore, the hazards associated
with the radiator and disposal systems would not affect the reactor during transportation
and initial prelaunch activities.
The separable heat exchanger also provides advantages for in-orbit reactor replacement and
disposal. Reactor disposal orbit lifetimes can be significantly increased (approximately a
factor of ten) by the separation of the reactor/shield from the rest of the system. The
increased orbital lifetimes resulting from a separation of the reactor/shield are discussed in
Section 7.3.4. The separable heat exchanger can be a significant design feature affecting
nuclear safety in prelaunch and orbital operations and should be given careful consideration
in future space reactor power module designs.
Accidents occurring during transportation could cause damage to the power module. Damage
to the control drum actuator system may cause inadvertent control drum rotation resulting
in a reactor criticality or excursion. Defined modes leading to criticality or an excursion
during transportation and handling are difficult to postulate; nevertheless, the potential
exists. The incorporation of a mechanical control drum locking device can prevent drum
rotation during transportation and handling and can also be applied in subsequent phases.
5.2.3.3 Packaging. Transporting and Handling Safety Considerations
The guidelines considered important to the safe packaging, transporting and handling of
nuclear hardware during prelaunch operations at the launch center are listed in Table 5-2.
These guidelines are also presented in Volume V, "Nuclear System Safety Guidelines".
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5.2.4 NUCLEAR STORAGE
The nuclear hardware would arrive at KSC
by the most appropriate carrier depending
on conditions and configuration at that time.
It should be transported directly to a
Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) which
also serves as a storage facility (see
Figure 5-7 and Section 5. 2. 7. 2). KSC
storage times of a few months to several
years may be required of isotope heat
sources and nuclear reactor power modules
in order to provide a replacement in-
orbit time of approximately 12 days. Nu-
clear hardware in storage should be held
in a state of readiness (1-2 days prepara-
tion time) for integration with the launch
vehicle. Due to potential scheduling diffi-
culties and the need for back-up systems,
INTERGRAL
REACTOR/SHIELD
RADIATOR& POWER
CONVERSION SYSTEM
DISPOSAL SYSTEM
Figure 5-6. Modular Concept
MODULAR
I
it is postulated that a maximum of three reactor power modules, several small isotope
heat sources and possibly an entire complement of fuel capsules for two large heat source
power systems may have to be stored at one time. Cooling, environmental control, and
anti-criticality spacing must be maintained. The reactor power modules could be stored
within the environmentally controlled transport trailers in the NAB. The NAB could also
be designed to provide isotope heat source storage capability. An ATMX Series 500 rail-
car, considered for use by the AEC for shipment of large heat source fuel capsules, could
be retained on a railroad siding adjacent to the NAB as a storage facility.
Routine airborne and surface radiation and contamination measurements must be made
while the nuclear hardware is in storage. A plutonium air monitor (RADECO model RAD-
221A or equivalent) whose selectivity detects the alphas emitted from plutonium-238 heat
sources is recommended, in addition to neutron and gamma dosimetry. Permanent radia-
tion monitors are also required and must be integrated with alarm systems.
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Periodic checkout and status monitoring of the nuclear hardware is advisable during stor-
age. Where feasible, consideration should be given to checkout/monitoring of systems
without removing environmental enclosures. The facility requirements and detailed radio-
logical monitoring requirements required during storage are discussed in Sections 5.2.7.1
and 5. 2. 7.2, respectively.
NUCLAR ASSEMBLY
BUILDING
AMTXRAILCAR
REACTOR POWER
MODULES
ISOTOPES
Figure 5-7. Nuclear Assembly Building Storage Operations
5.2.4.1 Nuclear Storage Safety Considerations
Table 5-3 summarizes the important considerations which should be applied in the safe
storage of nuclear hardware at the launch center.
5. 2. 5 PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS
The prelaunch operations described in this section include the principal receipt, assembly,
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Table 5-3. Guidelines for Storage of Nuclear Hardware
GENERAL
• Consider use of a nuclear assembly building as the prime storage facility
• Storage provisions must accommodate lifetimes of a few months to several years
• Segregated storage should be provided insofar as possible
• Storage should be provided in facilities equipped with adequate environmental control (low humidity, dry clean air, no water
collection on floor, no sprinklers)
• Provide fire protection compatible with nuclear material and liquid metal systems
• Provide routine radiation measurements
• Provide permanent radiation monitoring and alarm systems
e Provide periodic checkout and status monitoring capability while in storage
• Provide nuclear hardware readiness capability of 2 days
• Store ordnance and thrasters in a separate facility
REACTOR
• Consider storage of power modules in transporters within separated storage bays
ISOTOPE
• Store isotopes with proper anti-criticahty spacing provisions
a Consider use of shielded areas to minimize radiation in adjacent bays
• Provide redundant and or back-up cooling where auxilhary cooling is required
• Consider use of AMTX type railcars for back-up storage
checkout, integration and launch countdown activities associated with the nuclear hardware
at KSC. Reference is made to the general ground flow plan, Figure 5-1. Normal reactor
power module prelaunch operations are expected to comprise approximately 90 days.
However, replacement hardware should have a 10 to 12 day prelaunch timeline to minimize
down-time in orbit. The prime discussion is concerned with the reactor power modules.
x
The isotopes associated with the reference Space Base do not present significant nuclear
safety problems during prelaunch operations. However, consideration has been given to
nuclear safety of the larger quantities of isotope which could be employed on future missions
(e. g., Isotope Brayton Heat Source). The safety of the X-ray hardware has not been
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emphasized, as conventional techniques can be employed in the installation and test of
this equipment within the Space Base core module.
5.2.5.1 Nuclear Assembly Building Operations.
The principal prelaunch operations involved with nuclear hardware prior to integration
with the launch vehicle include:
• Receipt and Inspection
• Subsystem Checkout
• Assembly
• System and Integration Checks
• Storage
It is feasible that these operations could be accommodated within an existing KSC facility
such as the VAB, the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building or the Pyrotechnic Facility.
However, the nuclear and liquid metal hazards involved and the nuclear safety require-
ments such as segregated storage, controlled accessibility and special environmental
control dictate consideration of a separate and isolated nuclear facility.
For study purposes, the use of a Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) has been assumed.
A description of the typical requirements of such a facility are presented in Section 5.2. 7.2.
Actual checkout, assembly and test time for a typical reactor power module within this
facility is expected to comprise approximately 20-30 days.
5.2.5.1.1 Receipt and Inspection.
The power module would arrive at the NAB within a transporter. A comprehensive visual
inspection would be performed and recording instruments would be checked for shock,
vibration and environmental conditions - temperature, humidity, air chemical composition
and radiation. Shipping covers are opened or removed and an inspection made of the power
module for visual damage, fluid leaks, system integrity and cleanliness. Reactor control
5-23
safety devices are checked. Consideration should be given to the use of the Transporter
during all phases of inspection, checkout and storage; providing a universal piece of hard-
ware equipped with proper status and safety instrumentation and structural support. Pro-
vision must be made for the discharging and purging of the liquid metal loops outside the
confines of the NAB so that in case of a leak, the system could be safed for shipment to a
repair facility. After completion of receipt and inspection activities, the power module is
ready for systems checkout or short term storage. Purging the enclosure and replacement
of desicant material and filters should precede placement in storage. The radiation
hazards of a reactor power module during receipt and inspection operations are considered
"safety negligible" provided procedures are rigidly followed and environmental and control
drum safety features are incorporated.
•\
Receipt and inspection of isotopes consists primarily of investigation for shipping damage.
This can normally be accomplished by inspecting individual capsules for integrity, surface
defects and tolerances. Glove box inspection is required for refractory metal encapsulated
heat sources to prevent oxidation. In other instances, such as the technique employed for
the SNAP-27 fuel capsule, (Reference 5-9 and 5-10) handling receipt and inspection can be
accomplished in a clean open air environment. Smear (wipe) tests and air monitoring
must be performed prior to these operations. Strict adherence to procedures allow for
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- ' 'thV'safe handling*of isotopes. These procedure's include: (1) limiting the distances'and
time^an individual is allowed for observation, (2) stacking/packing limits to prevent criti-
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during all nuclear operations.
Where other than passive cooling is required, backup cooling systems must be provided.
The radiation and thermal hazards are dependent on the type of isotope fuel used. The
238
majority of heat sources being developed employ PuO isotope as fuel. The proposed
238Isotope Brayton backup power source would most likely consist of about 120 kg of PuO
£
(Reference 5-8). However, other isotope fuels offering performance advantages may be
employed. The safety program must be responsive to the nuclear material (isotope) that is
to be used.
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5. 2. 5.1. 2 Subsystem Checkout
Prior to integration with the launch vehicle
or placement in storage, a series of sub-
system verification tests would be per-
formed to assure the integrity and func-
tional operation of the power module.
Consideration should be given to the per-
formance of these tests with the power
module in the Transporter (Figure 5-8).
Semi-portable test equipment could be
employed, portions of which could be used
in the VAB and at the launch pad. Such
procedures reduce the need for additional
handling and ground support equipment
and minimize the possiblities of incurring
damage and leaks in liquid metal coolant
lines. The first series of tests consist
* < V > \
of electrical continuity checks of wiring
harnesses arid connectors and functional checks of all'monitoring circuits and subsystems
»
to the extent possible without activating the reactor control drum system. No mechanical
control drum lockouts are provided on the reference reactor. They should, however, be
considered a'prime ground safety feature arid be incorporated for these tests. (Control
drum'lockouts are also recommended,during orbital buildup and to assist in positive reactor
shutdown and disposal".) "''
CHECKOUT&
SUBSYSTEM
TESTS
Figure 5-8. Checkout and Subsystem Tests
During the second series of tests, the NaK and gas heat transfer coolant systems (reactor
primary loop'j intermediate loop, and radiator loops) should be circulated to verify
functioning of the PCS, valves and Electromagnetic (EM) pumps arid provide pressure
and'leak tests of all lines and connections. These tests are performed without reactor
power, possibly requiring the use of electrical heaters. Several of these electrical and
fluid system tests should be repeated every 6 months while a power module is in storage
as well as immediately upon removal from storage for flight.
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The third series of tests involves a check of reactor control drum and circuitry operation.
Control drum interlocks (if provided) would be temporarily removed. Provision for individual
removal of interlocks should be considered to prevent movement of more than one drum at a
time. Reactor control response and actuator and drum operation is verified by individually
stepping the drums one or two steps and then backing off to the full out position. The refer-
ence reactor does not provide a positive method of identifying control drum position, but
rather anticipates a step of the drum for each pulse sent. A possibility exists that a drum
could freeze or temporarily stick in a given position without the condition being detected
when operating or testing in the sub-critical region. This would be the case during the pre-
launch checks, where control drum position or correct movement and control could not be
ascertained. A means of detecting control drum position should be provided for ground
checkout, which would also increase the safety and control of reactor start-up and other re-
actor operations in orbit.
No criticality tests should be made at KSC, these having previously been successfully com-
pleted prior to shipment. Except during the checks of the control drums and circuitry, the
drum lockout devices must remain inserted at all times until initiation of the startup sequence
in orbit. Nuclear hazards during these subsystem checks are categorized "safety negligible"
if procedures and design considerations are followed.
With suitable containment (Section 5.2. 3.1), subsystem checks of isotope tracers would not
constitute a significant nuclear safety hazard. However checks of candidate isotope heat
sources require special precautions as discussed in the previous section to minimize radiation
to personnel and maintain adequate thermal protection.
5. 2. 5.1. 3 Assembly
The reference power module does not permit a separation of the radiator from the reactor/
shield at KSC. The Disposal System located at the extreme end of the power module, should
be designed to be shipped separately without its rocket motors and ordnance. This feature
would permit modular replacement in orbit and avoid bringing explosives into the NAB. The
Disposal System minus its rocket motors, would be assembled to the power module in the
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NAB for system integration tests. Assembly of special flight components and repair or
replacement of power conversion system hardware could take place at this time. The inert
cover gas environment for the power module can not be maintained for all tests within the
NAB. Special precautions should be taken to assure maximum environmental control of the
facility and the accessibility of liquid metal fire fighting equipment during operations when
liquid metal is 'present.
If the power module were to employ a separable heat exchanger, as discussed in Section
5.2.3.2, final assembly may best be performed at the time of integration with the launch
vehicle (either within the VAB or at the launch pad). This procedure would eliminate the
need for, and reduce the hazards involved in, the transport and handling of a large horizontal
or vertical stack, but would not permit a complete mechanical and electrical integration check
until mating with the launch vehicle. Inter-connecting cables and interface adapters/simulators
could be use for preliminary checks with the launch vehicle, but would not eliminate the need
for final integration tests with the launch vehicle on the Mobile Launcher.
The assembly of a large isotope heat source
(Figure 5-9) should be performed behind
a shielded facility segregated from the
reactor power module assembly area.
5. 2. 5.1. 4 System and Integration Checks
The power module would be given a series
of preliminary integration tests within the
NAB to assure mechanical and electrical
compatibility with the launch vehicle and
ground support equipment. Power module
system interface tests would be performed
during which simulated launch vehicle and
power module interface electrical signals
are sent, received and sequenced for
NAB ASSEMBLY
AREAS HEAT SOURCE
ASSEMBLY
Figure 5-9. Large Heat Source
Assembly Operations
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prelaunch and in-flight operation simulation.
Mechanical and electrical interfaces are
checked. Mating interface adapters are used
to check for surface roundness and attachment
compatibility (Figure 5-10). Electrical inter-
face checks include umbilical connections and
telemetry checks verifying ability to receive
and transmit on "up" and "down" links. These
activities will not present a significant radi-
ation hazard as long as nuclear safety regula-
tions are followed. A "safety negligible"
category has been assigned.
SIMULATED
INTERFACE
POWER
MODULE
At the completion of these tests, the power
module is readied for transport and integra-
tion with the launch vehicle or put in interim
storage. Preparation for transport includes
1) the safing of all ordnance and control sys-
tems, 2) preparation of protective shrouds, 3) purging and closing of the Transporter or
containment vessel, and 4) Transporter instrumentation checks.
Figure 5-10. Preliminary Interface
Integration
5. 2. 5.1. 5 Nuclear Assembly Building Operations Safety Considerations
Table 5-4 summarizes the important considerations which should be applied in the receipt,
inspection, and checkout activities of nuclear hardware at the launch center.
5. 2. 5. 2 Vehicle Assembly Building Operations
The principal operations within the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) high bay area are the
integration and combined systems tests of the launch vehicle stages, the nuclear payload and
support hardware (Figure 5-11).
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Table 5-4. Guidelines for Operations within the Nuclear Assembly Building
GENERAL
• Limit and regulate personnel activities in radiation areas
• Use proper handling tools and protective clothing
• Provide personnel doslmetry, permanent and portable radiation monitoring
• Employ two-man "buddy" system
• Provide multiple escape routes
• Maintain environmental control provisions insofar as possible
• Do not permit ordnance and disposal rocket motors within NAB facility
• Maintain liquid metal and nuclear fire fighting capability
• Perform mechanical and electrical interface checks prior to transport to the VAB or launch pad
• Provide adequate isolation (segregation) for checkout and storage of the various nudear hardware
REACTOR
• Consider use of universal transporter during inspection, checkout and storage
• Provide liquid metal purging and discharging capability outside confines of NAB
• Employ mechanical control drum lockout devices on reactor power modules
• Restrict control drum movement to a single drum during testing
• Provide means of sensing control drum position
• Consider use of separable heat exchangers to permit use of modular design
ISOTOPE
• Adhere to nuclear hardware packing limits and provide anti-crrticality containers
• Provide backup cooling systems for isotope heat sources
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Integration of the nuclear hardware includes mating to the launch vehicle, electrical and
mechanical compatibility checks and integration with ground support equipment. Prelimi-
nary checks would be conducted of control and telemetry links with the Range, Launch Con -
trol and Mission Control (Electromagnetic Interference tests are performed at the launch
pad to verify compatibility with power module and ordnance circuitry).
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The mating operation may prove to be the highest risk prior to launch, due to the potential
for NaK leaks being caused during handling. The use of a well designed horizontal to verti-
cal support cradle, which can be a part of a Transporter (shown previously in Figure 5-5),
would reduce the possibility of damage and can also provide environmental protection. Figure
5-12 illustrates two proposed horizontal to vertical lift techniques. Environmental cover
gas and purging capability would be switched from the portable system on the Transporter
to the Mobile Launcher after mating is achieved and service arm umbilicals are connected.
A modular design employing a separable heat exchanger allows the mating and stacking of
individual modules within the VAB or at the launch pad. A similar procedure would.be em-
ployed with an Isotope Brayton power system. An auxiliary coolant system is an important
element during these operations in maintaining the refractory metal heat source plate and
fuel capsules below 420 K. This unit can be transferred with the heat source to the mating/
integration level of the Mobile Launcher tower. The cooling system on the Mobile Launcher would
then be connected, the auxiliary coolant system serving as a back-up. The radiation levels
and thermal environment of a large heat source are such as to require the longer duration
manned operations to be performed several feet from the source or behind temporary shields.
Reference 5-8 should be consulted for additional details on these operations.
PROTECTS E CO\ER OR^HROID
(INERT GAS E N \ I R O N M E N T >
TRANSFER CRADLE
TRANSPORTER
POINT
\ERTICAL LIFT
HORIZONTM TO \ERT1CAL
Figure 5-12. Use of Transporter During Lift and Mating Operations
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Small isotope heat sources generally would not require extensive special operations. They
could be installed in the core modules within the assembly areas or in cases where the iso-
topes are readily accessible and not required for system checks - installation with ordnance
items is preferred. Auxiliary cooling systems within the core modules may be required
prior to in-orbit operations.
5. 2. 5. 2. 2 Combined Systems Tests
The combined systems tests in the VAB consist of flrst,an interface and systems status
check of the power module including umbilical disconnect and plug drop tests and secondly,
a simulated countdown, launch and flight readiness demonstration of the entire vehicle.
Only separation, command and control, telemetry and launch readiness go-no-go functions
are required of the power module. Control drum actuators are not activated and lockout
devices previously recommended should remain installed. The power module should re-
main within the environmental shroud. After completion of the tests, the entire vehicle is
prepared for transfer to the launch complex.
Two trade-off considerations have a direct bearing on VAB activities and are presented
below:
1. VAB Versus Launch Pad-Nuclear Payload Integration. The normal radiation hazards
of the reactor power module in the VAB are considered "safety negligible. " The probabilities
of inadvertent criticality and nuclear excursions are low and can be further reduced with the
incorporation of mechanical control drum interlocks. However, accidents involving the
nuclear hardware and liquid metal systems can occur and result in damage to equipment
and injury to personnel. Possibly the principal hazards resulting from the reactor power
module within the VAB arise from the necessity of mating, testing and transporting with a
complete liquid metal inventory. (As previously stated, this hazard would be substantially
reduced with the use of a non-liquid metal radiator.) The present fire protection systems
used in the VAB are incompatible with liquid metal. Further discussion of the liquid metal
fire protection requirements is contained in Section 5. 2. 6.2.
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The potential hazards within the VAB can be eliminated by foregoing tests in the VAB and
performing the equivalent operations at the launch pad. The functional tests required of
nuclear hardware after integration with the launch vehicle are very limited, consisting mostly
of support tests such as isotope cooling and reactor thermal shroud operation. Due to the
constant radiation and thermal hazards associated with an isotope heat source and the mini-
mum functional test required, it is recommended that isotope systems be integrated with
the launch vehicle at the launch pad. Similar procedures should be considered for a reactor
power module. The tests in the VAB would be performed with a simulated payload.
The reduced crane/hoist flexibility and the exposure to weather during mating are the prime
disadvantages of integration at the launch pad. These disadvantages are particularly im-
portant considerations when massive components are involved, such as a reactor power
module.
i
\
2. Dual Versus Single Reactor Power Module Launch. The use of the INT-21 affords the
possibility of a dual power module'launch. The power module radiator diameter would of
necessity be reduced from the 6. 6 m (21. 7 ft) to less than 4. 9 m (16 ft) to allow two
modules within the INT 21 shroud envelope. This concept was proposed by NAR in Refer- '
* «
ence 5-11. The impact on nuclear safety of a dual power module launch is quite involved.
Additional integration complexity is expected and the quantities of nuclear material and
liquid metals are doubled. However, the increased risk caused by these factors is partially
compensated by a reduction in risk since the dual power module launch only involves a single
launch versus the two required in the previous case. The quantitative nuclear safety ad-
vantages of either mode could not be addressed in this study, but remain to be evaluated
should future design options permit.
5.2. 5. 2. 3 Vehicle Assembly Building Operations Safety Considerations
In order to minimize the hazards within the VAB, the design and operational guidelines
presented in Table 5-5 should be considered.
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Table 5-5. Guidelines for Operations within the Vehicle Assembly Building
GENERAL
• Conduct thorough evaluation of the necessity and desirability of integration and testing of nuclear hardware within VAB
• Install reactor power modules and isotope systems as late in the prelaunch sequence as possible
• Provide environmental protection during mating and integration operations
• Use only experienced and cross trained personnel
• Limit and regulate personnel and activities in radiation and liquid metal areas
• Provide personnel dosimetry, and permanent and portable radiation monitoring systems coupled with alarms and warnings
• Employ two-man "buddy" system where appropriate
• Provide multiple escape routes
• Provide nuclear procedures in the KSC Ground Safety Plan K-V-053 (Ref 5-12)
• No smoking or eating should be permitted in nuclear areas unless specifically designated
REACTOR
• Provide power module environmental protection by double containment and inert gas shrouds or bladders
• Conduct thorough evaluation of the incompatibility problem of the present VAB fire protection system
• Provide rapid response liquid metal leak detection and fire suppression equipment at the ground and payload levels of the
Mobile Launcher
• Avoid the use of materials, gases and liquids that are incompatible with liquid metals
• Consider use of dummy power module for certain Launch Vehicle, VAB & ML integration activities
ISOTOPE
• Provide Isotope auxiliary and backup cooling systems compatible with the VAB and Mobile Launcher
• Integrate isotope systems at the Launch Pad (bypassing the VAB) where feasible
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5.2.5.3 Launch Pad Operations
The principal operations involving nuclear hardware at the launch pad, as illustrated in
Figure 5-13, include:
• Isotope Installation (Reactor Power Module Installation Optional)
• Integration with Launch Pad Ground Support Equipment and Range Systems
• Rocket Motor Installation
• Combined Systems and Overall Acceptance Tests
• Simulated Countdown Demonstration *
• Ordnance and Ignitor Installation
• Launch Readiness, Countdown and Launch
ISOTOPE
, AND
MOTOR
JQJTCTALLATION
TELEMETRY &
RANGE CHECKS MONITORING,
CONTROL AND
COUNTDOWN
Figure 5-13. Launch Pad Operations
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5.2. 5. 3.1 Reactor Power Module Operations
An objective of the power module launch pad activities is to keep operations involving the
power module to a minimum. This objective becomes realistic when the launch pad test
and preparation requirements of the power module are analyzed. In general, the power
module activities are rather limited, the power module assuming nearly a "dormant" role
(status monitoring only) until orbital operations begin.
Current processing of Apollo/Saturn V vehicles at the launch pad comprises a 75 to 85 day
period with approximately 25 days specifically assigned to Spacecraft and Lunar Module
tests and preparations (Reference 5-13). Several possible modifications or alternatives
in current KSC operations could lessen reactor power module time at the launch pad and
provide potential nuclear safety improvements, e. g.,
1. Conduct more launch vehicle and power module tests within the VAB to
shorten the time at the launch pad.
2. Mate the power module with the launch vehicle late within the launch pad timeline.
The first consideration increases the hazard potential in the VAB as discussed in Section
5. 2. 5. 2. Mating the power module late within the launch pad timeline can significantly
reduce the exposure of the power module to undesirable environments and hence its vulner-
ability to potential prelaunch accidents. Mating of the power module could possibly be per-
formed prior to loading of hypergolics and installation of ordnance (less than 25 days before
launch).
The Mobile Launcher (ML) crane capability for such an operation should be confirmed
(Reference 5-14). Wind loads during the lift to the 75m (250 ft) level must also be accounted
for to prevent damage during the lift operation. Figure 5-12 illustrates a use of the Trans-
porter with an internal protective shroud and cradle designed to protect the power module
from damage during the mating/integration operation.
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Modifications would be required of the service arms and work platforms to provide adequate
accessibility, fire protection and environmental control. These and other facility considera-
tions are discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.6.
The reactor power module should be protected from the vented H and O gases which occur
£t &
during the propellant loading tests and the countdown because of the potential liquid metal
reaction hazards present. Such protection could be achieved by use of environmental shrouds
and on-pad purging with dry N .
5. 2. 5.3.2 Isotope System Operations
If an Isotope-Brayton Heat Source is to be launched, mating and integration is recommended
at the launch pad to increase the safety of prelaunch operations (Reference Section 5.2.5.2).
The actual loading of the heat source should be accomplished late in the countdown to 1)
minimize radiation exposure to launch pad personnel, 2) reduce on-pad cooling time and
restricted accessibility of operations and launch pad personnel and 3) reduce the heat source
exposure to undesirable environments and potential launch pad accidents. An auxiliary cool-
ing system must be operated until launch pad cooling is in operation and shall remain in a
state of readiness as a back-up system.
Transfer of the Isotope Heat Source to the Launch Vehicle or Spacecraft mating level may
be accomplished by the Mobile Launcher crane. A transfer mechanism may also be required
to perform the horizontal or vertical installation on the spacecraft. These operations involv-
ing the heat source should be performed with controlled personnel accessibility and behind
a light shield where feasible to minimize radiation exposure to support personnel. Controlled
access and continuous monitoring of the area is required after the heat source is in place.
Relatively low temperature ignitable materials and gases (~ 420 K) should be prevented
from reaching the surface areas of the heat sources. The use of inert cover gases and purg-
ing is recommended.
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The installation of small isotope heat sources is entirely feasible at the launch pad and is
considered a safety advantage if accessibility permits. Adherence to radiological procedures,
similar to those developed for the SNAP-27 fuel capsule (Reference 5-15) must be enforced.
5.2. 5. 3. 3 Launch Pad Operations Safety Considerations
A summary of the key launch pad nuclear safety considerations is presented in Table 5-6.
Table 5-6. Guidelines for Operations on the Launch Pad
GENERAL
• Keep nuclear hardware operations at the launch pad to a minimum
• Consider mating and integration of nuclear hardware late in the launch pad timeline (just prior to loading of hypergolics and
installation of ordnance is recommended)
• Limit and regulate personnel in nuclear hardware designated areas
• Provide personnel dosimetry, and permanent and portable radiation monitoring systems coupled with alarms and warnings
• Consider use of two man "buddy" system for work with nuclear hardware
• Provide and designate multiple escape routes for emergencies
• Provide nuclear hardware launch pad procedures in the KSC ground safety plan (K-V-053)
• No smoking or eating shall be allowed in designated nuclear areas
REACTOR
• Provide environmental protection of the power module during lift, mating and all operations at the service level of the ML
(inert cover gas, purging, double containment, etc )
• Provide liquid metal leak detection capability
• Conduct thorough evaluation of the incompatibility of the present ML and pad fire protection system with liquid metals
• Provide special liquid metal fire protection and suppression techniques with the transporter and at the power module level of
the ML
• Avoid use of matenals, gases and liquids that are incompatible with liquid metal hardware
ISOTOPE
• Mate and integrate isotope hardware at the launch pad
• Provide redundant/back-up cooling capability during all operations
• Prevent low temperature (~420° K) ignitable materials and gases from approaching the radiating surfaces of the heat sources
(consider cover gas & purging operations)
• Provide radiation and thermal shields for prolonged operations around a large isotope heat source
5-38
5. 2. 6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY IMPACT AT KSC
The majority of nuclear hardware safety operations at KSC will not require procedures or
personnel that are radically different from these already in use at KSC. The major areas
requiring supplementation are radiological safety and fire prevention and suppression.
5. 2. 6.1 Radiological Safety
The radiological safety activity during prelaunch and launch can be categorized as routine
handling and emergency handling. The routine handling of the nuclear hardware for a Space
Base, including the reactor power modules should not require significantly different radio-
logical safety procedures and support than those currently in use. The KSC document
"SNAP 27 Radiological Control Plan" (Supplement H to Volume II of K-V-053 - Reference
5-15) provides an excellent guideline for the type of control and equipment that will be re-
squired. All activities associated with the handling and testing of nuclear hardware should
make use of the two man "buddy system. " Use of controlled access areas and personnel
trained in the support of nuclear hardware operations, with a working knowledge of the
hazards and characteristics of radiation is mandatory. Radiation safety personnel will be
routinely concerned with 1) nuclear hardware criticality control and detection, 2) radiation
control and monitoring, and 3) radiation contamination control and decontamination.
5.2.6.1.1 Criticality Control and Detection
Engineered safeguards, backed up by cross-trained personnel and strict adherence to pro-
cedures are required to prevent criticality of nuclear hardware due to packaging and stacking
or inadvertent reactor excursions. Radiation monitors coupled with alarms must be provided
to assist radiation safety personnel in planned evacuation of the area, in the event of abnormal
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high radiation levels around the nuclear sources. The safety organization will be responsible
for the identification of escape routes and monitoring the radiation exposures of the workers
during these incidents.
5. 2. 6.1. 2 Radiation Control
Radiation control procedures must follow routine Health Physics practices. These procedures
include: the training of personnel, maintenance of individual exposure records, monitoring
of log books, providing continuous and periodic health physics surveys and the establishment
and control of limited access areas. The types of activities performed should include:
• Bioassays -, Radiation workers must provide urine samples periodically and
before and after each launch.
• Wipe Tests - Alpha wipe tests must be performed periodically and during and
after major operations involving nuclear materials.
• Air Monitoring - Air samplers should continuously monitor the air in storage
and test areas. Additional samplers should be located in the VAB and at the
launch pad.
• Personnel Badge Monitoring - Film badges and self-reading dosimeters must
be warn by radiation workers with results periodically recorded on personnel
radiation exposure records.
• Radiation Surveys - Periodic gamma, beta and neutron radiation surveys must
be made of the nuclear hardware. In addition, surveys are made during special
operations (e. g., assembly transportation, etc.)
• Radiation Warnings - Proper warning signs on facilities and equipment must be
installed and maintained.
• Radiation Control Zone Designation - Control zones must be established with
regulation and controlled access to nuclear areas where personnel dosimetry is
required.
The radiological safety procedures followed should be designed to insure that the radiation
workers do not receive unnecesssary exposures or exposures in excess of those permitted
under Federal Regulation 10CFR 20 (Reference 5-16), listed in Table 5-7. Dose guidelines
for the general populace are specified in 10 CFR-100 and DML 50-268 (References 5-18,19)
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and listed in Table 5-8. The general public should not be exposed to any radiation from
the nuclear hardware under normal operating conditions. Since KSC is a restricted area
and under NASA administrative control, all personnel could be considered "radiation
workers, " but this category should be limited to personnel assigned to work with or near
the radiation sources, and therefore would be those who have access to the radiation control
zones.
5. 2. 6.1. 3 Contamination Control
Contamination control mainly consists of Health Physics surveys to insure integrity of the
source cladding or containment vessels and controlling access and operations of personnel
in contaminated areas. Isolation procedures must be developed and strictly followed in the
s
event of a contamination accident. Eating, drinking and smoking must be prohibited to all
personnel handling contaminated material or hardware until they have been monitored and
found free of contamination. Proper respiratory equipment, anti-contamination and protec-
tive clothing must be readily accessible. Daily bio-assay samples must be evaluated and
compared to permitted body burdens to prevent over-exposures.
5.2.6.2 Fire Protection
In general, potential fire hazards associated with the nuclear hardware arise from two
sources: 1) the ignition potential presented by isotope heat sources and 2) the chemical
reactions and subsequent combustibility of reactor power module liquid metals. Key to fire
prevention in both instances is the provision of storage and work areas free of combustible
or reactive materials, and the strict adherence to procedures and use of proper equipment.
The launch vehicle propellants represents the largest source of combustible materials during
the Prelaunch Phase. A discussion of the characteristics of launch vehicle propellant fires
is contained in Appendix C of Volume III, Part 2.
5.2. 6. 2.1 Nuclear Fires
Reference is made to the Fire Fighting Plan developed for radioisotopes as listed in the
KSC SNAP-27 Radiological Control Plan (Reference 5-15). The most important precautions
to be taken by fire fighting personnel in nuclear radiation areas are to prevent inhalation
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Table 5-7.
Currently in bsc (10 CTR 20)
Dose Limits for Ground Radiation Workers
Exposure
* Whole Body - Head, trunk
active blood-forming organs,
gonads, lens of eye
• Skin - of whole body
• Hands - and forearms,
feet and ankles
Condition
Accumulated
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5 (N-18 yr)
1.20
'JO. 00
7.50
75.00
18 75
Recommended (NCRP-^9) Jan. 15, 1971 (rief 5-17
Exposure
• Whole Body
• Skin
• Hands, feet
and ankles
• Forearms
• Other Organs
Condition
Long term
Accumulated
Year
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18 yr)
5/year
15
75
25
30
10
15
5
Table 5-8. Dose Guidelines for General Populace
Permitted Exposure Standards (10 CFR 20)
Exposure
a Whole Body
Dose Rate (rem/period)
0.002/hour
0.100/week
0.500/year
Accident Exposure Guidelines
Exposure
| External J
• Whole Body
| Internal j
• 70 Year Bone Dose
• Lower Large
Intestine
Dose (rem)
25*
150**
300**
75**
*10 CFR-100
**DML50-268
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or ingestion of toxic particles and to avoid contamination of their bodies and equipment.
Fighting a plutonium fire is similar to fighting any toxic propellant: Personnel must wear
anti-contamination clothing and respiratory protection.
The use of significant amounts of water around a Zr-H reactor should be avoided because
water acts as a neutron moderator and therefore increases the criticality potential. Facility
design should minimize the potential for free standing water where a reactor could be partially
or completely immersed.
5. 2. 6. 2. 2 Liquid Metal Fires
Alkali (liquid) metals contained in a reactor power module, such as NaK, require special
considerations in safety and fire protection because of the high degree of reactivity liquid
metals have with many common substances. The reaction products themselves pose a pro-
blem as they are irritants, they may be highly corrosive, and may then lead to fires and
explosions, unless properly controlled.
While it is true that liquid metals possess many properties which make them hazardousf
for certain applications, proper precautions permit their safe use even at high temperatures
and pressures. Detailed procedures in the handling and associated fire control of liquid
metals are available in numerous references (e. g., References 5-5, 5-20, and 5-21). In
addition, the Liquid Metal Engineering Center operated for the U. S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission by Atomics International is available for consultation and as a source of reference
material.
These sources of information should be used extensively in the detailed planning of facilities
and development of procedures to handle the liquid metals involved in the reactor power
modules. A discussion of the reactive characteristics of liquid metal and some of the safety
precautions which should be taken are presented in the following paragraphs.
The prelaunch environment presents some obvious hazards. Significant quantities of sub-
stances which react with NaK are commonly used as fire suppressants, cleaning solutions
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and launch vehicle propellants, two of the most common being water and oxygen. In addition,
the relatively high humidity of the Florida environment adds to the danger.
When liquid NaK (melting point ~ 260°K) and water are brought into contact with each other
a vigorous exothermic chemical reaction takes place. Sodium and potassium oxides are
formed and heat and hydrogen are liberated. If the reaction occurs in air, ignition of the
liberated hydrogen and oxygen from the air can occur. If sufficient water and oxygen are
present the reaction may be explosive and damage to equipment may occur as a result of
physical and thermal effects and fire.
Even small quantities of NaK can be hazardous when mixed with water. An uncontrolled
reaction between quantities as small as several Kilograms of reactants in a room or en-
closed area can completely disrupt the facility and severely damage an entire conventional
building.
The reactions of liquid metal with air may not be as immediate as they are with water,
but NaK will generally ignite spontaneously in air, and combustion will be sustained if
initial conditions of temperature and environment prevail. Upon ignition, the temperature
o o
of the burning mass increases rapidly to 1150 K (1600 F) and it continues to burn, giving
off large quantities of opaque, white smoke making visibility very poor. No flame is visible
but only a glowing mass of the metal. Fumes resulting from combustion are hazardous and
protective equipment must be worn by personnel combating NaK fires.
Fires are generally extinguished by the removal of oxygen. Extinguishing materials normally
used must not be applied to liquid metal fires because of the reaction with common extinguish-
ers containing 02,such as water, carbon tetrachloride, carbon dioxide and sodium bicarbonate.
The exclusion of oxygen can be effected by covering the burning metal with such materials as
dry alkali metal Chlorides, graphite, or soda ash (calcium carbonate). Met-L-X dry powder
is an impregnated sodium chloride which is free flowing and not susceptible to moisture
pickup. Another commercial material is Pyrene G-l powder, a graphite-base material.
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Yellow is the adopted color for liquid metal fire protection equipment. Extinguishers,
buckets, bottles, tubes and shovels used for this purpose should be painted yellow for easy
identification.
Complete coverage of the burning area and material is essential. Fires on vertical or
irregular surfaces pose a problem because of the difficulty in application of the extinguisher.
A possible solution to this problem is the provision of a steel sump or sink whereby the metal
can be dumped and concentrated in one place and then covered with extinguisher. The power-
module radiator coolant loops do not lend themselves to this provision. An inert cover gas
environment (double containment) combined with proper extinguishers and procedures are the
solution.
Disposal and clean-up can be as hazardous an operation as the fire fighting itself. On the
other hand, it is a relatively safe operation if adequate personnel protection is used and
proper precautions are observed.
As can be determined from the above material, the fire protection provisions at KSC are
presently incapable of supporting a reactor power module. In addition, known incompati-
bilities of presently used substances with liquid metals exist. The effective control and
prompt extinguishment of liquid metal fires at KSC can be accomplished through implementa-
tion of a program which includes special design considerations as well as careful adherence
to procedures, use of trained personnel and provision of proper equipment. In order to
implement such a program, a thorough study is recommended with emphasis on the VAB
and launch pad. The following general considerations are provided in Table 5-9 and should
be followed in any liquid metal fire protection program:
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Table 5-9. Guidelines for Liquid Metal
Fire Protection Operations
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Remove potential reactive materials from the vicinity of the liquid metals
Provide proper and adequate personnel protection equipment
• Clothing
• Respiratory equipment
• First aid
Provide liquid metal fire fighting equipment and extinguishing agents The equipment and containers must be marked
yellow
Provide well trained personnel with considerable actual liquid metal f ire-f ighting practice
Extinguishing agents should be applied carefully to prevent splashing
Complete coverage of the fire is mandatory (apply at blanket)
Consider use of sump tanks to remove remaining metal safely
Never apply normal fire extmguishants containing water or oxygen
Consider controlled environments utilizing inert gases and double containment when unable to remove nearby reactive
materials
Adherence to all regulations and procedures is mandatory
Provide nuclear and liquid metal facility design to prevent the presence of moisture and standing water
5. 2. 7 FACILITY IMPACT
Considerable use can be made of existing KSC facilities (Reference 5-14) in supporting the pre-
launch operations of the nuclear hardware. The major components at the Launch Center include:
The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), where the launch vehicle and payloads are assembled and
tested; the Launch Control Center (LCC) which provides the display, monitoring and control
equipment for prelaunch and launch operations; the Mobile Launcher (ML) which in conjunction
with the Crawler-transporter provides the launch platform and principle environmental and
umbilical support in the VAB and at the pad. The Crawler-transporter travels some 8 km on a
specially prepared roadway to deliver the Mobile Launcher and the launch vehicle/payload to the
launch pad.
KSC facility requirements must be based on future program requirements. In instances, where
several power modules and isotope heat sources must be accommodated, modifications to exist-
ing facilities and new specialized facilities are required to ensure the safety of the operations.
Special facilities recommended for KSC include an isolated nuclear assembly storage, assembly
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and checkout building as well as liquid metal servicing facilities capable of supporting three
reactor power modules in addition to several isotope heat sources. Nuclear hardware fire
protection, environmental protection, handling and servicing modifications are required in ex-
isting facilities (eg Vehicle Assembly Building, Mobile Launcher, Launch Pad). In the examples
identified the Mobile Launcher is a common and possibly a prime facility.
Table 5-10 identifies the major facility usage requirements at KSC in support of reactor power
module and isotope heat source nuclear hardware.
5.2.7.1 Existing Facilities and Operations
The principal existing facility modifications required are:
• Support and Service Structures
• Environmental Control
• Fire Protection
• Radiological Control
The nuclear hardware configurations and power module dimensions are not firm and therefore
it is unreasonable to affix firm specifications on the support hardware at this time. The intent
is to identify where modifications can be expected for nuclear hardware typical of a Space Base
Mission.
Support & Service Structures - Minor modifications in the service arms of the Mobile Launcher
(ML) and access platforms of the VAB can be expected. The most significant impact is on the
ML crane if future requirements call for the integration and matting of the nuclear hardware
at the Launch Pad.
The mass of a completely assembled nuclear power module (~30t) will exceed the design capa-
city of the ML crane (22. 7t at 15m, 9t at 26m extension from center of tower). Adequate
clearance must be maintained from the tower center line to account for wind loading. Modular
design of the nuclear hardware would reduce crane capacity requirements.
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Environmental Control - An inert cover gas of Argon, Nitrogen or Helium is required of
Reactor Power Modules whenever possible. Cover gas and purge supplies would be required
on the ML, within the VAB and at the Launch Pad. Portable unit should be available during
transportation and these units would be combined with permanent facilities on the ML or in
storage and assembly areas within the NAB to provide back-up capability.
Isotope heat sources generally require dry air or nitrogen cooling. Backup systems must be
provided. The portable units used for transportation can provide the backup capability at
the Launch Pad. The primary N source should be supplied at the isotope heat source level
^
on the ML.
Fire Protection - As has been stated in Section 5. 2. 6. 2, fire protection must be provided at
all facilities. The nuclear reactor moderating potential and liquid metal reaction caused by
water and other commonly used substances presents an incompatibility with normal currently-
in-use fire protection procedures. A thorough study of this problem is recommended, par-
ticularly at the Launch Pad and in the VAB.
Radiological Control - The radiological control program currently utilized for the SNAP-27
power system (Reference 5-15) can be implemented and expanded where necessary to provide
for the additional facilities and operations involved with the launch of a reactor power module.
The primary purpose of radiological contol is to (1) provide the detailed procedures to ensure
no unnecessary exposure of personnel during the mission and (2) provide the ability to cope
with all conceivable accidents effectively and with minimum harazrd to personnel.
Accident effects involving nuclear hardware can be minimized by (1) providing protective mea-
sures and contingency plans for immediate vicinity personnel, (2) quick execution of safing and
contamination control procedures, and (3) escape mechanisms for jettison of hardware away
from severe environments.
Nuclear accidents requiring emergency procedures and extensive contamination control are re-
mote. Plans for exercising prompt and effective control of the situation and the location of
5-49
nuclear facilities away and downwind of populated areas will further minimize the potential
hazard. Multiple escape routes, respiratory equipment and protective clothing must be pro-
vided in work areas.
Plans and techniques for protection and safing of a reactor and isotope systems during a launch
pad abort should be developed. A discussion of this problem is contained in Section 5.3. It
does not appear desirable to provide a launch escape or jettison system for a reactor power-
module assuming the fission product inventory is minimum due to the limited pre-operational
criticality tests. This same conclusion does not necessarily apply to all isotope systems.
Since relatively large isotope inventories exist during prelaunch. The design of a reactor
shield should provide protection from the fragmentation, explosion and fire environments of a
launch pad accident.
Decontamination procedures after an accident will be of the same type as those contained in
Reference 5-15. A three phase decontamination procedure has been identified:
1) Gross decontamination
2) Removal of non-fixed particulate contamination
3) Removal of fixed particulate contamination
The first phase consists of a trained team to identify the extent of contamination, locate con-
taminate areas, control access and remove major contaminated parts. The second phase will
consist of a thorough cleaning and disposal of all removable contamination. Areas and items
with non-removable contamination will be left for the third phase where concrete is chipped out,
steel cut and chemicals, sandblasting or steam is used for complete cleaning. Repainting sur-
faces is sometimes permissible where the external radiation level of isotopes such as Pu-238
is nearly zero. Appendix H of Reference 5-15 contains additional guidelines for radiological
de c ontamination.
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5.2.7.2 Nuclear Assembly Building
The majority of the nuclear hardware prelaunch activities should be accomplished in an iso-
lated facility capable of supporting assembly, testing and storage operations. Existing facilities
at facilities at KSC such as the Pyrotechnic Installation Building located in the Industrial Area
may meet future requirements of a single reactor power module. However, this facility is in-
adequate for processing and storage of several reactor power module and isotope heat sources.
A new facility, hereafter referred to as the Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) is required at
KSC for a program involving several large nuclear sources (eg: Space Base). The NAB should
be capable of supporting a minimum of three nuclear reactor power modules and several isotope
heat sources in various stages of assembly, test and storage. Reactor and isotope storage must
be separated from the assembly and test bays by suitable radiation shielded, blastproof and fire-
proof walls.
Present plans require the handling of an entire power module assembly in a horizontal position.
However, this technique may require complex GSE and handling operations in order to provide
safe horizontal support of the heavy reactor/shield within the module. If vertical assembly and
test were planned, a recessed pit should be considered (Figure 5-14).
VERTICAL ASSEMBLY
Figure 5-14. Vertical Assembly in VAB
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The requirements and hazardous characteristics of reactor power modules differ significantly
from those of an isotope heat source. -A low nuclear and liquid metal hazard potential and low
radiation exposures to personnel can be achieved by providing separate assembly areas for
isotopes and reactor power modules where simultaneous operations can be performed.
A typical layout of such a facility and preliminary requirements are shown in Figure 5-15. A
railroad spur is shown adjacent to the building to provide transportation and potential storage
capability for isotope heat source fuel capsules within the ATMX Series 500 railcar.
The area requirements of the NAB could be substantially changed depending on multiple program
1*>
usage. Reactor power module requirements of future unmanned programs have not been included
although it is expected these programs would utilize this facility. The use of an isotope-Bray ton
system could increase the isotope storage requirements.
Location of the NAB requires relative proximity to the railroad, road, the VAB and Launch
€s-Complex, yet provide sufficient isolation from normally populated areas. A suggested location
is shown in Figure 5-16.
Nuclear and fire safety precautions must be provided to protect workers, hardware and the
surrounding environment. Radiation protection requirements can be met by providing shielded
,<
and isolated work and storage areas equipped with radiation detection monitoring, and alarm
instrumentation. Multiple access and escape routes must be planned.
Minimizing moisture within the NAB should be a design objective. The building should be water-
proof and there should be no sprinkler system, exposed water pipes or steam lines in the work
and storage areas. The floor should be sealed concrete and sufficiently elevated to prevent
water from entering. Continuously operating power ventilators with proper filtering should be
provided to remove moisture. Smoking, eating and open flames should be prohibited in most
areas. Switches, lights and motors must be explosion and arc proof. Cover gases should be
maintained when possible to further reduce any possible reactivity and exposure to the atmo-
sphere.
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Figure 5-16. NAB Suggested Location
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5.2.7.3 Liquid Metal Servicing Facility
The reactor power modules would be shipped direct from the factory with a full complement
of NaK. NaK loops would remain filled and unopened throughout the remaining portion of the
mission. This procedure eliminates the need for extensive liquid metal processing and charg-
ing facilities at KSC, but a limited servicing capability is still required to perform safing opera-
tions if liquid metal leaks or line ruptures should occur. After safing and cleanup and power-
module would be shipped back to the factory for repair.
This mode of operation appears to be appropriate for limited nuclear operations at KSC. How-
ever, a full capability liquid metal servicing facility should be considered when future multiple
mission requirements dictate.
The Liquid Metal Servicing Facility depicted in Figure 5-17 is typical of the limited facility
which would be required, which is capable of expansion as requirements dictate. The preferred
location is approximately 100m from the NAB but within the same perimeter fence. An alter-
nate location, providing greater accessibility, would be immediately adjacent to tLe NAB
separated by fireproof walls.
The prime considerations in the safe operation and design of the facility are the provisions for
complete isolation from moisture and reactant substances along with proper fire protection.
Liquid metal containers must be raised off the floor on blocks or grates to allow visual checks
for leaks and corrosion. Drip pans are also required to catch and keep dripping metal off the
concrete floor. Cover gases (Helium, Nitrogen, Argon) should also be considered.
In all operations involving the use of liquid metals and nuclear hardware, it is vitally important
that cleanliness be maintained, that proper clothing is worn and "buddy system" rules are
rigidly enforced.
5.3 LAUNCH/ASCENT NUCLEAR SAFETY
The Launch/Ascent Phase begins with ignition of the S-IC stage followed by lift-off of the
booster and terminates with the successful completion of rendezvous and docking of the nuclear
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Figure 5-17. Liquid Metal Servicing Facility
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payload. A typical launch/ascent flow plan is presented in .Figure 5-18. For purposes of this
study, it is assumed that an S-n kick-stage is used to perform final rendezvous. Actual docking
is initiated by the Space Tug. Replacement power-module components and isotopes are assumed
to be transported by the Space Shuttle.
The principal mission support interfaces of the Launch/Ascent Phase are identified in Table 5-11.
Table 5-11. Potential Nuclear Hardware Interfaces
During Launch Ascent
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5. 3. 1 RADIATION HAZARDS
The potential radiation hazards during the Launch/Ascent Phase result principally from mission
aborts and accidents which cause the nuclear payloads to impact land or water at some point a-
long or near the trajectory trace, creating a potential hazard to personnel and the ecology. The
radiation hazards from the reactor power modules or Isotope systems are in the form of direct
radiation or the release of fission products to the ecological system which in turn are directly
or indirectly assimilated through the process of inhalation or ingestion. A thorough discussion
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of the accident causes and consequences arising from the reactor power modules during the
Launch/Ascent Phase is presented in Volume HI and Volume IV Part 2 of this study. The po
potential hazards and consequences of typical isotope payloads which may be flown can be ob-
tained from References 5-8, 5-22, 5-23 and Volume IV Part 2 of this study.
The liquid metal hazard was treated quite extensively during prelaunch. It is not considered a
significant hazard during launch and ascent phase as the propulsion stages have considerably
greater energy release potential. However compliance with Range Safety Requirements per-
taining to toxic and combustible material must be maintained.
The key mission support functions required to provide maximum nuclear safety of the mission
through the Launc/Ascent Phase are:
• Range Safety
e Radiological Control
• Mission Control
Each are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
5. 3. 2 RANGE SAFETY
The Eastern Test Range (ETR) provides many of the facilities and instrumentation systems to
support the launch and ascent operations through the injection of the payload into earth orbit.
Every reasonable precaution must be taken to minimize the risk to life, health and the ecology.
The responsibility for safety during launch is given to the Range Missile Control Division and
the Safety Office. Reference is made to the "USAF Range Safety Manual" (Ref. 5-24) for the
present modus operandi.
The following paragraphs contain some of the key Range Safety considerations in the launch of
nuclear hardware typified by a Space Base Mission.
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5. 3. 2.1 Launch Site Selection
The location of the Complex 39 launch pads at KSC are ideally situated for easterly launches
of nuclear payloads. The pads are relatively isolated from large population areas and permit
launch directly over open ocean areas. The single major undesirable feature is the presence
of large amounts of shallow water which is conducive to reactor quasi-steady state operation
should an impact occur in that area. A controlled area with a radius of approximately 13 km
(8 nm) has been specified and appears adequate for the preparation and launch of nuclear
material at KSC. The controlled area is defined as that area in which all personnel are under
direct administrative control. The 13 km radius from the perimeter of nuclear facilities
located near the VAB remains within the boundaries of KSC and the ETR.
Launches of nuclear hardware should be scheduled with prevailing winds from a westerly direc-
tion (blowing away from populated areas). This guideline is not necessarily a mandatory re-
quirement for the launch of a reactor, but should be rigidly followed in the launch of an isotope
power system. The toxic nature of the liquid metal on-board the reactor should also be given
consideration in the application of this guideline.
Polar launches over central and Southern Florida and Cuba are not permissible with nuclear
payloads. This guideline is presently being followed by NASA and the Air Force Eastern Test
Range.
5.3.2.2 Flight Termination and Trajectory Implications
No nuclear payload should be intentionally jettisoned or impacted on land. Proposed flights will
normally not be approved by Range Safety if normal impact dispersion areas for such items
encompass land (Ref. 5-24). In the event of inadvertant land impact, a trained impact recovery
team in conjunction with a Radiological Safety officer must assess the situation, obtain radio-
logical measurements and take the necessary steps required to control and render the area
safe (Refer to Section 5. 3.3).
The established flight termination impact area Instantaneous Impact Predictions (HP's) for re-
actor and isotope hardware should be restricted to outside the continental shelf. It has been
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determined (Ref. Volume HI) that the reactor presents no credible hazard in deep ocean
areas. Other studies (Ref. 5-8) indicate this to be generally true for isotopes as well. Ob-
viously erratic flight and other conditions may prevail where it may be required to initiate
termination inside the impact limit lines. Control of the area, safmg and possible recovery
must then be initiated.
The reference 55 inclination orbit with a 46 launch aximuth requires an overfly of the Eura-
sian continent. The radiological safety implications and consequences of this trajectory are
presented in Volume HI, Part 3 of this study and in Ref 5-8.
Premature flight termination of the Sin stage can cause HP's within the continent. Although
it has been concluded that the radiological risks of a "clean" reactor power module are relative!'-
low, a southerly launch should be given strong consideration. This trajectory would require a
dogleg maneuver. Nonetheless, if payload margins permit, the southerly route is recommended.
5.3.2.3 Destruct Systems
The launch of nuclear materials necessitates a new look at range safety procedures, particularly
in regard to destruct options.
Current requirements (Ref 5-24) specify that all primary launch or propulsion vehicles must
contain two independent command flight termination systems. If certain thrust stages (Space
Tug, Disposal System) are injected into orbit prior to their ignition, command systems are not
required for these stages. Command destruct systems must however be installed on the powered
stages (S-IC and S-n) capable of destruction of the lower as well as the injected stages by means
of installed destructors. Several modifications to this procedure should be considered.
The S-II destruct system should be safed before Eurasian land mass overfly in order to take
advantage of any possible range extension. Before destruct command, a signal would be sent
for engine cut-off which then arms the destruct system. The range safety officer must assess
f t
several data points before reaching-the decision to destruct. Typical reaction time for a range
safety officer to initiate the destruct command is 20 seconds.
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Due to the rather severe explosive and fragmentation environment caused by a booster
destruct, consideration should be made for jettison of the nuclear package moments before
destruct initiation. The desirability of separation prior to destruct is however, questionable.
Timing is critical and large AV's are required. The effects of such a destruct delay on range
safety must be carefully evaluated. Other alternatives to this procedure include the incorpora-
tion of a fragmentation shield around the nuclear hardware or rather extensive launch escape
systems such as that employed on the Apollo Spacecraft.
5. 3. 2.4 Tracking and Location Aids
The incorporation of tracking and location aids such as beacons, pingers and dye markers will
assist in the location of nuclear devices and reduce potential hazards to the populace and
general ecology. These aids should provide (1) immediate tracking data for ground radar and
trackers and (2) delayed location assistance for impact in water or on land. Tracking and loca-
tion hardware must be compatible with Range instrumentation and recovery force equipment.
Similar equipment will assist in the end of mission and recovery phase of the mission (Section
5.5). Flotation gear has been given consideration for recovery of large isotope systems. A
timed or transmitted signal could initiate a scuttle if location and recovery could not be com-
pleted.
A summary of the key Range Safety considerations are presented in Table 5-12.
Table 5-12. Guidelines for Range Safety Operations
An administratively controlled area with a radius of approximately 13 km should be maintained in the selection of sites and
performance of nuclear activities
2 An exclusion area of approximately 4 km radius should be maintained from the launch site during the launch
3 Launches of nuclear hardware at KSC should be scheduled with prevailing winds blowing away from populated areas (out
to sea)
4 Polar launches over Central and Southern Florida and Cuba are not permissible with nuclear payloads
5 Consider a southerly launch azimuth to avoid the Eurasian overfly of the S—II and payload for the 55° inclination orbit
6 Flight termination impact areas should be outside the continental shelf
7 Consider command destruct delays to allow separation of the nuclear payload prior to stage destruct
8 Consider safing the S—II destruct system as Eurasian overfly is made
9 Provide tracking and location aids for land and water recovery
10 Provide trained impact and recovery teams for quick location and safing of contaminated areas
11 Conform to requirements of the USAF Range Safety Manual and provide necessary modification inputs
12 Consider use of floatation gear for large isotope systems
5-62
5.3.3 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL (
Radiological control during the Launch/Ascent Phase is most effectively administered by (1) the
establishment and rigid control of an exclusion area around the launch site and (2) the prompt
use of impact/recovery teams.
An exclusion area should be established during launch, with a radius of approximately 4 km.
Only the necessary impact/recovery teams would be allowed. This procedure is essentially
the same as the present fallback area in current use by KSC for an Apollo Saturn V launch from
Complex 39.
Upon an abort and subsequent impact of nuclear hardware in the vicinity of the launch complex,
the team would be dispatched and obtain a radiological assessment as discussed in Section
5. 2. 7.1. Prompt location and enforcement of controlled access areas is essential. Cleanup
and decontamination will then be initiated. Specially designed handling tools will be required
for the retrieval of nuclear hardware due to the thermal and radiation environment. A reactor
located in shallow water may be found to be operating in a quasi-steady state critical condition.
A means of safing the system (possibly remotely) must be devised. Candidate procedures in-
clude encapsulation or covering, drainage of water and destruction by explosive charges. What-
ever mechanism is used, undue radiation exposure of the recovery team and additional dispersal
of radioactive material should be prevented. A summary of the key considerations for imple-
mentation of radiological control during the Launch/Ascent Phase is presented in Table 5-13.
Table 5-13. Guidelines for Launch/Ascent Radiological
Control Operations
3
4
5
6
7
8
Establish and control a 4 km exclusion radius around launch site
Provide rapid response impact recovery teams for KSC and down range safing and recovery of nuclear impacted
material
Provide decontamination capability
Provide proper nuclear material handling tools
Provide means of safing a reactor in a quasi-steady state critical condition
Use experienced cross-trained personnel
Minimize exposure to recovery team
Prevent additional dispersal of radioactive material
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5. 3.4 MISSION CONTROL
The communications, tracking and command control network for nuclear missions originating
from KSC includes the Launch Control Center, Mission Control Center, Data Relay Satellite
System and the telemetry and tracking capability of the Manned Space Flight Network.
The nuclear safety responsibility rests with NASA-KSC and the USAF Eastern Test Range
Safety Office until orbit is achieved. Included in this responsibility is the decision to terminate
the launch and provide direction of the impact/recovery forces.
After orbit insertion, control and safety responsibility rests with the NASA Mission Control
Center (MCC) and the Command and Control Room in a Space Base. Capability for telemetry/
status monitoring and command control of a nuclear power module must be provided by both the
Space Base and the MCC. The MCC will provide backup capability.
The present Manned Space Flight Network is not adequate at the 55 inclination orbit. The use
of DOD facilities and additional relay satellites should be considered to provide rapid response
capability as well as additional tracking data for orbit and impact determination.
A summary of the mission control considerations during launch and ascent is contained in
Table 5.14.
Table 5-14. Guidelines for Mission Control During
Launch/Ascent Operations
Establish nuclear safety responsibility with NASA-KSC and the ETR until orbit is achieved
Establish nuclear safety responsibility with NASA-MSC during orbital operations
Control of nuclear power module must be provided by both a space base and the MCC
Consider additional tracking, command and telemetry network capability for missions in 55° inclination orbits
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5.4 ORBITAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT
Support of manned nuclear missions in orbit
will require essentially the same types of
facilities and mission control capabilities as
those presently in use for the Apollo and Sky
Lab missions. The potential nuclear hazards
and effects involved in orbital operations dur-
ing a 10-year manned space mission are pre-
sented in Section 6. 0. This sub-section will
briefly address the ground support considera-
tions characteristic of manned nuclear mis-
sions, as depicted in Figure 5-19 with empha-
sis on (1) Radiological Control and (2) Data
Management.
The principle mission support interfaces with
the nuclear hardware are identified in Table
5-15.
• EXPERIMENT ACTIVITIES
• OTHER MISSION SUPPORT
. MISSION CONTROL
• RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
• DATA MANAGEMENT
END OF
MISSION
Figure 5-19. Mission Support
for Orbital Operations
Table 5-15. Potential Nuclear Hardware Interfaces With
Mission Support During Orbital Operations
IN ORBIT GROUNDOPERATIONS
POTENTIAL
MISSION SUPPORT
INTERFACES
NUCLEAR HARDWARE^
RELATED OPERATIONsI
^
BUILD-UP / POWER MODULESTART-UP
OPERATIONAL MODE
LOGISTICS '
MAINTENANCE
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
POWER MODULES
ISOTOPES
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5.4.1 RADIOLOGICA L CONTROL
Obtaining and recording the real-time integrated dose of each crew member is desirable, but
probably not practical. Considerable radiological processing of dosimeters and urine speci-
mens would be performed in orbit by the Base radiological control. However, selected inte-
grated dose data (film emulsions, urine samples, etc.) can be processed on the ground to
serve as a check and reduce the work load in the Base. Radiation control of samples and
emulsions must be maintained during logistics operations to assure correct crew dose deter-
mination. In addition, tabulated crew radiation doses recorded by the base data management
system can be transmitted to Mission Control for additional processing, analysis and mission
planning. This sharing of the radiological data handling responsibility should be designed to
prevent inadvertent overdoses to the crewmen and allow for effective scheduling of work and
timely crew resupply. Figure 5-20 depicts the sharing of the radiological control load and
other mission support functions by the base and mission control.
A more comprehensible discussion of radiological control in orbit is contained in Section 6.
MISS ION PLANNING
STATUS MONITORING
FAULT ISOLATION
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
RADIATION MONITORING
SUPPORTED BY ON-BOARD AND
GROUND MISSION CONTROL AND
DATA MGT. SYSTEM
)• PASSIVEDOSIMETRY
• ACTIVE DOSIMETRY
• HEALTH PHYSICS INSTRUMENTS^
• BIOLOGICAL DOSIMETRY )
FREQUENT READOUT - PROCESSING ON-BOARD
ALARMS
ISOLATION
TLM, VI DEO AND
AUDIO LINKS
DECONTAMINATION
• ZERO G
• ARTIFICIAL G
• PROCESSING
• ANALYSIS
• WORK SCHEDULING
• RESUPPLY
o SOLAR FLARE
WARNING
RADIATION EMULSIONS & LOGISTICS
(TO AND FROM)
Figure 5-20. Mission Support During Orbital Operations
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5. 4. 2 DATA MANAGEMENT
In addition to radiological data processing and analysis, ground systems will serve as a prime
diagnostic and backup control center for the assessment of nuclear power module status. Shut-
down and disposal functions must be capable of being directed and commanded from Mission
Control.
Operating histories would be recorded and key data (temperature, power level, pressure)
analyzed to detect abnormalities and provide advanced warnings so corrective actions can be
taken in space and through logistic re supply.
5. 4. 3 MISSION SUPPORT GUIDELINES
Key mission support considerations during the orbital operations of a nuclear spacecraft are
summarized in Table 5-16 below.
\
Table 5-16. Guidelines for Mission Support During
Orbital Operations
Consider requirements for attended support of the MCC for the entire mission
Provide logistic resupply and processing of radiological dosimetry— emulsions and urine specimens
Provide adequate radiation control and shielding of logistic samples
4 Process integrated dose data on flight personnel and critical hardware and make necessary logistic/resupply plans
5 Provide nuclear system status and fault diagnostic support
6 Provide back-up evaluation and command and control capability
7 Provide and process complete power module and heat source operating histories as required
8 Provide advanced warnings of potential failures when possible
9 Provide advanced warning of solar flares
5. 5 DISPOSAL/RECOVERY OPERATIONS SUPPORT
The principal functions involving the nuclear hardware during the Disposal/Recovery Phase are
identified in Figure 5-21. The major mission support interfaces are listed in Table 5-17. The
reactor power module is assumed to contain its own disposal system (Section 3). Prime track-
ing, telemetry and command control for reactor power module disposal into high earth orbit will
be the responsibility of the Space Base and its crew. However, the MCC must provide back-up
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TOWER MODULK
DISPOSAL
SHUTDOWN
SI PARATION/STAB
TUANSFER BURN
COAST TO APOGfr t
CIRCULARIZATION BURN
SPACE BASE
CLOSEOUT
S\STFM SHUTDOWN
tQUIPMh NT TRANSFER
CRFW TRANSFER
SHUTTLh
RETRIEVAL
RECOVERY OR
REBOOST
ISOTOPE
RECOVERY
OPERATIONS
BY SHUTTLE
PRE -MATURE
RE-ENTRY
TRACKING RECOVERY& SAFING
MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
• TRACKING
• FAULT DIAGNOSIS
• RECOVERY AND SAFING (RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL) I
• BACK-UP COMMAND AND TELEMETRY
• CONTINGENCY IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 5-21. Disposal/Recovery Operations Support
capability. To provide this capability the power module must be equipped with its own on-
board telemetry, tracking and command and control system capable of stimulation from either
the Space Base or ground systems.
Prime command functions include control drum rotation, activation of shutdown systems,
separation and stabilization, guidance alignment, thrust ignition and termination of the disposal
system.
Tracking aid equipment and a transponder must be placed on the power module to assist long
range tracking and computation of final orbit. Once final disposal orbit is achieved, all respon-
sibility is with the MCC. As discussed in detail in Volume m, Part 2, there exist a. number of
unlikely but credible accident modes which may prevent a successful disposal to the desired
high earth orbit and result in a reduced life orbit "premature reentry" of the power module.
To minimize the hazards of this unlikely occurrence and of potential reentry it is important to
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Table 5-17. Potential Nuclear Hardware Interfaces with
Mission Support During Disposal and Recovery
POTENTIAL
MISSION SUPPORT
INTERFACES
NUCLEAR HARDWARE
RELATED OPERATIONS I
POWER MODULE |
 SHUTDOWN
DISPOSAL •
TRANSFER BURN
GQAS.T TR APOGEE
CIRCULARIZATION BURN
PDTPNTIAI. 1 TRACKING
RE-ENTRY | RECOVERY & SAFING
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN
EQUIPMENT TRANSFER
SPACE BASE | CREW TRANSFER
CL E
 | ISOTOPE RECOVERY
ALTERNATE - SHUTTLE RECOVERY OF REACTOR
A
o
o
o
A
X
X
X
o
o
o
o
A
X
X
X
X
X
0
A
X
X
X
X
X
X
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
o
0
X
X
X
X
X
X
o
A
X
o
A
A
o
A
X X
o
X
X
o
LEGEND
X REACTOR POWER MODULE
O ISOTOPE SYSTEMS
A ALTERNATE
track and determine the potential impact area, such that when impact occurs, the power module
can be readily located so controlled access and decontamination can be initiated.
Key to the effective implementation of this effort is (1) the incorporation of tracking and loca-
tion aids on the reactor shield such as beacons, dye markers and underwater pingers and (2) the
availability of a trained quick reaction impact recovery team which can be flown to the land or
shallow water impact area. No attempt at recovery is necessary in deep ocean areas.
The NASA Space Shuttle provides an alternate and versatile means of achieving power module
or other nuclear hardware disposal. The Shuttle could well serve as the prime mode of re-
covery for isotope systems and as prime or back-up for reactor power module disposal or re-
covery. In either case, the inherent reliability of the Shuttle in reentry and return to the
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designated landing site makes a reentry and recovery accident very unlikely. The use and
safety aspects of the Shuttle as a means of transporting nuclear hardware has been evaluated
and is discussed in some detail in Volume IV of this report.
5.5.1 DISPOSAL/RECOVERY OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Key considerations during disposal and recovery operations are summarized in Table 5-18.
Table 5-18. Guidelines for Mission Support During
Disposal & Recovery Operations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Provide prime control for reaction power module disposal to high earth orbit from Space Base
Provide back-up tracking, control, telemetry capability for reactor power module disposal operations from the MCC
Provide supporting diagnostic data for power module and disposal system status and fault isolation
Provide tracking and location devices on nuclear hardware
Provide determination of interim and final orbits from (MCC)
Provide determination of potential impact areas of a reactor power module or an aborted isotope recovery mission
Provide technical and hazard data for advanced warnings of impact to proper authorities
Consider use of floatation gear on isotope systems
Provide rapid response recovery teams to locate control, safe and decontaminate impact areas
Provide recovery capability in shallow water areas
Provide recovery of all isotope devices
Consider use of Space Shuttle as a mode of disposal recovery of reactor power modules and prime mode of recovery for
isotope systems
13 Provide recovery and radiological control teams at shuttle landing site
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SECTION 6
SPACE BASE OPERATIONS - RADIOLOGICAL
HAZARD ANALYSIS
6.1 GENERAL
The purpose of this section is to identify the effects of potential radiological hazards on a
Space Base and to provide an assessment of their influence on design and operations. Pri-
mary emphasis is on nuclear safety of the crew, subsystems and experiments in Space Base
operations as opposed to Section 5 which deals with mission support operations and also
Volume HI of this study which deals with terrestrial safety associated with the reactor power
module. The radiological hazards considered are those which are directly associated with
nuclear radiation and also those non-nuclear hazards which may be associated with the pre-
sence of nuclear materials, e. g., heat, chemical reactions, etc.
6.2 POTENTIAL HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Potential hazards have been grouped into two categories: 1) hazards associated with the
normal operation of a Space Base and 2) hazards arising from accidental (unplanned) events.
Associated with each of these categories are a hazard source, the condition of the source
and the resulting potential hazard. The hazard source, its condition, and the effects on a
Space Base varies according to the mission phase. Therefore, it is necessary to identify
the existence of the potential hazard and its resulting impact on a Space Base crew, sub-
systems and experiments according to mission phase. Sections 6. 2.1 and 6. 2. 2 delineate
the rationale used in screening the potential hazards, and identify in accordance with the
baseline mission and design features, those potential hazards which require further evaluation.
Tables 6-1 and 6-2 in the following sections show the potential hazards identified as a function
of hazard source and mission phase. These tables represent a preliminary evaluation of the
existence of a hazard. The designation "N. A. " (not applicable) indicates that the particular
source condition cannot occur during the respective mission phase. The designation "NO"
indicates that the source condition does not pose a hazard or poses a negligible hazard due
to baseline design or operational features. In the following discussions, these features are
noted, where applicable, and underlined for emphasis. The designation "YES" implies that
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a hazard may exist and requires further investigation to determine the hazard category.
Evaluations as to the effects of these potential hazards and associated preventive and
remedial measures are discussed in Section 6. 3.
6. 2.1 NORMAL OPERATIONS
Hazards associated with the normal operations are those which are inherent to the operations
or configurations of the Space Base program. Consistent with the baseline mission and con-
figuration, four categories of hazard sources have been identified. These are: 1) the
natural radiation environment, 2) the Space Base reactor power modules, 3) the interfacing
vehicles associated with the Space Base and 4) equipment associated with the Space Base
Experiment Laboratory facilities.
The following discussions identify the rationale used to generate the preliminary hazard
\
identifications shown in Table 6-1 under normal operations for each hazard source.
6.2.1.1 Natural Radiation Environment
For the orbit altitude and inclination of interest (500 km, 55 inclination) the natural radia-
tion environment consists primarily of geomagnetic ally trapped electrons and protons, ga-
lactic cosmic radiation, and radiation associated with solar flares. As can be seen from
Section 3. 8.1. the natural radiation environment presents a significant source of radiation
for all portions of the mission, except prelaunch. The extent of the effect of the natural
radiation environment on a Space Base design and operations is evaluated in Section 6.3.1.
6.2.1.2 Reactor Power Modules
Four potential hazard source conditions have been identified for the Reactor Power Modules
under normal conditions. These are: 1) shutdown without prior operation at design thermal
power level (but after low level criticality checks), 2) operation at normal thermal power
level (330 kWt), 3) shutdown after normal operation, and 4) operation at emergency thermal
power level (600 kWt). The preliminary assessment of the impact of these conditions as
pertains to the various mission phases is discussed below.
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Prelaunch. Of the reactor power module conditions identified above, only the first
is applicable to the prelaunch phase. This is true if testing prior to reactor full
power operation in orbit is restricted to low power level criticality checks. For
example, restricting criticality testing to a total of 30 kW-hr at power levels of a
few hundred watts (thermal), results in a maximum dose rate (immediately after
testing) of 1. 3 mrem/hr at a position 3 meters from the shielded reactor. Within
two weeks after testing, this dose rate would decay to 0. 6 mrem/hr, a value which
is within the National Committee for Radiation Protection (NCRP) recommendations
for maximum exposure of radiation workers (Reference 6-11) and which is sufficiently
low as not to present a threat to the Space Base crew, experiments, and subsystems
which could be nearby during prelaunch activities.
Launch/Ascent. Limiting operation of the reactor, as discussed in the prelaunch
phase, also results in no hazard to the Space Base program elements during launch/
ascent and precludes the existence of the other reactor hazard source conditions
during this phase.
Orbital. During this phase the conditions associated with the reactor power module
during operation and shutdown after full power operation must be evaluated in con-
junction with the natural environment to assess the impact of the resulting radiation
environment on a Space Base and those vehicles which interface with the Space Base.
In addition to the radiation environment, the reactor power module radiators may
present a source of infrared radiation which could interfere with logistic and experi-
ment vehicle attitude control system scanners during final rendezvous maneuvers.
(See Section 6. 3.1.)
End-of-Mission. Since the End-of-Mission (EOM) phase of the mission is primarily
concerned with clpseout of a Space Base facility, the only reactor power module
source condition which applies under normal operations is a shutdown reactor after
normal operation. Reactor Power Module EOM is discussed separately in Section
7. 3. 4, Reactor Disposal Techniques.
6.2.1.3 Interfacing Vehicles
As discussed in Section 3. 8. 3, three types of vehicles which interface with the Space Base
are potential sources of radiological hazards. These are: 1) the Reusable Nuclear Shuttle
(RNS), 2) the Orbital Propellant Storage Depot (OPSD), and 3) free-flying (detached)experi-
ment modules. Of the three, the RNS (Reference 6-2) represents the most significant
source of direct radiation because of its nuclear engine propulsion system. Although the
OPSD and experiment modules are only sketchily defined at present, they are being con-
sidered here because of the possibility of nuclear electrical power systems being incorpo-
rated into the designs.
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Prelaunch and Launch/Ascent. No hazards from the RNS and OPSD are experi-
enced during these phases since no operational interface exists. Experiment
modules which may contain isotope power sources must be considered. (See
Section 6. 3.1, 6. 3. )
Orbital. During the orbital phase, a Space Base may interface with these vehicles
as described in Section 3.5. Therefore, all hazard source conditions must be evalu-
ated as to their potential effect on the Space Base during orbital operations. (See
Section 6. 3.1. 6.)
End-of-Mission. Closeout of a Space Base does not require interfaces with
these vehicles. (See Section 7.3. 4 for a discussion of reactor disposal and Section
7.3.2 for isotope handling procedures.)
6.2.1.4 Experiment Laboratories
As discussed in Section 3. 8. 4, there are three categories of hazard sources associated
with the Space Base experiment laboratories: 1) dynamic sources, 2) open isotope sources,
and 3) closed isotope sources. Since definition of the characteristics and location of these
sources is insufficient to allow evaluation of specific concepts, several assumptions have
been made to allow preliminary identification of safety considerations. In addition, Sections
7. 3.1 and 7. 3.2 discuss precautions and considerations in the handling of isotope systems.
Prelaunch. It is assumed that dynamic equipment may be exercised during prelaunch
operations in order to verify satisfactory operation and installation. However, passive
equipments such as isotope sources would be stored with appropriate containment.
(See Section 7. 3.2.) Therefore, during normal operations, the use of isotope tracers
would not be applicable to the prelaunch phase, whereas unrestricted checkout of x-ray
equipment could affect equipments and personnel. Similarly the interactions with iso-
tope capsules (which may, for example, contain several hundred thermal watts in
heater forms) must be evaluated. Preliminary analysis of the quantity of tracers
likely to be required to support experiment laboratories, indicates microcurie in-
ventories which would pose a negligible hazard from direct radiation.
Launch/Ascent. It is assumed that dynamic generators are not powered during this
phase. The prelaunch comments otherwise apply.
Orbital. Considerations associated with operation of the x-ray equipment, storage
of tracers and installed isotope capsules are the same as in the prelaunch phase.
However, isotope tracers must be considered from the standpoint of quantities in-
volved and potential by-products of usage, e. g., gaseous by-products which could
be dispersed, and waste containing trace quantities of isotopes.
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End-of-Mission. It is assumed that dynamic generators will be secured after their
useful life, in such a manner as to preclude their operation during the close-out of -a
Space Base. Interactions with the closed and open isotope sources would be the same
as during the orbital phase. As a matter of policy, these isotopes should be re-
covered and returned to earth to preclude dispersion in the atmosphere if a Space
Base were to be allowed to reenter and burn up. (See Section 7. 3.2.1 for guides to
isotope capsule design requirements.)
6. 2. 2 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
Table 6-2 correlates the potential radiological hazard sources associated with a Space
Base Program to the accidental source conditions and the resulting hazards as a function
of mission phase. The following discussion identifies the rationale for the preliminary
hazard identification.
6.2.2.1 Reactor Power Modules
Five accidental source conditions have been identified with the reactor power modules. As
can be seen from Table 6-2, these conditions may result in a hazard during each of the
mission phases with the exception of the damaged reactor shield. In this case, the limita-
tion on prelaunch reactor operation (only low power level criticality checks - see Section
6. 2.1.2) minimizes the fission product inventory and therefore the source strength of the
reactor. Maximum damage, i. e., total removal of the shielding would result in a dose
rate of about 30 mrem/hr at a distance of 10m (33 ft) from the bare core. The low power
level operating history would also result in a negligible quantity of tritium produced in
the shield (Reference 6-3). Whereas, these conditions may be of concern to launch pad
support personnel (see Section 5.1) the effect on the Space Base components and crew would
be negligible during the prelaunch and launch/ascent phases and indeed prior to initial opera-
tional startup of the reactor.
6.2.2.2 Interfacing Vehicles
These vehicles are encountered by the Space Base only during operations in orbit; therefore,
consideration is restricted to the orbital phase. As discussed in Section 3. 8.3, the OPSD
has been assumed to employ a reactor(s) similar to the Space Base power system, and
therefore, similar source conditions and hazards would apply.
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6.2.2.3 Experiment Laboratories
The accidental source conditions identified for the experiment laboratory sources are of
a generic nature reflecting the lack of specific design data. In general, these conditions
must be considered for all operational phases with the exception of the following situations.
It is assumed that dynamic generators are not powered during launch/ascent and therefore
cannot be turned on. In the case of the isotope sources, it is assumed that should these
devices be launched with Space Base modules, the modules would not be manned, and,
therefore, internal exposure of the crew would be precluded. The same reasoning applies
to the prelaunch phase where pad personnel could be exposed (see Section 5.1) but Space
Base crew would not be exposed.
6.3 HAZARD EVALUATION
This section considers the potential hazards identified in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 of Section 6.2
\
and evaluates the effect of these hazards on a Space Base Program. The evaluation follows
the format used in the previous section,initially considering hazards associated with normal
operating conditions and subsequently those associated with accidental conditions. Fault
trees developed to identify the potential causes of these hazards are contained in Appendix B.
6. 3.1 NORMAL OPERATIONS EVALUATION
Considering the hazard identification of Table 6-1, the majority of the potential hazards
to a Space Base identified under normal operating conditions, are associated with the orbital
portion of the mission - Launch/Ascent (Rendezvous and Docking), Orbital, and End-of-
Mission. Therefore, major emphasis has been placed on the operations of the Space Base
in orbit. Those considerations dealing primarily with the Experiment Laboratory hazard
sources are treated specifically in Section 6.3.1. 7, and cover the sole topics associated
with Prelaunch.
6.3.1.1 Environment Components
Under normal operating conditions, the radiation environment in and around the Space Base
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is due to four sources, 1) Geomagnetically trapped and galactic cosmic radiation, 2)
Reactor power module radiation environment, 3) Radiation sources distributed about the
Space Base, and 4) Solar radiation (principally solar flares).
Figure 6-1 shows the dose rate from the geomagnetically trapped protons and electrons
as a function of Space Base module cylindrical wall thickness for skin and depth dose.
2
Based on Space Base studies (Reference 6-4), 1. 6 g/cm is a representative value for
cylindrical wall effective shielding, including the effects of internal equipment location.
Similarly, Figure 6-2 shows the isodose contours induced by the two reactors, each opera-
ting at its normal power level of 330 kWt. As can be seen from this figure, the dose rate
from the reactors, over the habitable area of the Space Base varies from 1. 0 to 0. 35 mrem/
hr. Since the vehicle structure and equipments provide essentially no attenuation of the
\
gamma and neutron radiations from the reactor, this is the range of dose rates experienced
inside the Space Base due to the operating reactors. Comparing these rates with the dose
rates from the natural environment (exclusive of solar flares) shown in Figure 6-1. the
depth dose due to the natural environment is 2. 8 to 8 times the dose due to the reactor
environment. The comparatively low dose rate from the reactors is due primarily to the
extensive, shaped 4?r reactor shield employed.
The remaining significant localized source of radiation on the Base Space comes from iso-
tope capsules which may be associated with experiment laboratories. Although the location
and size of these capsules is as yet undefined, an estimate of the effect of distributed cap-
sules may be evaluated by considering the use of an isotope powered waste management sys-
tem. This system is a candidate experiment for Advanced Technologies and may be used
throughout future manned space vehicles. One unit presently under development employs
a capsule contai
(Reference 6-5).
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Figure 6-1. Radiation Dose Rate On-Board the Space Base as a Function of Cylindrical
Wall Thickness for Geomagnettcally Trapped Protons and Electrons, Including Galactic
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Figure 6-2. Reactor Power Module Isodose Contours
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The combined neutron and gamma dose rates from this radioisotope source result in a
dose rate of 0. 6 mrem/hr at 1 meter from the capsule. In order to evaluate the effect of
distributed sources about a Space Base, the contribution of these radioisotope sources to
the composite radiation dose rate was evaluated using the previously discussed capsule as
a baseline. Figure 6-3 shows the localized effect of radioisotope capsules of this type
distributed about the vehicle. The inset shows the dose rate as a function of distance from
the capsule source, where the closest approach is limited to 1 meter by the geometry of the
system. A review of the Space Base concepts indicated that the location closest to the re-
actors, where waste management facilities are planned to be located is on the artificial "g"
module habitation decks. Combining the Waste Management System, radioisotope sources,
reactors and continuous natural environment dose rates at this location would give the
highest localized dose rate in the vicinity of a distributed radioisotope source of this type.
The localized effect is shown by superimposing the radioisotope source dose vs. distance
on the composite curve. The maximum dose rate curve would be the dose rate based on
100 percent occupancy of the area adjacent to the Waste Management System. Review of the
projected crew traffic indicated that maximum occupancy of the artificial "g" habitation areas
would be more nearly 50 percent. Therefore, the curve based on the average 50 percent
occupancy is more realistic. As can be seen from Figure 6-3, this combined dose rate is
nearly equal to the maximum dose rate from the reactors and natural environment at the
reactor boom/zero "g" interface. Therefore, for analyses purposes, the dose rate at this
point was assumed uniform throughout the Base as representative of deployment of radio-
isotope capsules throughout a Space Base vehicle.
Figure 6-4 shows the solar flare event dose from a single event, considering the effective
cylindrical wall thickness. For the range of flight times considered, up to 1 year, the solar
flare model predicts a 95 percent confidence level of one flare occurring during the first
5 weeks, with a second event possible thereafter.
6.3.1.2 Crew Effects - Normal Radiation Environment
The crew of a Space Base will be exposed to the environment described in the preceding
section during their tour of duty on board the Base. For this preliminary evaluation the
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specific location of individual crew men in the Base is not important since the dose rate
in different portions of the Base may easily be perturbed up to the maximum (habitable
location closest to the reactor) by localized sources (see Figure 6-3). Therefore, in
evaluating overall crew exposure, a uniform environment may be established on the Space
Base while the variations in the environment as a function of position must be considered
for evaluation of other periods of exposure such as rendezvous and docking and EVA opera-
tions. The crew radiation limit guidelines employed are those previously discussed in
Section 4.2.1.
6. 3.1. 2.1 Rendezvous and Docking Operations
In addition to the time spent on the Base, the crew will be exposed to the natural radiation
environment and the reactor environment during transfer to and from the Base. Depending
on the selected approach path to the final docking point, a more severe reactor radiation
environment may be encountered than would be experienced during normal activities on the
Space Base. Since it is assumed that the Space Base may take any orientation with respect
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to the orbit plane, there exists the possibility that the approaching vehicle could encounter
the more lightly shielded reactor environment. This would occur, for example, should
rendezvous be attempted from the -x direction (see Figure 6-2). In order to determine
the severity of this condition, and to evaluate the requirement for rendezvous restrictions,
a terminal rendezvous approach was postulated, where the approach is along the -x axis
of the Space Base (proceeding from -x to +x) with docking at the extreme end of the zero "g"
section of the Base. This approach would expose the crew to the highest reactor radiation
environment.
Figure 6-5 shows the reactor induced dose rate profile along the -x to +x axis of the Space
Base, where the origin of the abscissa is at the reactor mount. The same figure shows the
velocity/distance braking gates that a shuttle would use in final rendezvous maneuvers.
Based on these data, a total integrated dose due to the reactor environment is approximately
5 mrem. In addition, the crew would be exposed to the natural radiation environment.
\
Since resupply missions could require 3 to 17 orbits until docking (Reference 6-6), the
accumulated dose due to the natural environment during this time period would range from
13 to 19 mrem. (Note: a portion of the 17 orbit profile is spent at low altitude where a
lower natural environment dose rate prevails.) Therefore, the maximum dose for a nor-
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mal docking maneuver would expose the crew to a total of 18 to 24 mrem. Selection of
an approach direction with a less severe reactor environment, e. g. from the +x direction,
could reduce the reactor contribution to the dose to an essentially negligible quantity. It
can be seen that reactor systems pose a negligible hazard to the crew during rendezvous
and docking, providing that nominal braking gates are adhered to. Shuttle loiter, if allowed
in the lightly shielded area of the reactor, could expose the transfer crew to the allowable
average daily depth dose of 0.2 rem within a time period of as little as 12 minutes. Whereas,
approaches from any direction other than from the lightly shielded area of the reactor would
provide essentially unlimited loiter time. It is therefore concluded that maximum advantage
be taken of the reactor shielding characteristics in specifying normal shuttle approaches in
order to minimize crew exposure during transfer to and from the Space Base. However,
contingency operations would allow a nominal approach from any direction without exposing
the crew to a hazard which could be categorized as greater than Safety Negligible.
6. 3.1.2.2 On-Board Exposure
During the entire duration of his mission, a crew member will be exposed to the combina-
tion of environments discussed in Section 6. 3.1.1. A major uncertainty in the total dose
received, is the number and intensity of Solar Flares. Considering the radiation exposure
limits shown in Section 4 and using the solar flare event model shown in Section 3.8, an
estimate can be made of the degree of crew exposure as a function of mission time. The
requirement for additional shielding or for storm shelters can also be estimated.
Figure 6-6 shows the integrated dose to various parts of the body as a function of mission
duration. The solid lines represent the accumulated dose both with and without flare events.
The "step" in the plots, which include solar flare dose, reflects the event model which pre-
dicts a 95 percent confidence of one flare in the first 35 weeks and a second flare with 95
percent confidence after 35 weeks. The dashed lines indicate the suggested exposure limits
for various time periods. The testes dose is shown for reference only, since the testicular
dose limits are considered as risk versus gain considerations rather than a design criteria
(see Section 4.2.1).
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As can be seen from Figure 6-6, the accumulated dose from all sources, except solar
flares, is always well within the recommended limitations for the skin, depth and eye dose
locations. When the dose due to solar flares is included,the depth and skin dose are still
within limitations, however, the dose to the eye is exceeded significantly when mission dur-
ations of one year and greater are considered. The fact that solar flares cause the eye
dose limitations to be exceeded indicates that additional protection against the flare environ-
ment may be required, e. g., storm shelters, in the case of longer missions (one year
and longer).
Figure 6-7 shows typical storm shelter characteristics required to bring the accumulated
yearly dose to within guideline limitations. Characteristics are given for both the eye and
testicular doses. Three types of shelters are considered: 1) Spot shielding where selected
2
areas of the base would be provided with shielding in addition to the nominal 1. 6 g/cm ;
V2) Uniformly increasing the effective outer shell shielding and 3) Treating a central tunnel
configuration (Reference 6-7) as a storm shelter. The third case allows optimization on a
shield weight basis between shielding provided solely for solar flare protection and the pro-
tection afforded from the remaining radiation environment (see insert in Figure 6-7).
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The concepts described in Figure 6-7 assume the addition of shielding to the main space-
craft structure. In providing protection for the eye (which appears to be the limiting dose
area) consideration can be given to providing localized protection, e. g., helmets. The
approach might allow additional operational flexibility but would have to be evaluated on the
basis of overall mission risk/value considerations. Since geomagnetic shielding essen-
tially eliminates the solar flare environment at 30 orbit inclinations the solar storm
shelter conclusions apply only to orbits above 40 , in particular the 55 inclination orbit.
6. 3.1.2. 3 EVA Exposure
During EVA activities the astronaut will not be afforded the protection of the Space Base
structure and therefore, will encounter somewhat higher dose levels than during on-board
exposure. In addition, his location with respect to the Space Base is important due to the
variation of the reactor induced radiation field. Figure 6-8 and its accompanying table
indicate the periods of time required to accumulate various dose levels during EVA, in
different regions around the Space Base. The data is presented for the two reference
orbit inclinations. The region shown in the figure corresponds to the isodose regions
shown in Figure 6-2. The accumulated doses also include passage through the South
Atlantic anomaly. Figure 6-8 illustrates the importance of astronaut location during EVA.
In particular, if work is required in the vicinity of the reactors, the allowable EVA time
may be less than one hour. In order to maximize EVA times and minimize dose, EVA
should be planned for orbits that do not intercept the South Atlantic anomaly.
6. 3.1.2. 4 Crew Protection Design and Operational Considerations
Those aspects of crew protection addressed in this section, deal with the broad design and
operations considerations which can significantly impact the nuclear safety of a Space Base
mission. The crew protection design and operations guidelines are summarized in Table 6-3.
Principal consideration should be given to provision of (1) radiation shield e. g., solar
flare shelters, (2) on-board radiation monitoring and warnings, and (3) regulation of crew
•i
operations, e. g., adherence to EVA, loiter, rendezvous and crew dose guideline opera-
tional restrictions.
At present, the only practical concept for providing shielding against the radiation environ-
ment to be encountered by the Space Base is massive, passive shielding. Active shield con-
cepts such as plasmas and magnetic shields have been studied but currently lack develop-
ment and may have considerable impact on the vehicle configuration (Reference 6-8).
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Table 6-3. Crew Protection Guidelines
DESIGN
• Provide Storm Shelter facilities for refuge from solar flare events (high inclination orbits such as 55°)
• Consider localized protection for the eyes in relatively high radiation areas (e g , use of helmets)
• Provide on-board radiological monitoring of radiation dose accumulated by the crew
• Provide a central on-board warning system for monitoring and alerting against radiological hazards
OPERATIONS
• Maintain nominal braking gate velocities
• Minimize loiter time in the vicinity of the reactors
• Establish crew rotation procedures in conformance with career and periodic dose guidelines
• Restrict EVA during orbits intercepting the South Atlantic anomaly
• Limit EVA duration as a function of the variation with position in radiation levels due to the reactor(s)
• Take advantage of reactor shielding characteristics in implementing approach and loiter operations
• Coordinate EVA with the Radiological Safety Office to ensure safe EVA environment at the time of implementation
The natural radiation environment is the major radiation component encountered by the
Space Base since the reactor dose is greatly attenuated due to the degree of shielding pro-
vided by the reactor shield (see Section 3. 8.2.1). Of the natural environment components,
the Galactic Cosmic radiation is the least important at the near earth altitudes. (Galactic
cosmic radiation becomes important for interplanetary flight considerations due to the
higher particle fluxes.) Therefore, the trapped radiation environment and the Solar Flare
environment are the most significant from the standpoint of crew protection. From the
discussions of Section 6. 3.1.2. 2, it can be seen that complete shielding of a Base from
the solar flare and natural radiation environment is impractical. The solar flare is a
significant contributor to the total dose (Reference 6-9) and may exceed the allowable dose
to the eye under normal conditions. Protection against solar flares will require a storm
shelter particularly for crew durations in excess of one year.
Localized shielding can be used effectively to shield local radiation sources such as on-
board isotopes. Optimum materials that would be used for shielding depend on the particle
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type and particle energies. The relative effectiveness of various shielding materials in
shielding different types of isotope sources which may be carried on-board may be evalu-
ated from the data in Reference 6-10.
Radiation Monitoring. On-board monitoring of the dose received by the crew is important
from the standpoint of protecting the crew and maximizing the effectiveness of the crew
and identifying radiation hazards.
The previous section alluded to the uncertainty associated with the occurrence and severity
of solar flare events. Continuous on-board radiation dose monitoring of personnel would
provide timely evaluation of individual crew member dose to allow for planning of extension
of tour of duty, e. g., to complete a vital experiment or function, or to allow for participa-
tion in emergency activities which would expose him to highe^ than normal dose rates. In
light of the uncertainty in solar flare activity, this would provide for increased mission
flexibility and conversely, protect the crew member from early overexposure. On-board
monitoring can also indicate violation of procedures or an unsafe condition in the activities
of crew members. An individual whose dose level is increasing inordinately in comparison
to the rest of the crew can be traced to determine the source of the anomaly.
Y
A second aspect of radiation monitoring is providing early warning of high radiation levels,
which not only affect the Space Base in general, but also laboratories which include isotope
or dynamic radiation equipment. Section 7. 3.1 outlines the elements of such a radiological
safety program and indicates the recommended equipment and personnel requirements.
v
4
Crew Operations. Table 6-3 lists operational considerations associated with the crew.
The necessity to minimize the dose to the crew is emphasized. The guidelines for periodic
and career exposure are shown in SectionH. 1. Several factors influence the actual dose
that a crew member would receive. For a given orbit, these factors include solar activity,
crew member work location and function. For example, personnel engaged in EVA may
accrue a higher dose over a given period due to exposure to natural radiation with lighter
shielding. Similarly, personnel working with isotope sources or on power system
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maintenance may also experience higher doses. Therefore, it may not be possible to
establish a crew rotation period, without introducing inefficiencies in crew utilization
(e. g., the highest dosed crew member would set the maximum rotation period for more
lightly affected members). It appears that to maximize crew utilization, actual planning
for crew member rotation should rely heavily on the Radiological Safety Program described
in Section 7.3.1. Decisions to extend experimentation efforts, rotate reactor operations
crew, or assess effects of EVA activity can be based on hard data rather than extrapolations
of predicted environments.
The remaining guidelines are associated with rendezvous and EVA associated activity.
Due to the high natural environment dose rates encountered in the South Atlantic anomaly,
EVA activity should be planned for orbits which do not intercept this region. Similarly,
during periods of EVA, the location of the astronaut and the time period at that location
should be controlled because of the variation of the radiation field around the reactors.
The importance of establishing the local environment before performing EVA cannot be
overemphasized.
6.3.1.3 Effects on Subsystems - Normal Radiation Environment
The effects of radiation on the Space Base Subsystems can be segregated into effects on
electronic equipments and effects on other spacecraft material. The effects on semi-
conductor electronics may be broken down into two types: Bulk damage effect which is
the disruption of the crystal lattice and ionization effects which result from interactions
of ionized gases with ionized semi-conductor surface impurities. Other subsystem mate-
rials react in different manners, ranging from loss of flexibility and outgassing in plastics
to insensitive materials such as dry lubricants. (See Section 4. 0 and Appendix A for
detailed data.)
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In evaluating the effects on a Space Base, component definition contained in References
6-7 and 6-11 was used to establish typical subsystem components. The sensitivity of these
components to bulk damage or ionizing radiation effects has been broken down into three
levels of damage:
Threshold Damage - Specific effects occur which would likely require some
consideration in design to insure proper operation.
Moderate Damage - Significant degradation of component performance
occurs requiring special design considerations.
Severe Damage - Operation is seriously impaired possibly requiring new
design approaches.
Figures 6-9 and 6-10 summarize the sensitivity of the various subsystems. Semi-conductor
bulk damage effects have been normalized to the equivalent 1-Mev neutron environment. The
1-Mev neutron effects also include the effects on materials of secondary ionizing radiation
produced by neutrons. The ionization effects includes the effect of all particles on both
materials and electronics. Figures 6-11 and 6-12 present a more detailed breakdown of
the subsystems by component.
In each of these figures the total radiation dose to which the subsystems would be exposed
in a 10-year mission has been superimposed on the sensitivity charts. The reactor contri-
bution to this dose is shown by the dotted line and is seen to be negligible compared to the
natural radiation environment. The natural environment dose was computed for a range of
2
possible effective shielding (1 to 10 g/cm )and, therefore, covers both the equipments on
the Space Base as well as those on experiment module subsatellites.
As can be seen from Figure 6-9 and 6-10, the radiation exposure of the subsystems cannot
be neglected as each subsystem contains some components that exhibit at least threshold
sensitivity to the projected environment. Therefore, specific design considerations must
be implemented for these components in order to insure proper operation. Neglecting
film and experiment interference considerations, the radiation effects on the subsystems.
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during a 10-year mission, are considered to constitute a negligible hazard providing piece
parts and materials are judiciously selected during the design process. (See Appendix A,
Radiation Exposure Limits, for projections of component hardening capability).
Since photographic film is primarily associated with the Space Base experiment program,
film considerations as well as experiment interference are discussed in Section 6.3.1.4.
6.3.1.3.1 Subsystem Design and Operational Considerations
This section deals specifically with typical Space Base subsystems exclusive of the Reactor
Power Modules. Table 6-4 lists the subsystem design and operational considerations arising
from the nuclear hazards during orbital operations. The subsystem nomenclature follows the
definition presented in Section 3. 2. 2. 2.
The analyses (Section 6.3.1.3) indicate that equipment associated with expected subsystem
implementation may be marginal in terms of degradation due to the combined radiation environ-
ment. Therefore, component and subsystem design should reflect this condition and employ
hardening techniques where required. Particular subsystem considerations are discussed
below.
Navigation and Control - The design considerations of interest specifically to the Navigation
and Control System deal primarily with sensors and propulsion capability. Star trackers may
be one of the few subsystem components that may be sensitive to high dose rates. These dose
rates could result from the natural environment (solar flares) or could be caused by accident
situations (such as a reactor power excursion). The susceptibility to these environments could
result in temporary loss of attitude reference during critical maneuvers.
A nuclear related hazard, thermal interference from high temperature waste heat radiators,
should also be considered. If IR scanners are incorporated in the attitude control of such
interfacing vehicles as the Tug, Shuttle, or detached experiment modules, a false signal could
be generated during critical rendezvous maneuvers.
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Table 6-4. Support Subsystem Design and Operations Guidelines
DESIGN
GENERAL
• Select components and component piece parts to minimize degradation due to radiation exposure over the mission
duration
NAVIGATION AND CONTROL
• Screen dose rate sensitive equipment to eliminate catastrophic interference from high radiation levels during normal opera-
tions or accident conditions
• Consider susceptibility of IR scanners on interfacing vehicles to false signals from waste heat radiators
• Consider providing sufficient orbit adjust capability to rapidly change Space Base orbit altitude
COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA MANAGEMENT
• Provide capability and interfaces with on-board Radiological Safety Program for radiation dose data handling
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT
• Provide separate waste management systems for crew and laboratory contaminated waste
• Provide separate atmosphere control for laboratories with high concentrations of isotope in use or in storage
• Provide radiation shielding for isotope powered waste management systems
• Consider locating isotope powered waste management systems in areas of low traffic which are not continuously
occupied by a specific mdividual(s)
• Consider using strippable thermal control coatings on vehicle exterior surfaces for long term maintainability and as a
means of NaK or fission product decontamination
STRUCTURES
• Provide capability to isolate compartments containing a high concentration of isotopes
• Consider coating the surfaces of pressure hulls and structure to assure compatibility with NaK coolants
PROTECTION
• Provide means for monitoring and warning of imminent collisions with space debris and orbiting vehicles
• Provide emergency EVA suits which are compatible with NaK, for emergency EVA and PM servicing
OPERATIONS
• Minimize loiter and traverse near reactor to reduce potential radiation and thermal interference with navigational
equipment
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The analyses of accident conditions Section 6.2.2 and 6.3.2 indicate the severity of the hazard
which would result from the release of radioactive debris (e. g., from a destructive reactor
excursion) that would have a long residence time in the vicinity of the Space Base. A possible
approach to minimizing the hazard is to remove the Space Base from the vicinity (orbit) of the
debris. The penalty associated with implementing this capability depends on the quantity of
debris released and the expected dispersion. Since the dose rate is approximately proportional
to the inverse of the square of the separation distance a relatively small mass/logistic penalty
may significantly enhance safety.
Communications and Data Management - Due to the large quantity of electronics associated with
this subsystem, the selection of radiation hardened piece parts and components is particularly
applicable. Specifically, semi-conductor data displays may exhibit some degradation from long
term exposure to the general radiation environment. (Figures 6-9, 6-10, 6-11 and 6-12).
In addition, the communications subsystem must allow for equipment interfaces and data handling
associated with the radiological safety program (see Section 7.3.1). This is especially important
since recognition of these requirements in early phases of design will allow for the capacity and
flexibility required.
Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) - The considerations associated with the ECLS
subsystem stem primarily from the use of isotopes internal to the Space Base.
A portion of the experimentation aboard the Space Base is expected to use isotope tracers, both
in Space Manufacturing and the Biosciences. Contaminated waste from these laboratories (bio-
logical specimens, solutions) must be segregated from the general waste management system.
This precaution is necessary not only to safeguard against consumption of excess quantities of
isotope, but also to eliminate the dissemination of isotopes that could interfere with subsequent
experimentation. Depending on the quantity of isotopes (tracers of capsules) stored in a given
area, a spill or capsule leakage could spread excessive quantities of radioactive material
throughout the Space Base (see Section 7.3.2). Environmental isolation is required.
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The implementation of isotope powered waste management systems can significantly perturb
the radiation environment in areas immediately adjacent to the system's location. Localized
shielding may be required. In addition, it is undesirable to locate these systems in or near
areas that would be subject to continuous or high percentage occupancy by a specific individual(s)
in order to minimize the radiation dose.
Structures - The considerations dealing with the structures and docking and airlock subsystems
arise from the release of isotope contamination within the Space Base and corrosive material
(NaK) external to the Space Base. Airlock/compartment closure provides assurance that the
airborne and entrained contamination that could arise from compartments containing isotope in-
ventories could be minimized effectively in the event of a release.
NaK coolant release effects on the structure must be considered. Compatibility between alumi-
num and aluminum alloys has been reported up to 500°K. Coolant from the primary loop is
significantly above this temperature (945°K) and therefore there exists the possibility of contact
between the structure and NaK coolant at temperatures above compatibility levels for a period of
time dependent on the quantity released. This accident situation is discussed in Section 6.3. 2.1, 2.
In recognition of this situation, provision for NaK compatible coating materials in the vehicle
structure has been recommended.
Protection - The protection subsystem comprises crew habitation modules, living quarters,
IVA and EVA suits, etc. Activated and corrosive NaK can reduce or eliminate protective
subsystem effectiveness and thereby present a hazard. From the standpoint of radiological
hazards, collision with large pieces of space debris or orbiting vehicles can also induce
failures resulting in NaK coolant release, loss of reactor control, etc., (see Appendix C).
These types of accident situations are addressed in Section 6.3.2.1. The severity of the
effects of such a collision are sufficient that positive means should be employed to avoid
such a condition. Advance warnings combined with an orbital adjust capability could pro-
vide the means for collision avoidance.
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Two conditions that could require special crew protection during emergency operations in the
presence of NaK are: (1) a NaK coolant leak external to the Space Base (Section 6.3.2.1), and
(2) a leak in the Power Conversion equipment engine room (see Section 7.30 3). In such circum-
stances it may be desirable to provide access to these regions to accomplish "safing" of the
system or rescue operations. The provision of an EVA suit which is compatible with NaK should
be a design objective.
6. 3.1.4 Effects on Experiments (Normal Radiation Environment)
In evaluating the effect of potential radiological hazards on the experiment program, the
data from Section 6.3.1.3 may be applied directly to experiment support equipment from the
standpoint of equipment damage. However, radiation interference with measurements and
radiological effects on biological experiment specimens must be evaluated separately,,
6.3.1.4.1 Bioscience Experimentation.
The Space Base bioscience experimentation program is expected to incorporate a wide range of
specimens, including animals, plants and microbiological specimens. Table 6-5 lists examples
of candidate experiments and specimens derived from the OMSF publication, "Candidate Experi-
ment Program for Planned Space Stations," (Reference 6-12). As can be seen from this table,
there exists a wide range of sensitivity for the various experiments and specimens which depend
on the objectives of the experiment and the characteristics of the specimens. Depending on the
specimen, radiation sensitivity may be related to age or stage in development. Included in
Table 6-5 are the expected doses to which the experiments would be exposed, including both the
contribution of the reactor power system and the geomagnetically trapped radiation environment.
The occurrence of a solar flare would result in an additional dose of from 3 to 60 rem depending
2 2on the effective shielding (10 g/cm to 1 g/cm , respectively). The predominant effect is due to
the natural environment and, therefore, selection of location within the Space Base in order to
minimize reactor dose contribution would have a relatively minor effect on experiment exposure.
In planning experimentation programs it is necessary to evaluate the radiation sensitivity
of the specimens to be employed to determine requirements for localized shielding. In
addition, particularly sensitive experiments should be equipped with local radiation monitoring
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to allow screening of anomalous behavior. The following broad (general) criteria can be used
if no previous radiation studies have been performed:
• Warm blooded animals are more sensitive than cold blooded animals.
• Vertebrates are more sensitive than invertebrates.
• Sublethal doses are generally limiting.
• The age of the specimen is critical as to its sensitivity. In life cycle studies, embryos
are much more sensitive than adult specimens.
'! • The larger the chromosome volume, the more sensitive the organism is to radiation.
j
• Specimens having high cellular division rates (such a embryos, blood, etc.) are highly
sensitive to radiation whereas experiments involving low division rates such as muscle,
nerve, bone, etc., are least sensitive.
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of experiments to the environments to be encountered
on the Space Base, 60 experiments in 8 experimental disciplines (astronomy, physics, etc.)
were evaluated. Figure 6-13 shows a summary for equipments associated with the Astron-
omy experimentation program. Radiation flux rates which would cause data degradation
(dynamic interference) are shown for the different particles involved. Permanent damage
thresholds for the equipment are also noted. Complete charts for the entire experiment
program are given in Appendix A. The analysis allows evaluation of the susceptibility of ex-
periments to both the natural environment and the reactor environment.
Figures 6-14 through 6-19 indicate those areas of the 500 km orbit where dynamic inter-
ference would be encountered. These figures are arranged in order of increasing sensitivity,
and the degree of interference to be expected is noted for the applicable experiments. In
each figure, the large area of sensitivity near the center indicates the influence of the South
Atlantic anomaly. As can be seen, several experiments would have to be turned off or data
ignored during passage through these areas, unless special shielding or measurement
techniques are provided.
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Figure 6-13. Experiment Radiation Sensitivity Thresholds
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Whereas the preceding figures indicate the sensitivity to the natural environment (primarily
trapped electrons and protons) experiments also exhibit sensitivity to the neutron and gamma
ray environment induced by the reactors. To avoid dynamic interference from the reactors,
Figure 6-20 indicates the minimum approach distances to the Space Base reactors for vari-
ous operating experiments which are candidates for implementation as subsatellites (de-
tached or free-flying modules). These distances are in relation to the lightest shielded
area of the reactor, as shown in the figure. If Space Base orientation were to be managed,
closer approaches would be allowable, i. e., from the more heavily shielded directions.
6.3.1.4. 3 Photographic Film Degradation
The photographic film associated with the experiments requires special handling in order
to minimize data degradation. Figure 6-21 shows the sensitivity of film stored on the Space
Base. The threshold of fogging is defined as the exposure which would result in a film opti-
cal density of 0.2 (see Appendix A, Section A. 3). From Figure 6-21 it is apparent that even
2
assuming a shielded storage facility (20 g/cm ^careful handling of the film is required.
Specifically, film should be used as quickly as possible and developed immediately after
use. This procedure would maximize the film usefulness, however, resupply would be
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required on a regular basis. Depending on the acceptability of the optical density of 0. 2
as a fog threshold, fast film (ASA400-800) would have to be resupplied every 25 to 50 days.
In addition, the occurrence of a solar flare during the storage period could require complete
resupply of the film inventory. To aid on-board evaluation of film acceptability, dosimeters
could be included with the stored film jackets to allow correlation of fogged condition for the
particular type of film.
In addition to film used on the Space Base, detached experiment modules will also employ
film. This film may be exposed to a slightly higher radiation environment than that stored
on the Base since less shielding will be provided by the vehicle structure and also since
there exists the possibility of exposure to the lightly shielded area of the reactor. Figure
6-22 shows film sensitivity as a function of time at distance from the lightly shielded area
2
of the reactors, for different film shielding conditions (10 to 20 g/cm ). As separation
distance from the reactors increases, the storage time that produces threshold fogging is
eventually limited by the natural environment (assuming no solar flare). Although initial
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visual observation of the detached module might be desirable in order to verify operation,
deployment trajectory and operational location must be managed in relation to the reactors
to maximize film usefulness.
6.3.1.4.4 Experiment Design and Operational Considerations
Table 6-6 presents design and operational guidelines dealing with the implementation of the Space
Base experiment program. The guidelines listed have been grouped according to the associated
hazard source.
>
Design for General Radiation Environment - In discussing subsystem design considerations, in
Section 6.3.1.3.1, the requirement for designing to survive the general radiation environment
was noted. However, the required design life of the experiment should be evaluated in order to
determine whether special design implementation is actually required.
Film associated with the experiment program is one of the most sensitive elements of the Space
2
Base Program. Analyses indicates that when stored in a shielded container (20 g/cm ), high
speed (ASA 400-800) film would have a life of 25 to 50 days depending on film speed. In order
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Table 6-6, Experiment Program Design and
Operations Guidelines
DESIGN OPERATIONS
GENERAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
Provide hardening of electronics associated with experiment equipments expected to be in long term usage
Provide shielded storage for photographic film and emulsions
Consider storing dosimeters in on-board film storage areas to allow evaluation of fog condition and film acceptability
Monitor radiation dose to radiation sensitive bioscience experiment specimens
Design for radiation screening to reduce dynamic interference in experiments taking measurements within environmental
radiation regimes (e g , anti-coincidence techniques)
GAMMA AND NEUTRON ENVIRONMENT
Provide for detached module (subsatellite) implementation of gamma ray and neutron sensitive experiments (eg , FPE
51,55)
Maintain, neutron and gamma sensitive experiments within the shadow shielding of the reactors, if attached or integral
with the Space Base (eg, FPE 57 ,517)
DYNAMIC GENERATOR ENVIRONMENT
Provide shielding and interlocks, and restrict reonentation and relocation of dynamic generators (x-rays, ion guns,
lasers and microwave sources)
ON-BOARD ISOTOPE ENVIRONMENT
Provide secure, unbreakable storage of isotope (tracers and capsules) both in launch and operational configurations
Establish laboratory protection equipment (filters, detectors, glove boxes, airlocks, etc ) consistent with the type and
quantity of isotope and tracers likely to be used in a given laboratory
Provide thermal shielding to protect personnel from high temperature isotope capsules
Consider locating laboratories using isotope tracers, in zero-g portions of the vehicle in order to preclude contamination
(spills) resulting from the loss of artificial "g" capability
Consider locating laboratories with high tracer and isotope concentrations, in isolatable, removable modules to preclude
general internal contamination of large permanent portions of the Space Base
GENERAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
Consider curtailing experiment operation through major portions of the South Atlantic Anomaly and portions of the
polar regions to prevent dynamic interference/data degradation (eg , FPE 5 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26)
Provide experiment data screening procedures for experiments sensitive to South Atlantic Anomaly interference
Provide regular resupply of photographic film and emulsions (e g , 25 to 50 days for ASA > 400 and up to 200 days
for ASA < 80)
Provide for entire replacement of high speed film (ASA > 400) supply after an intense solar proton event
GAMMA AND NEUTRON ENVIRONMENTi
Plan experiment module deployment trajectory to minimize approach to and stay in high radiation areas around
Space Base reactors |
Consider neutron and gamma sensitivity of experiments on detached modules when selecting deployment location
and minimum approach to Space Base
Restrict rendezvous separation distances from reactors when transporting unprocessed film
Consider RNS approach and departure trajectories in selecting detached module deployment position to allow
minimization and anticipation of experiment interference j
ISOTOPE SOURCES AND DYNAMIC GENERATORS
Provide for intact return to earth, of isotopes and contaminated waste, for disposal
I
Consider locating laboratories using dynamic generators or isotopes in low traffic areas to minimize exposure of
the crew
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to maximize film life on board the Space Base, film must be stored in a shielded container.
Storing a dosimeter along with the film would allow evaluation of the condition of a particular
batch of film and enhance the flexibility of the experiment program between film resupply periods.
Similar consideration is indicated by the wide range of sensitivity to radiation exhibited by candi-
date Bioscience experiment specimens (Table 6-5). Those specimens particularly sensitive to
radiation should be monitored by dosunetry to ascertain whether observed effects may be due to
radiation.
Design for Reactor and Isotope Interference (Gamma and Neutron) - Certain portions of the ex-
periment program - predominantly those associated with the astronomy discipline - are particu-
larly sensitive to the radiation environment generated by the reactor power module or isotope
sources. Those experiments whose measurements could be degraded by gamma or neutron radia-
tion from sources on board the Space Base should be considered for detached module implementa-
tion. The source of these radiations are the reactor power modules of the Base and isotope cap-
sules which may be associated with the experiment program. However, should back-up electrical
power be provided by an isotope system (such as isotope-Brayton), experiment sensitivity and
location could be significantly altered due to the gamma and neutron environment associated with
these isotopes, e. g., Pu-238, Cm-244.
Design for Dynamic Generators - Dynamic generators (e. g., X-ray equipment) which may be
associated with the experiment program must be designed to provide a minimum hazard to the
Space Base program. Shielding and interlocks must be provided to protect crew members work-
ing with the equipment and also crew members in adjacent compartments and interfacing vehicles
(should the equipment be pointed to the exterior of the Space Base vehicle). Once the design has
been established, the configuration should be restricted from relocation and reorientation that
could negate the safeguards that had been implemented.
In addition to crew protection considerations, the shielding and facility design should consider
the possibility of other sensitive experiments which could be located in nearby compartments.
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Design for Tracers and Isotope Sources - The extent of the protection equipment required asso-
ciated with the use and storage of isotope tracers and capsules depends primarily on the quality
of isotope/tracer to be used/stored in the vehicle (see Section 7.3.2). One of the prime con-
siderations is the decontamination procedures which would have to be implemented in the event
of release of isotope/tracer material in the Space Base. Storing of Isotope tracers in zero "g"
portions of the Base may preclude contamination (spills) resulting from termination or loss of
artificial "g" capability. While it would seem to be considerably easier to implement conven-
tional decontamination techniques in an artificial "g" environment, an unexpected loss of this
environment could easily result in a tracer spill. In any event decontamination techniques will
have to be developed for zero "g" operations. A concept which could facilitate decontamination
if a large release of isotope should occur involves the use of isolatable/removable modules. All
isotope/tracer work and equipment could be located in this type of experiment module. In the
event of isotope release, requiring extensive decontamination, the module could be returned to
earth, by the Shuttle, for conventional decontamination.
Experiment Operations - The implementation of operational considerations associated with the
experiment program can make a significant contribution towards the objectives of (I) minimizing
data degradation and interference and (2) minimizing the radiation exposure to personnel.
Experiment planning indicates the necessity to shut-off experiments or ignore data collected
from experiments sensitive to the South Atlantic anomaly environment. The sensitivity of film
carried as part of the experiment program requires regular resupply and care must be exer-
cised in deploying detached experiment modules containing film.
Experiment sensitivity to reactor radiation is crucial in planning detached module orbits in rela-
tion to the Space Base. Although parameters such as operating range, observation time, and
communication power requirements are significant design considerations, the data from sensitive
experiments can be negated if the minimum approach distance to the reactors is not controlled.
A similar problem exists where the RNS radiation field is the source of the interference. Opera-
tionally, the dose from an arriving or departing RNS should be minimized with respect to the de-
ployed experiment modules, as well as the Space Base.
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Nuclear material associated with the experiment modules should be returned to earth for re-
covery. The use of the Shuttle for nuclear system transportation, recovery and disposal is
discussed in Volume IV of this study.
The radiation exposure of crew members and the hazards that could be initiated by untrained
personnel should be minimized by appropriate location of isotope and tracer sources in low
traffic and specially designated areas.
6.3.1.5 Reactor Power Module Environment Effects During Special Operations
The direct radiation effects associated with operation of the reactor at the nominal power level
of 330 kWt have been evaluated in the previous sections, in conjunction with the natural radia-
tion environment. In addition to these predominant considerations, other reactor power module
operating conditions and thermal characteristics may have an impact on the Space Base Program
operations and equipments.
6.3.1. 5.1 Alternate Reactor Conditions Effects
Two alternate reactor modes are of interest 1) the reactor shutdown after normal operation and
2) the reactor operated at the "emergency" power level.
Post Operation Shutdown. The radiation field from a shutdown reactor is due primarily
to the accumulated fission product inventory and the activated NaK coolant. The radiation
environment, in the habitable regions of the Space Base, produced by a shutdown reactor
is significantly less than that produced when the reactor is operating. The shutdown
* -4
reactor contribution is approximately 7x10 mrem/hr as opposed to 0.5 mrem/hr per
reactor during operation. However, the shutdown reactor will presumably require ser-
vicing or replacement that may require operations near the lightly shielded end of the
reactor. In this area the combination of the fission product inventory and activated cool-
ant produce a substantial radiation environment. Figure 6-23 shows the environment in
the vicinity of the shutdown reactor. This figure includes the dose contribution from the
other operating reactor assuming operation at an emergency power level of 600 kWt.
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However, the contribution of this operating reactor to the environment shown in Figure
6-23, is on the order of 10 mrem/hr. Therefore, the fission product and activated coolant
dose from the shutdown reactor predominates early after shutdown. Dose rates early
after shutdown range from 2 to 200 rem/hr in areas close to the shutdown reactor. Such
an environment would pose a severe hazard to personnel attempting servicing operations
even aboard a vehicle such as the Tug or Shuttle. Special procedures such as allowing
fission products to decay, establishing approach corridors and providing special shield-
ing would have to be implemented to minimize the hazard of overexposure to excessive
gamma radiation. These procedures are discussed in Sections 7. 3. 3 and 7.3. 4, Reactor
Maintenance, Repair and Disposal.
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Figure 6-23. Radiation Dose Rate 2 Meters from Center of Shutdown Reactor
as a Function of Time after Reactor Shutdown
Emergency Power Operation. The Space Base Electrical Power System may have the
capability of increasing the normal reactor thermal power level in order to counteract
the loss of electrical power that would occur during normal replacement or failure of one
of the reactors. The thermal power level would be increased to approximately 600 kWt
or nearly double the normal operating power level. As a result, the radiation environment
on the Space Base will vary only slightly and the reactor contribution to the general radi-
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ation environment around the vehicle will be essentially unchanged. Local radiation levels
in the vicinity of the lightly shielded area of the reactor will vary somewhat from normal,
however, these areas are restricted to normal traffic in any case. Therefore, the Space
Base operations and environment would essentially be unaffected by the shift of reactor
power to approximately double the normal thermal power level,provided this power mode
is only implemented with one reactor shutdown.
6. 3.1.5. 2 Thermal Interference Effects
The Reactor Power Module rejects waste heat though radiators which, for the Brayton
cycle conversion system, operate in the range of 350 to 500 K (165 to 440 F). This
condition poses a potential hazard to EVA activities in the area of the radiators and also
may interfere with terminal rendezvous operations.
Although nuclear radiation levels would allow restricted EVA in the area of the reactor
radiators, contact with the hot radiator surfaces must be avoided during EVA in order
to avoid suit degradation and subsequent depressurization. If high temperature radiators
(>800 K) were to be employed, access around the radiator would be more restrictive
due to the more intense IR radiations.)
Consideration has been given to using infra-red (ER) scanners and sensors as part of the
attitude reference system of such vehicles as the Shuttle and detached (subsatellite) experi-
ment modules. Since the reactor radiators present a significant source of IR radiation,
they could provide spurious targets to IR horizon sensors and thereby disrupt attitude con-
trol during terminal rendezvous maneuvers. Horizon scanners which scan a wide field of
view would likely intercept this false source of IR. Therefore, vehicles which rendezvous
with the Space Base should be equipped with an attitude control reference which is insensi-
tive to the radiator IR sources, or be restricted to a terminal approach trajectory which
would preclude interference from the reactor radiators.
6.3.1.5.3 Design and Operational Considerations for Special Operations
Table 6-7 summarizes the guidelines for special Power Module operation environments.
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Table 6-7. Reactor Power Module Special Environmental Conditions -
Design and Operating Guidelines
DESIGN
• Consider special gamma shielding for Shuttle or Tug crew if immediate reactor servicing is required after shutdown
• Consider use of attitude control reference components in experiments and interfacing vehicles which are insensitive to radiator
IR sources
OPERATIONS
• Allow reactor Power Module fission products to decay prior to performing operations near reactor docking interface
• Operation of a reactor Power Module at the emergency levels (600 kWt) should be restricted to an individual module to
minimize the effects due to radiation
• Contact with thermally hot radiator surfaces must be avoided during crew EVA
• Consider restrictions in terminal approach trajectories of experiments and interfacing vehicles to preclude IR interference
6.3.1.6 Interfacing Vehicle Radiation Environment Effects
The Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS), the Orbital Propellant Storage Depot (OPSD) and
Detached Experiment Modules are interfacing vehicles associated with the Space Base
Program, which may generate a nuclear radiation environment. The RNS would employ
a NERVA-type rocket engine with its associated nuclear reactor. The OPSD may be pro-
^\
vided with a nuclear reactor power system although the reactor and power conversion sys-
tem are as yet undefined. Consideration has also been given to Detached Experiment Modules
incorporating radioisotopes in the Electrical Power Systems.
6. 3.1. 6.1 Reusable Nuclear Shuttle Radiation Effects
The Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS) poses a potential hazard to the Space Base under two
operating conditions: thrusting and shutdown loiter. Since the baseline RNS operation
orbit is 480 km at a 31. 5 degree inclination -(Reference 6-13), the interactions with the Space
Base at a 55 degree inclination would depend upon respective launch times and orbital per-
turbations to produce encounters at the intersection of the orbit planes. The alternate
nominal 30-degree inclination Space Base orbit would provide for more frequent orbital
encounters. Therefore, the consideration of the RNS interactions with the Space Base
was based on this latter premise.
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RNS Thrusting. While the RNS is thrusting out of earth oribt, two potential sources of
excessive radiation exist. The first is direct radiation from the RNS reactor. The in-
tensity of this radiation is dependent on the distance from the RNS and the attitude of the
RNS with respect to the line of sight to the Space Base. The latter consideration is due to
the variation in shielding around the RNS. The second source of radiation is gaseous
fission products which diffuse through the fuel matrix or particulate fission products re-
sulting from corrosion of the fuel. (See Section 6.3.2.2. 1.) The products may then be
expelled in the rocket exhaust causing the exhaust plume to be radioactive (Reference 6-14).
Evaluation of the accumulated dose to a manned space vehicle, has been performed (Refer-
ence 6-2) for a "Leave Earth Maneuver" with the manned vehicle initially 1190 km (640 nm)
ahead of or behind the RNS at start-up. The accumulated depth dose for these two positions
was calculated to be 0.1 mrem and 2. 3 mrem respectively. It is estimated that a startup
as close as 19 km (10 nm) from the Space Base would result in an accumulated depth dose
of at least 250 mrem. This implies that the RNS should be maintained at a position greater
than 19 km (10 nm) from the Space Base at initial start-up in order to minimize crew dose
and maintain depth does below the 200 mrem/day yearly average. With the implementation
of suitable operating procedures, the RNS thrusting mode should pose a negligible hazard
to the crew of the Space Base. These doses would also pose no threat of permanent damage
to Space Base support subsystems. However, passage of the thrusting shuttle as close as
18,500 km (10, OOP nm), line-of-sight, to sensitive experiment modules (e. g. FPE 5. 5)
would cause temporary experiment interference. Preliminary analysis (Reference 6-14)
indicates that passage through the RNS expanded plume (contrail) should pose a negligible
hazard to the Space Base, since a total dose per passage of less than 7 mrem is predicted.
However, intermittent experiment interference for those experiments susceptible to gamma
ray interference must be anticipated.
RNS Loiter. In order to fully utilize the capability of the RNS and Space Base/Station
vehicles, it may be desirable to have the RNS loiter in the vicinity of a Space Base while
accomplishing crew or material transfer. During such loiter maneuvers, the RNS will
constitute a source of gamma radiation due to its fission product inventory. The strength
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of the radiation source diminishes as a function of time after shutdown, as the fission pro-
ducts decay. Due to the characteristics of the RNS shielding provided for crew protection,
the dose rate due to fission products varies as a function of view angle around the RNS.
This variation is shown in Figure 6-24. Figure 6-25 shows the actual fission product dose
rate at the 90 degree view angle position, 100m(330 ft) from the RNS, as a function of time
after shutdown. It can be seen that high dose rates can be encountered even after significant
shutdown times unless advantage is taken of the RNS shielding. This can be accomplished
by maintaining the RNS attitude such that it points toward the Space Base with the engine
pointing away from the Base. Even in this attitude, gamma ray sensitive experiments on
detached modules must be kept at sufficient distance to avoid interference with measurements.
Separation distances on the order of 30 km (16 nm) would be required for those sensitive
experiments which could not be kept forward of the shield. Similarly, logistic vehicles such
as the Space Tug and the Shuttle should rendezvous with the RNS from the maximum shielded
direction in order to avoid unnecessary exposure of crew and passengers.
6. 3.1.6.2 Orbital Propellant Storage Depot Radiation Effects
Since the Orbital Propellant Storage Depot (OPSD) lacks definition as to its reactor power
system and energy conversion mode, specifics of its impact on the Space Base Program
under normal operating conditions are not possible at this time. However, assuming that
the electrical power system would incorporate a reactor similar to the Space Base power
system with moderate shielding, the OPSD would induce similar effects to those discussed
in the previous sections. Since no direct contact is made between the Space Base and the
OPSD the influence of direct radiation on the crew and subsystems would tend to be negli-
gible if, for example, a separation distance on the order of 6 km is maintained. At this
distance the maximum dose rate at the Space Base due to the OPSD would be about 0. 01
mrem/hr, assuming a dose characteristic similar to that shown in Figure 3-12 of Section 3.
This dose rate is 2 to 3 orders of magnitude less than the natural environment dose rate. The
deployment of detached experiment modules must also be managed as discussed in Section
6.3.1.4 to avoid unacceptable experiment interference.
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While the OPSD cannot be neglected as a hazard source during normal operations, it
would appear that the implementation of a combination of design and operational features
(shielding,orbit selection and separation distance) would allow it to operate at a position
easily accessible to the Space Base (e. g., through use of the Space Tug) while posing
a negligible hazard to the Space Base.
6. 3.1.6.3 Detached Experiment Modules Radiation Effects
As discussed in Section 3. 8. 4, consideration has been given to incorporating isotope heat
sources with various energy conversion systems, as part of detached module electrical
power systems. These sources would produce neutron and gamma radiation environments.
As a result, dynamic interference could be induced in sensitive equipments on board the
detached modules and also on board the Space Base when the modules are docked for refur-
bishment. In addition, when docked to the Space Base, consideration must be given to pro-
viding shielding for the crew engaged in servicing the modules as well as personnel and
equipment in areas adjacent to the docking position.
The extent of the effects induced by modules which incorporate isotope systems depends
to a large extent on the power levels required and the efficiency of the energy conversion
system employed since these factors influence the total inventory of isotope fuel. Incorpo-
ration of shielding and limiting approach distance to radiation sensitive equipments can
minimize the radiological effects of isotope powered experiment modules on the Space Base
Program.
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6.3.1.6.4 Design and Operational Considerations for Interfacing Vehicle Radiation Effects
As noted in Section 3.8.3, several of the interfacing vehicles may incorporate nuclear power
sources. From a design and operational standpoint, it is important that the radiation field
from these sources be recognized, e. g., during rendezvous and docking, and in the deploy-
ment of radiation sensitive equipment. Table 6-8 presents the design and operational guide-
lines associated with the normal operation of interfacing vehicles.
Table 6-8. Design and Operations Guidelines for Interfacing Vehicle Radiation
Effects
DESIGN
• Consider auxiliary shielding of the crew engaged in servicing detached experiment modules containing nuclear sources
• Consider shielding of ad|acent/radiation sensitive areas of the Base when detached experiment modules are docked for
servicing '
OPERATIONS
• Establish and maintain maximum shielded approach corridors to orbital vehicles employing nuclear power systems to minimize
exposure of crew and experiment interference
• Establish minimum deployment range for vehicles utilizing nuclear power sources (eg , RNS start-up maintained at a position
> 19km from Base)
• Intermittent experiment interference must be anticipated when thrusting RNS type vehicles are in vicinity of Base
< 18,500km
• Restrict approach paths of vehicles employing IR (infrared) attitude control detectors to avoid interference from high
temperature sources
• Establish minimum approach distances during RNS thrusting (arrival and departure) to minimize crew exposure
• Establish minimum rendezvous distances with shutdown RNS based on RNS attitude control failure modes
6.3.1.7 Experiment Laboratory Induced Radiation Effects
6.3.1.7.1 Dynamic Generator Radiation Effects
The effects of the dynamic generators may be characterized according to whether these gen-
erators produce ionizing or non-ionizing radiation. X-ray machines would be typical of
those producing ionizing radiation whereas microwave generators (radar, microwave ovens,
etc.) and lasers would be typical of those producing non-ionizing radiation.
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The radiation effects due to x-ray exposure are similar to that characterized by gamma
radiation as described in the previous sections for biological and subsystem damage and
for experiment interference (see, for example, Figure 6-12, FPE 5.3). Since this equip-
ment is not expected to be used continuously, its operation could be programmed to accom-
modate sensitive experiments. Therefore, the primary concern is to insure adequate
procedures to prevent unauthorized operation and exposure and to provide adequate shield-
ing to prevent radiation streaming to adjacent habitation and experiment areas. Such
streaming to adjacent areas could cause spurious exposure of specimens and possibly
biased or degraded data.
Biological effects induced by microwave generators are subject to considerable discussion
(Reference 6-15}. Evidence indicates that cataract formation may be induced. Whole body
effects caused by heating when exposed to high power levels result in brain and other organ\
damage. However, some studies of radar workers who have been continuously exposed over
several years indicate no detrimental effects (Reference 6-15). In terms of frequency, the
range from 2000-3000 MHz represents the greatest hazard for cataract production. United
2
States standards for microwave exposure is currently 10 mW/cm .
Laser equipment represents high intensity light and is a hazard to the eye. The threshold
2level for damage to the retina is 0.1 joules/cm . Precautions are necessary (procedures
warnings, shielding, etc.) to prevent inadvertent exposures of the crew during operations
where lasers are operating.
6. 3.1. 7.2 Open Isotope Sources Radiation Effects
Tracer elements have been identified as possible open isotope sources, i. e., usable with-
out primary containment, e. g., injected into specimens. Because of the generally small
quantities involved (microcurie inventories) there is no hazard from direct radiation.
However, the use of these elements can lead to contamination of the Space Base or spurious
experimental results due to lack of management of the products of their use. For example,
excreta and tissue from biological specimens as well as contaminated trash must be segre-
gated from the central waste management system to avoid undesirable tracer dosage to
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other specimens and the crew in general, e. g. from recycled water. Also, gaseous
by-products such as CO generated as the result of using a Carbon-14 tracer must be
prevented from release to the general Space Base environment if quantities involved would
approach maximum permissible concentrations or interfere with experimental results
(see Sections 6. 3.2. 3 and 7.3. 2). The precautions against excessive release would pre-
clude interference with End-of-Mis si on (EOM) operations. As a matter of environmental
policy it is desirable to return tracer inventories to earth for disposal.
6.3.1. 7.3 Closed Isotope Source Effects
Isotope capsules containing various inventories of isotope may be used as heaters for equip-
ment thermal control, waste management system pyrolysis units, etc. The effect of these
sources under normal operation is to locally increase the direct radiation environment.
Evaluation of one current concept of a waste management system (Reference 6-5) identified
in Section 6.3.1.1 indicates that properly shielded implementation of a 400 watt (thermal)
Pu-238 capsule would not duly perturb the total local radiation environment on the Space
Base. The effects of higher fuel loadings would have to be evaluated using the techniques
described in Section 6.3.1. In addition to radiation, these sources can also represent a high
temperature hazard for which protection must be provided.
6.3.1. 7.4 Design and Operational Considerations for Induced Radiation Effects
Table 6-9 summarizes some of the key guidelines for the accommodation of induced radia-
tion generators.
6.3.2 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS EVALUATION
The accident conditions and associated hazard sources have been previously identified in
Table 6-2. The results of an evaluation of the hazardous effects of these conditions is
presented in the following sections.
6.3.2.1 Reactor Power Module Accidents Radiation Effects
An identification of potentent power module accidents is contained in Section 7.2.1. The
radiation effects of reactor power module accidents are discussed below.
Damage to the shield in orbit can occur through puncture by meteorites, or collision with
space debris or vehicles. The damage may range from a small puncture to possible.
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Table 6-9. Design and Operations Guidelines for Induced Radiation Effects
DESIGN
• Provide shielding to prevent radiation streaming from dynamic generators to adjacent habitation and experiment areas
• Provide capability to prevent inadvertent laser beam exposure of the crew (particularly eyes) during laser operations (e g ,
shielding, warning devices)
• Provide segregated waste management systems where isotope tracers are to be disposed of in biological waste and water
• Prevent release of tracer gaseous by-products (such as CO2 from C-14 tracer) into the general Base environment
• Provide localized shielding of small isotope heat sources within Base modules
• Consider thermal protection where isotope heat sources are employed
OPERATIONS
• Prevent unauthorized operation of dynamic (induced) radiation generators ,
• Provide restrictive procedures (location, viewing, etc ) during laser operation
• Provide for the return to earth of tracer and isotope inventories
complete removal of a large portion of the radiation shield. Collisions severe enough
to penetrate the radiators and remove significant portions of the shield would be of such
; magnitude that the collisions would by themselves alert the Base of an emergency situation.
; Small penetrations by meteorites would be undetectable without some instrumentation and
therefore could result in a continuous rise in radiation level at the Space Base.
Meteorite penetrations of the shield would likely be restricted to the outer LiH neutron
shield. Considering the meteorite environment (Reference 6-16) and the reference shield
configuration (Figure 3-10, Section 3. 8. 2.1), it is extremely unlikely that meteoric particles
would have sufficient energy to penetrate the radiator, LiH clad, LiH and the 9 to 15 cm of
Tungsten gamma shield. Therefore, the results of a small shield puncture would be pri-
marily a change in the neutron environment due to the damage to the LiH neutron shield.
When LiH is exposed to vacuum at operating temperature, hydrogen dissociates from the
Li (Reference 6-3) reducing the effectiveness of the neutron shielding. Based on this
dissociation rate, Figure 6-26 shows the resulting increase in neutron dose and dose rate
as a function of time after penetration. As can be seen from this figure, the hydrogen is
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Figure 6-26. Accumulated Neutron Dose and Neutron Dose Rate
after LiH Shield Puncture
essentially depleted approximately 1100 hours after the puncture occurs and the dose rate
levels off to approximately 2 rem/hr. Figure 6-27 shows the total integrated dose at the
Space Base (60 meters from the reactors) including the dose to the eye and the depth dose
from the natural trapped radiation environment (Figure 3-7). The allowable 30-day dose
levels are also indicated (see Section 4.2). These allowable levels are not exceeded
providing a major solar flare does not occur during this period. The data of Figure 6-27
indicates that no immediate danger exists from a small LiH shield puncture. However,
the situation must eventually be detected and corrected since unacceptably high dose levels
would be accumulated ~ 900 hours after the penetration occurs. Since the reactor power
module would have to be shut down and replaced in order to permanently resolve the hazard,
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even a small shield puncture would constitute a "safety marginal" hazard category. Since
the LiH portion of the shield material would presumably be composed of multiple sealed
compartments of LiH, early detection of a puncture could be determined by pressure sen-
sors located in each compartment. In addition, a slow increase in neutron dose rate could
be detected by the instrumentation associated with the On-board Radiological Safety Program
(see Section 7. 3.1).
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Should a larger collision remove a portion of the external LiH shield, the total dose rate
on-board the Base would be instantaneously increased by approximately 2.3 rem/hr. Such
a dose rate is well above the daily allowable rate and would require prompt response, i. e.
shutdown or jettison of the reactor, in order to minimize crew exposure. However, several
hours would be available before portions of the crew would accumulate sufficient dose to
eventually become incapacitated (see Appendix A, Section A.5). Although no immediate
damage or injury to personnel would occur, the hazard should be categorized "safety
critical" in order to minimize crew exposure.
A third possibility is a collision with a sufficiently large piece of debris or a space vehicle
that would remove at least a portion of the entire shield (both neutron and gamma shielding),
exposing the bare reactor. Under such conditions, the dose rate at the Space Base could be
as high as 700 rem/hr. Such a dose rate is intolerable for periods longer than approxi-
mately four minutes. Longer periods of exposure would result in some members of the
crew to exhibit partial incapacitation (vomiting), during the next 24 hours (see Appendix A,
Section A-5). Therefore, the reactor power module must be immediately shut down and/or
jettisoned. Shutdown with the reactor power module remaining at the power module mount
would still result in a maximum dose rate of approximately 40 rem/hr from the fission pro-
duct inventory and indicates that the reactor power module must not only be shut down
within about 4 minutes, but jettisoned within about a half hour to avoid incapacitating the
crew. Such an accident would represent a "Safety Critical" hazard.
Considering these last two damage conditions, an impact of the magnitude sufficient to
destroy major portions of the reactor shield would also be likely to damage mechanisms
which could effect shutdown of the reactor. Therefore, jettisoning and neutron poison
injection (see Section 7.3. 4) may be the only means of avoiding overexposure or safing the
system under these circumstances.
It should be noted, however, that the probability of such a collision with orbital debris is
relatively small. Analyses of collision probabilities based on the NORAD satellite catalog
(Reference 6-17) indicates that the probability of the Space Base colliding with a piece of
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orbital debris or orbital vehicle in a 10-year mission is approximately 1.18 x 10 . Since
the reactors/shields provide a much smaller target, the probability of either reactor/shield
-4being struck over a 10-year period is about 5x10 . The probability of the severe damage
postulated above is even less since the damage depends on the relative velocity, the location
of impact point, etc.
6. 3.2.1. 2 Activated NaK Coolant Release Effects
There are three sources of NaK (sodium potassium eutectic - 78 percent Potassium) in the
Reactor/Brayton cycle power conversion system (see Figure 3-4) coolant loops:
• Reactor Primary Loop
• Intermediate Loop
• Waste Heat Rejection Loop
Alternative Brayton cycle systems which could be employed may utilize organic coolants
in the Intermediate and Waste Heat Rejection Loops rather than NaK. In any case, due to
the high neutron fluxes encountered in the reactor, the primary loop NaK coolant is acti-
vated. Radioactive decay of the activated NaK results in a gamma ray environment. The
activation of the Intermediate and Waste Heat Rejection Loop coolant is negligible due to the
low neutron fluxes encountered outside the reactor shield.
Release of NaK to the environment around the Space Base is of concern because of potential
deposition of NaK on the spacecraft and the ensuing potential structural corrosion, equip-
ment contamination and possible interference with EVA activity. In the case of activated
NaK, the additional hazard due to radiation must be considered as well as those previously
mentioned. Therefore, the release of activated NaK is considered here since it encompasses
all the potential hazards.
Rate of release of activated NaK may range from a slow leak due to a meteorite puncture,
to a spontaneous total release if a destructive reactor excursion were to occur (see Section
6. 3.2.1. 5). In order to obtain a Quantitative "feel" for the radiation effects due to activated
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NaK release, it was assumed that the total NaK primary loop inventory iwas dispersed
uniformly and spherically and was deposited uniformly on Space Base modules that en-
countered the expansion. It was further assumed that the equilibrium activated NaK
inventory at the 330 kWt reactor operating point is 700 curies.
Based on these assumptions, the initial dose rate at the artificial "g" modules would be
approximately 32 mrem/hr. Since the effective decay constant of the NaK is approximately
—51. 28 x 10 /sec the total dose accumulated due to the NaK decay is approximately 0. 7 rem.
Based on these assumptions it appears that deposition of activated NaK on the habitable
portions of the Space Base would not pose a severe radiation hazard to the crew. Experi-
ments which are sensitive to gamma ray interference may exhibit degradation of data.
However, the overall integrated dose and dose rate would be too low to result in permanent
radiation damage to subsystems.
The non-nuclear hazards associated with interactions of the deposited NaK with the Space
Base structure and equipments depends primarily on the temperature of the NaK when de-
posited and then the quantity deposited. Data (Reference 6-18) indicates that NaK exhibits
long term compatibility with aluminum and aluminum alloys up to about 500 K (440 F).
Therefore, there is the possibility that no excessive corrosion of the Space Base structure
would occur. However, the eventual surface temperature may be determined by the potential
degradation of thermal control coatings which could then cause a rise in temperature above
the compatibility levels. The concept of strippable thermal coatings (Ref 6-19 and 6-20)
for long-term thermal control system maintenance might provide a solution to this condition.
An additional consideration is the effect on personnel engaged in EVA. Again, the hazards
here are (1) direct radiation depending upon the quantity released and the release mechanism
(spontaneous or slow) as well as (2) compatibility with the space suit. Space Base opera-
tions would preclude EVA when a NaK coolant release is suspected (reduction in coolant
loop pressure or flow rate). Consideration should be given to providing an EVA suit which
would be compatible with NaK in order to allow emergency EVA activity to be accomplished
safely in the event of NaK release.
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The effect of NaK released to the Space Base environment depends primarily on the quantity
and temperature of the NaK released and the quantity deposited in a given location. As a
result, the hazard category may vary from safety negligible (release of minute quantities)
to safety critical (large release, large quantity at high temperature deposited in localized
area, with subsequent structural corrosion).
6. 3. 2.1.3 Fission Products in NaK Coolant Release Radiation Effects
The previous section discussed the radiobiological hazards involved with the release of
activated NaK and related NaK hazards. An additional consideration is the release of
activated NaK which contains fission products. This fission product release may be brought
about by various combinations of events (see Appendix C) but requires that the reactor fuel
element cladding is breached in some manner. The mechanisms for release of the contami-
nated NaK would of course be the same as described in the previous section. The differ-
ence in the total effect would be the additional radiation field caused by the fission products
entrained in the released NaK.
The severity of the effect of the release of fission products will depend on the quantity
j
.
actually released. The actual quantity released under a given failure would vary with the
number of fuel elements affected, the quantity of fission products released to the NaK in
the primary loop, the length of time the breached fuel element condition persisted and the
magnitude of the NaK release. For a gross release, such as the destructive excursion
discussed in Section 6. 3. 2.1.5, data exists which allows some approximation of the fraction
of the fission product inventory released (Reference 6-21) and therefore an estimate as to
the extent of the effects involved. However, no comparable data is readily available that
would allow a quantitative evaluation of the effects resulting from slow leakage of fission
products into the NaK and their subsequent release. Therefore, for the purposes of this
evaluation, only a qualitative assessment of the effects of released fission products in the
coolant was attempted.
From the standpoint of exposure to direct radiation and experiment dynamic interference,
the fission products are predominantly a source of gamma-rays. Consequently, the Space
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Base structure will be relatively ineffective in shielding these gamma rays as compared
to electrons (Beta radiation). The hazardous condition would have to be detected (see
Section 7. 3.1) and corrective action taken in order to protect the crew. Such action would
also preclude exposure of subsystems to a permanently damaging dose. However, equip-
ment and experiments sensitive to gamma radiation are likely to exhibit interference.
From the previous discussion, it is apparent that a considerable range of effects could be
experienced. Depending on the severity of damage, i. e., the quantity of fission products
released, the hazard category could range from "safety negligible" to "safety critical" as
in the case of the activated NaK without the fission products.
6. 3. 2.1. 4 Non-Destructive Reactor Excursion Radiation Effects
A reactor excursion is the unplanned operation of the reactor above its normal operating
point resulting in higher thermal power and higher radiation fluxes. A non-destructive
excursion would result from controlling the excursion, i. e. partial or complete shutdown
of the reactor, either through safeguards (see Section 7) or due to the inherent charac-
teristics of the reference ZrH reactor (see Section 3.2.2.1) so that the reactor remains
mechanically intact. Assuming that these conditions are fulfilled the sole result of the
event is a momentarily increased radiation level in the vicinity of the Space Base. Since
the reactor is assumed to remain structurally intact,these radiation levels would be attenu-
ated by the reactor shield.
In estimating the magnitude of a possible excursion, the rationale described in Volume in,
Part 2, Section 4.1 and data from References 6-21 and 6-22 were used. It was assumed that
the "worst case" non-destructive excursion could be nearly the same magnitude as that as-
sumed for the maximum credible destructive excursion, i. e. 100 MW-sec.
Based on these assumptions, the total dose due to the excursion would be on the order of
0. 04 mrem, which is negligible. The maximum dose rate to subsystems and experiments
would be on the order of 100 rad/hr. As pointed out in Section 4, the only subsystem equip-
ment likely to be dose rate sensitive are equipments such as star trackers. However, the
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effect is simply degraded data (noise) which would be of negligible consequence since the
duration would be 1 millisecond or less. The same would be true in the case of radiation
sensitive experiments.
Since the reactor power module may be shut down after such an event with corresponding
reduction in electrical power availability the category of the hazard would be at most
"safety marginal. " In the event that the Space Base Electrical Power System possessed an
emergency power mode, such as discussed in Section 3.2.2.1, the hazard category would be
"safety negligible," since full functional capability would be retained.
6. 3.2.1. 5 Destructive Reactor Excursion Radiation Effects
This section represents a preliminary assessment of the effects of a destructive reactor ex-
cursion, in orbit. (Section 5.1.1.2 discusses effects during the prelaunch phase and Section
6.2 of Volume III Part 3 of this study discusses the terrestrial nuclear safety aspects of me
event.) The destructive excursion is considered to be an event similar to that described in
the previous section with the exception that the magnitude and/or duration of the energy re-
lease is sufficient to cause mechanical/structural disassembly of the reactor. Design features
associated with the reference ZrH Reactor greatly reduce the likelihood of a destructive re-
actor excursion. However, characteristics and failure modes of as yet undefined auxiliary
systems (such as the on-board reactor control system) and unplanned, but possible, events
(such as collisions) may occur, which could lead to a destructive excursion. Therefore, the
emphasis in determining the effects of the postulated events has been placed on estimating the
magnitude of the hazards and the time period available for instituting corrective procedures
following a destructive excursion.
In estimating the effects of a destructive excursion, the following sources of radiation
were postulated:
1. Increased radiation due to operating power level during the excursion.
2. An expanding fission product cloud (particulate and gases) and activated NaK
cloud around the Space Base following disassembly of the reactor.
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3. Deposited fission products and activated NaK on the portions of the Space
Base passing through the cloud.
4. Reactor debris remaining in the vicinity of the Space Base.
From the standpoint of the response time available, the initial pulse of radiation during
the excursion along with the expanding fission product and NaK cloud are important since
they take place over a very short period of time. The deposited fission products, NaK
and the resulting reactor debris will affect the long term radiation environment around
the Space Base.
Excursion Prompt Radiation Effects. As seen in the previous section, the radiation dose
and dose rates during a non-destructive reactor excursion cause little effect on the Space
Base, providing the reactor shield remains intact. However, in the case of a destructive
excursion, the actual position of the shield during the first few milliseconds of the excur-
sion and of break-up of the reactor is extremely important in determining the radiation
dose experienced at the Space Base. Should the shield be removed or cracks occur during
the actual power pulse, the prompt dose rate at the extremes of the habitable area of the
Base could range from 40 rem to 120 rem (see Volume III, Part 2, Section 4.4.2).
Since one of the mechanisms for terminating the excursion is the actual break-up and dis-
tortion of the critical assembly, it is conceivable that at least cracks could occur in the
shield assembly. However, due to the massive nature of the shield.it is questionable
whether large portions of the shield could be removed during the time period over which
the actual excursion takes place. Therefore, it is possible that some areas of the Space
Base could be exposed to very high radiation doses but doubtful that the entire crew would
receive these doses during the excursion. A percentage of those personnel nearest the
reactors, who are exposed to the high dose levels (120 rem) would experience some incap-
acitation (vomiting) during the first ten hours after exposure (see Appendix A and Section
4.1.2).
Fission Product and NaK Cloud Radiation Effects. To estimate the effect of the initial
release of the fission products and NaK it was assumed that fission product particulate
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and gases along with the entire activated NaK inventory in the primary loop was iso-
tropically released at the end of the power excursion. The fraction of the fission product
inventory released as fines and particulate was assumed to be approximately 20 percent
based on the SNAPTRAN-2 destructive test results (Reference 6-23). The primary source
of radiation from the expanding cloud is the gamma radiation component from the fission
products. The activiated NaK component is initially much smaller and is only considered
from the standpoint of deposition on the modules.
The fission product radiation may be divided into two components: those created during the
excursion, and the inventory due to the normal power operation of the reactor (Vol HI Part 2
Section 4.2.2). The cloud composed of these two components was assumed to expand in a
spherical, isotropic manner according to the analysis shown in Reference 6-24.
The resulting dose from the passing cloud is shown in Figure 6-28. The total inte-
grated dose from the expanding cloud is approximately 6 rem. As shall be seen, this dose
is small compared to other dose sources that follow a destructive excursion. However,
since the bulk of the expansion is over in a matter of seconds, interference with equipments4 rdue to the high dose rates of gamma radiation (3 x 10 rad/hr) would be likely.
Deposited Fission Products and NaK Radiation Effects. In Sections 6. 3. 2.1.2 and 6. 3. 2.1. 3
the effects of released NaK and fission products were discussed. Based on the results of
the SNAPTRAN-2 tests (Reference 6-23) and the model for the gaseous and particulate cloud
expansion (Reference 6-24) the time-line effects of deposited Nak and fission products may
be assessed.
It was assumed that the NaK and fission products, expanding in the manner described in
the previous section were deposited uniformly on Space Base projections encountered during
the expansion. From the baseline configuration, the artificial "g" modules represent the
largest projected area to the expansion and therefore radiation doses were based on a posi-
tion at the center of these modules. Figure 6-28 shows the accumulated dose as a function
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Figure 6-28. Dose Due to Dispersing Fission Products and NaK
function of time due to deposited fission products and NaK. As can be seen, the total dose
due to this source of radiation is approximately 26 rem one day after the excursion.
Radiation Effects from a Destructive Excursion and Associated Debris. The previous
sections have dealt with only 20 percent of the total fission product inventory of the reactor.
The remaining 80 percent is composed of "debris", that gaseous material (which has not
been released from the fuel) and the remaining solids, in the form of intact fuel elements
or "chunks" of fuel elements. The determination of the distribution of this debris is be-
yond the scope of this study. It is conceivable that the distribution could range from a
widespread dispersion in the vicinity of the Space Base, to the configuration where the
bulk of the debris remains at, or in the reactor power module due to the configuration of
the structure. This latter case was assumed in order to establish a quantitative "feel"
for the severity of the radiation from the reactor debris. In addition, it was assumed that
one fuel element was lodged at a position at the mid-point of the zero "g" axis of the Base.
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Based on these assumptions Figure 6-29 shows the time-line total dose, at the extremities
of the zero "g" axis from all radiation sources caused by the destructive excursion. Under
these conditions personnel in the habitable sections of the Space Base, closest to the reactor,
would receive an LD-10 dose (dose required to kill 10% of those exposed) within 1 minute
after the excursion occurred. If the conditions postulated persisted, personnel in this area
would receive an LD-90 dose in about three hours. It should be noted that Figure 6-29
does not include the dose that would be received from radiation during the excursion, if
the shield were damaged, so that at least locally more severe conditions could exist.
- NOTE DOSE FROM REACTOR RADIATION DURING EXCURSION NOT INCLUDED
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Figure 6-29. Total Radiation Dose Timeline at Space Base Extremities Due
to a Destructive Reactor Excursion
Summary. The effects descrihed in the preceding sections are highly dependent on the
distribution of the reactor debris after the excursions. The consequence of this dependence
can be illustrated by the different approaches to saving the crew that would have to be im-
plemented. If the debris were to remain primarily at the reactor mount, then promptly
jettisoning the power module (see Figure 6-29) would minimize the crew's exposure and
facilitate subsequent space rescue operations. If the majority of the debris were to be
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dispersed randomly about the Space Base, jettisoning the power module would have little
effect and the Space Base orbit would have to be promptly adjusted to leave the orbit of the
debris. In either case, it is likely that some of the crew would receive a lethal radiation
dose, and that the Base would be sufficiently contaminated that it would have to be abandoned.
These consequences indicate that a destructive reactor excursion must be categorized as
"safety catastrophic."
In addition to the effects on the Space Base, the orbiting debris may eventually cause
experiment interference in the detached experiment modules, and complicate their re-
trieval by the Shuttle.
6. 3. 2. 2 Interfacing Vehicle Accident Radiation Effects
6. 3. 2.2.1 Reusable Nuclear Shuttle Accident Radiation Effects
Three RNS accident conditions have been identified which could result in a potential hazard
to the Space Base Program. Two of these conditions, i. e., the fission product contami-
nation of the rocket plume and the destruction of the reactor, have been analyzed in Refer-
ence 6-14. The third, loss of attitude control is important during RNS maneuvers close to
the Space Base, and would generally apply only when the RNS and Space Base are in rendez-
vous compatible orbits.
Fission Product Ejection Radiation Effects. Fission products can be ejected from the RNS
engine either in the form of gaseous products diffusing through the fuel matrix, into a cool-
ant channel or as free fuel beads resulting from corrosion of the fuel. Analysis of the
resulting distribution in the rocket plume and the encounter of the Space Base with the fully
expanded contrail is discussed in Reference 6-14. The results of these analyses indicate
that a dose of about 7 mrem would be accumulated on board the Space Base during passage
through the contrail. This dose would have a negligible effect on crew safety.
Considering dose rate induced effects, the total passage time through the expanded con-
trail is about 450 sec., resulting in an average dose rate of about 56 mrem/hr. As a
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result, the photon flux would be on the order of 10 to 10 photon/cm -sec. This flux
would be sufficient to disrupt sensitive experiments (such as FPE 5.1) as they pass through
the contrail. Therefore, such experiments would have to be turned off or data ignored dur-
ing encounters with the thrusting RNS, if RNS plume contamination is detected. This will
not be a continuously recurring problem, since particulate fission products ejected from
the reactor plume are not expected to remain for long at orbit altitudes of about 500 km
(270 nm). This is due to the fact that the relative earth velocity of the ejecta would be
300 to 900 m/sec (1000 to 3000 ft/sec) much less than the characteristic orbital velocity
of approximately 7500 m/sec (Reference 6-14).
Destructive Disassembly Radiation Effects. A large portion of the fission product inventory
would be released in a loss of coolant accident, followed by destructive disassembly of the
RNS engine and reactor. The departure of the RNS is initiated from a position behind the
Space Base (relative to the orbital velocity) and at a separation distance, at startup, of at
y'
least 30 km (16 nm) (Reference 6-2). It is unlikely that an excursion of sufficient energy
•i
release could occur that would produce a catastrophic (lethal or debilitating) prompt radia-
tion dose to the Space Base over a 30 km (16 nm) separation distance. However, no data
exists which allows quantitative evaluation of this potential hazard. Analyses performed
in Reference 6-14 indicate that following the loss of coolant accident, the dose from fission
products to an astronaut on board the RNS would be on the order of 20 to 40 rem. The
separation distance from the Space Base should reduce the dose to Base personnel to a
level well below catastrophic conditions. The debris released could cause experiment
interference over long periods of time (several months) since the orbital residence time
of the debris is expected to be relatively long.
Loss of Attitude Control Radiation Effects. To maximize the utility of the RNS, it should
be capable of making approaches to the Space Base for the efficient transfer of cargo and
personnel. As pointed out in Section 6. 3.1. 3.1, this can be accomplished by maintaining
RNS attitude such that the Space Base is protected by the RNS shield. In the event of loss
of attitude control, the Base could be exposed to relatively high gamma radiation from the
RNS fission product inventory. As can be seen from Figure 6-25 dose rates could be as
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high as 250 rem/hr at a point 100m (330 ft) from the RNS. If loss of control persisted
for even a few minutes, Space Base operation (crew rotation schedule, gamma ray sensi-
tive experiments, etc.) would be disrupted. However, with a suitable selection of approach
distances and RNS attitude control system implementation, the hazards associated with the
occurrence of this accident in the vicinity of the Space Base can be minimized.
6. 3. 2.2.2 Orbital Propellant Storage Depot Accident Radiation Effects
It has been assumed that the OPSD will have an electrical power system with a reactor
similar to that employed on the Space Base. Therefore, the hazardous conditions associ-
ated with this reactor will be similar to those discussed in Section 6. 3.2.1. The initial
effects of these conditions on the Space Base will be less severe because of the separation
distance maintained between the two vehicles. However, dispersed radioactive debris
would interfere with experimentation and space operations in orbits which are close to the
OPSD orbit.
v
6.3.2.3 Experiment Laboratory Accident Radiation Effects
6. 3. 2.3.1 Dynamic Generator Accident Radiation Effects
The accidents associated with dynamic generators result primarily from inadvertent
turn-on while personnel are in an exposed area, or the intrusion of unauthorized pei'sonnel
\\
into a restricted area (either intravehicular or extravehicular) while equipment is Jt>eing
operated. The possible effects of exposure have already been discussed in Section 6. 3.1. 4
and would be the same under accident conditions. The nature of the possible radiological
accidents is such that control and minimization of the hazards can be accomplished by
\
appropriate administrative control, provided that design precautions for exposure control
under normal operation have been implemented (see Section 6. 3.1.4.1). These adminis-
trative controls would include warning signs, signals indicating equipment operation, equip-
%
ment access restrictions and restriction of general operations, if necessary, during equip-
ment operation.
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6. 3. 2. 3.2 Open Isotope Source Accident Radiation Effects
The primary accidental hazard source condition associated with the use of open isotope
sources is release of the isotope to the Space Base environment. This hazard differs
from the radiation hazards previously discussed in that internal rather than external
radiation exposure is considered. The consequences of the resulting hazard depends on
the isotope, the quantity released, the form of the isotope (solid, liquid gas, particulate)
and the location in the vehicle. (See Section 7. 3. 2.)
Knowing the isotope involved is important in establishing the critical organ effected,
e. g. bone, lung, thyroid gland, etc. The quantity released is of major importance since
it determines the degree of possible exposure. The form of the isotope (gas, particulate,
solution) relates to the severity of the hazard in the degree of dispersion that is to be ex-
pected and also, to some extent, the susceptible organs. Appendix A, Section A-5 dis-
cusses internal exposure and maximum permissible concentrations (MFC) for a variety
of radionuclides. (Vol IV Part 2 App.D also discusses some aspects of the risk of exposure
to various isotopes.) In terms of space application, the location of the isotope release in
a Space Base is important for dispersion and decontamination considerations. For example,
a release of liquid material in the artificial "g" section would more easily be isolated and
retrieved than in the zero "g" section of the vehicle.
Although present estimates of the quantity of isotopes tracers that would be carried on a
Space Base would be in micro-curie quantities, the MFC for continuous exposure could be
exceeded if large inventories of tracers were released. Since a wide variety of tracer
elements are expected to be used, the most important factor influencing the severity of the
V,
effects would be the quantity stored on-board, and as a result the hazards could range from
safety negligible to safety catastrophic. Equipment requirements and general handling
procedures for use with isotopes are discussed in Section 7.3.2.
6. 3. 2. 3. 3 Closed Isotope Source Accident Radiation Effects
Two accident source conditions associated with closed isotope sources (isotope capsules)
are 1) failure or removal of biological shielding which may be associated with the source,
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and 2) failure of the isotope encapsulation. The first of these would cause effects similar
to those described in previous sections for direct exposure to radiation. In addition, the
type of radiation (particles) would be similar to that of the reactor and natural radiation
environments since the most likely isotopes to be used would be Pu-238, Cm-244, Sr-90,
Co-60, etc. (See Reference 6-25.) Therefore, biological effects and subsystem and experi-
ment damage would be similar and assessment of effects would vary according to the par-
ticles emitted by the particular isotope and the quantity of isotope used on board.
Failure of the isotope encapsulation material results in the internal biological exposure
discussed in the previous section. This failure could range from failure of vents associated
with the release of decay product gases (e. g., in the case of Pu-238, the alpha emitter-Radon)
to release of isotope particulate matter. As in the case of the isotope tracers the severity of
the hazard would depend on the severity of the breach and the quantity of isotope or radioactive
gases released.
The design and operational considerations which are recommended to eliminate the hazards
or reduce the effects of the hazards just described are presented in Section 6. 3.2.4.
6.3.2.4 Design and Operational Considerations for Accident Radiation Effects
Many of the guidelines presented in the previous sections dealing with radiation effects during
normal operations apply under accident situations. Table 6-10 summarizes the key guidelines
for implementation for the accident situations discussed.
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Table 6-10. Design and Operations Guidelines for Accident Conditions
DESIGN
• Provide instrumentation to detect reactor shield punctures/damage
• Provide radiological instrumentation to detect increased radiation resulting from shield damage
• Consider use of reactor core neutron poison injection to provide reactor safmg
• Design for "no reactor excursion" capability
• Consider use of NaK compatible EVA crew space suits
• Consider use of strippable coatings on exterior surfaces of Base for ease of decontamination
• Provide NaK leak detection capability
• Consider a rapid response PM jettison capability *
• Consider prompt rescue capability of the entire Space Base crew
• Consider providing sufficient orbit adjust capability to rapidly change Space Base orbit altitude
OPERATIONS
• Restrict and control interfacing vehicle approach distances and attitudes
• Avoid EVA when NaK leaks are suspected
• Perform crew rescue when radiation levels in or around Base are intolerable
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SECTION 7
SPECIAL STUDIES
7.1 GENERAL
Several special design and operational studies were performed of a Space Base mission to
provide additional nuclear systems safety considerations for use in future manned space
programs.
7.2 NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN STUDIES
The reactor power modules are the largest single source of radiation from Space Base
program hardware. Therefore, emphasis has been placed on the hazards presented by re-
actor power modules and the design features important to nuclear system safety.
These studies address nuclear system safety aspects related to:
1. Accidents to Power Module which may cause a nuclear hazard
2. Reference Reactor Power Module Design Considerations
3. Power Module/Space Base Configuration
4. The Use of Alternate Power Conversion Systems
5. The Use of Alternate Reactors, and
6. Power Conversion System Configuration
The results of these studies are intended to provide the designer with guidelines to assess the
relative impact on nuclear safety of reactpr power module design features. Some options
which offer attractive nuclear safety advantages may adversely affect the system design,
performance, operations and cost. These considerations must be evaluated prior to actual
program implementation.
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7.2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS TO POWER MODULE WHICH MAY CAUSE
A NUCLEAR HAZARD
This report summarizes accidents occurring in or to the power module exclusive of the
reactor, which could conceivably result" in a nuclear hazard. The accident sequence is ex-
amined from the time it originates in, or impacts upon, the power module until the appear-
ance of the nuclear hazard. No attempt is made to identify all the accidents external to the
power module which may cause a failure. As an example, numerous explosive events in?
or near the Space Base could sever one of the coolant circuits in the power module. In this
study, me rupture of the cooling line is considered to be the accident rather than the original
explosion.
\
The basic definition of the power module was that described in Section 3 with additional sub-
systems and components assumed to complete the system. Table 7-1 lists the subsystems
and components comprising the power system with the added components designated with
asterisks. t
\
7.2.1.1 General
Two general types of single-failure accidents in the power module would present a nuclear
hazard to the Space Base. They are:
1. A failure or rupture of the reactor coolant containment
2. A fracture or cleavage in the shield assembly.
** *
s
p
The former accident would release activated NaK and, perhaps, fission products to the
Space Base vicinity or into the intermediate heat transfer loop, a portion of which is located
outside the shield. The latter accident would result in a high nuclear radiation field in the
direction of the shield breach.
/•
In all accidents except the two identified in the previous paragraph, multiple failures would
be necessary to create a nuclear hazard. The potential hazards can be prevented IF;
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Table 7-1. Composition of Power Module Components
Reactor Loop
• Reactor
• TEM pumps (2)*
• Piping
Intermediate Loop
• TEM pumps (2)*
• -Piping
• Accumulator**
Power Conversion Loop (3)
9 Turbine-alternator-compressor
(TAG) unit
9 Recuperator
• Ducting
Primary Heat Rejection Loop (3)
9 Primary radiator (3) coolant circuits
sharing fin surface)
o Motor-pump assembly (2)
• Piping
Secondary Heat Rejection Loop** (3)
« Secondary radiator (3 coolant circuits
sharing fin surface)
9 Pumps
Aftercooling Loop**
9 Heat exchanger
• Pump
• Radiator
Control Systems
9 Engine controls**
fliield
• Lithium hydride neuton shield
e Heavy metal gamma shield
• Cooling system**
• Pump
• Piping
• Radiator
• Accumulator**
• Fill lines and valves**
• NaK - NaK heat exchanger
• Fill lines and valves**
• NaK-gas heat exchangers (3)
• Isolation valves @ HX inlet (3)
• Gas - NaK waste heat exchanger
• Turbine bypass valve and/or
cutoff valve**
• Gas management system
• Accumulator**
• Fill lines and valving**
• Insulating shroud
• Piping
• Accumulator
• Fill lines and valving
Piping
Accumulator
• Electrical system control
*More recent concepts employ Electromagnetic (EM) Pumps
**Assumed to exist in system
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1. The accident or its effects can be detected early
2. The reactor can be shutdown
3. The reactor afterheat can be rejected from the power module.
7.2.1.2 Discussion of Results
The failure or accidental damage to each of the power module components was examined as
a function of the following mission or power module operating phases; normal operation,
power module startup, power module shutdown, prelaunch, launch, and power module disposal.
For each identified failure, a succession of possible events and probable corrective or emer-
gency actions was defined. The immediate and subsequent effects of the failure on power
module operations was determined along with the possibility of an immediate nuclear hazard.
A sequence of corrective and emergency actions was designated which would allow continued
operation of the power module, if possible, and would shutdown the system if corrective action
failed or was impossible. The next step evaluated the consequences to the power module if
all emergency corrective actions failed and identified the resultant potential nuclear hazard.
Table 7-2 summarizes the results of the failure'identification for the normal orbital operation
phase of the power system. In most cases the information is straight forward but some
explanatory comments follow.
It has been assumed in this study that some type of reactor aftercooling subsystem will exist
on a Space Base. The existence of aftercooling capability is moot since the study must con-
sider the consequence of its failure even if it does exist.
The rupture of the reactor cooling loop is identified as an immediate nuclear hazard because
of the release of activated coolant. If the reactor cavity and the gallery can be confined,
vapor-tight, then the danger of an immediate nuclear hazard is greatly diminished.
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Any rupture of the reactor primary loop or any other loop in the power module that eliminates
the ability to remove the generated heat in the reactor, makes immediate shutdown of the
reactor mandatory to prevent overtemperature and physical damage to the reactor fuel
elements.
If a leak occurs in the reactor primary-to-intermediate loop heat exchanger, then activated
reactor coolant can be introduced into the intermediate loop. Since the intermediate loop
extends outside the shield to the power conversion systems located at the interface of the
Space Base and main radiator, a source of unshielded nuclear radiation is brought close to
the Space Base. The quantity of activated coolant introduced into the intermediate loop can
be limited by balancing the loop pressure levels to eliminate a pressure difference across
the fracture in the heat exchanger.
The reactor coolant flow passages in any part of the reactor loop may become partially
blocked because of accidental contamination, solidification of coolant contaminants or dissolved
containment material, etc. If design coolant flow rates cannot be maintained, a reduction in
reactor power level may be necessary to prevent deleterious temperature levels in the reactor
fuel elements.
Two standby power conversion systems (PCS) are provided for each reactor in the reference
power module, so any failure in an operating Brayton loop need only be a temporary loss of
power until a redundant PCS is activated. If the Brayton system failure causes immediate
and total loss of reactor cooling, then the reactor must be shutdown or at least set back in
power level to the heat rejection capability of the aftercooling subsystem until the redundant
PCS is activated (possibly 2-4 hours). If the Brayton failure is one that allows continued
operation of the Brayton loop for a limited time, for example, loss of cooling to the TAG
bearings, then the redundant PCS may be activated while the reactor is still operating.
It has been assumed that a turbine bypass valve and/or a cut-off valve is present in the
Brayton loop-to-pr event drastic over speed and possible physical breakup of the TAG unit,
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in the event a failure within the electrical circuit of the alternator removes the alternator
mechanical load from the TAG shaft.
Accidental removal of the thermal emissivity coatings on the power module radiators could
seriously limit the safe operating power level of the power module if the emissivity of the
radiator fin material were very low. The problem could be alleviated if the surface of the
radiator material were treated to have a moderate value of ~ 0.5.
It has been assumed in this study that the configuration of the secondary cooling circuits are
similar to the main heat rejection circuit, i. e., a single secondary radiator surface contains
three separate cooling circuits, one for each PCS.
A puncture or rupture of the outer surface of the Lithium Hydride (LiH) shield may result
in the local dissociation of the LiH and escape of the released hydrogen, dependent on the
local shield temperature. The resultant "hole" in the hydride shield would be a source of
an abnormally high neutron flux, thus increasing the neutron radiation dose rate in the direc-
tion of the "hole". The release of metallic lithium which accompanies the dissociation of
LiH may gradually corrode the containment walls of adjacent sections of LiH if temperatures are
>900°K (1200 F) thus propogating the failure and increasing the size of the shield "hole". Con-
ceivably, this procedure could continue until the entire LiH shield section were disintegrated.
These possibilities suggest design guidelines which would insure protection of the outer surface
of the shield and/or limit the temperature in the outer shield regions to some low level to pre-
clude or severely limit the dissociation of LiH in the event of a puncture. Also the assurance
of shield cooling through redundancy of components and subsystems is another potential
design guideline.
•Failure of most of the components in the engine control and electrical control subsystems
would not have a drastic effect on the operation of the power system. The two exceptions are:
1. Failure of the voltage control component which would result in either a very low or
a very high field excitation current to the alternator. The resultant drastic over-
speed or underspeed of the TAC unit would necessitate shutdown of the power module.
7-8
2. Fracture of all parasitic load resistors resulting in over speeding of the TAG
unit.
Table 7-3 presents the potential hazardous accidents to the power module which might occur
in orbit during a normal power module startup. The accidents listed are in addition to the
many failures within the power module that have already been listed in Table 7-2 and which
also apply to the startup phase. None of the startup accidents identified would result in
an immediate nuclear hazard.
During power module shutdown, the critical subsystem is the aftercooling subsystem as in-
dicated on Table 7-4. If it fails, overheating and failure of the reactor fuel elements is
possible.
In the prelaunch phases before launch, the main hazard from a nuclear viewpoint would be a
NaK fire that would destroy the reactor and release nuclear fuel. As shown on Table 7-5,
this hazard may be eliminated by containing the NaK in confined regions and blanketing it
with inert gas. The same hazard exists during the atmospheric portion of the launch ascent
phase (Table 7-6). It would probably be very difficult to extinguish the NaK fire with an inert
gas blanket during this operation but once the launch vehicle rose above the Earth's atmos-
phere, the fire would extinguish due to the lack of oxygen and moisture.
For the power module disposal phase, the power module will be cool and inoperative if
sufficient wait time was allowed. The prime nuclear hazard would occur if the reactor
coolant loop were fractured to release fission products and activated coolant (see Table 7-7).
Design and Operations Guidelines pertaining to this analysis are contained in Section 7.2.2.
7.2.2 REFERENCE REACTOR POWER MODULE DESIGN AND OPERATIONS
CONSIDERATIONS
Table 7-8 indicates the design considerations associated with the Reactor Power Modules,
including the following subsystems:
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1. General PM including Power Conversion System (PCS)
2. Reactor/Shield
3. Reactor/Control
4. NaK Coolant Loops/Radiators
5. Reactor Disposal System
Section 5 of this volume indicated design and operational considerations associated with mission
support activities. The data of Table 7-8 deals primarily with orbital considerations. In
addition, Volume III of the study emphasizes terrestrial safety considerations.
7.2. 3 POWER MODULE/SPACE BASE ALTERNATE CONFIGURATION EVALUATION
Six different power module/Space Base configurations were evaluated to assess the relative
influence on nuclear safety for each configuration. The configurations evaluated are de-
scribed below.
Configuration
(Space Base Reference
Design)
Description
Two reactors, one on each of two booms at one
end of the base with separation distance between
reactors being ~ 30 m (100 ft).
Individual reactors located on booms on
opposite ends of the Base.
Tandem reactors, in-line, each with its own
radiation shield located on a boom at one
end of the Base.
Tethered reactors located on opposite ends
of the Base.
Two reactors, arranged side-by-side in an
integral radiation shield located on a boom at
one end of the Base.
Same as (5) except reactors are in-line
instead of side-by-side.
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REMARKS 1REASON^ STATEMENT
,N
(See Section 733) 1Facilitates repairs and minimizes crew
exposure during maintenance duties
ENERAL
Consider providing a pressurized and
temperature controlled engine room
o
 
.
Split normal load between PCS with PCS 1
capable of operating at above normal I
power (see Section 7 1 3 2 4 ) 1
Maintains Space Base power level and
dissipates reactor heat in event of one
unit failure
Consider simultaneous operation of
multiple PCS with each reactor
*
(See Section 733) 1Facilitates repairs, and minimizes crew
exposure during repairs
Design repairable equipment on a
"black box" modular approach
*
.5S
.
s0)O)ccoo0)138£Provide real-time back-up and alternate
control and monitoring of power plant
via ground control
•
Provision could be made for separation of 1
of Reactor/Shield from radiator or power 1
module from the Space Base (see Section 1
734) |
Allows reliable separation from base
without rocket ignition
7.34
Consider a positive mechanical system for
separating power module from Space
Base
•
Consider relative location of machinery, 1
tankage for protection of NaK lines and 1
shield 1
i
Minimize release of NaK, shield penetra-
tion in event of PCS accident -(rotating
machinery) or pad explosion
Provide protection against fragmentation
accidents
•
Consider automatic start-up equipment, 1
heated coolant loops etc 1
Minimize temperature excursion and
after heat cooling Minimum down-time
Provide rapid start-up capability of
redundant PCS
*
(See Section 721 ) 1To prevent drastic overspeed of breakup
of TAC unit
Provide turbine by-pass or cut-off valves
in each PCS
*
To preclude possible destruction of all
resistors by a single accident
VIOVISow(Da1&V4•60>•DOa*
See Section 6 3 2 1 , 7 2 1 and Volume 1 1 1
Part 2 Redundancy should be considered
Minimize core rupture and release of
activated coolant
Provide an after-heat removal subsystem
that has adequate heat rejection capa-
bility to limit the temperature rise in the
reactor core to acceptable margins even
after shutdown from emergency (600
KWt) operating conditions
•
Protect against shield degradation and
puncture
Consider use of shield meteoroid bumper•
See Section 6 3 2 1 and 721 1To limit the volume of hydride affected
by a shield break
Provide a compartmentalized LiH shield•
E ACTOR/SHI ELD
DC
.
Reference ZrH reactor is relatively insen- 1
sitive to criticality accidents (see Section 1
7 1 3 2 3 ) 1
Most severe accident on Base is destruc-
tive reactor excursion
Design reactor to preclude criticality and
excursion accidents
•
Double containment and compartmen- 1
tali zed sealed sections would minimize fl
the shielding loss due to puncture or leaks 1
H2 dissociates from LiH when exposed to
space vacuum
Provide means to insure neutron shield
integrity
•
Pressure transducers in shield compart- 1
ments would complement Radiological 1
safety program sensors (see Sections 1
6 2 2 1 1 and 7 31) 1
Early detection will minimize hazardProvide instrumentation to detect LiH
shield puncture
•
Local temperatures in reference design 1
range up to 900° K Additional reentry 1
protection would aggravate the problem 1
(see Section 734) Temperatures should 1
be limited to ~ 550°K 1
Prevent LiH dissociation and loss of
neutron shield effectiveness
Consider a shield cooling system•
(See Section 6 2 1 1 1 ) 1Natural environment much higher than
reactor environment in reference design
Possibility of reducing total dose within
weight constraints
Review trade-off of reactor radiation
shielding vs material radiation shielding
•
EACTOR/CONTROL
DC
Consider remote operation rather than 1
EVA (see Section 7 3 4 11) 1
Provides protection against ground trans-
portation, launch installation and disposal
criticality accidents
Consider a positive means for locking
reactor control drums in least reactive
position
*
Consider use of SCRAM mechanisms or I
similar features (see Section 1
To minimize reactor damage and extent
of hazards due to massive failures, e g
loss of coolant, collisions, shield damage,
etc
Provide an effective redundant and auto-
matic means of shutting down the
reactor in specific failure mode situations
•
Reactor control should be connected to •
back-up power supply 1
1Reactor could continue to generate— ~
thermal power for some time after loss of
power to actuators
1Ii
.Provide a positive means-for shutdown of
the reactor after loss of electrical power
l
Control drum lockout and/or core 1
poisons are possible candidates (see 1
Section 7 3 4 1 1 ) I
To prevent possibility of reactor
excursions
Consider providing positive/permanent
reactor shutdown at end of mission
•
Assists in positive control and in start-up 1
operations 1
Present pulse counting system would give
false position indication in event of drive
train failure
Consider providing two independent
means of sensing control drum position
•
Minimizes hazards of coolant loop NaK I
release 1
Minimize reactor temperature excursion
and increase lifetime of reactor
Provide coolant pump failure detection
and automatic start-up of redundant
pumps
•
See Seciton 6 3 2 1 and 721 ITo limit amount of activated coolant
which could be released
NaK inventory in reactor coolant loop
should be as small as possible
•
C
NCO
<N<OCgoSU)Minimize NaK coolant releaseFailure of reactor coolant containment
should be minimized by use of generous
design margins, factors of safety, elimina-
tion of welds, etc
•
See Section 6 3 2 1 and 7 2 1 1To minimize loop puncture by blast frag-
ments and confine escaping activated
coolant
Provide protection (heavy gamma
shielding) in the shield cavity and gallery
section
*
See Section 6 3 2 1 and 7 2 1 IA leak between loops in the heat
exchanger would result in a coolant trans-
fer from the intermediate loop to reactor
loop rather than the reverse
Consider operation of the reactor primary
loop at a slightly lower pressure than the
intermediate loop
•
See Section 6 3 2 1 and 721 1Minimize release of activated coolantConsider use of an isolation valve across
the gas sides of the accumulators which
would automatically open to equalize the
two loop pressures if a leak occurs across
the heat exchanger
*
Actuation of the valves should be such 1
that electrical power is required to 1
open or close the valve 1
To minimize release of activated coolantProvide isolation valves on both sides of
each NaK-to-gas heat exchanger
•
See Section 721 1To reduce temperature excursions and
after heat removal requirements
Provide stand-by power supply capability
for each coolant pump requiring electrica
power
•
See Section 721 1Maintain reasonable operating power
levels and eff iciances
Treat Radiator substrate materials for
highest possible thermal emissivity consis-
tent with application, adhesion, life, etc
*
CODCO1aK COOLANT LOOPS/RADIAl
Plumbing in gallery section is exposed in 1
the reference design 1
Minimize probability of release of fission
products, activated/non-activated NaK
Provide meteorite puncture protection for
NaK coolant lines
*
NaK lines not repairable in space (see 1
Section 7 3 3 and 6 2 1 1 2) 1
Precludes loss of coolant accident and in
conjunction with 19 minimizes NaK leak
hazard
Provide redundant, non-repairable design
philosophy for NaK loop plumbing
*
Double containment and isolation valves 1
should be considered (see Section 1
6 2 1 1 2 ) I
Minimize NaK release hazardConsider means to minimize the release
of NaK in event of leaks
•
Effective in conjunction with Item 18 1Minimize NaK release hazard, allow imple-
mentation of emergency procedures
Provide pressure and flow measurements
in coolant loops to aid in NaK coolant
release detection
•
Separable heat exchanger should be con- 1
sidered (see Section 733 and Section 1
734 also Volume IV, Reference 7-7) 1
4Minimizes transportationrhandlmg, pre-
lauoch, disposal and replacement hazards
1Consider implementation of a NaK loop/
reactor separation interface
*
'
Applicable to Brayton and Organic 1
ranking cycles 1
Minimizes the liquid metal inventory and
associated hazards
Consider use of non-liquid metal radiator
where performance requirements permit
*
Reference design is marginal at 330 kw(t), •
higher power levels would require the I
system 1
Provides for dissipation of reactor heat in
event of loss of coolant and therefore
reactor meltdown and release of fission
products and activated material
Consider implementation of an indepen-
dent reactor decay heat removal system
•
ISPOSAL SYSTEM
Q
Reference configuration may not survive 1
some reentry modes if LiH is relied upon 1
as reentry protection (see Section 734) 1
Minimize hazard to earth's populaceProvide an effective reactor reentry and
impact protection system
•
Effective for reservoir impact identif ica- 1
tion Consider transponders, pingers, dye 1
markers (see Section 734) •
Minimize hazard to general populaceProvide tracking and impact capability in
event of reactor reentry
*
(See Section 734) 1Minimize hazard to earth's populace and
to Space Base crew
Provide safe, prompt disposal of spent or
malfunctioning reactor
*
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Table 7-9 presents a summary and discussion of the effects on nuclear safety for each config-
ration. One can conclude, from Table 7-9, that configuration(2) appears to be a very attrac-
tive consideration. However, final judgment must factor in the effects of system performance.
For example, note that this configuration has significant nuclear safety advantages for all
operations; however, two of these functions, orbital and rendezvous operations, impose per-
formance penalties in the form of increased shield weight. The increased shield weight
would be required to protect crew, instruments, and experiments which are sensitive to neutron
and gamma radiation which would now emanate from both sides of the Space Base. Rendezvous
and logistics transfer functions would also be affected. The reduced approach corridor for
rendezvous resulting from reactors located on each end of the Base should be factored into
future performance trade-offs.
7.2.3.1 Conclusions
The reference design, ConfigurationQp offers significant nuclear safety advantages for the
intended mission. Configuration(D can provide an increased safety margin at the expense
of increased shield weight, due to the increased isolation of each reactor and should be evalu-
ated for future design and performance interactions.
7. 2.4 Alternate Power Conversion Systems
The effects on nuclear safety by substituting the following power conversion system candidates
are presented.
1. Mercury Hankine
2. Organic Rankine
3. Compact Thermoelectric Converters
4. In-Core Thermionic
These systems were compared to the reference Brayton system. The ZrH reactor was
assumed to be the power source except in the case of the in-core thermionic, where a fast
reactor is employed.
7-19/20
©
©0]0)
0
©
©
©
©
©
03
©
o§
3
 fr
 
«j
 
2
 g
 S
flJisiili
s
™
s
s
,8
o23
o
s
i
 2S
S
 
S
a
 
"53
 
*i
•a
 
oj
 
o
o
 
•
«
 S
0
 
c
 
S
ca
 
S
 
w
ca
 
jj
 
i
fi
 d
 
c
 
2
 
«
 g
 
^
faljslfijiff
:s
 H
<S
l|
'S
ii
"
5
5
2
 
c
l
^
i
?
!
'
=
*
8
 S
 2
5
 §8
•S
 o
 
o
»
 
"3
 
S
3
 S.S
 S
^-C
^+
s-a
&
T5C3^i
H
«
e
CO0)1
0
S
a
s
fS
S
S
S
-
3
•
c
n
c
H
J3J3
 S
-C
1
 1
 1
 s
 S
 s
 s
T
J
[
a
-
3
r
a
"
o
 
>
 
a
 to
0
 
J
J
 
™
S
 o
 3
S
 §
C
 
C
a>
 
o
•a
 
^
 f->
2
-n
 
<0
 
-4-»
 S
 
<2
 
§
0
 
*;
 d
 
o
 
Q
 2
S
i
 !S
 I?
 
s 1!
as stringent a
other configu
due to increa
3
,
1
oOI
Sz
s
 
I
0
fl
S
3
d SE
'
©0}rt0
©
mcdV
H
.
L
i
O
O
 
O
Repair of outboa
module is im-
practical PCS
repair feasible o
inboard module
only
ts
 
a
.
nit
I
d)IOSIt-COH
i
 
•§8 §
^
 
t
.
,
 
o
 
o
0
_
-
rt
 
rt
 
P
 
C
 
h
o
 ®
3
 
«
 
h
 43
 a
 *
s
"E
 
ID
 o
 
rt
 
T;
 
w
rt
 
§
.
 0
to
 
c
o
 
H
 
o
 
to
»
c
 
®
 I.H
 
-a
2
 
3
 
^
 
3
S
 
"
 S
 9
&
-
 I
 
"8
«
 
°
 
<D
 
S
f
o
 
£
f
.
 
-
 
o
 
h
«
 
•§
 °
 i
S
 
^
 y
 
o
siisa
la
s
 ii
-
 2-3
 "
 g
 |
 2
^
°S
§-8
 
|
«
-2
 8
 8
 
-3
 3
 
«
-
i
i
•E
tem
-
!
=
JJJIJih
il-
§-^
a l
 
s
's
:
lllflllil
•§
 
a
,
 £
 
»5
 
g
»
f
 
S
ats-g
s
 1
^
 s
™
xtra
ay be
low r
iled s
3
 S
^
a
l
 2
3
 £
IIII
•a
 g
 u
 «)l
w
 
o
 
^
 
?
>
 c
a
 c
o
 
a
-g
 g
III
3S-3
LI
 
2
S
 8
.
I
 2
S
 Q
7-21/22
Table 7-10 represents a comparison of the effects on nuclear safety for each of the alternate
power conversion systems studied and a relative ranking for each configuration. One can
conclude from this table that the Organic Rankine system and the reference Brayton system
are equally attractive. The lower operating temperature of the Organic Rankine System is
a significant feature which provides reduced thermal stress and material compatibility prob-
lems. In addition, the greater temperature margin between the fuel clad nominal operating
temperature and its melt temperature is a very attractive safety advantage; the Organic cycle
operates at a reactor outlet temperature of 750 K as compared to 950-1000 K for each of
the other systems studied. The relatively high efficiencies, 20-30%, and hence lower reactor
power for the Brayton and Organic systems result in lower fission product and activated
coolant levels. The Ugh efficiency also reduces the amount of after-heat which must be dis-
sipated after the reactor is shut down.
The working fluid, a Helium-Zenon gas and organic fluid, for the Brayton and Organic systems
respectively, are non-toxic, non-corrosive and as such are very important considerations
wnen planning the repair, maintenance and disposal operations. Their inert characteristics
are very desirable as related to nuclear safety. The potential degradation of the organic
fluids when subjected to long term radiation has not been considered in this analysis, but
should be factored into the final selection process.
The remaining alternate PCS', the Thermoelectric, Mercury Rankine and In-Core Thermionic,
have several specific features which make them less desirable from a nuclear safety aspect.
Their relatively low efficiencies, 5-13%, result in higher fission product and activiated
coolant inventories. Each of these systems have caustic and/or toxic working fluids in the
PCS loop which tend to increase the corrosion/erosion rates and also significantly reduce the
possibility of performing PCS repairs.
Static systems such as thermoelectrics and thermionics are often considered attractive due
to their inherent multiple redundancy. However, when the repair function is evaluated from
a nuclear safety aspect it becomes quite evident that significant nuclear safety disadvantages
exist. For example, NaK leaks which could develop in the Thermoelectric System Compact
7-23/24
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Converter or its associated piping would probably result in system shutdown. This failure
is considered unrepairable whereas piping leaks (He-Xe gas) in a Brayton system probably
can be repaired. If the NaK leak were of significant size it could contaminate the entire
engine room equipment. The power conversion diodes in the thermionic reactor cannot be
repaired since they are an integral part of the reactor. For the out-of-core thermionic
reactor, diode repair is also considered impractical due to the use of NaK or Li as the heat
transfer medium.
CONCLUSION
The reference Brayton system appears to be an ideal selection as the power conversion sys-
tem from a nuclear safety aspect. The Organic Rankine is equally as acceptable on the basis
of nuclear safety.
7.2.5 AL TERNAT E POWE R RE AC TORS
The results presented in this section only represent a summary of the work performed due
to the classified nature of the study. The detailed information supporting these results is
presented in Appendix F (Volume n, Part 2).
A number of different reactor designs have been proposed as the nuclear heat source in a
space vehicle electrical power generation system. A few of these reactor concepts have pro-
gressed to the fuel element development stage and the Zirconium Hydride (ZrH) reactor
(SNAP-8) has been built and tested. An advanced Zirconium Hydride reactor design is the
reference system for the Phase A Space Base Studies. However, final selection of the reac-
tor type will depend on future studies on performance, development cost, and relative nuclear
safety. An initial evaluation of nuclear safety has been made and is presented in this section
and in Appendix F. Its purpose is to compare actual and potential safety problems so that
appropriate analysis can be performed and nuclear safety can be considered in the final
selection of the reactor design for future programs.
«
The comparison of nuclear safety has been made as a function of reactor type, with reactors
being typed as either "thermal" or fast, depending on the predominate energy of the neutrons
triggering the fission process. The zirconium hydride reactor (SNAP-8) is an example of a
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"thermal" reactor for space power application while the Advanced Reactor Design of NASA-
Lewis (Reference 7-1) is typical of "fast" reactors being developed for generating electrical
power in space. The comparisons are qualitative only, and have been obtained by examining
a number of space reactor designs and determining their characteristics in regard to nuclear
safety. These considerations were then applied to the Reference Zirconium Hydride (ZrH)
Reactor design and the NASA-Lewis Advanced Reactor (AR), in all the Space Base mission
phases. The ZrH thermal reactor system was assumed to generate 100 kWe, while both
100 kWe and 300 kWe designs were considered for the AR fast reactor systems.
The safety aspects of the ZrH thermal reactor and the AR fast reactor are listed below in the
order of decreasing nuclear hazard. The order presented is somewhat subjective because
of the qualitative nature of the safety evaluations and the lack of complete information on the
probabilities of occurrence for the various accidents.
1. The ZrH system has a nuclear safety advantage in that it will not melt from self-
generated heat. If it should melt because of the external environment, it would not
form a nuclear reactive configuration. In contrast, under certain conditions, the
AR fast reactor will melt from self-generated heat and could form an uncontrollable
critical mass, generating about one hundred times greater than normal thermal
power, at temperatures of about 303QOK (5000QF).
2. The compression of a shutdown ZrH thermal reactor into a compact, voidless mass
will not initiate a sustaining nuclear reaction but a similar compression of the AR
fast reactor could produce an uncontrolled critical reaction. The probability of
experiencing such a reactor compression in orbit is remote. The probability of
attaining the required compression in an Earth impact is yet to be determined.
3. Under certain conditions, the penetration of water or other hydrogeneous liquid
into the ZrH thermal reactor can produce a supercritical condition, although the
probability of achieving the required rate of liquid injection seems remote. In
contrast, the same material inserted into the AR fast reactor lessens its reactivity.
This contrasting response to hydrogeneous material may be important, in the event
of an accidental return to Earth of a reactor and a subsequent impact and submersion
in a body of water.
4. The prompt neutron lifetime and prompt period of the ZrH thermal reactor is
approximately two hundred times longer than the corresponding times in the AR
fast reactor. The respective reactor control systems will be designed with
response times to match the different neutron time characteristics. Therefore,
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under normal conditions, the difference is of little consequence. However, if
accidental prompt criticality occurs, the peak power and the total excursion
energy released in the AR fast reactor could be orders of magnitude greater than
in the ZrH thermal reactor.
5. The core components in the AR fast reactor have a much higher temperature capa-
bility than corresponding ZrH thermal reactor components. This capability will
probabily allow the AR reactor to absorb, without damage, a range of accidental
increases in power and temperatures, which otherwise, would disable and release
fission products from the fuel elements of the ZrH thermal reactor.
6. The reported "design" life for the AR fast reactor is five years and the same lifetime
has been assumed for the ZrH thermal reactor in this study. However, the energy
generation capability of the AR reactor in terms of megawatt-hours is about three
times greater than that of the ZrH reactor. Since the AR power system is more
efficient due to its higher operating temperature levels, its potential lifetime capa-
bility is approximately 4. 5 times longer than the ZrH thermal reactor (when both
systems are operated at 100 kWe). When the AR system is operated at 300 kWe,
its potential lifetime is still 50% longer than the ZrH operating at 100 kWe. Thus,
fewer replacement/disposal operations, with their inherent hazards, may be re-
quired with the AR system. However, the AR reactor has a nuclear safety dis-
advantage. .. .Although its potential lifetime is greater, the inventory of fission
products (which are approximately proportional to lifetime/energy generation) that
could be released in a replacement/disposal accident, are correspondingly greater.
7. The higher temperature capability of the AR fast reactor is reflected in higher power
conversion efficiency and lower operating thermal power levels for equivalent elec-
trical output. The nuclear safety advantages of the lower power level are somewhat
offset by the greater failure probability in the power conversion components due to
the higher temperature levels. The net comparison of relative nuclear safety will
depend on the failure rate characteristics of the power system components at the
different temperature levels.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, the ZrH reactor has some inherent characteristics, i. e., strong negative tempera-
ture coefficients, low void fractions and a contained hydrogen moderator which all contribute
to providing significant nuclear safety advantages. Although the AR (fast reactor) does pro-
vide greater safety margins in some areas, its nuclear safety characteristics are not as
dominant as those of the ZrH reactor.
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7.2. 6 ALTERNATE POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
The influence of the PCS configuration on nuclear safety was evaluated for four different
conditions:
1. Variable PCS configuration and operating conditions.
2. Separate versus integral heat exchangers.
3. Multiple (redundant) versus integral NaK loops.
4. PCS location relative to the reactor.
The effect of excess power generation capability, a power conversion unit being able to
operate at twice its normal output (25 kWe to 50 kWe), was also assessed. Each of the
configurations evaluated is illustrated in Figure 7-1.
Table 7-11 contains a summary of the nuclear safety considerations for each of the PCS
configuration options as a function of mission phase. Further delineation of the various
arguments is presented below for each configuration.
7.2.6.1 Variable PCS Configuration and Operating Conditions
7.2.6.1.1 Single vs Multiple PCS Operation per Reactor
With a single operating PCS per reactor, any failure in the PCS requires an immediate
shutdown of the reactor to prevent high temperature which could damage the fuel elements.
A reactor shutdown is a potential nuclear hazard because of the possibility of a reactor
control system failure preventing shutdown, a failure in afterheat removal or localized
fuel clad failure due to the shutdown temperature transient. Multiple operating PCS'
eliminate the need for a reactor shutdown if one PCS fails, because the remaining PCS(s)
continue to provide a cooling function for the reactor. Reactor temperature levels can be
maintained by a setback in reactor power and flow rate, or gas pressure levels can be
increased in the operating RCS(s) to utilize the full reactor power. The important point is
that one possibility of a potential shutdown accident has been removed.
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4
Multiple operating units per reactor will require more complex engine and electrical control
systems. This complexity is a matter of degree, since even with a single operating PCS
per reactor, startup, shutdown, phase synchronization and load sharing control problems
exist, when multiple reactor power modules are used. With multiple PCS units, the control
procedures would be the same, but the logic and control circuits would be more complicated.
7.2. 6.1.2 Single vs Multiple (Redundant) PCS'
The operating life of a Brayton power conversion loop is expected to be approximately 2-1/2
years, which is half the expected 5 year life for the reactor. Consequently, at least one
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redundant PCS per operating PCS is required if the power module life is to equal the expected
reactor life. However, premature failure of the redundant PCS could require early replace-
ment of the power module even though the reactor is capable of continued power generation.
Since replacement and disposal is probably the greatest potential nuclear hazard associated
with the Space Base power module, any design, procedure or method that limits the replace-
ment/disposal operation to those due to reactor failure only, improves the nuclear safety
of the power module. Multiple redundant PCS' is one such design configuration. The greater
the number of redundant PCS', the greater the probability of attaining a total power module
life equivalent to the reactor life.
The main disadvantages of multiple redundant PCS' are the many ancillary loops, and com-
ponents required in addition to a more complicated control system. This added complexity
may reduce the achievable reliability of the power system thus negating to some degree the
safety advantage of the added PCS'. When the control system has been better defined and
failure rates of the components involved are known, the optimum number of redundant PCS'
can be determined.
7.2.6.1.3 Power Generation Capability of a PCS
A unique characteristic of a Brayton power conversion loop is the ability to vary its power
output over a substantial range by regulating the pressure level of the working gas. If this
capability were utilized in the reactor power module it would have both positive and negative
effects on system nuclear safety.
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A PCS designed to generate greater-than nominal power in an emergency will have a waste
heat rejection radiator area much larger than that needed for nominal power. Consequently
such a system (operated at nominal power output) will have low compressor inlet tempera-
tures and high system efficiencies with attendant safety advantages due to the lower reactor
thermal power generation rate. The additional safety advantage would be the ability to utilize
excess reactor power resulting from a PCS failure, by adjusting the operating point of the
remaining PCS units.
The negative safety aspects of this excess power generation capability include the greater
collision and replacement hazards associated with bigger radiator area, and high reactor
power levels during emergency power generation operation. The latter situation occurs
when one reactor PM fails and the remaining PM power level is increased to satisfy the
full Space Base power demand. Depending on the radiator area, the power output of the
operating reactor may have to be more than doubled and the temperature levels in the PM
increased by approximately 55 K (100 F). In that case, nuclear radiation levels in the im-
mediate vicinity of the operating PM will be correspondingly higher. The increased tem-
perature levels of the PM also increase the stress on components and thus lower the system
safety.
7.2.6.2 Incorporation of a Separable Heat Exchanger
The use of a Separable Heat Exchanger (SEHX) would allow separate replacement of either the
reactor shield assembly or the PCS (Brayton power conversion loop and heat rejection loop)
so that the logistics of power module replacement and disposal would be simplified. From a
nuclear safety viewpoint, however, a SEHX also presents potential safety hazards that re-
quire future design and performance studies. The ability to replace only the PCS and thus
avoid the premature replacement of the reactor is a definite safety advantage which was dis-
cussed previously in Section 7.2.6.1.2. The use of a SEHX also creates performance
penalties that effect nuclear safety. For example, inclusion of a "SEHX" increases the
temperature differential between reactor and the PCS and, hence, an increase in the reactor
outlet temperature and reactor thermal power. By necessity a "SEHX" will be either very
large, if radiation is t he heat transfer mode utilized, or compact and complex with many
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closely spaced, interlocking fins, if liquid metal conduction is the heat transfer mode. In
either case, the act of joining or separating the two halves of the power system at the SEEK
will be exacting with a probability for damage and puncture of the SEHX and the intermediate
loops. Future design iterations should carefully consider this potential problem.
Utilization of a SEHX would prevent fission products and/or activated coolant, that might leak
into the intermediate loop from the primary loop, from reaching the Brayton power conversion
loop. Thus, radiation levels in the lower regions of the PCS, where maintenance operations
would be performed, could be kept at predictable design levels. However, an ordinary heat
exchanger placed in the intermediate loop would provide the same "barrier" function without
the replacement hazardds. The latter heat exchanger could develop an internal leak and allow
activated material to reach the PCS module, but the probability of two heat exchangers in
series failing could be sufficiently low to make it a preferred configuration.
The predominant argument for utilization of a SEHX is the safety advantages it provides for
reactor disposal Its use permits disposal by the Shuttle, decreases payload capability re-
quired of the disposal vehicle and could increase the orbital decay life of a disposed system
by almost a factor of nine (9).
7.2.6.3 Single vs Multiple Reactor Primary and Intermediate Loops
The main safety argument for the use of multiple reactor primary and intermediate loops
has been discussed in the previous sections; it significantly reduces the probability of the
power module replacement for reasons other than reactor failure. In the reference ZrH power
module design, any breach, rupture, or leakage of the reactor primary or intermediate loops,
exclusive of internal leakage in the connecting heat exchanger, necessitates the shutdown and
replacement of the power module. Such an accident would not require power module re-
placement if an alternate set of primary and intermediate loops were available. The potential
nuclear hazards for PM shutdown, replacement and disposal would be eliminated even though
the hazards due to released fission products and activated coolant would still exist.
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Multiple primary and intermediate loops would also lessen radiation levels at the PCS in
„ the event an internal leak developed in the primary-to-intermediate loop heat exchanger.
A switch to the alternate loops would prevent continued leakage of activated material into
the Brayton loop heat exchangers. The radiation levels in PCS would decrease with time
as the activated material trapped in the failed circuit gradually decayed in 'activity.
The safety disadvantage of multiple primary and intermediate loops lies in the additional
components, isolation valves, and the more complex control system and Brayton loop heat
exchanger designs required. System piping and control could become extremely compli-
• cated if multiple primary and intermediate loops were combined with multiple operating
PCS' and multiple redundant PCS'.
7.2.6.4 Brayton Power Conversion System Location
A power conversion system in a space reactor power module is usually located as close as
possible to the reactor to limit heat losses and pumping power requirements in the reactor
primary or intermediate loop. In such a close coupled configuration the PCS can be placed
on the near side between the reactor and Space Base, or on the far side of the reactor where
it is inaccessible from the Space Base. Another alternate is to neglect the performance
advantages of the close coupled locations and separate the PCS from the reactor so that it
can be easily reached for maintenance and repair. This latter objective can be attained by
* r
_ placing the PCS at the rear of the Power Module near the Space Base boom junction.
Major safety differences do not exist between the locations mentioned, but the separated
arrangement offers some advantages. For a given shield design, maintenance and repair
operations on the PCS would be performed in a lower radiation level environment with the
separated arrangement. However, a close coupled configuration could have the same radia-
tion dose rate levels at the expense of a slightly heavier shield.
The effect of radiation dose rate as a function of distance for repair and maintenance is
discussed in Section 7.3.3 of this volume.
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The ease of access, repair and parts replacement increases the reliability and life of the
PCS at the separated location, thus increasing its safety. In addition, the PCS could be
located mside a thermally-insulated "engine room" enclosure having an air lock access to
the Space Base, which would provide greater physical safety for the maintenance crew. An
engine room facility could also be made available for the close coupled configuration with the
addition of a longer access tunnel between the Space Base and the PCS location.
The safety disadvantage of the separated configuration is the long intermediate loop length
needed to transport the reactor heat to t he PCS. The loop is more exposed to accidental
physical damage than a similar loop in a close coupled configuration and increases reactor
t
outlet temperature. Increased piping insulation can resolve the latter problem.
The close coupled configuration with the PCS outboard of the reactor has no safety advantage
but has a disadvantage because of its inaccessibility for maintenance and repair.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Multiple PCS operation per reactor is the preferred configuration to enhance nuclear
safety, providing reduced probability of reactor over-temperature due to abrupt loss
of cooling accident.
2. Multiple reactor primary and intermediate loops enhance nuclear safety; they pro-
vide for isolation of potential NaK leaks, can reduce reactor replacement frequency /
and provide means for emergency reactor cooling.
/
3. A separable heat exchanger can significantly improve the reactor disposal phase
of the mission; it increases orbital lifetimes, allows for replacement of the reactor-
shield instead of the entire PM and decreases the overall disposal payload.
4. Increased separation distance between the PCS and reactor provides more flexibilility
for PCS maintenance and repair (lower radiation dose rates) and decreased shield
weight.
7.3 SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SAFETY OPERATIONS STUDIES
The following discussions provide additional data and more specific information on four
areas of nuclear safety operations:
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1. On-Board Radiological Safely Program
The program and equipment implemented on board a Space Base for the protection
of the crew and equipment.
2. Isotope Handling Considerations
Design and operational considerations involved with the safe handling of tracers
and isotope capsules.
3. Reactor Maintenance and Repair
An analysis of the safety considerations involved with reactor power module repair
and maintenance.
4. Reactor Disposal Techniques
An analysis of the safety aspects of various reactor power module disposal
techniques.
7. 3.1 ON-BOARD RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROGRAM
The primary purpose of the on-board Radiological Safety Program is to provide the equip-
ment and personnel required to protect the crew from radio logical hazards associated with the
program. This can be accomplished by a combination of continuous monitoring of the crew
status and hazardous areas, coupled with appropriate alarms for radiological emergencies.
The data acquired in assuring the protection of the crew will be equally valuable in establish-
ing subsystem exposure and experiment interference effects associated with the radiation
environments.
It should be noted that the Radiological Safety Program is required even if the Space Base did
not employ nuclear reactors for electric power, since the natural environment itself is a
significant source of radiation.
Knowledge of the status of the crew's radiation exposure and dose rate at which the exposure
takes place, is important for the following reasons:
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1. Assurance that individual crew members can perform adequately will be in-
fluenced by the prediction and detection of early and progressive responses to
radiation exposure.
2. Records of accumulated dose are necessary in establishing career radiation limits.
3. Response to emergency radiation conditions must be based on accurate knowledge
of exposure and exposure rate.
The equipment required to provide this data must be sensitive to a wide spectrum of particles
and energies due to the natural, reactor induced, and isotope inventory radiation environments.
Absorbed dose and relative biological effectiveness must be determined at both skin and
critical organ depths. Since no one type of equipment can meet these criteria, a Radiological
Safety Program will have to incorporate a variety of equipment and procedures. The com-
bined program, illustrated in Figure 7-2, can be discussed in terms of the following re-
quirements.
1. Passive Dosimetry System
2. Active Dosimetry System
3. Health Physics Instrumentation
4. Biological Dosimetry System
5. Personnel Requirements
The passive dosimetry system would consist of small packets to be worn by each member of
of the crew to record his individual absorbed dose. The active dosimetry system would
consist of dose rate monitors placed at key locations. This system would provide useful
information needed to calculate biological exposures from the absorbed doses. It should
also be connected to an alarm system to provide dose rate information during a radiation
emergency. The Health Physics instruments would consist of various detectors necessary
to monitor the man y different types of radiations and to calculate the biological exposures
to the crew from these radiations. The biological dosimetry system would consist of tests
the medical staff can perform to verify the physical dose measurements on individual crew
members.
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7.3.1.1 Passive Dosimetry System
The objective of the passive dosimetry system
is to provide a measure of the accumulated
abosrbed dose of each individual crewman.
Since the system must be continuously in the
possession of the crewman, it must be small,
light and must not interfere with the per-
formance of his regular duties.
RADIATION MONITORING
• PASSIVE DOSIMETRY \
I ACTIVE DOSIMETRY | FREQUENT READOUT - PROCESSING ON-BOARD
• HEALTH PHYSICS INSTRUMENTS? ALARMS
• BIOLOGICAL DOSIMETRY ENVIRONMENTAL ISOLATION
RADIATION EMULSIONS
(TO AND FROM)The passive dosimetry system would consist
of small packets of nuclear emulsion film
and thermoluminescent powder or rods. Each
crewman should have one or more of these
packets which he is responsible for wearing
at all times. 'During the initial flights, the
crew may be asked to wear up to four packets (head; chest, back, thigh); however, past
>
experience at nuclear facilities shows the more complicated the dosimetry system, the
less likely that all dosimeters are worn. Later flights may rely on one, or possibly two
passive dosimeters for each member of the crew.
Figure 7-2. Radiological Program
The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) should have the equipment to periodically read and record
the passive dosimeters. One important drawback of this type of system is that it is an
"after the fact" monitor. Since there may be a need for a decision based on up-to-date
crew exposure records the passive dosimeters should be read and recorded frequently. A
reasonable system would require that each crewman have a Thermal Luminescent Dosimeter
' (TLD) rod connected with an identification card. This card would be inserted daily into a
special reader connected to the data management system. The data management system
would then give a daily readout (capable of monitoring in the Base and by ground systems)
of the individual's absorbed dose, the quality factors as obtained from the active and Health
Physics systems and the resultant biological dose.
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A second reason for frequent evaluation of the passive dosimetry system is to prevent repeti-
tion of high exposures. Situations, such as misuse of the x-ray unauthorized entry in radia-
tion areas, and localized radiation streaming due to micrometeorite damage to the reactor
shield, may be detected by an investigation of a higher than normal exposure reading. Fre-
quent checks can thus prevent exposure from faulty procedures or changed radiation conditions.
In addition to evaluation by the on-board Radiation Safety Officer, the passive dosimeters
can be returned to Earth for more detailed evaluation. Film emulsions, in particular, re-
quire specialized development and reading techniques to obtain maximum information. Ar-
rangements would have to be made to tranpsort shielded film to and from the base for periodic
changes. The passive dosimetry system can also make use of photo luminescent glass, plastic
polymers or or foils. Multiple systems with more than one dosimeter should be considered.
7.3.1.2 Active Dosimetry System
The active dosimetry system must have two primary functions. First, it must provide
additional data that can be used to evaluate the biological exposure of each crew member.
In particular, this information would include a time profile of the dose and a depth dose dis-
tribution. Second, the system must provide warnings and alarms during a radiation emergency.
The active dosimetry would consist of several sets of tissue equivalent ion chambers located
throughout a Space Base. These ion chambers shielded with 0. 7 mm and 5.0 cm of a tissue
equivalent material would provide a reading of both integrated dose and dose rate at tissue
depths approximating the skin and the critical organs.
Ion chambers associated with the active dosimetry system require the following characteris-
tics:
1. High sensitivity - To cover a wide range of dose rate
2. Good response time - Must be able to follow contracted dose rate
3. Tissue equivalency - Behaves according to Bragg-Grey criteria (Reference 7-2)
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4. Capable of integration with data management and alarm systems
^
5. Easily read and interpreted by the crew
6. Low drift rate
7. Minimum maintenance, calibration, power and volume requirements
8. Emergency power through back-up power supply system
The location of the ion chambers must be selected based on both primary functions. The
first set should be placed "outside" the Space Base. This set would be used to predict
radiation exposure during any extravehicular activities. It would also be used to evaluate
external radiation conditions particularly during a solar flare. The second, third, and
fourth sets should be placed in the Space Base, one at the reactor end, one in the center
and one near the far end. The remaining sets of ionization chambers could be placed
throughout the Base in high occupancy areas or near experiments sensitive to radiation
levels. Through the data from the active dosimetry system, and from the Health Physics
measurements, the RSO can determine a quality factor to apply to the crews absorbed dose
to determine biological dose. Depending on time limitation and special circumstances, this
quality factor can be an average figure applied to all crew members or a specific number
applied to one specially investigated case.
v
The readout from the ion chambers should be connected to remote readouts at the reactor
console and/or the RSO's work station. The output should also be connected to an alarm
system. The system would alert the captain and crew of impending radiation emergencies.
A typical alarm system would have three levels. The first, set at 0.1 rad/hr would "alert"
*
the operating crew of high radiation levels. The second level, set at 1. 0 rad/hr, would
"alarm" the crew to prepare for emergency action. The third level, set at 10.0 rad/hr
would alarm the Base that emergency action is required. Specific preplanned emergency
plans would then be put into effect at each of these levels.
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The RSO would be responsible for the maintenance, calibration and evaluation of the ion
chamber monitoring system. He must, therefore, have the spare parts, the calibration
sources, and the time scheduled^to maintain the system.
V.
7.3.1.3 Health Physics Instrumentation
The third radiation monitoring system comes under the heading of Health Physics instru-
ments. These equipment, also under the care of the Radiation Safety Officer, would have two
prime functions. The first is to provide radiation safety data similar to the data required
around any nuclear facility. Radioisotope heat sources must be monitored for leakage,
x-ray machines and radioisotopes must be periodically surveyed and work near the reactor
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would require surveys of the radiation levels. Thus the Radiation Safety Officer would re-
quire a full complement of air monitors, survey instruments, contamination meters, and
other Health Physics equipment. At the present time there is a large selection of instru-
ments on the market. However, few instruments have been flight tested and meet the neces-
sary requirements of weight, volume, shielding, and low maintenance. Prior to launch of
a Space Base a development program is needed to assure that required Health Physics in-
struments are qualified for flight and will give meaningful data in the radiation fields en-
countered during flight.
The second main function of the Health Physics instruments is to provide the Radiation
Safety Officer with sufficient data to assign a realistic quality factor to the absorbed dose
readings from the passive dosimetry system. These instruments would include protron
spectrometers, neutron detectors, linear energy transfer monitors, depth dose chambers
and heavy particle monitors. The need for this sophisticated equipment will depend, to a
large extent, on the scope of the experimental program in space radiation prior to imple-
mentation of a Space Base. An extensive experimental program could supply the RSO with
sufficient data to calculate the biological exposure from the absorbed dose in most situations.
Several of the Health Physics monitors should be connected to alarm and control systems.
The air monitors around the reactors and around the isotope capsules (e.g., heat sources)
would alert the operating crew of high levels of radioactive contamination. These monitors
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could also be programmed to close doors, isolate air systems and circulate air through
absolute filters. Contamination monitors in laboratories using tracers can alert the staff
of spills that could ruin an experiment or cause a contamination hazard. The radiation
monitors and neutron detectors near the reactor should also be alarmed.
7.3.1.4 Biological Dosimetry
The final radiation monitoring system, biological monitoring, provides what may be the best
assessment of the severity of radiation damage to an individual. This system would consist
of tests to be performed by the Medical staff that would either verify or modify dose esti-
mations made by physical measurements. Many important decisions effecting the mission
and the crew members would be based on exposure data. The prime purpose of the biological
tests would be to provide data on the effected individual's biological damage to assist in
making these decisions. Biological monitoring is not planned as a day to day monitoring
system or a low dose detector. It should be used to evaluate the consequences of high ex-
posure or during emergency conditions.
^
Although there are many indicators to be measured, hematological changes are the most
sensitive indicator. Special difficulties are encountered evaluating the effects from frac-
tionation of the dose, nonuniformity (partial body exposure), quality of radiation, and other
stresses (weightlessness, etc.). However, in spite of these difficulties, the hematological
changes, combined with the physical measurements, will give a good indication of the severity
of the radiation damage from an exposure to space radiation.
In addition to blood counts, the medical staff can also use other clinical signs to determine
the magnitude of an exposure. Reduced resistance to stress, tendency to "fatigue, low grade
infection, and decreased blood oxygen transport are all signs of chronic radiation exposure.
Erythema can be used to measure high level skin exposures and chromosome changes can be
observed after radiation exposures. As with the passive dosimetry system, blood samples,
urine samples for determining internal contamination, and other biological samples can be
returned to earth for detailed evaluation.
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7.3.1.5 Personnel Requirements
Manning of the Radiological Safety Program will be an important consideration when deter-
mining the makeup of the crew. With respect to radiation safety the crew may be divided
up into four groups. Those groups would include the Radiation Safety, Medical and Opera-
tions Staffs, and the remainder of the crew. It should be noted that, with the exceptionof the
Radiation Safety Officer, the radiation safety duties of these personnel would be on a part-
time basis. Full-time participation would be required only during emergency situations.
For example, radiation safety technicians could be drawn from the crew members normally
engaged in instrumentation and electronic maintenance and repair. However, in planning
crew staffing, it should be recognized that a portion of these technicians' time would be
devoted to the Radiological Safety Program and that special, preflight training is required for
these individuals. In addition, the requirement for a radiological safety program does not
result solely from the use of nuclear, electric power generation systems (e. g., reactor
power modules). The natural radiation environment, the uncertainties in the environment
(e.g., solar flares) and the use of isotope sources in the experiment program engender poten-
tial hazards which require the implementation of a radiological safety program. For example,
in a Base with a complement of 50-60 crewmen, it has been estimated that the use of nuclear
reactors would result in an additional man being occupied half-time in the Radiological Safety
Program out of a maximum of effectively three men devoting full-time to the Program.
The Radiation Safety Staff should conisist of the RSO and two or three assistants. The radia-
tion safety duties of these people would be part time responsibilities and they should be
available for part-time duties with the Medical, Reactor Operations, or Experimental Staffs.
j £ f y
 AFor two reasons it is preferable to have several part-time people responsible for radiation
safety father than one full-time. First, the radiation safety work will usually be routine and
morale will improve with the assignment of other tasks. Second, in a radiation emergency
• ' i '- i i
more than one man will be needed to provide the required radiation safety coverage.
t
The background of the RSO should include education in radiation biology and instrumentation.
His training and job experience should include considerable Health Physics work. As RSO,his
major responsibilities are to care for and interpret the active and passive dosimetry systems,
and the Health Physics instruments, and to advise on matters concerning radiation safety and
radiation emergencies. His routine work would include (1) daily checks on the monitoring
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system, personnel exposure calculations and records; (2) Health Physics coverage and surveys;
(3) supervising the Radiation Safely technicians. His emergency duties would include dose
prediction and dose determination, radiation control, and contamination control.
The Radiation Safety Technicians should have experience working in and around nuclear facili-
ties. They also should be knowledgeable of the radiation safety instrumentation, and proce-
dures, the responsibilities of routine Health Physics surveys, policing passive dosimetry
requirements, data management inputs and data taking. Their emergency responsibilities
would include Health Physics surveys and monitoring work in high radiation areas.
The Medical Staff will have two radiological safety responsibilities. The first is to provide
dose information for biological monitoring records. The second is to provide medical serv-
ices for overexposed crewmen. The Medical Staff must, therefore, have training and ex-
perience in working with radiation sickness accidents.
The Radiological Operations crew will be responsible for reactor operation, work around the
reactors and isotope heat sources, and emergency work involving radiation exposure. For
this reason all the members of the operating crew should have attended a training program in
radiological safety, and should be able to evaluate radiation risks and to interpret the radiation
safety monitoring system. A second impact on this crew involves their availability in a radia-
tion emergency. In order not to exceed mission dose levels, crew members with a high ac-
cumulated dose would not be available for emergency work. Crew rotation schedules and work
assignments will be dependent on total exposure to the individual members of the crew. Key
positions may have to be rotated at some fraction of the mission exposure level to assure
their availability in an emergency.
The remainder of the Space Base staff needs only sufficient radiation safety knowledge to
allow them to make valid risk judgments and to function effectively in a radiation emergency.
Prelaunch and on-the-job training courses can provide this knowledge.
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Table 7-12 presents a representative breakdown of personnel requirements, indicating
duties and background training required.
7.3.1.6 Equipment Requirements
Table 7-13 indicates representative equipments required for a Space Base Radiological
Safety Program. The equipment quantities indicated are based on a nominal 50-man crew.
Requirements for additional personnel can be approximated by linear scale-up.
7.3.1.6.1 Passive Dosimetry Equipment
The passive dosimetry equipment has been grouped under TLD (Thermoluminescent dosime-
ters), which are read and interpreted on the Space Base, and film which would be returned
to earth for analysis. The integrated TLD reader/data management system must be de-
veloped, and at present no reader equipment has been flight tested. The film badges are
expected to be similar to those used on the Apollo Program.
Location of the TLD readers should be selected for convenience of access to insure daily
readout. A minimum of two locations have been noted in the Table 7-13. However, it may
be more realistic to provide reader stations in each of the living quarter areas.
7.3.1. 6.2 Active Dosimetry Equipment
This system consists of the tissue equivalent ion chambers and associated interface equip-
ment. Since this system is part of the radiation monitoring and alarm system, readouts
must be provided at key decision and interpretation areas, i. e., Command console and the
Radiation Safety Office. It is expected that the sensors employed in the system would be
similar to the Van Allen Belt dosimeter used on Apollo missions.
7.3.1. 6. 3 Health Physics Equipment
The Health Physics equipment described in Table 7-13 provides monitoring of radiation con-
ditions within the Space Base and assists the RSO in establishing quality factors for the mea-
sured absorbed dose (quality monitors). In general, the instruments cited have not been
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Table 7-12. Personnel Requirements for Radiological Safety Program
Personnel Type
Radiation Safet\ Officer
Radiation Safety Technicians
Medical Staff
Radiological Operations Crew
Remainder
Duties
• Care for radiation monitoring equipment
• Keep records on accumulated exposure
• Make surveys, interpret data from radiation
monitors
• Emergency responsibilities/decisions
• Radiation safety training program
• Supervision of Radiation Safety Technicians
• Collate Data Management information from
Base and Ground Links
• Instrument maintenance, repair and
logistics support
• Health Physics surveys
• Emergency responsibilities
• Read and record TLD, film, and police
passive monitoring regulations
• Responsible for biological dosimetry
• Care for overexposed
• Emergency responsibilities
• Reactor repair, EVA's other non-routine
jobs involving radiation exposure
• Assist RSO as required
• Emergency responsibilities
• Work amongst radiation hazards
Remarks
• One individual
• Training - Health Physics certification.
Radiation Biology, Instrumentation
• Part-time responsibilities, also active in
scientific experimentation
• Two individuals
• Training - Nuclear facilities work -
Instrumentation and Health Physics opera-
tion and maintenance experience
• Training and experience in treating radiation
sickness
• At least six, individuals with nuclear facility
experience
• 40-hour (minimum) pre flight radiation safety
training program at National Laboratory
•' In-flight training by RSO
• 6-hour (minimum) radiation safety training
program by RSO or comparable individuals.
• In-flight training by RSO
NOTES
1
2.
A maximum of 3 crew members would be devoted full-time to the radiological safety program, during a period of normal operation.
The use of nuclear reactors for electrical power generation accounts for approximately one man, half-time, of the crew utilization
estimate in Note 1.
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developed for space application, with the exception of applicable Apollo hardware. This
lack of development applies not only to flight qualification requirements but also operabihty
in the presence of the Space Base radiation background. Development of the required in-
struments should stress ease of maintenance and versatility (incorporate several functions
in one piece of hardware).
Air monitors are required, particularly in laboratories where isotope capsules or isotope
tracers are in use. These monitors must be capable of detecting 1/10 MFC (maximum per-
missible concentration - see Appendix A, Section A. 5 for MFC of typical isotopes), of the
isotopes to be detected. These monitors would be connected to alarms, both in the area
being monitored and in the Radiation Safety Office. In order to detect low concentrations, the
air monitor must be shielded from the background radiation.
The proportional counter is used to quantitatively measure, the degree of contamination.
The sensitivity of the device will depend primarily on the shielding that can be provided
against the background radiation. The hand held radiation survey meters should have a sen-
sitivity ranging from 18 mrad/hr to 100 rad/hr. Equipment in the Radiation Safety Office
must include a selection of radiation sources for calibration of the various instruments and
meters. All portable radiological monitoring equipment should be designed to be operable
outside of the Space Base, so as to be applicable to EVA surveys.
In addition to instruments required to monitor ionizing radiation, equipment must also be
provided to monitor leakage in microwave generators and laser equipment used in experiment
laboratories. The sensitivity indicated for a microwave detector is based'on the present
2
exposure standard of 10 mv/cm ; however, the trend is currently toward lower allowable
exposures. Similarly, the sensitivity indicated for a laser detector is the threshold of value
for damage to the, retina of the eye.
i
7.3.2 ISOTOPE HANDLING
The isotope sources which may be on-board, internal to the Space Base, include "closed"
isotope sources and "open" isotope sources. Closed sources refer to sealed capsules in
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in which the isotope is totally contained, such as capsules which may be incorporated in waste
management systems or used to insure temperature control of equipment. The "open" sys-
tems include isotopes such as tracer materials that may be employed in such a manner, that
the isotope is "free" within the environment of the Space Base although contained within the
specimen being tested. Isotope sources may pose a hazard not only from external exposure
from direct radiation but also internal exposure from ingestion of radioactive material,
should the isotope be released indescriminately to the environment.
7.3.2.1 Closed Isotope Sources
The implementation of closed sources on the Space Base, involves considerations related
to both the safety of the general populace and on-board the Space Vehicle. Representative
AEC guidelines for current capsule design for space application are shown in Table 7-14 and
apply primarily to protecting the earth's general populace. These guidelines have been de-
rived for the Multihundred Watt Thermoelectric Generator program and further amplification
may be found in References 7-3 and 7-4.'
On board the spacecraft several general guidelines as to location and protection for isotope
capsules has been noted in Section 6.3.1.4. Specifically, shielding against radiation and
thermal hazards have been noted. The extent of these requirements depends primarily on
the quantity and type of isotope used on-board. Areas that contain isotope should be clearly
identified by visual labeling, noting the type of radiation being emitted and the level of the
radiation (dose rate). Should sufficient quantities be involved, the amount of time which per-
sonnel can spend in the area should also be noted.
Although sealed sources generally preclude the release of the contained isotope, some isotopes
produce gas as a by-product of the radioactive decay process (e. g., Pu-238 and Cm-244 re-
lease helium as a by-product of alpha-decay). When such capsules are to be used for a long
period of time, venting of ftie capsule may be required to preclude eventual rupture of the
capsule. When venting is provided, the release of radioactive gases also associated with the
decay process (e. g., radon and radon daughters in the case of Pu-238) should be precluded
from release to the in-board environment.
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Table 7-14. Isotope Capsule Safety Design Guidelines
GROUND HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION
• The heat source shall be designed to
a Preclude inadvertent release of or contact with the fuel during all ground handling operations Ground handling
procedures shall be compatible with radiation exposure limits set forth in AEC-MC-0524
b Preclude the accumulation of radon and radon daughters in excess of the values set forth in AEC-MC-0524, especially
in vented systems
c Minimize heat source degradation from handling, aging, and/or storage by proper manufacturing and scheduling of
factory-to-flight processes and operations
• For shipping and handling the RTG or heat source, the shipping container must satisfy the requirements of the AEC as set
forth in AEC-MC-0529 and the Department of Transportation (DOT), as applicable, for any potential shipping modes
PRELAUNCH AND LAUNCH
• The heat source shall be designed to
a Immobilize the fuel during all potential prelaunch and launch failures Sequential environments (e g , overpressure and
impulse, fireball, shrapnel, impact, after-fire, and adverse thermochemical or chemical reactions) consistent with the
launch vehicle shall be considered
b Minimize ground contamination of the launch site
c Satisfy the above prelaunch and launch requirements for at least one month following a launch pad abort to facilitate
recovery and return of the fuel to radiological control
ASCENT
• The heat source shall be designed to immobilize the fuel
a And preclude biospheric contamination under all ascent abort failures including those sequential events cited in
(a) under Prelaunch and Launch
b During and after credible sequential reentry and terminal velocity impact situations
c In order to facilitate fuel recovery following land impact for a period of at least one year
d In order to facilitate fuel recovery from water depths up to 600 feet for a period of at least one year
^
ORBITAL AND SUPERORBITAL
• The heat source shall be designed to immobilize the fuel
a And preclude release of fuel in space as a result of mechanical, chemical and/or thermal degradation
b During and after credible sequential reentry and terminal velocity impact situations
c In the event the RTG or the heat source is recovered from space
1
d In order to facilitate fuel recovery following land impact for a period of at least one year
e In order to facilitate fuel recovery from water depths up to 600 feet for a period of at least one year
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS '
• Long-term fuel immobilization under conditions of earth burial is desired
• AEC-MC-0524 specifies radiation exposure criteria applicable to all phases of the RTG program
• Subcnticality of the heat source under all normal and accident conditions shall be assured
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The Health Physics equipments described in Section 7.3.1.6 would be used to monitor the
performance and condition of the sources and areas containing the sources.
7.3.2.2 Open Isotope Sources
The hazards involved ^h the use of open isotope sources (tracers) depends on the type of
isotope and quantity to be brought on the Space Base. These sources are expected to be
stored in very small quantities, so that the hazard is mainly from ingestion in the event
of an inadvertent release, rather than from direct radiation.
Table 7-15 presents a general guide as to the relative hazard associated with handling quan-
tities of the various isotopes. The eventual determination of the degree of protection required
will depend on the specific isotopes used, the allowable MFC (maximum permissible concen-
tration) associated with these isotopes, and the specific quantities that could be released
during a "spill" (see Appendix A for MFC for particular isotopes). The MFC must be
considered on the basis of 168-hour week (continuous exposure for the crew on the Space
Base. By considering the total volume which could be contaminated and the quantity of
the specific isotope required to be stored on board, the degree of contamination in terms
of MFC level could be determined. The following approach to establishing handling and
equipment requirements is considered to be representative. The fractions and multiple
of MFC's is considered realistic but is used here strictly for discussion. Table 7-16
illustrates the progressive requirements.
7.3.2.3 Decontamination Techniques
In the event of leakage of isotope from a capsule or a spill of tracer elements in the ex-
periment laboratories, techniques would have to be implemented to return the affected areas
to normal use. In addition, personnel returning from EVA, or reactor maintenance may
carry deposits of radioactive material (NaK, fission products), and would have to be de-
contaminated prior to being allowed general access to the Space Base.
7-55
Table 7-15. Hazard from Absorption into the Body
Seln-trd rmlinifiotoprs grouped according to relative rn-lioroxlritj with the
amounlH lonildered as low, intermediate or high level, in laliomury [irl<tice
GROUP
L SLIGHT HAZARD
•No". K« eu'Vur.".'*11
At". »",-Hg"'
II MODERATELY DANGEROUS
r .^C14 . P". -No". S~. Cl".
•Ha**'. Rll"*. T."'. T.'". I*,
V.'BO*' -Lo"0, CV,
fV-'.'NT'. -A^*. 'AU ,^
01 VERY DANGEROUS
Co4'. FiM , Sr"0 , Y* .*Zr** ,
C4l*>.P»"'.BIf"
ACTIVITT SCALC
tto^c inie ionic loomc
» /AC IOO/M i <nc n me loomc i cuuc
ACTIVITY TO tl HAMW.CO IN L»tOB»TCHIT
Effective radiotoxicity is ohtained from a weighting of the follow
ing factors
HdlMifp
Energy and character of radiations
Degree of sel*n tive Iocali7ation Jn the body
Rates of eliminationQuantities involved and modes of handling In tvpical e\peri
ments ^
The slant boundaries between levels indicate border line zones, and
emphasize that there is no sharp transition between the le\els and
the nsso< ;at«l protection techniques.
The principal gamma-emitters are indicated b^ asterisk (e g,
*Na") The above level system does not apph to the hazards of ex-
ternal irradiation
Table 7-16. Requirements for Open Isotope Source Handling
Degree of
Possible Contamination
0 1 MFC
1.0 MFC
10.0 MPC
Open System Handling
Requirements
Isotope may be used In the open At-
mosphere control for the area should
be fitted with absolute filters to mini-
mize dispersion
Isotope should be stored and used only
in a glove box. The glove box should
be maintained at a pressure lower
than ambient The air exhaust from
the glove box should be fitted with an
absolute filter to trap particulate mat-
ter The air intake should also be
fitted with an absolute filter to pre-
clude dispersion in the event of a pres-
sure reversal.
The isotope should be stored and used In
in an access controlled laboratory
Access to the laboratory should be
through an airlock. Handling proce-
dures in this lab would include the
glove box precautions shown above
A separate atmosphere control and
water supply should be provided for
the laboratory. The laboratory should
provide for protective clotiimg, de-
contamination equipment personnel
without further contamination of the
overall vehicle
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In practice, laboratories, where contamination can be anticipated, incorporate equipment
to minimize the effects of contamination (see Paragraph 7.3.2.2) aid also design sur-
faces (walls, floors, work tables, etc.) to minimize porosity and facilitate decontamina-
tion (Reference 7-5). Conventional decontamination techniques include vacuuming,
washing (wiping) with absorbent wipes, paint stripping and refinishing to remove contami-
nation as well as over-painting to prevent further spreading once lowest achievable levels
are reached. Clearly the general application of these techniques would not be applicable
to zero "g" areas of the Space Base, since without a gravity field a large percentage of
t
the contaminated material could-be in suspension. Vacuuming appears to present the
promising approach to initial decontamination. In severe cases this could be carried to
the extent of depressurizing the entire compartment affected (accompanied by an air flush )
through an absolute filter.
However, considerable innovation and development of techniques would be required to
deal with residual radiation in zero "g". It might appear that restricting, isotope han-
dling to artificial "g"'areas would relegate the problem of decontamination to convention-
ff
al means. However, the hazard involved with a loss of artificial "g" capability, could
cause a contamination situation and subsequently require zero "g" decontamination tech-
niques.
A similar problem is encountered in decontaminating astronauts returning from EVA.
Access to the Space Base will most certainly be accomplished through the zero, "g" por-
tion of the Base and, therefore, will require the development of applicable decontamina-
tion techniques.
t
One approach to this problem which could prove more effective in terms1 of safety is to pro-
vide a separate, detachable, Shuttle retrievable module which could serve as a decontamination
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area and laboratory for high isotope concentrations. This configuration would serve the
purpose of minimizing contamination of permanent portions of the Space Base, provide the
interface for accepting and decontaminating crew returning from EVA, and provide isolation
areas where a crew member could be treated prior to return to earth. Areas of this module
could be allowed to achieve higher contamination levels than would generally be acceptable in
permanent areas of the Space Base. In addition, at some threshold value, the module could
be replaced, and returned to earth for conventional decontamination and refurbishment.
7.3. 3 REACTOR POWER MODULE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
The Space Base Electrical Power System (EPS) was analyzed to determine the nuclear safety
considerations associated with the repair and maintenance functions,of the Reactor Power
Modules. The reference EPS as defined in Section 3.2.2.1 was used as the basis of the
evaluation. An "engine room" approach was assumed (Figure 7-3). Operating conditions
considered included the case where the Power Module (PM) to be repaired was shutdown and
the remaining PM was operating at the emergency power level of 600 kWt.
The PM design does not provide for a pres-
surized or pressurizable engine room, con-
sequently space ambient conditions have been
referenced as the working environment for
the analysis.
7.3.3.1 Repair and Maintenance Approach
This study evaluated the nuclear safety
hazards associated with PM repair and
maintenance, and the operational limitations
imposed by safety constraints. The objec-
tive was to provide a repair and mainte-
nance capability within the limits imposed
by nuclear safety. The critical factors con-
sidered in the evaluation were:
BRAYTON POWER
CONVERSION ^J[K>
SYSTEM (3) I* S *•
DISPOSAL .
SYSTEM /
& PROPULSION
DOCKING INTERFACE
ELECTRONICS
4 CONTROLS
BOOM/TUNNEL
Figure 7-3. Typical Power Module Engine
Room Position
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1. Working environment (shirtsleeve, EVA, IVA)
2. Temperature constraints
3. Crew stay time / Objective .... minimize
, , , _ , . . I radiation dose t o crew4. Radiation environment
5. Zero "g" constraints
A consideration in each of these factors is that each affect the radiation dose to which an
astronaut is exposed, i. e., a pressurized and temperature controlled engine room is pre-
ferred because it provides a greater degree of flexibility for the astronaut to effect repairs
and maintenance in a minimum of time thereby reducing the integrated radiation dose.
Each of the critical factors was then used to establish the repair and maintenance approach.
Four levels of repair and maintenance were considered:
• Piece part
• Modular (black box)
• Component
• Subsystem
The piece part approach was rejected. This approach increases stay times, requires con-
siderable flexibility and dexterity and may also require considerable "trouble shooting", all
of which increase total radiation exposure of the repair crew. The modular (black box),
component and subsystem approach is recommended since each of these methods can meet
the critical factors criteria. For purposes of this study, components are identified as inte-
gral units of a subsystem such as a Brayton Rotating Unit or a pump. Subsystems encompass
a wider range of the PM and in this case, the most prominent example is a reactor/shield
which can be separated from the PM by means of a separable heat exchanger.
i
Each of these methods - modular, component and subsystem - represent an approach to re-
pair and maintenance that reduces stay times, facilitates handling and eliminates "trouble
shooting" which result in decreasing the amount of radiation an astronaut is exposed to.
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7.3.3.2 Radiation Environment
Radiation emanating from both reactors was considered during the analysis. Repair and
maintenance within the engine room was based on the conditions that both reactors were
operating at the reference power level of 330 kWt each and that the engine room structure
2provides a radiation shielding effectiveness of 1 gm/cm . The nominal distance between
the reactor and the engine room is 8.26 m (25 ft) as defined in the MDAC baseline (Refer-
ence 7-6). Using this criteria and data from Figure 7-4, the amount of radiation received
by an astronaut performing repairs in the engine room is 39 mrem/hr (depth dose). Natural
radiation would contribute an additional 3 mrem/hr (depth dose). One can also deduce from
Figure 7-4 that repair in the gallery areas (approximately 1.98 m (6 ft) from the reactor)
is impractical due to the high radiation levels, in the order of 600 rem/hr. Repairs in the
gallery area were also investigated for the case where the reactor to be repaired is shut down
and the remaining reactor is operating at the emergency power level of 600 kWt. Data from
Figure 7-5 indicates the radiation dose rate in the gallery area is in* the range of 200 rem/hr
twenty-four hours after shutdown and still relatively high at 0. 9 rem/hr ten days after shut-
down. Based on these data, it is concluded that repair and maintenance in the reactor and
gallery areas would not and should not be performed after the reactor has been operated, due
to the excessively high radiation levels.
7.3.3.3 Repair and Maintenance Frequencies
Repair and maintenance frequencies and stay times required to effect repairs were also
considered. Repair frequency data presented in Figure 7-4 was obtained from a North
American Rockwell (NAR) study (Reference 7-7). These data indicate that as many as 21
repairs will have to be made on the Brayton Power Conversion Systems over the 10-year
mission. These figures are based on estimated failure rates and when simplified, result in
a repair rate of one per six months per Power Module. The same study also presented data
of estimated times required to effect repairs. An average repair time of 1.5 to 2. 0 hrs,
including transit time along the power module support boom, was derived from these data.
Assuming a conservative approach that the entire two hours is spent in the engine room at
a distance of 8.26 m (25 ft) from the reactor, the astronaut would then receive an integrated
depth dose of 78 mrem (39 mrem/hr from Figure 7-4) from the reactor and approximately
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6 mrem (depth dose) from natural radiation
sources. The maximum allowable one year
average daily depth dose rate is 200 mrem
(see Section 4). During the normal course
of his daily routine aboard the Space Base,
an astronaut receives an average of 91 mrem
(depth). If we add the repair dose of 78
mrem from the reactor and the 6 mrem from
natural sources (due to the two-hour repair)
to the 91 mrem, a safety margin of 25 mrem
still remains for the one day period. It is,
therefore, concluded, that repair and main-
tenance in the engine room is feasible and
can be performed within radiation exposure
limits.
RADIATION DECAY AFTER SHUTDOWN
ENGINE ROOM
DISPOSAL MODULE
0 9 REM/HR AT
10 DAYS
a •
200 REM/
HR
102 103 104 105
DOSE RATE MREM/HR
CONDITIONS
1 REMAINING REACTOR AT 600 KWT
2. MEASUREMENT 1 83M (6 FT) FROM q
Figure 7-5. Radiation Decay After Shutdown
Longer stay times of up to five hours can probably be accommodated when considering a
repair frequency of one per six months.
7.3.3.4 Related Hazards
NaK Piping Repair Hazards - Repair of NaK lines in the primary, intermediate or heat
rejection loops is considered impractical in light of the following safety hazards NaK9
presents:
• Inherent toxicity
• Activation by nuclear radiation
• Potential fire hazard
The reference PM is designed as a single loop system thereby precluding further PM opera-
tion should a NaK leak develop. Repair does not appear to be feasible due to the nuclear safety
hazards identified above. The hazards are also significantly increased when one accounts for
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the zero "g" environment in which the repairs must be made (Reference 7-1, 7-8). However,
for future designs, which might include redundant NaK loops thereby providing a means for
continued PM operation, a method should be provided for containment of the NaK and safing
of the system. One approach to the problem is to incorporate double wall piping or to design
the piping insulation for a dual function, i. e., heat insulation and NaK containment.
Rotating Machinery Hazards - Rotating machinery can present a safety hazard to the crew
due to potential fragmentation accidents and its dynamic characteristics. Appropriate safe-
guards should be included in future designs.
Temperature Hazards - High temperature surfaces in the engine room area such as piping,
heat exchangers and the PCS should be equipped with protective guards to prevent accidental
contact by the crew performing repairs.
Electrical Hazards - Electrical Hazards such as high voltages associated with the PCS should
be considered in design of the engine room and protective features incorporated to reduce
and/or-eliminate them for the protection of crewmen performing repairs.
7.3.3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
Table 7-17 presents a summary of hazards that have been identified during this study and
recommendations to reduce and/or eliminate them. Hazards identified for specific repairs
were documented on maintenance and repair sheets (Appendix D ), of which Figure 7-6 is
a typical example. The principal repair and maintenance guidelines resulting from the evalua-
tion are identified in Table 7-18.
7.3.4 REACTOR DISPOSAL TECHNIQUES
Reactor disposal constitutes one of the prime areas of concern in the use of nuclear reactors
for space applications. Terrestrial nuclear safety and handling operations are affected to a
greater degree during reactor disposal than during reactor launch ascent and early orbital
operations. This is due to the inherent operating characteristics of a nuclear reactor, i. e.,
the fission product inventory increases as a function of reactor power level and operating time.
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Table 7-18. Reactor Power Module Maintenance and
Repair Guidelines
DESIGN
• Consider use of a pressurized and temperature-controlled engine room
• Consider methods of NaK containment, such as double-walled construction
• Provide modular (black box), component and subsystem level repair capability
• Emergency EVA and IVA suits should be located in engine room for emergency purposes
• Consider multiple redundancy in high radiation areas and where EVA is required
• Provide guards around high temperature equipment and electrical hazards
• Provide protective shielding around dynamic machinery
• Provide fault/failure isolation diagnostic system '
• Consider fault diagnosis support from ground systems
• Provide quick disconnect interconnections
• Consider modular replacement of Disposal System
• Consider placement of Disposal electronics within engine room «»
OPERATIONS
»-
• Do not attempt repair in the gallery area or to the reactor (Considered impractical due to the high radiation levels that exist
even after reactor shutdown)
• Do not attempt repair to NaK lines (not considered feasible due to the hazards involved of toxicity, potential fire and radio-
activity resulting from NaK activation)
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The following major considerations have been analyzed to determine their effects on nuclear
safety:
1. Reactor disposal prerequisites; i. e., ability to maintain the reactor subcritical,
ability to reduce reactor radiation levels.
2. Disposal mode selection; transfer to high earth orbit, controlled reentry to earth,
injection into a heliocentric orbit, destruction, etc.
3. Disposal vehicle selection; manned or unmanned.
4. Reactor disposal analysis; performance requirements, reentry effects, failure
modes and effects.
The reference reactor disposal vehicle used in this study is an Integral Disposal Module
(IDM) consisting of four solid fuel engines and an independent guidance and navigation system
(Figure 7-7). A detailed description of the IDM is presented in Volume HI Part 1 of this
study.
7.3.4.1 Disposal Prerequisites
The reactor operational status prior to disposal significantly affects the choice of disposal
altitude and disposal vehicle. The two dominant considerations are the reactor's criticality
status (ability to remain subcritical) and the radiation levels attributed to the fission product
inventory. The latter is the controlling factor in determining both the radiation dose level
that the disposal vehicle crew will be exposed to, and the orbital lifetime required for fission
products to decay to a safe level.
7.3.4.1.1 Reactor Operational Status
It is essential to preclude a reactor criticality accident both during the disposal phase and
subsequently during the reentry or earth impact resulting from an accident. The consequence
of an excursion occurring could affect the safety of the Space Base crew (see Section 6.2.2.1)
disposal vehicle crew and earth's general populace.
7-67
Imoa
,
enQ0)It-c
-
0)
7-68
Permanent shutdown of a terrestrial based nuclear reactor is an accepted practice at the
end of its operational life. This is accomplished either by: 1) injection of a neutron poison
into the coolant; 2) disconnecting and removing the control drum (or rod) drive mechanism;
or 3) removal of fuel elements. Removal of fuel elements and control drum drive mechanisms
is not practical for the Space Base reactor. Four concepts to maintain permanent reactor
shutdown were analyzed. These concepts are:
1. High earth orbit reactor destruct
2. Neutron poison injection
3. Release of the fuel's hydrogen moderator
4. Incorporation of control drum lockout devices.
f
High Earth Orbit Reactor Destruct - This concept was rejected because it could result in
contamination of the upper atmosphere and the ultimate reentry into the earth's environment
of radioactive materials.
Neutron Poison Injection - Two concepts for neutron poisoning were considered; injection
directly into the core coolant or injection into void tubes located within the core as shown in
Figures 7-8 and 7-9 respectively. Maintenance of the poison within the core coolant is
dependent upon primary loop containment integrity and therefore is considered less reliable
than the injection into void tubes.
Typical poison materials which were considered are hafnium, europium, gadolinum, cadmium
and lithium. Cadmium appears to be most promising from melt temperature, neutron cross
section and material compatibility aspects. Cadmium with a melt temperature of 594 K can
be maintained in a solid state until the time of permanent shutdown to prevent accidental
injection during normal operations. It can also be reverted to the solid phase after it has
been heated and injected into the core as a liquid. This phase change significantly increases
the concept's reliability to maintain the poison within the core during disposal and negates the
necessity to maintain absolute primary loop containment integrity.
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REACTOR
HEATERS
DOUBLE EOLATION
SOLENOID VALVES
Figure 7-8. Permanent Reactor Shutdown Concept Injection into Coolant
HEATERS
DOUBLE ISOLATION
SOLENOID VALVES
FUEL ELEMENT
TUBES, NORMALLY VOID
Figure 7-9. Permanent Reactor Shutdown Concept Injection into Void Tubes
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It is recognized that the neutron poison injection concept requires extensive design and per-
formance trade-off studies and may have an affect on the operational nuclear safety advantages
gained.
Release of the Reactor Fuel's Hydrogen Moderator - Release of the fuel's hydrogen moderator
(see Volume III, Part 1, 2 of this report) can be accomplished by raising reactor temperatures
to the fuel clad rupture point. One of the main disadvantages of this method is that fission
products are released to the coolant and could be released to the environment in the event of
a breach in the primary loop containment. Another means of effecting hydrogen release is
to cycle the,fuel temperature and destroy the integrity of the fuel elements' ceramic barriers
thereby accelerating the diffusion of the hydrogen through the clad material. This method
allows for retention of fission products within the fuel elements and eliminates the problem of
fission product release to the coolant and possibly the environment. Both of these methods
were rejected because implementation of procedures to effect hydrogen release could in
themselves result in creating unsafe conditions through reactor excursions.
Incorporation of Control Drum Lockout Devices - Control drum lockout devices were first
employed in the SNAP-10A flight reactor. Utilization of these devices can serve a dual
purpose, (1) prevent inadvertant control drum motion (reactivity insertion) during the ground
operations, launch, docking and installation phases of the mission and (2) can be used after
permanent shutdown to reduce the probability of a nuclear excursion during the disposal
phase of the mission. Figure 7-10 represents a concept of an electro-mechanical lockout
device. It is recognized that a five year life requirement is a technical necessity if the
devices are to function upon permanent reactor shutdown; however, this is not considered
unreasonable since the control drum actuators, which are also electromechanical devices
must operate for the same lifetime and in the same environment. Although operational
lifetime may be achieved, the lockout devices many not survive an accidental reentry and
subsequent earth impact with impact velocities in excess of 244 m/sec (800 ft/sec).
Therefore, a combination of the neutron poison injection and control drum lockout devices
appears to offer the highest probability of success in the prevention of nuclear excursions
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during the non-operational periods of reactor
life.
7.3.4.1.2 Reactor Shutdown Radiation Levels
Fission Product Inventory - Fission product
inventory is one of the major parameters
which dictate the required orbital altitude
if transfer to high earth orbit is selected as
the prime disposal mode. Figure 7-11 pre-
sents data which illustrates typical fission
product decay time as a function of fission
product inventory. This data is based on
the reference Space Base reactor having
been operated at a power level of 330 kWt
for five years. From this data, an orbital
REMOVABLE LiH PLUG
(FOR MANUAL OPERATION)
Figure 7-10. Control Drum Lockout Concept
lifetime can be selected that would allow the fission product inventory to decay to a level
which would constitute an extremely low, or negligible, hazard upon its ultimate reentry
into the earth's atmosphere. For example, an orbital lifetime of 300 years would allow the
90Sr inventory to decay to the level of approximately one curie whereas an orbital lifetime
in the order of 540 years would further decrease the inventory to approximately 0.001 curies.
Once an orbital lifetime is selected that reduces the fission product inventory to accepted
values, the disposal vehicle propulsion characteristics and orbital mechanics for placing
the reactor in the selected orbit can be determined. (See Section 7.3.4.4 for details.)
<!
Fission Product Decay Radiation - The level of fission product decay radiation emanating
from the shutdown reactor is one of the primary parameters which affects selection of the type
of disposal vehicle; manned or unmanned. Figure 7-12 illustrates the direct radiation dose
rates emanating from the Space Base reactor as a function of time after shutdown. Using
this data, the radiation dose rate to a manned disposal vehicle crew located 1.83 m (6 ft)
from the center of the reactor, or 0.76 m (2. 5 ft) from the surface of the power module, is
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Figure 7-11. Decay of Long-Lived Fission Products Following Reactor Shutdown
RADIATION DECAY AFTER SHUTDOWN
18tf
shutdown. If the mission timeline permits
i 1—i—i 1
-90°
approximately 200 rem/hr one day after
a ten-day waiting period without affecting
the Space Base operations, the dose rate is
reduced to 900 mrem/hr for the same loca-
tion; however radiation levels of this magni-
tude would still require crew radiation
shielding for a direct rendezvous approach.
Vehicle maneuvering techniques can be de-
veloped to reduce the direct radiation dose
to the crew. One candidate concept is shown
in Figure 7-13. If a manned vehicle could
accomplish the rendezvous approach shown
in Figure 7-12 the crew dose from direct
radiation can be maintained within the allow-
able 150-200 mrem/day value. However,
103
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Figure 7-12. Radiation Dose Rate as a
Function of Time After Reactor
Shutdown
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Figure 7-13. Reactor Shuttle Loading Concept
once the reactor/shield is installed in the vehicle cargo bay, assuming it can be separated
from the Power Module, the scatter radiation dose becomes the dominant factor rather than
direct radiation. Typical scatter radiation dose rates within the Space Shuttle crew quarters
were calculated for the assessment of nuclear safety in Space Shuttle operations (Volume IV
Part 1 of this study). The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 7-14. These data
indicate the crew dose attributed to scatter and direct radiation can be kept below 200 mrem/
day, if transfer operations are not initiated until 10 hours after reactor shutdown.
7.3.4.2 Disposal Mode Options
The primary criteria to be considered in determining the optimum disposal mode and location
are the safety of the terrestrial population and that of the Space Base crew. The following
modes were considered for disposal of the Space Base reactors:
1. Controlled reentry - ocean burial
2. Controlled reentry - land recovery
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3. Orbital destruction
4. Injection into heliocentric orbit
5. Transfer to high earth orbit
Natural earth orbital decay, "random reentry",
was not considered a planned reentry mode,
but was evaluated to determine the effects
of aborted disposals resulting from the dis-
posal modes and locations identified above
(see Section 7. 3.4.4).
Controlled Reentry - Controlled reentry by
unmanned vehicles with either a land re-
covery or ocean burial could present a
serious hazard to the terrestrial population
in the event of a mission abort. Consequently,
REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS
REACTOR IKD BEEN OPERATTNC AT A
LE\ELOF 12S kttt FOR 10 000 HOI RS
I I I I I I I I 1 I I I 1J
1 IME AFTER SI (IT DOWN (IIOIRS)
Figure 7-14. Reactor Scatter Dose Rates
While Stowed in Shuttle Cargo Bay
highly reliable systems, capable of performing the following functions are necessary:
1. Prevention of burnup and disassembly during reentry.
< j . i2. Control of impact point with a high degree of confidence.
3. Prevention of reactor disassembly upon impact.
Controlled reentry, where another vehicle such as the Space Shuttle provides the reentry
capability, appears to be more promising as a disposal method because of the crew's ability
to respond to emergency situations but requires further detailed study (Reference Volume IV,
i
Part 1) to assess the consequences of abort accidents such as reentry burnup and propulsion,
guidance or landing system failures. This mode was retained as a backup for the disposal of
a reactor.
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Orbital Destruction - Earth orbital destruction of a reactor was rejected as a disposal mode
because it may result in immediate or long-term contamination of the upper atmosphere,
terrestrial environment and general populace. Furthermore, the resultant radioactive debris
may effect other satellites, experiments and the Space Base crew.
Injection into Heliocentric Orbit - Injection into a heliocentric orbit theoretically provides an
infinite orbital lifetime which precludes any possibility of radiological hazards to earth and
the upper atmosphere. In order to inject the PM weighing 31.8t (70 klb) into such an orbit, a
AV of approximately 3.14 km/sec (10,300 ft/sec) would be required. The solid propellant
mass for such a maneuver would be approximately 66. 5t (168.5 klb). This mass penalty was
considered too great to justify further consideration of this disposal mode.
Transfer to High Earth Orbit - Early in the study it became apparent that transfer of the
reactor to high earth orbit would provide a means to significantly reduce the radiological
risk associated with reactor disposal. A successful transfer can be considered negligible
when the reactor ultimately reenters. This mode was selected as the baseline to evaluate
candidate disposal implementation methods.
7.3.4.3 Candidate Disposal Vehicles
The candidate disposal vehicles that can be utilized for the preferred disposal mode of trans-
fer to high earth orbit are manned disposal vehicles (e. g., Space Shuttle, Space Tug), the
Integral Disposal Module (IDM) and unmanned versions of the Space Tug.
7.3.4.3.1 Manned Disposal Vehicles
Two of NASA's (candidate) advanced vehicles, the Space Shuttle and Space Tug (Reference
7-9) may be used for the disposal of spent space reactors. Manned disposal vehicles offer the
following advantages:
1. High probability of mission success since crew members can respond and correct
for system malfunctions.
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2. Flexibility in selecting disposal location, since the manned vehicle can be used to
either transfer the reactor directly to high earth orbit, or, in the case of the Shuttle,
act in a backup mode to retrieve and return the reactor to earth in the event of an
orbit transfer abort.
Both the Shuttle and the manned Space Tug are expected to have the capability to transfer a
reactor or power module to a high orbit for disposal (Reference 7-7). Volume IV, Part I of
this report discussed the Nuclear Safety aspects of using the Shuttle for Nuclear System
Transportation.
7.3.4.3.2 Unmanned Disposal Vehicles
Two types of unmanned disposal vehicles have been considered: (1) Integral Disposal Modules
that are part of the Power Module structure and (2) Vehicles, such as the unmanned version of
the Space Tug, which have propulsion and maneuvering capability and are mated to the spent
reactor at the time of disposal initiation.
Integral Disposal Module - The IDM, shown conceptually in Figure 7-7, has intrinsic charac-
teristics which influence nuclear safety. The primary advantage, over other vehicles con-
sidered, is the ability to accomplish immediate disposal of the reactor during any mission
phase since it is integral with the Power Module structure. Therefore, the reactor disposal
may be accomplished inthe event of a reactor accident or a Space Base abort situation, without
reliance on an independent support vehicle. Because of the importance of the disposal function,
the IDM must be an extremely reliable unit. The projected reactor lifetimes require that the
IDM be capable of reliably performing after mission durations of up to five years. Therefore,
the IDM must incorporate design features such as redundancy, and strategic radiation shielding
of sensitive components, to assure reliability. Periodic functional checkout, maintenance and
repair must also be scheduled during the mission, since repair will be difficult once the power
module has been separated from the Space Base.
Unmanned Tug - This concept is envisioned as a vehicle with guidance, propulsion and docking
capability, which would be controlled from the Space Base or through ground networks. A
recent tug concept, provides for separation of the crew module of the manned tug, and remote
operation of the remaining portion of the vehicle (Reference 7-9).
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Employing an unmanned tug for reactor disposal appears very attractive from a nuclear
safety standpoint. It provides a portion of the flexibility exhibited by the manned vehicles
while eliminating the radiological hazards to which the crew of these vehicles could be ex-
posed. It also partially circumvents the long life required with the IBM concept. As presently
conceived the unmanned Tug, could be either stored on-board the Space Base or launched by
the Shuttle. Therefore, the repair and checkout of guidance and disposal engines could be
accomplished immediately prior to its use as a disposal vehicle.
The exclusive use of the unmanned Tug as a disposal system negates the IBM advantage of
immediate separation of the power module in the event of an accident. Therefore, system
concepts employing the Tug for disposal should also include provisions for quick separation
of the power module from the Space Base and the development of techniques for the recovery
in the event of subsequent power module tumbling. These latter features would provide con-
tingency capabilities in the event of emergency situations associated with the power module.
7.3.4.4 Reactor Disposal Analyses
An analysis of the disposal of a reactor to high earth orbit was performed to determine the
following:
1. Performance requirements of the disposal vehicle.
2. Orbital lifetimes of the baseline power module and of a separated reactor-shield.
3. Effects of a disposal module abort during the transfer (Hohmann transfer).
4. Reentry characteristics of the power module assuming the aborted transfer results
in earth reentry.
The analysis is based on the use of the reference Integral Disposal Module although it is also
applicable to the unmanned Space Tug concepts.
7.3.4.4.1 Vehicle Performance Requirements
A parametric orbital mechanics analysis was performed to determine the following:
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1. Amount of disposal vehicle fuel and the AV required to attain orbits between 741 km
(400 nm) and 1298 km (700 nm) and injection into a heliocentric orbit.
2. Orbital lifetimes for each of these orbits were calculated as a function of varying
solar flux and ballistic coefficients. The orbital lifetime of an abandoned Space
Base was also determined.
3. The orbital life sensitivity to engine abort was also determined on the basis of
a Hohmann Transfer.
Vehicle Performance - The AV required to boost the power module, 31. 8t (70 Klb) to various
orbits is shown in Table 7-19. The analysis assumed the power module had been separated
from the Space Base by ejection springs. Transfer to a higher orbit consists of two propul-
sive maneuvers- (1) a thrust from the reference orbit to the selected transfer orbit, and
(2) a thrust at apogee to affect circularization at the disposal attitude.
As shown in the data, the mass penalty incurred for injection into heliocentric orbit is 76t
(168. 5 Klb) for a solid fuel booster. This penalty was considered too great and was one of
the prime reasons for rejection of a heliocentric orbit as a disposal mode.
Orbital Lifetime - The orbital lifetimes and associated altitudes presented in Table 7-19
differ from those used for the radiological risk asseessment presented in Volume III, Part 3
of the study. The basis of this difference is that the most conservative solar flux model
available was used in the risk assessment analysis whereas this analysis is based on a
solar flux model prepared by the Lockheed Corporation for the NASA's George C. Marshall
Flight Center (see Appendix E for details).
One of the pertinent results of this analysis is the significance of being able to separate the
reactor/shield from the power module. The orbital lifetime of the reactor-shield can be
increased by approximately a factor of nine (9) if a separable heat exchanger or similar
means were available to accomplish separation.
Also of significance is the fact that if the Space Base is abandoned, with the power modules
still attached, the associated earth orbital lifetime of 5-18 years will allow for implementa-
tion of emergency procedures for reactor recovery and disposal.
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Orbit Sensitivity to Engine Abort - Table 7-19 illustrates the sensitivity of an engine abort
occurring if the first thrust firing is successful and the engines do not fire for the second
thrusting (orbit circularization). If worst case conditions are assumed, an orbit lifetime of
72 years can be attained for the power module in a 927 km (500 nm) elliptical orbit.
The analysis also indicates that immediate direct reentry of the reactor does not occur if
the guidance system malfunctions for the second thrust firing, but instead results in a highly
elliptical orbit. Guidance system malfunctions for the first thrust firing at the reference
Space Base orbit result in direct immediate reentry for firing angles between -90 and -180
from the horizontal. However, most of the guidance abort cases considered result in ellipti-
cal orbits with orbital lifetimes longer than that of the Space Base orbit altitude. For those
few cases resulting in immediate earth reentry, a reentry analysis was performed to deter-
mine reactor survivability. (See Appendix E for details of engine and guidance system
malfunctions.)
7. 3. 4. 4.2 Reactor Reentry Analysis
A reactor reentry analysis was performed to determine the power module and reactor-shield
reentry characteristics. The analyses included consideration of the following postulated
disposal abort conditions:
1. Power module guidance system fails on first thrust firing and power module
r centers.
2. Power module engines do not fire for circularization burn and the power module
reenters in a normal earth orbital decay (EOD) mode.
3. Power module guidance system failure which results in an elliptical orbit and
eventual EOD (same reentry as item 2).
4. Power module reentry from a circular orbit, normal EOD.
A summary of this analysis and the resulting principal parameters are presented in Table
7-20 which includes three of the basic reentry configurations:
1. Earth orbital decay of the reactor-shield.
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2. Earth orbital decay of the power module with release of the reactor-shield from
the power module at an altitude of approximately 98 km (320,000 ft).
3. Reentry of the power module resulting from a successful first thrust firing and
failure of the power module g
The worst case reentry conditions result from configuration (3) which sequentially lead to
a release of the reactor/shield from the power module at a nominal altitude of 98 km and
2
skip out of the reactor-shield due to the change in ballistic coefficient from 5. 506 N/m
2 2 2(115 Ibs/ft ) to 82.114 N/m (1715 Ibs/ft ). The summarized data for configuration (3)
also includes two different reentry angles -2 and -4 , and two initial power module thrust
velocities, a AV of 401 m/sec (1315 ft/sec) and a AV of 226 m/sec (740 ft/sec). These
velocities represent the total thrust required to boost the power module from the reference
Space Base orbit to disposal altitudes of 1298 km (700 nm) and 927 km (500 nm), respectively.
To provide for worst case conditions, results are shown for the case where all four disposal
engines fire simultaneously due to a malfunction rather than the two required for the firs't'
thrust and then two for the circularization thrust.
The analysis also included a variation in reentry orientations such as:
1. Power module end-on and side-on
2. Reactor/shield end-on; gallery end first and gallery end backward
3. Reactor/shield side-on
4. Reactor/shield tumbling
5. Space Base end-on and side-on .
(Refer to Figure 7-15 for orientation definition.)
The analyses indicate that if the Space Base is abandoned and reenters through the normal
earth orbital decay, the reactor/shield reentry and release altitude is similar to that of
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the power module EOD mode with the reactor/
shield being released from the power module
at 98 km (320 Kft).
Lithium Hydride ablation calculations were
also performed. Figure 7-16 illustrates the
amount of LiH which is ablated for reentry
conditions. The worst case condition occurs
when the power module reenters after a first
thrust firing, the reactor/shield skips out of
the atmosphere and ablates away some of the
LiH on each skip, and ultimately reenters
in a EOD mode in a stable gallery-end-first
orientation. The exact amount of LiH which
ablates is difficult to calculate since it is ^
dependent on the number of skips and the Figure 7-15. Reactor/Shield Combination
depth of penetration into the atmosphere for each skip. However, since a normal EOD, stable
gallery-end-first orientation results in ablation of 318 mm (12.5 in.) of the 640 mm (25 in.)
protecting the reactor, it can be safely assumed that the total amount of LiH ablated would
be in excess of 318 mm. The curve on the right (in Figure 7-16) is the potential of skip for
a AV reentry of 40m/sec (1315 ft/sec) as a function of reentry angle. Trajectory calculations
predict the reactor/shield will skip out for angles of 0 to -0.75 with a potential for skip from
-0.75 to -2.0 , but direct reentry does occur for angles beyond -2.0 .
The comparative difference in ablation of LiH for a stable-gallery-end-first and a tumbling
orientation is also shown in Figure 7-16. A tumbling orientation results in only 81 mm
(2.65 in.) of ablation compared to the 318 mm of the stable gallery end-on orientation.
C, VLLERl t\D B1CKU 1RD
The influence of initial LiH temperature (at the beginning of reentry) was assessed. This is
a function of the reactor decay heat and time of reentry after reactor shutdown. The data
o opresented in Figure 7-16 shows a AT of 111 K (200 F) changes the amount of LiH which i
ablated by approximately 10%. The first condition assumed an initial temperature of
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Figure 7-16. Earth Orbital Decay and Aborted AV Reentry Analysis
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T = 477°K (400°F) and the second a T = 366°K (200°F). The LiH temperature would be
o q
significantly affected by the incorporation of an independent reentry shield since the current
means of rejecting the decay heat is by radiation (assuming primary coolant loop is inactive).
Incorporation of an independent heat shield would most likely utilize an insulating material
between the reentry shield and that LiH thereby necessitating an independent LiH cooling
system.
The power module reentry sensitivity to (1) the AV (engine thrust) impacted for aborted
transfers, (2) the altitude at which the reactor/shield is released from the power module
and (3) the reentry angle, is illustrated in Figure 7-17. The conclusions derived from this
data arc that the amount of LiH ablated during reentry is:
1. Relatively insensitive to the altitude at which the reactor/shield is released from
the power module.
2. Slightly sensitive to the initial thrust firing velocity. Note that for a factor of
almost two change in AV, 401 m/sec to 226 m/sec, the amount of LiH ablated
changes by approximately 10%.
3. Very sensitive to the initial reentry angle. Doubling the reentry angle, -2 to -4 ,
increases the amount of LiH ablated by a factor of almost two (2) for the same AV.
The results of the reentry analysis presented so far indicate that for the worst case reentry,
reactor/shield skip and ultimate EOD, results in ablation of more than 318 mm (12. 5 in.)
of the 640 mm (25 in.) of LiH protecting the reactor. The analysis was based on the following
assumptions:
1. The shield was composed of all LiH encapsulated with 31 mm (0.10 in.) of stainless
steel. The layers of tungsten shown in Figure 7-15 were not included due to com-
plexities introduced to the analysis and the uncertain behavior (requires an experi-
mental test program) of the tungsten-LiH composite. The tungsten will probably
oxidize and also re-radiate some of the thermal energy. However, its high melt
temperature, 3,643°K (6, 030°F) can adversely affect the reentry. Since LiH melts
at 961 K (1270°F) it will melt long before the tungsten reaches its melt point, ex-
pand and increase its internal pressure. The effect of the increased pressure on
the tungsten and the possible interactions between molten lithium, liberated hydrogen
and the tungsten are unkonwns which may affect the reentry. Resolution of this
problem was beyond the scope of this study.
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Plasma arc tunnel tests of LiH specimens had previously been performed by
General Electric. These tests indicate that the LiH ablation rate is a factor of
2-3 greater than predicted by analysis for less severe environmental conditions.
The results of these tests are shown in Figure 7-18 and are discussed in more
detail in Volume TH, Part 2 of this study, as is t he reentry analysis.
Applications of these results to the reentry analysis could result in the ablation
of all the 640mm (25 in.) LiH protecting the reactor during reentry and result in
exposure of the reactor core and fuel to the reentry environment.
7.3.4.5 Conclusions
The conclusions presented here are based
on nuclear safety aspects and require further
consideration to define those technologies
(e. g., reactor poison injection), which are
expected to significantly contribute to the
safe disposal of a reactor power module.
These conclusions are:
1. A positive means of reactor shut-
down is desirable to further mini-
mize criticality accidents resulting
from disposal operations. The
neutron poison injection concept
has been used on terrestrial com-
mercial reactors and is recom-
mended for the reference reactor.
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Figure 7-18. LiH Specimen Reentry Teji Results
Intact reentry of a conventional LiH shield is questionable for many of the reentry
modes which were considered for the Space Base application. Prior to this study,
LiH was utilized predominantly as a radiation shield and considered acceptable
as a reentry protection material. Results of this study indicate the need for an
independent reentry protection system.
Separation of the reactor/shield from the PM would significantly increase orbital
lifetimes, i. e., increases ballistic coefficient. Inclusions of a separable heat
exchanger in the PM design is one means of providing a separation capability.
It also allows for replacement of the reactor/shield without having to replace the
entire PM.
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2. The location and orientation of the primary cooling piping is not established for
the reference design. Consequently, the analysis did not account for this. However,
it will most certainly penetrate the LiH and each layer of tungsten from the reactor .
to the gallery (see Figure 7-15). The total effect of these penetrations on the
reactor/shield aerodynamic characteristics and the reentry behavior of the LiH
will probably adversely affect the reentry.
3. It was assumed that thermal energy created during reentry is absorbed by the LiH
heat capacity, i. e., its sensible heat (WCp Af) and latent heat of fusion. Recent
experimental tests by the NASA, Ames Laboratories and the General Electric
Company indicate LiH dissociates at its melt temperature, into free Li and H2
which oxidize. The General Electric study shows that the oxidation produces
exothermic reactions which liberate energy in the order of 55. 8 x 106 joules/kg of
LiH (24,4)00 Btu/lb of LiH). In considering the most optimistic reentry characteris-
tics of LiH the heat capacity of LiH consists of its sensible heat, latent heat of fusion,
heat of dissociation and the vapor blocking contribution. Arbitrarily assuming an
initial LiH temperature of 427°K (300°F) the total heat capacity is calculated to be
approximately 31.7 x 106 joules/kg of LiH (13,635 Btu/lb of LiH; the individual
components of this term are:
Joules/Kg of LiH Btu/lb of LiH
Sensible heat = 3.4xl06 (1475)
Latent heat = 2.9xl06 (1250)
Heat of dissociation = 11.4xl06 (4910)
C
Vapor blocking contribution = 14.0x10 (6000)
Total 31.7x10 13,635
The heat capacity arrived at may be highly optimistic depending upon the actual
behavior of the LiH during the eentry process. For example, if the LiH melts
and is forced into the free stream in droplet form without dissociating, the
effective heat capacity could be reduced to the sum of the sensible heat and
latent heat of fusion, 6.34 x 106 joules/kg (2,725 Btu/lb)of LiH.
Both experimental and analytical studies conducted by the General Electric Company
with graphite have indicated that for certain reentry configurations, virtually all
of the heat released by exothermic reactions in (he boundary layer is transferred
back to the reentering body. There is no evidence to suggest that this phenomena
is indicative only of graphite and it would appear that the theory can be extended
to other reentering bodies having reacting gas boundary layers. It is probable
that some percentage of the energy liberated by the exothermic reactions, 55.8 x 10
joulesAg °f LiH (24, 000 Btu/lb) will be transferred back to the reactor shield.
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4. Transfer to high earth orbit provides time for decay of fission products. Orbital
lifetimes in the order of 250 years allow for fission product decay to levels that
are below generally accepted safe levels.
5. The unmanned Tug appears to offer promising safety advantages for disposal of
spent reactors. It eliminates any potential problem of radiological hazards to a
crew, provides flexibility in the selection of disposal location, and can be checked
out in free flight prior to attachment to the reactor.
6. Safe disposal of a damaged reactor (activated coolant or fission products are
released) is greatly enhanced by use of the unmanned Tug.
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SECTION 8
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
The general design and operations considerations discussed in this volume will require
additional study and evaluation to establish the specific means of implementation on future
programs. In addition to these studies, which will be conducted as part of the normal design
evolution of a program, several particular areas of research and technology development
are required which have a major impact on nuclear safety both in space and on the earth.
The areas identified and discussed in some detail below include:
1. Launch Support Requirements - Nuclear Hardware Impact
2. Liquid Metal Support Requirements - Impact at Launch Center
3. Launch Support Fire Protection - Nuclear Hardware Impact
4. Nuclear Reactor/Power Module Separation
5. Reactor Protection Technology
6. Blast and Fragmentation Protection - Schemes and Estimation Models
7. Reactor Permanent Shutdown
8. Nuclear Debris In-Orbit
9. In-Orbit Decontamination Techniques
10. Space Qualified Radiation Monitoring Equipment
11. Standardization of Safety Analysis Techniques
8.1 LAUNCH SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS - NUCLEAR HARDWARE IMPACT
8.1.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
The analysis associated with this study (especially those contained in Section 5) identify the
general facility requirements for the handling and preparation of nuclear hardware at the
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launch center. These requirements have been defined based on the nuclear safety needs of
a single program, but have not considered schedule, technical, cost and joint usage aspects
in the implementation of the total nuclear facility requirements.
The prime objective of such a study shall be to study and identify the projected facility needs
such that a plan can be implemented which makes maximum usage of existing facilities. In
addition, new facilities required can be designed with future growth capability and serve
multiple usages.
8.1.2 APPROACH
The projected needs of future nuclear programs should be evaluated to establish a plan for
meeting the expanding use of nuclear power systems and hardware in the coming decades.
These studies should consider the use of isotope as well as reactor systems. A thorough
study of the hazards involved and current methods employed at nuclear facilities to imple-
ment safety is required. A review of existing facilities should be made to identify potential
usage and the additional requirements necessary to allow usage as nuclear facilities. The
scope of the study should consider the risk-gain trade-offs of nuclear activities which would
be allowed in existing facilities versus modifications necessary for obtaining special licenses
or the need for a completely new facility. Cost, schedules and facility and personnel risk
factors should be considered. An example of such a study is the potential use of the VAB as
an assembly and integration area for nuclear power systems versus the bypassing of the
facility with final integration at the launch pad. The latter approach requires a separate
checkout and assembly facility.
An additional study area could involve a preliminary identification of nuclear hardware opera-
tional procedures to determine the impact on launch operations.
8-2
8.2 LIQUID METAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS - IMPACT AT LAUNCH CENTER
8.2.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
Reactor power systems for space applications use significant quantities of liquid metal
coolant. The safe handling and servicing of this hardware and liquid metal inventory must
be provided at the launch center. The facility and procedural requirements necessary for
the support of future programs shall be identified such that results can be factored into
j
future plans, budgets and schedules.
8.2.2 APPROACH
The projected liquid metal servicing and handling needs of future nuclear programs should
be evaluated. The study should consist of a thorough review of the hazards involved in the
handling of liquid metals and the techniques used at existing facilities around the country.
The requirements for the safe handling of liquid metals at the launch center should be
established.
A review of existing facilities at the launch center should be made to identify compatibility
with liquid metal handling and safety requirements. Special facility requirements such as
isolated chambers, environmental protection and fire protection shall be identified. Modifica-
tions to existing facilities shall be proposed and new facility requirements identified. Trade-
offs should include the advantages of a full charging and unloadmg/safing facility versus a
minimum facility whereby liquid metal charging must be done at the factory. Preliminary
procedures should be developed to identify the potential impact on launch operations. Costs
and schedules should be developed for budgetary and planning purposes.
8.3 LAUNCH SUPPORT FIRE PROTECTION - NUCLEAR HARDWARE IMPACT
8.3.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
Section 5 of the study indicates the requirements for fire protection at the Launch Complex
and indicates the possible incompatibility between conventional fire protection techniques
and materials and characteristics of the nuclear/liquid metal hardware. Present fire
8-3
protection methods rely extensively on water deluge and sprinkler systems. However,
water and other common fire extinguishing solutions are not compatible with liquid metal
fires. Furthermore, the reference reactor may pose a hazard when submerged in water
under certain conditions (see Volume Ill-Part 2). The objective of the study shall be to
identify fire protection techniques and possible technology programs which have as a goal
the compatibility with nuclear hardware at the launch pad_,assembly and storage facilities.
8.3.2 APPROACH
Fire protection requirements and currently employed concepts at nuclear and liquid metal
facilities would be identified. Current fire protection provisions at applicable launch complex
facilities would be evaluated for compatibility and compliance with nuclear hardware require-
ments. Application of currently employed nuclear/liquid metal fire protection techniques
to the launch complex and the resulting impact on existing facilities and flight hardware would
be evaluated. Modifications to existing procedures and facilities would be proposed. Where
definite incompatibilities exist which cannot be resolved by utilizing available techniques,
studies must be pursued to identify new techniques. These techniques would be candidates for
a technology development program.
8.4 NUCLEAR REACTOR/POWER MODULE SEPARATION
8. 4.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENT
The capability of separating the reactor/shield assembly from the power module assembly
has been shown to be a significant means of enhancing nuclear safety. The analyses per-
formed in evaluating reactor disposal techniques (Section 7.3.4), reactor maintenance and
repair (Section 7. 3.3) and concepts involving the Shuttle as a nuclear system transportation
vehicle (see Volume IV) all substantiate this conclusion. Although reversible means for
accomplishing this separation have been considered in previous separable heat exchanger
work, permanent separation techniques may allow achieving at least partial enhancement
of safety (during reactor disposal) without attendant penalties in system performance. Studies
should be performed which would indicate approaches to providing reactor separation tech-
niques to maximize nuclear safety while minimizing system performance penalties.
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8.4.2 APPROACH
Operational requirements for a separable heat exchanger would be established (e.g., operating
temperature levels, allowable temperature differentials, quantity of heat to be transferred).
Candidate concepts would then be investigated to select most promising concepts. Concepts
include use of heat pipes and low melt temperature heat transfer metals.
These steps would be followed by an analysis and conceptual design of a candidate separable
heat exchanger using heat transfer principles previously investigated. This technology pro-
gram would lead to the development of specifications and^predicted performance characteristics.
Special studies related to the use of a separable heat exchanger would be instigated such as
materials investigations and a conceptual design of a self-sealing quick disconnect for NaK
service.
8.5 REACTOR PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY '\
8.5.1 OBJE CTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
The discussions in Section 6, 7 and In Volume HI, Part 2 of this study indicate the importance
of a reliable reactor protection system. The adequacy of a LiH shield as presently envisioned
for use with the ZrH reactor is in question. A technology program should be initiated prior
to establishing a firm reactor shield design which addresses the following:
1. Investigations to provide assurance that the reactor protection system will:
a. Perform as a nuclear radiation shield
b. Be capable of resisting penetration and/or loss of shielding effectiveness in
orbit.
c. Dissipate reactor waste heat without degradation of shield material.
d. Provide protection through aerodynamic reentry and subsequent earth impact.
2. Determine effects on reliability and performance due to:
a. Long term radiation environment
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b. Long term high temperature environment
c. Irregular surfaces
8.5.2 APPROACH
Requirements for a reactor protection system would be established. Preliminary design
concepts would then be developed based on a reference reactor power module program/
mission(s). Trade-off studies would then be conducted, important parameters being shielding
effectiveness, reentry capability, mass, manufacturing capability, reliability, cost, etc.
Selected materials and configuration concepts would be evaluated and necessary test programs
conducted. The ability of the material and material matrix to meet the requirements pre-
viously established would be ascertained, i.e., radiation shield, reentry burn up, earth
impact.
The optimum material would be selected and preliminary design concepts would be developed.
Full scale tests should be performed prior to commitment to a flight program.
8.6 BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION SCHEMES AND ESTIMATION MODELS
8.6.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
The high energy fragments resulting from exploding tanks are of major concern for the proper
design of nuclear hardware, as well as spacecraft equipment. The source of this fragmenta-
tion includes booster propellant tanks as well as storage tanks aboard the spacecraft. How-
ever, very little information or data is currently available to characterize the fragments
with regard to size, shape and velocity. The purpose of this proposed program is to develop
analytical models, supported by an extensive test program, for the prediction of tankage
fragmentation as well as the study of shielding materials and methods of protection.
8.6.2 APPROACH
The test portion of the program would in general consist of two phases:
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1. To determine the fragmentation distribution in a typical tankage field and to access
the vulnerability of other tankage systems in the vicinity, and
2. To determine the characteristics of shielding materials, and methods for protecting
tankage and nuclear heat sources in the vicinity of the initial explosion. It is
anticipated that a typical test would consist of scaled tankage arranged in a repre-
sentative manner and surrounded by a barrier of selected geometry and material
(such as wood) which would capture the fragments and thus yield information on
velocity, mass and geometric distribution. A selected shielding system would then
be inserted into the test arrangement and the test would be repeated to evaluate the
shielding design. Analytical techniques would be developed or extended in parallel
with the test program and correlation between test and analytical results would be
developed. The output of the effort would be improved shielding materials and
designs, and analytical tools for use in designing future systems.
8. 7 REACTOR PERMANENT SHUTDOWN
8.7.1 OB JE CTIVES/RE QUIRE MENTS
Discussion in Section 7. 3 and in Volumes III and IV substantiate the need for a permanent
reactor shutdown system. Such a system would significantly reduce the risks due,to a
reactor impact on the earth's surface or in shallow water areas. Therefore a program
should be initiated to investigate the techniques, feasibility and merits of a positive and
permanent reactor shutdown system to preclude reactor criticahty and excursion accidents
during disposal and on earth impact.
8.7.2 APPROACH
Requirements of the system would be defined. Preliminary design concepts would be formu-
lated, i.e., pre-poisoning of fuel, control drum lock-out" devices, poison injection, release
of hydrogen moderator, etc. Trade-off studies would then be performed addressing such
parameters as effect on reliability, cost, performance penalties, etc. Candidate techniques
would be evaluated and tested prior to commitment to full scale qual and flight reactor hard-
ware.
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8.8 NUCLEAR DEBRIS IN-ORBIT
8.8.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
The analyses of Section 6.3. 2 indicated the projected severity of accidents which result in
the dispersion of radioactive debris. To allow an assessment of the severity of these accidents,
a simple model of the events (e.g., destructive reactor excursion, NaK leaks, etc) was
postulated. The model is possibly conservative, but indicates that severe effects (over-
exposure) would be experienced by the crew in the event of a destructive reactor excursion
and that very little time is available to implement contingency procedures.
(
In order to establish definitive procedures and design requirements to cope with this hazard
of radioactive debris a more accurate model of the immediate and long term distribution of
the possible debris is required. Not only is this a necessity in establishing the responsive
action to be taken on the orbital vehicle.but also in defining emergency space rescue operations.
8.8.2 APPROACH
An analytical study would be supplemented by a test program,possibly based on SNAPTRAN
air burst tests,to obtain a reasonable estimate of debris fragment size, velocity and charac-
teristics representative of an orbital excursion. Tests may also be required to determine
characteristics of released radioactive gases and liquid metals. This data would be used in
determining quantities, types and stay times of debris around the Base. Total integration
doses to the Base and crew would be determined and preventative measures and contingency
plans formulated.
8.9 IN-ORBIT DECONTAMINATION TECHNIQUES
8. 9.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
As discussed in Section 7. 3.2, conventional means of dealing with radioactive contamination
in a gravity environment are not generally applicable to zero-g application. It will, therefore,
be necessary to develop in-orbit decontamination techniques particularly for laboratories
and storage areas using isotope tracers and isotope fuel capsules. These techniques should
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provide for on-board implementation and consideration should be given to experiments testing
these techniques on forthcoming manned space flights.
8.9.2 APPROACH
The candidate isotope systems to be flown and modes of isotope release would be identified.
Decontamination requirements would be established and concepts formulated for zero "g"
and artificial "g" application in representative manned earth orbital spacecraft. Simulated
tests would be performed on earth with eventual testing of selected concepts proposed for a
manned earth orbiting experiment on forthcoming space flights.
8.10 SPACE QUALIFIED RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT
8.10.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
Section 7.3.1 indicates the elements of an on-board radiological safety program to be imple-
mented by the crew of a Space Base. While the equipment required by this program is avail-
able with needed sensitivities for earth-bound application, a majority of the equipment has
not been qualified for Space Flight. In addition, the equipment should be specifically designed
to accommodate the background radiations associated with the mission. These instruments
should be designed to be flexible in function, thus minimizing the inventory of sensors and
equipment to be carried.
8.10.2 APPROACH
The radiation monitoring requirements, i.e., sensitivities, quantities, application, etc.,
would be established. A review of current equipment used in earth and space applications
would be made and matched with the program requirements. Commonality of hardware and
usage would be stressed. Selected concepts would be evaluated for space application and
subsequent space flight qualification would be initiated. New technology requirements would
be identified and programs initiated.
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8.11 STANDARDIZATION OF SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
8.11.1 OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS
At the present time, there are no firm guidelines to direct the safety analysis study programs
(terrestrial safety type) of nuclear power systems. Consequently, the results presented by
different contractors are often difficult to compare and usually do not present a tangible
measure of safety. Hence, it is difficult to determine the true effectiveness of design changes
or modifications. A standardized approach should be developed, which would be used by a
contractor as a guide for performing a nuclear safety analysis.
8.11.2 APPROACH
A handbook would be prepared which describes the requirements for a nuclear safety analysis.
This handbook would be flexible in that it would allow the contractor to modify analyses and
to incorporate new situations into the study wherever appropriate. Formal mechanisms for
change would be specified. Guidelines would be given for all phases to aid in the analysis.
Where appropriate, these guidelines would include specific models to be used with explana-
tions for their use. These would include, for example, booster fragmentation models, prob-
ability models, meteorological models, radiation exposure models, and risk models. Uniform
procedures would be specified for the identification and reporting of accidents and imposed
risk.
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APPENDIX A
RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS AND EFFECTS
A.I INTRODUCTION
This appendix defines and/or tabulates the radiation exposure limits to be used in various
mission vulnerability and hazards analyses which can be a part of future manned space
missions. The work identified is part of the Radiation Exposure Limits task of the Space
Base Nuclear System Safety Study, Contract No. NAS8-26283.
The objective of the task was to develop engineering estimates of the effects of each of the
various radiation environments of concern for all segments of a Space Base Mission. The
environments of interest include the reactor source, various isotopes and the natural space
radiation environment. The effort was divided into the following four major areas: Support
Subsystems, Non-Biological Experiment Subsystems, Biological Experiments and Human
Considerations. Radiation effects data and safe exposure limits have been developed for
each of these four areas. The primary purpose was not to assess the impact of a particular
environment on the Space Base Mission but rather to develop the basic effects data by which
such mission vulnerability and hazards analyses may be carried out in subsequent Study
efforts.
The general approach was to utilize the Space Base system baseline developed for the study
(see Section 3. 0) carry out a detailed data search and compilation and to use this data to
generate the appropriate radiation effects limits required for subsequent mission analyses.
No new basic radiation effects data was generated. The exposure limits were developed
from existing experimental data, or where no data was found to exist, on engineering esti-
mates and analytical approximations.
Each of the above areas are discussed separately in the following sections. The results are
given in the form of detailed data tables as well as summary charts for each area. Because
of the many varied sources of data and information used in the study, special emphasis was
placed upon identifying the basis of each particular exposure limit developed. This will be of
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great assistance in future considerations of new data in evaluating and updating the exposure
thresholds.
Due to the many important modifying factors associated with radiobiological and scientific
aspects of the mission, supporting data are included which contain detailed radiation effects
data to supplement the summary tables.
A. 2 RADIATION EFFECTS ON SPACE BASE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEMS
The radiation damage levels of the various support subsystems and components which com-
prise a Space Base Program, exclusive of the biological and non-biological experiments pay-
load and crew complement, are presented here. The functional description of the Space Base
Program utilized in carrying out this study is that given in the North American Rockwell (NAR)
Space Base Definition, DRL No. MSC T-575, and the McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) Space Base
Definition DRL No. MSFC-DRL-160. Since much of the system design is preliminary in
nature, this initial radiation sensitivity assessment is preliminary in many respects due to
the lack of detailed component design data and piece-part and material definition for the
majority of components. The results, nonetheless, will be very useful in determining the
impact of the presence of nuclear power sources on a Space Base.
Where possible, the present evaluation is based upon experimental radiation effects data.
For piece parts and materials for which no data is available, either (1) analytical techniques
were utilized to predict the component or material response or (2) radiation effects data for
similar piece parts or materials was used. Also, where component design was such that the
piece parts and materials to be used in the design were not yet identified, a generic definition
of the piece parts or materials usually utilized in such applications was assumed.
A. 2. 1 RADIATION DAMAGE THRESHOLDS - SPACE BASE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
COMPONENTS
The radiation damage thresholds for the components within each of the Space Base Support
Subsystems were determined for both the NAR and MDAC subsystems identified in Table A-l
for each individual portion of the total mission radiation environment. These environments
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Table A-l. System Definition
MAR
ELECTRICAL POWER (EP)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT (ECLS)
INFORMATION (INF)
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL (G&C)
PROPULSION AND REACTION CONTROL (P&RC)
CREW AND HABITALITY(C&H)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (ENV P)
DOCKING (DOCK)
MDAC
ELECTRICAL POWER (EP)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT (ECLS)
DATA MANAGEMENT (DM)
COMMUNICATIONS (COM)
ON BOARD CHECKOUT (OBC)
STABILIZATION AND ATTITUDE CONTROL (S&AC)
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION (G&N)
PROPULSION(PROP)
CREW HABITALITYAND PROTECTION (CH&P)
MECHANICAL (MECH)
consist of the reactor neutron and gamma
environments together with the natural
trapped electron and proton radiations as
well as solar event proton and alpha parti-
cles. The level of definition for each com-
ponent's damage threshold is consistent
with the level of the subsystem definition as
provided in the NAR & MDAC Space Base
Definitions.
In the majority of cases, the individual sub-
systems are only defined down to a generic
component level. In these instances the
components were examined with respect to
their particular usage and performance re-
quirements. The typical piece parts and
materials which could be employed in each component to accomplish the particular function
was then determined. Where reference was made to a specific piece part or material in
either the NAR or MDAC definition, the particular item was used in the component defintion.
Damage thresholds for most piece parts and materials were readily established by a direct
application of available experimental radiation effects data. When data was lacking, damage
thresholds for similar piece parts and materials were assumed. The threshold damage level
given here for a particular component is that level of radiation dose where the materials and
piece parts which make up the component or subsystem are beginning to experience a signifi-
cant change in their characteristics. In the actual design of a component, variation in the
piece part and material characteristics can be accounted for to a large extent. Thus, the
component damage threshold levels will, in general, be higher than for the piece parts and
materials that make up the component. However, for this assessment, the typical piece part
thresholds were assumed to represent those for the components as well. This, for the most
part, would be a conservative assumption.
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In those instances where radiation effects data was not available for each individual portion
of the mission environment, experimentally determined particle and photon equivalency data
was utilized. For materials the primary damage mechanism is due to ionization effects and
the radiation equivalency is generally in the form of equal ionization dose values. That is,
equal ionization doses from penetrating electrons, protons, gamma photons, etc., generally
result in the same level of damage in a particular material. An example of an ionization
equivalency relationship for silicon is given in Figure A-l. For semiconductor electronics
both bulk (crystal) damage and ionization (surface) damage mechanisms are possible. The
bulk damage equivalency, however, is not as straight-forward as ionization equivalencies.
Here recourse must be made to experimentally determined equivalency values for a particu-
lar class of devices. An example of the bulk damage equivalency relation for silicon trans-
istors is given in Figure A-2 which shows the relative effectiveness of various types of
radiations in causing the same level of damage in the devices. Both the bulk damage and
ionization relationships are of primary importance in developing the total effects of various
concurrent radiation environments.
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In carrying out the component analysis, a number of assumptions concerning semiconductor
and material damage criteria were followed. This was particularly so for the semiconductor
electronics devices, which are undoubtedly the most radiation-sensitive devices that make up
the subsystems. The radiation damage thresholds for bulk damage and ionization effects in
transistors is based upon that radiation dose which will cause at least 5 percent reduction in
current gain at ^ 300°K (25°C).
In general, those materials which are performing noncritical functions are also the most
radiation-resistant. Therefore, a large number of materials can be eliminated from the list
of sensitive materials by a cursory investigation of each component having specific reference
to structural materials (i.e., component housings, transistor cans, etc.), since they are of
a generally radiation-resistant metallic composition. Correspondingly, those materials
utilized in the highly critical functions on a spacecraft also happen to be the most sensitive
to radiation damage. Aside from the highly critical semiconductor devices, most of the
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other critical functions are performed by organic materials, generally in mechanical applica-
tions and the relatively more radiation resistant inorganic materials in optical applications.
Organic material radiation damage thresholds have been found to differ at various tempera-
tures as well as when the materials are immersed in different liquids. In addition, damage
thresholds have also been found to differ for a variety of irradiation atmospheres, i. e.,
vacuum, air, or other gas. A complete and accurate definition of these thresholds is desir-
able because of the possible combined environments which may be imposed on these materials
in a Space Base. However, damage threshold definition of this nature was not available.
Since vacuum, temperature, and immersion media tend to increase the radiation stability of
most organic materials over that for air, and since a large portion of a Space Base is pro-
vided with a "shirtsleeve" environment (air), damage thresholds in air were assumed herein
for the organic materials defined in each component.
Using the above techniques, component radiation damage thresholds were determined for each
of the identifiable Space Base components. The detailed results of these radiation sensitivity
analyses are given in Table A-2. The generic identification for each component is given as
well as its respective subsystem location in both the NAR and MDAC configurations. The
typical piece parts and materials which could be used in the fabrication of each component
and which would probably limit component performance in a radiation environment are also
identified. Radiation damage levels for each of these limiting items are given for the various
radiation environments of concern. The alpha-numeric information enclosed in parentheses
following each radiation dose entry in the Table refer to specific reference from which the
radiation damage level data was obtained or to specific analytical techniques which were used
to determine the particular damage level.
•c
A. 2 RADIATION DAMAGE LEVELS - SPACE BASE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEMS
The component radiation damage levels given in the previous section relate specifically to
those levels which are indicative of component damage threshold. However, to completely
evaluate the significance of the various hazards which could occur with a nuclear powered
Space Base System, the various degrees of damage beyond threshold and their corresponding
radiation levels must be established. Damage characteristics such as these can be developed
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once the damage threshold levels are identified through a combination of radiation effects
data, a knowledge of the basic radiation induced phenomena underlying the damage response,
and component design practice considerations.
Using the above techniques, component "degree of damage" characteristics were developed
for the Space Base support subsystems. The essential results of this analysis are shown in
Figure A-3 for a 1 Mev neutron environment and in Figure A-4 for ionization dose effects.
The components shown are those contained in the MDAC and NAR support subsystems and
are listed by generic subsystem terminology. The actual NAR and MDAC subsystems corre-
sponding to the generic subsystems are shown Table A-3. Subsystem Correlation
 ;
in Table A-3. Three levels of damage effects
are shown in Figures A-3 and A-4: threshold,
moderate, and severe effects. In general, a
threshold level denotes fliat range of accumu-
lated radiation dose where specific effects
begin to occur in the piece parts and/or
materials and which would likely require some
consideration in component design to insure
proper subsystem operation. Moderate effects,
on the other hand, generally denotes that range
of radiation dose which would result in signifi-
cant degradation of component performance
and would require special design considerations
for components to operate at this level. State-of-the-art radiation hardening design practices
would be adequate to design for this radiation dose, however. The severe effects levels would
seriously impair component operation, and, in many cases, new design approaches would be
required. Considerable efforts would be required in order to design components to operate in
this region.
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INF
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P&RC
C&H
ENV P
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MECH
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SUMMARY
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DOCKING
Radiation dose rate effects are not considered to be of any significance for the anticipated
radiation environments in most of the components in the support subsystems. An exception
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to this would be the star trackers used for navigation and control. The threshold dose rate
for this unit could be approximately one to a thousand rad/hr (depending on the particular
detectors used) compared to greater than a megarad/hr for other components.
An overall summary of the effects of 1 Mev neutron radiation in each of the Space Base
support subsystems is shown in Figure A-5. A similar subsystem summary for the ionizing
radiation environments is shown in Figure A-6. Preliminary estimates of the total radiation
dose received over a 10-year mission life from both the nuclear power sources and the
natural radiation environment at a 55 inclination, 500 Km (270 nm) circular orbit are also
given. These doses, of course, cannot be taken as accurate indications of the dose a par-
ticular subsystem will recieve, since there are obvious shielding as well as physical location
configurations which must be considered in detail. However, the estimated doses will be
useful in identifying those areas in which the radiation environment could impact the subsys-
tem design cycle. The radiation doses for the natural environment were obtained from the
NASA Technical Memorandum #NASA TM X-53865 entitled. "Natural Environment Criteria
for the NASA Space Station Program".
The range of shielding shown for the natural environment dose corresponds to the range that
the components within the support subsystems would typically be afforded. The neturon dose
level given for the natural radiation environment is actually the "equivalent 1 Mev neutron
dose" which would cause the same damage as the actual electron, proton, and alpha particle
environments encountered. These equivalent doses were developed using the relative damage
effects characteristics previously shown in Figure A-2 for these environments.
As can be seen from the subsystem summaries, the electronics as a class generally repre-
sent the more radiation-sensitive equipment as compared to the materials. However, in
typical spacecraft configurations, the electronics are usually afforded more inherent shield-
ing than that for many of the materials. Furthermore, in the case of on-board nuclear
sources, the separation distance between source and component greatly determines compo-
nent radiation dose. As such, the limiting item within a particular subsystem or system
cannot readily be identified without an intimate knowledge of component shielding and physical
location conditions.
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Due to the commonality of piece part and material usage, the damage thresholds for each of
the subsystems are generally comparable to one another, differing by about one order of
magnitude or so. An exception to this would be the film used in both the data display and
radiation detection applications as well as current state-of-the-art light emitting diodes used
also for data display. The wide range of component damage thresholds shown are indicative
of the various parts and materials presently available which could be used in each application,
some of which being much more radiation resistant than others. In view of this, an attempt
was made to estimate the increase in damage threshold which could be attained considering
future advances in the state-of-the-art over the next five to ten years for radiation resistant
equipment together with employing judicious piece part and material selection procedures
which can readily be implemented during the design process. The essential results of this
analysis on a subsystem level are shown in Figures A-7 and A-8 for the neutron and ioniza-
tion dose sensitivities respectively. Also shown are the estimates of the 10-year mission
dose that these subsystems would receive from both the natural and nuclear radiation envi-
ronments. For the system configuration assumed, the electronics would still generally
represent the more sensitive equipments although over an order of magnitude increase in
neutron damage threshold for the more sensitive equipments is anticipated. lonization
damage thresholds for the electronics, in particular, metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) and
low power bipolar structures are anticipated to increase by over two orders of magnitude.
Similarly, the corresponding decrease in materials sensitivity is anticipated to be about
three to four orders of magnitude primarily as a result of using radiation resistant materials
selection procedures.
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A. 3 RADIATION EFFECTS ON SPACE BASE EXPERIMENTS (NON-BIOLOGICAL)
This section contains an assessment of nuclear radiation threshold levels for "dynamic inter-
ference" and permanent damage in Space Base non-biological experiments based upon 1970
state-of-the-art. Radiosensitivity of the biological experiments is discussed in Section A. 4.
The major part of this section is concerned with dynamic interference effects; the term "dynamic
interference" is explicitly meant to describe a rate-sensitive noise component which degrades the
results (data) of experiments. Examples are airglow photometer saturation (Ref. A. 3-1) in the
Van Allen belts and dynamic interference in sensitive gamma ray spectrometers associated with
the use of on-board nuclear sources. Experiments may be separated into two interference
classes: sensitive and insensitive. Here the latter term is arbitrarily applied to those experi-
Q _2 _1
ments with interference thresholds above 10 particles - cm - sec . The dynamic inter-
ference threshold will usually mean the radiation flux causing a noise level of 1/1 Oth of the maxi-
mum signal sensitivity for an experiment.
Permanent damage thresholds occur where minor equipment changes (such as reduced energy
resolution in semiconductor radiation detectors) degrade signal quality. Only the thresholds for
the most critical permanent damage are described here except in several isolated areas such as
optics employing various types of glass.
The Space Base Program experiment definitions (Ref. A. 3. 2 and A. 3. 3) qualitatively describe
various experiment disciplines, but are inadequate as to the type of data needed to generate
threshold levels for interference. In order to obtain the experiment detail required to develop
meaningful sensitivity threshold estimates, the approach used here was to consider the Space
Station experiments as defined in Ref. A. 3.4 (Experiments "Blue Book") as representative of
the type of experiment complement that would be utilized on a Space Base. This approach was
further justified by correlating each Space Base Experiment Discipline and its corresponding
laboratories and experimental objectives with each Space Station Functional Program Element
(FPE). Table A-4 shows the results of this correlation. Thus, for each Space Base Discipline,
the Space Station FPE's, as grouped in Table A-4, are assumed to be typical of the experiments
that would eventually make up that Discipline. The radiation sensitivity thresholds were then
developed for each Discipline according to the sensitivity of each experiment within its FPE's.
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Table A-4. Experiment Correlation
SPACE BASE SPACE STATION FPE
ASTRONOMY EXPERIMENTS LAB
X-RAY SURVEY TELESCOPE
HIGH RESOLUTION OBJECT TELESCOPE
ASTRONOMY SENSOR TEST PLATFORM
MODULE ACCESS FACILITY - ASTRONOMY
FA INT OBJECT SURVEY TELESCOPE
|DISCIPLINE ASTRONOMY]
51 GRAZING INCIDENCE X-RAY TELESCOPE
5.2 STELLAR ASTRONOMY MODULE
5.3 SOLAR ASTRONOMY MODULE
5 4 U.V. STELLAR ASTRONOMY SURVEY
5.5 HIGH ENERGY STELLAR SURVEY
5.21 IR STELLAR SURVEY
DISCIPLINE-PHYSICS
PHYSICS MODULE LAB
PHYSICS MODULE LAB
COSMIC RAY/HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS
5 6 SPACE PHYSIC AIRLOCK EXPERIMENTS
5.7 PLASMA PHYSICS & PERTURBATIONS
5 8 COSMIC RAY PHYSICS LAB
[DISCIPLINE ^ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY I
DATA ANALYSIS LAB
SENSOR CONTROL LAB
SENSOR PLATFORMS
FLUID PHYSICS LAB
DATA ANALYSIS LAB
SENSOR CONTROL LAB
SENSOR PLATFORMS
MANEUVERABLE SUBSATELLITE
5 17 CONTAMINATION MEASUREMENTS
5.18 EXPOSURE EXPERIMENTS
5 19 EXTENDED SPACE STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
5.20 FLUID PHYSICS IN MICROGRAV ITY
5 22 COMPONENT TEST AND SENSOR CALIBRATION
524 MSFENGINEERING& OPERATIONS
[DISCIPLINE- EARTH SURVEYS!
FPE 5.11 EARTH SURVEYS
5 12 REMOTE MANEUVERING SUBSATELLITE
DISCIPLINE BIOMEDICALj
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL LAB
BIOSCIENCE CENTRIFUGE
CONTROLLED B IOMED 1C INE ENVIRONMENT LAB
5.13 B IOMED ICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
5.13C CENTRIFUGE
5.14 MAN-SYSTEM INTEGRATION
5 15 LIFE SUPPORT AND PROTECTION SYSTEM
DISCIPLINE- BIOSCIENCES
B IOSC IENCE LAB
AGRONOMY AND FOOD SCIENCES LAB
5.9 SMALL VERTEBRATES
5.10 PLANT SPECIMENS
5.25 MICROBIOLOGY
5.26 INVERTEBRATES
CHEMICAL KINETICS
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS LAB
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY LABS
GENERAL SUPPORT FACILITIES
[DISCIPLINE- CHEMISTRY!
5 27 PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY LAB
DISCIPLINE- SPACE MANUFACTURING
MATERIALS PROCESSING LAB
MATERIALS ANALYSIS LAB 5.16 MATERIALS SCIENCE AND PROCESS ING
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The following sections briefly describe the approach followed in developing the sensitivity
thresholds and present detailed data tables and summary charts of the results. Supporting
data particularly on radiation sensors, photo-film and optics is presented in Section A. 3.4.
A. 3.1 APPROACH
This section describes the methods applied to each Space Station FPE to determine the radiation
thresholds, for the Space Base Disciplines. Much of the detailed data utilized here is presented
in the Supporting Data.
A. 3.1.1 Interference Thresholds (Flux)
Interference thresholds were determined for separate particle environments so that with
appropriate weighing factors, they can be used in later study tasks for various baseline environ-
ments. The separate monoenergetic particle fields for which interference threshold were devel-
oped are as follows:
Neutrons (1 Mev),
Electrons (1 Mev),
Protons (30 Mev),
Gamma Rays (1 Mev).
These particle fields are representative of the more penetrating components of reactors and
natural radiation environments although they are vastly simplified.
Unfortunately interference data in the literature directly usable for Space Base experiments is
limited. A compensation is that many experiments will not suffer a loss in data quality due to
interference if properly designed.
The method employed to develop the interference thresholds is as follows:
1. First, perform a cursory analysis of the experiments, employing the guidelines as
described in Section A. 3.4 to select those which may be radiation sensitive.
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Experiments judged sensitive typically are concerned with measurement of
electromagnetic radiation (excluding RF or MW antennas) or with measurement
of energetic neutral or charged particles. Thus radiation and optical sensors are
included. Experiments which are sensitive to interference at 10 particles -
cm -sec fall into the insensitive category.
2. Investigate experiment parameters, in detail, as readily available via the Blue Book,
generic data, etc.
These parameters include maximum sensitivity, dynamic range, signal to noise
ratio and probable environment to be sensed. Also required is detail regarding
"optics" and sensors, such as counter efficiency, collection areas, types of dis-
crimination, materials used, and other relevant factors.
3. Using data, analyses, and simplified methods, estimate the response of sensors to
each of the four particle environments and set the threshold for interference at those
flux values for which the true signal/interference noise ratio is one-tenth of the maxi-
mum sensitivity. In cases where the probable Space Base environment includes back-
ground nuclear radiation species identical to those in experiments, an additional speci-
fication of interference is noted in the estimates. Generally, no experiment shielding
is assumed at this level of response estimation.
4. Experiments utilizing film, as mentioned in Ref. A. 3.4, have a data quality problem
which is listed as an interference threshold.
A.3.1. 2 Permanent Damage Threshold (Cumulative Exposure)
Permanent damage thresholds were estimated on the basis of cumulative ionizing radiation dose
2(in units of rads) and equivalent 1 Mev neutron fluence (n/cm ). The method for reducing any
environment to an equivalent 1 Mev neutron environment has been previously covered in Section
A. 2. Several assumptions are made here:
1. Generally only the most limiting thresholds were established,
2. No allowance was made for long term annealing, and in particular, for some cooled
semiconductor devices this implies more damage than for room temperature devices
and,
3. Each experiment was assumed to have integral electronics systems.
Photo film damage thresholds were estimated on the basis of the probable generic types of
film used in experiments.
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A. 3. 2 RADIATION EFFECTS THRESHOLDS - DETAILED DATA TABLES
This section is comprised of the detailed results of flux and dose thresholds for experiments
(non-biological) typical of a Space Base Program.
Detailed radiation thresholds for experiments are presented in Table A-5 for each Space Base
discipline. Brief discussions are given below generally describing the basis of the threshold
estimates for each experiment discipline. The Astronomy Discipline is discussed in more
detail than the others since its sensors are typical of those used in other disciplines. More
detailed discussions of each experiment may be found in (Ref. A. 3.4).
DISCIPLINE; ASTRONOMY
FPE 5.1 GRAZING INCIDENCE TELESCOPE
This X-ray telescope FPE is designed to allow interchange of 4 different experiment packages
at its focus. There interference thresholds are discussed separately below:
2Polarimeter - The 8 G-M tubes have a total collection area of 500 cm ; hence with a GM tube
-3 —2 -2
sensitivity of 2 x 10 counts/photon -cm the interference is 1 count per photon (1 Mev)-cm
-1 3 2
-sec . Now the system sensitivity to the sensed radiation, low kev X-rays, is 10 cm (collec-
—2 —1 3 —1tion area) x (1 X-ray -cm -sec ) = 10 X-rays-sec . Thus for a signal-to-nose ratio of 10,
2 -2 -1
the interference threshold for 1 Mev gamma-rays=10 photons-cm -sec . The experiment
uses a large mass of hydrogen to scatter X-rays into the G-M tubes; neutron interactions in this
hydrogen are relatively efficient and hence the neutron interference threshold is set at 10 times
that for gammas. Anticoincidence shielding will be effective in eliminating interference by pro-
tons and electrons; however, a few hundred microseconds (resolving) time is lost per success-
ful discrimination. In addition, some protons and electrons will enter the G-M tubes directly
through the open solid angle of the telescope. The interference threshold for protons and elec-
—2trons is 10 particles-cm -sec.
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Curved Crystal Spectrometer - This experiment uses a number of very small G-M tubes and
— ^their effective collection area is 50 cm . Hence, the approximate photon interference threshold
is ten times higher than that above for the polarimeter. The neutron interference threshold is
conservatively raised by ten, also. The use of Csl anti-coincidence shields is expected to reduce
proton and electron interference by a factor of ten over that for 1 Mev photons.
High Resolution Source Studies - This experiment will amplify X-ray images with a channel
electron multiplier (CEM, gam 105) ahead of a vidicon. Hence the CEM is the sensitive compo-
—4 —2 2
nent. At 3 x 10 counts/1 Mev. photon-cm , and an assumed CEM area of 20 cm the inter-
-3 —2 -1ference is 6 x 10 counts per photon-cm -sec . Now, at unit efficiency to X-rays, the
-2
response of the CEM is 50 counts per X-ray-cm -sec. Therefore the threshold 1 Mev photon
3 —2 *flux, at an S/N of 10, is 10 photons-cm -sec. The threshold for neutron interference, being
sensitive to various near-by materials, is conservatively set ten times above that for gamma
rays. Protons and electrons are assumed to have unit efficiency of producing interference
counts, if arriving from the field of view; assuming the field of view is l/20th of the full sphere
around the CEM and the particles are arriving isotropically, then the threshold fluxes are 5 x20,
2 —2 -1
or 10 particles-cm -sec . No pulse height discrimination has been assumed here.
»>
2
Maximum Sensitivity X-ray Detector - Assuming the Si(Li) detector area is 10 cm and the
-3 2 -2
sensitivity for 1 Mev photons is 10 counts/photon-cm , the interference is 10 counts per
-2 —1 2photon-cm -sec . Now, with a collection area of 100 cm , and a S/N ratio of 10, the
2 -2 -1threshold flux to produce 10 counts/sec is 10 gammas-cm -sec . Similar comments to those
above apply to neutrons, protons and electrons.
FPE 5. 2 ADVANCED STELLAR ASTRONOMY
This FPE is designed to record starfield optical images and optical star spectra, using either
videographic or photo film data collection media.
Field Image TV - This experiment will employ an image orthicon as a light sensor behind a 3M
telescope. The image orthicon is assumed to have a maximum sensitivity of 10 ft-candles,
7 -2
or 5 x 10 photons-cm -sec. At a signal to noise ratio of 10, a threshold particle flux must
fi _o _i
produce interference effects comparable to 5 x 10 photons (~2 ev)-cm -sec . For gamma
—3 —1 3
rays, using the interference data for PMT's (10 counts-photon ) and estimating 10 optical
A-47
7 -2 -1photons (avg) per interference event, the threshold flux would be 10 photons-cm -sec „
With higher interaction rates, the threshold fluxes for electrons and protons are estimated to
2 17
be 10 and 10 times higher, respectively. The threshold for neutrons is estimated at 10
-2 -1
n-cm -sec .
Concave Grating Spectrograph - This experiment will employ a TV camera to record UV star
spectrographs. Since most interference events will randomly illuminate the camera photo
cathode, whereas the spectra will be ordered, the interference flux levels are estimated to be
an order of magnitude larger than discussed above for the Field Image TV.
PPE 5. 3 ADVANCED SOLAR ASTRONOMY
1. 5 Meter Telescope - Besides employing photofilm and TV vidicons, there will also be a
photomultiplier tube (PMT) for optical data collection. When filtering is used to look at
narrow spectra bands, the PMT may be used near its maximum sensitivity. Assuming a
_2
maximum sensitivity of 200 photons-cm -sec, and a signal to noise ratio of 10, together with
the TRW data of 2 x 10 count/photon results in a gamma threshold of 10 photons-cm" -sec" „
For the other particle radiations the threshold fluxes are adjusted to their interaction charac-
teristics.
X-Ray Telescope (0. 5 Meter) - This telescope has approximately a 16: 1 magnification. As-
-2 -1
suming a maximum system sensitivity of 0.1 X-ray-cm -sec and a proportional counter area
2 -1
of 10 cm , the maximum sensitivity at the counter is 16 counts-sec . For an S/N of 10 and a
_g
sensitivity of 4 x 10 counts/gamma ray (1 Mev) the gamma ray flux at the interference threshold
-2 —1
would be 40 photons-cm sec ; as the proportional counter allows some energy discrimination,
—2 -1the threshold flux is raised to 100 photons-cm -sec . The threshold for neutrons is estimated
3 —2 -1
as 10 neutrons-cm -sec , and for protons and electrons it is estimated as 10 times less than
for gamma rays.
A-48
FPE 5.4 HIGH ENERGY STELLAR SURVEY
Nuclear Emulsion/Spark Chamber Gamma Ray Spectrometer - This complex experiment has
detectors which may be used separately or in concert. Assuming they would be used separately
we consider first the Cerenkov counter. Normally this counter is capable of detecting charged
particle speed by measuring (with a PMT) the UV light developed in a transparent dielectric
traversed by the particle. In this application it may be set to reject the light from any electron
with energy less than 50 Mev, assuming pair production reactions predominate. Thus a proton
flux should not produce interference. On the other hand, the high energy photons are assumed
-7 2to have a flux of the order of 10 per cm -sec. Hence, optics fluorescence by simultaneous,
interfering radiations could produce signals mistaken as those from high energy photons. Thus
2 4 2the threshold flux for electrons and protons are set at 10 and 10 per cm -sec, respectively.
The neutons flux threshold is conservatively set the same as for gamma rays.
The spark chamber associated with this experiment is capable of considerable energy discrimi-
nation by measurement of the discharges due to sparks; however, each discrimination decision
-4disables the counter for a short time (~ 10 sec.). The background flux is considered to be at
the interference threshold when the fractional dead time associated with such decisions is 0.1.
2 2For a 10 cm chamber and unity l;Mev gamma ray interaction probability the interference flux
—2 -1is 10 gamma rays -cm -sec . Similarly, the interaction probability is estimated at 0.1 for
2 -2 —1
neutrons, resulting in a threshold flux of 10 n-cm -sec . For charged particles it is as-
sumed that an anti-coincidence shield is used, with a 10 second dead time.
FPE 5.21 INFRARED STELLAR SURVEY
DC Radiometer - This instrument is one of three which will be used alternately at the focus of a
3M telescope for stellar surveys in the 5-14 micron range. This work requires cooling of all
telescope components and especially the sensor, as any thermally radiated energy is sensed as
noise; similarly, the deposition of nuclear energy at the detector represents noise. A Ge: Hg
—10 2
cooled detector has a noise figure of approximately 10 watts/cm ; limiting the radiation de-
posited energy to one half of this value and assuming the detector is thick enough to absorb 1 Mev
A-49
2 —2 2 —2
electrons leads to threshold fluxes of about 10 electrons-cm sec and 10 protons-cm
-sec (assumes protons lose some energy before the detector). The gamma ray threshold
flux is estimated to be a factor of 20 higher and the neutron threshold flux is estimated to be
2 x 104 n-(
materials.
 -2 -1
 cm -sec ; better estimates would require detailed considerations of the surrounding
DISCIPLINE; PHYSICS
The FPE's in this discipline cover a variety of experiments, but the sensitive detectors are
generally of the types discussed above and the threshold flux values are estimated by similar
methods.
DISCIPLINE; EARTH SURVEYS
The FPE's in this discipline generally view the earth and hence receive strong electromagnetic
signals; among the more sensitive experiments, however, some are concerned with fine varia-
tions in signals which describe small temperature differences. Methods similar to those above
are used for threshold estimations. It is noted that data on some experiment gains was lacking
and this data would influence the threshold estimations.
DISCIPLINE; ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
The FPE's in this discipline use a variety of TV and other optical detection systems; the sensors
are similar to those described in the Astronomy Discipline.
&
DISCIPLINE; BIOMEDICAL. BIOSCIENCE
The only radiation interference sensitive components identified in these disciplines are TV
cameras and radiation detectors associated with radiobiological tracer studies.
A-50
DISCIPLINE; CHEMISTRY. SPACE MANUFACTURING
No dynamic radiation interference was identified in these disciplines.
A, 3. 3 RADIATION EFFECTS THRESHOLDS—EXPERIMENT SUMMARIES
This section is comprised of 7 charts (Table A-6) which summarize the radiation thresholds
by functional program element (FPE) for each Space Base discipline.
A. 3.4 SUPPORTING DATA
-<!
A. 3.4.1 Radiation Effects In Scientific Instruments
This Section compiles information in the literature on specific radiation effects thresholds, both
dynamic interference and permanent damage commonly associated with scientific instruments.
Several of the data tables in this section serve as summary references to the particular experi-
ments previously discussed.
The fundamental modes of interference considered are as follows:
Major: lomzation (and its effects)
Minor: ...Mass transport
Charge collection
Neutron interactions (leading to iomzation)
Since iomzation is a principal means of signal collection in various sensors, interference in fact
may be due to only those radiations for which proper discrimination is incomplete. As an ex-
ample, an X-ray sensor cannot discriminate between X-rays from a star or reactor but pointing
data may allow discrimination; on the other hand, some X-ray sensors are capable of rejecting
signals due to energetic protons (with reduced detection time available for X-ray counting).
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The Space Base experiments have various inherent signal and noise levels and consequently
nuclear radiation interference will not be sensed until it attains some appreciable fraction of
those levels. Thus, little literature was recovered in the area of interference in TV camera
systems where TV has been used for qualitative bright light (strong signal) applications while
various planned Space Base uses of TV in dim light have lower signal levels which could be
comparable with noise (fog) from nuclear radiations.
A.3.4. 2 Interference Data Base
The data base on interference by background nuclear radiations (as found in the literature)
comes from three categories: experiment, analysis (i.e. calculation) and flight experience.
This data base is helpful but incomplete as it is concerned with only several of the areas of
background radiations and experiment types associated with the Space Base. (e. g. little is said
about reactor spectra or high energy physics experiments).
Prior experiment data, using RTG's or other radiation sources has been found in references
A. 3.2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21b, 21c, 21e, 21f, 25, 30, 31, 34, 36. This data covers
spurious noise in various sensors as well as radiation induced fluorecence in glasses.
Prior analysis data, usually for RTG or Van Allen belt radiations environments has been found
in references; A. 3. 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19, 21b, 21d, 33.
Published flight data showing that radiation interference degraded mission success does not
describe all the flight data facts. As an example, experimenters probably have turned off
equipments during solar flares or simply ignored data attributed to interference and have still
collected quality data to meaningfully accomplish objectives. Flight data showing interference,
has been found in references A. 3.6, 7. Also, by personal communication, Mr. N. B. Koepp -
Baker of the General Electric Company reported (8/7/70) that the Nimbus Back Scatter UV
experiment using PMT's has the signal of its internal radioactive source (used in an interfero-
meter) "bucked out" on each transit of the South Atlantic anomaly region (at ~ 600 nm).
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A.3.4.3 Interference Data
Review of the literature on interference quickly allows classification of various sensors.
Sensors are most important as noise is most readily introduced at this first stage of data
handling. Table A-7 illustrates the sensitivity of various sensors to spurious nuclear radiation.
Typically it is noted that only direct radiation sensors fall in the sensitive category. The
insensitive category contains those sensors which either have no internal signal gain or are so
designed as to only sense non-nuclear radiation quantities such as magnetic field intensity, low
energy-charged particle flow, etc. The intermediate category contains those sensors which may
be sensitive, dependent upon their internal gain, application, system (or experiment) gain and
inherent noise levels associated with their use in an experiment. Consequently their inter-
ference thresholds are more difficult to assign.
Table A-7. Typical Sensor Classification (Sensitivity to Spurious Nuclear Radiation)
SENSITIVE INTERMEDIATE INSENSITIVE
PHOTOMULTIPLIER TUBES
ION CHAMBERS
PROPORTIONAL COUNTERS
CHANNEL ELECTRON MULTIPLIERS
CERENKOV DETECTORS
GEIGER TUBES
SCINTILLATION CRYSTALS
VIDICONS
IMAGE ORTHICONS
PLASMA PROBES
RADIOMETERS
LANGMUIR PROBES
RF IMPEDANCES
FARADAY CUPS
MAGNETOMETERS
GRAVIOMETERS
BOLOMETERS
PRESSURE TRANDUCERS
One of the most extensive investigations of interference in radiation sensors is reported in
Reference A. 3. 9. This data is summarized in Table A-8. The radiation source was a bare
SNAP-27 capsule (which emits energetic gamma rays and neutrons in the approximate ratio
of 50:1). Some of the more recent references present data on sensitivity to monoenergetic
gamma rays which is consistent with that above. Jones, et all (ref. 21f) report data on inter-
ference effects from 0.2 - 0. 73 Mev monoenergetic neutrons. Detection efficiencies were on
! -4! the order of 1-5 x 10 for a variety of silicon semiconductor radiations detectors of 30-1000
thickness (surface barriers and lithium-drifted types).
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Table A-8. Interference - Radiation Sensors
Radiation Sensor
Proportional counter
(Harshaw G-15 at 0.1 Mev)
Geiger-MuellerTube
( Rm 7302)
Cherenkov Counter
(1.5 in dia., 1 cm thick,
Peak rate per 20 Kev channel)
Semiconductor Telescope
(1 ^us gate, false coincidence
rate)
Channeltron
(Bendix CEMA028, saturated
mode, above 0.2 Mev)
Plastic Scintillators
(1.5 in. dia. 1 Cm thick, at
1 Mev)
Cesium Iodide
(1.5 in. dia., 1 cm thick
at 1 Mev)
Sodium Iodide
(1.5 in. dia. square cylinder
at 1 Mev)
Silicon Semiconductor Detector
(2 mm thick, 1 cm area) @ 1 Mev
Photomultiplier Tube
(RCA 4440, at 50 Kev)
Gamma Rav Response
Count s /Kev
Photon
2.5 x 10-6
5 x ID'6
5.3 x 10-5
6 x 10-7
4 x 10-8
Counts
Photon
3.7 x lO'^XDetector
area (cm^ )
2 x 10~3
 xDetector
Area fan )
5 x 10'*
1.9 x ID'4
2.7 x 10'**
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Interference in optics experiments may originate either in the transmission optics (lenses,
windows, etc.) or in the sensor. Table A-9 presents some typical data from the literature on
light sensitive tubes and glass fluorescence. No direct data was found on image orthicons or
vidicons. However, vidicon tubes normally have a "memory" effect such that the output is a
time integral of signal and noise; since the signal is usually steadier than the interference
noise, equal light illumination of the photo cathode due to picture image and interference radia-
tion usually produces an acceptable signal to noise ratio. Some low-light applications of vidi-
cons can be sensitive. However, if strongly fluorescing optics are used; image orthicons, in
general can be expected to have interference susceptibility between that of photomultiplier
tubes and vidicons.
«
Table A-9. Interference - Optics
Component
Photomultiplier tube
(6097S)
Image Dissector Tube
(CBS Lab Cl-1147)
Fl
0
0.
0.
1
10
,1.
10
ux or Dose Rate
01 Rad/Hr
1 "ii
ii
0 Rad/hr
i t
Out
3
5
2
1.
2
6
7
P
x
x
X
9
X
X
X
ut
io-10
10-1°
10
'
98
x IO"8
io-7
io-7
io-7
amp
amp
amp
amp
amp
amp
amp
Reference
I
2 ;
2 ;
2 !
2
2
13
13
ii
Relative Fluoresgnce
(1600 </\< 6590 A)
Sapphire
Spectrosil
Corning 9741
Cultured Quartz
6 x 106 e/cm2-sec 6.0
(1.2 Mev)
3.3
5.8
3.3
7
7
7
7
1
A-62
A.3.4.4 Permanent Damage Thresholds
AiS.4.4.1 Photo Film
Photo film is"the term used here to describe photographic film as well as various photographic,
nuclear dosimetry and nuclear research emulsions. Photo film, apart,from special radiation
detectors and a limited class of biological specimens, is perhaps the most sensitive material
to be subjected to the space/reactor radiation environment. Photo film is also a preferred and
logical media for data collection in many experiments. The effects of nuclear radiation back-
ground on film are twofold as shown in Figure A-9. The first effect is to increase the back-
ground fog density, generally through direct ionization effects as in optical image production by
light. The second is to change-the slope of the response curve. Thermal neutrons can also
cause activation of silver atoms in photo films, leading to delayed ionization effects.
2.4
20 -
1 6
o
_J
o
t—
0.
o
1.2 -
0 8 ~
0.4
-1 8 -1.4 -10 +0 2 +0 6-0.6 -0.1
LOG EXPOSURE (LIGHT)
Figure A-9. Photographic Film Response Change with Radiation
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The threshold radiation dose for degraded film utility, due to increased background fog is
strongly relatable to the inverse of the film speed (ASA number). Thus the faster films are
more sensitive to nuclear radiation and constraints on their use for space missions are more
severe (shielding, time in orbit, etc.). Table A-10 lists threshold doses on the various photo-
graphic film and emulsions uncovered by literature search (together with reference citations).
The threshold is defined as that dose for which the net optical density change is 0.2 (some
workers in the field use a criterion of 0.3). The threshold doses are clearly low enough in
many cases as to require major compromises in design, application and logistics as well as
film manufacture and processing.
In the case of film or emulsion used for recording of line spectra there is some discussion in
the literature as to a higher threshold dose being allowable, in the area of an optical density of
0.5
Standard references are available which relate various nuclear radiation environments to the
absorbed doses in film; for purposes of illustration, the next figure (Figure A-10) describes,
for several standard environments, the threshold fluence corresponding to threshold doses for a
range of film speeds (shown are Tri-X and Kodak 4404 films).
PROTONS - 30 MEV
ELECTRONS - 1 MEV
NEUTRONS - 1 MEV
PHOTONS - 1 MEV
TRH
KODAK 4404
10 10' 108 10 10
10 1011 1012
PARTICLES/CM ( O M N I D I R E C T I O N A U
Figure A-10. Photographic Film Degradation Thresholds
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A. 3.4.4. 2 Optics
The term optics covers a variety of sources, materials for transmission, focusing and filtering
as well as sensors. This section is intended to cover the optics field in sufficient depth to set
critical permanent damage limits for use in a radiation environment.
The laser, in some of its forms is noticeably sensitive to radiation. The following summarizes
4
data on ruby lasers (Ref. 8, 9): absorbed doses of 10 rads color the ruby and reduce the effi-
ciency of stimulated emission by about 30%, absorbed doses of 10 rads raise the threshold for
f»
stimulated emission by at least 30% and line width and far-field pattern were unaffected at 10
rads.
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A great variety of glasses are used as light transmission devices and data in this area is
tabulated in Table A-11. The radiation threshold is set at the dose for which transmission
in a test sample is degraded by about 5%. The transmission degradation is visible as a brown-
ing or formation of color centers and is typically related to the impurity concentration. A
common practice in space flight applications is to use a superior glass on the side of a window
exposed to space; although the use of reflective optics such as in telescopes avoids most radia-
tion degradation modes. Refractive index changes have been reported for a few optical glasses
and is summarized in Table A-12.
Table A-ll. Transmission Degradation Thresholds - Glass
DESIGNATION
Borosilicate
Natural Quartz
Visible
Ir
Purified Fus^ d Silica
A>2200 A
A =2 150 A
Silicon Germanium
Sapphire, A1203
MgO
Selenium Glass
ArS3
Calcium Alumina te
Vycor 7905
Visible
Ir
MgF2
BaF,
LiF
Corning 7940
Solex
Plate Glass
Polystyrene
Plexiglas
Ally carbonate
RADIATION THRESHOLDS - RADS
105 106 107 108 109
« t t i t
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Y • .
io5 io6 io7 io8 io9
REFERENCES
1
1
1
-2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
5
5
6
6
6
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Table A-12. Refractive Index Change, AT?
Glass
Flint -^
Borosilicate f
Barium Crown J
Fused Silica
Fused Silica, 7940
Flint (Ce prot.) ~\
Borosilicate (Ceprot.)J
Aluminosilicate
Vycor 7913
A - equivalent of 30 days
AW, Exposure
<0.0002 10 Rads plus
1015 e/cm2 (2 Mev)
Q
No appreciable change lolS™*/^ 1"*
+5\o -12 x 10"5
108 rads plus
<0. 00006 1015 e/cm2
+9 to +30 x 10"5 A
+9 to +25 x 10"5 A
in space, X from 0.2652 to 2.553 u
Reference
10
10
11
10
11
11
Index changes of the magnitude observed may result in serious degradation of image quality in
high resolution lens systems (Ref. 10).
A variety of sensors are used in light detection; these include photomultiplier tubes, bolo-
meters and TV cameras. The degradation threshold data are summarized in Table A-13.
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Table A-13. Typical Optical Sensor Degradation Thresholds
Dose for Permanent
Damage Threshold
Sensor
Photomultiplier Tube
Photo Tube
Vidicons
Image Orthicons
IR Detector
PbS (135 °F)
PbSe (135 °F)
Thermistor-Bolometer
N/Cm2
1012
10*2
1012
1012
103
2 x 1013
4 x 1013
Rads
105
3 x 105
3 x 105
3 x 105
-
-
-
Reference
1
1
1
1
12
13
14
A. 3.4.4. 3 Radiation Sensors
As with electronic circuitry, the most easily damaged radiation sensors are those employing
semiconductors. Radiation sensors employing metals, gases and ceramics are usable to
high radiation fluences. Table A-14 presents degradation data for various sensors.
Table A-14. Permanent Damage Thresholds - Radiation Thresholds
Radiation Sensor Exposure Environment References
Silicon (Surface barrier)
Diffused Junction
Silicon (lithium drifted)
Detector
Fission Chamber
Ion Chamber
Scintilon
Photo multiplier Tube
lflJ-9 p/cm , E ~ 5-lCMev
1012-10l3 e/cm2, E ~ 2-5 Mev
>10' R, gamma rays
1011-10l2 n/cm2, E *- 1 Mev
109 X/cm2, E ~ 5-50 Mev
107-108 p/cm2, E ~ 5-10 Mev
10 R, gamma rays
1010 n/cm2. E — 1 Mev
107 <X/cm2 E -^5-50 Mev
1018 n/cm2, E ~ few Mev
.10,12 n/cm2 (E->0.1 Mev) + 2 x 103 rads
1012 n/cm2
32
32
29
18
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A. 4 RADIATION EFFECTS ON SPACE BASE BIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS
A. 4.1 GENERAL
In most cases the organisms contained on a Space Base for bioscience experiments are more
radioresistant than man. However, for certain stages of development and for particular
tissues, radiosensitivity among animals and plants can be rather high. An example of an
organism in which a wide range of resistance is seen is the fruit fly. The adult fly has an
LD (dose required to kill 50% in one day) of 60 to 200 kilorads depending on age, while
oU~.L
the LD of fruit fly eggs is less than 200 rads. Other examples are given in the following
ou
section. In addition to stage sensitivity, cyclic sensitivity has been shown (Ref. A. 4-1) in
frog embryos. Resistance appeared to be a direct function of DNA content since the greatest
sensitivity was at telophase/early interphase and the greatest resistance occurred at late
interphase. A similar radiosensitivity based on DNA content (chromosome volume) has been
shown by Sparrow and co-workers (A. 4-2). For different spheres, however, radiosensitivity
appears to be a direct function of chromosome volume (see Figure A-ll and the following
Section). These data plus other specific and extrapolated information allow estimates of
experiment radiosensitivity of a range of biological specimens as shown in Figure A-12.
It has been assumed that Space Station Experiments as given in the NASA Blue Book would
typify those experiments to be performed on a Space Base. The wide range in sensitivities
shown for some species is due to the variety of tissues or developmental stages to be studied.
Also shown are preliminary estimates of the natural trapped radiation dose for a 30-day
2 2period for a range of shield thickness from 1 g/cm to 10 g/cm (Ref. A. 4-3). Also shown
for comparison, is the estimated 30-day dose from the reactor source at the (60m 200 ft)
dose plane. As can be seen, the natural trapped environment poses the more severe pro-
blem. In addition, the dose from a single solar flare could range from about 470 rads for
2 21 g/cm shielding down to about 30 rads for 10 g/cm shielding (Ref. A. 4-3).
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Figure A-11. Relationship of D and Chromosome Volume
Table A-15. Median Lethal Doses
A. 4. 2 ACUTE RADIATION EFFECTS
Mammals other than man generally are
somewhat more resistant to radiation than
man. This is also true of the lower verte-
brates (Table A-15). Invertebrates have a
high radiation tolerance - usually measured
in thousands of rads. Mature plants are
also quite resistant. The data given in
Table A-15 should be taken as "ball park"
in that they may differ with radiation quality,
dose protraction and dose distribution. An
example of the latter is given in Table A-16.
xor Ammais
VERTEBRATES
MAN
MONKEY
DOG
GUINEA PIG
RABBIT
RAT
MOUSE
CHICKEN
FROG
SALAMANDER
MEXICAN AXOLOTL
NEWT
MUD PUPPY
TURTLE
SNAKE
GOLDFISH
INVERTEBRATES
FRUIT FLY
AMOEBA (PELOMYXA)
E COLI
BREAD MOLD (NEUROSPORA)
DOSE IN RADS
300
530
300
250
800
750
625
900
850
1.000
1,400
1,500-2,500'
3,550
1,100
350
670
60,000-200,000"
80,000
20,000
12,000
'DEPENDING ON SPECIES
"DEPENDING ON AGE LD50-1
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Table A-16. Variation in LD with Body Region and Volume Exposed
SPECIES
Rats
Rats
Rats
Dogs
Dogs
Monkeys
EXPOSURE CONDITIONS
*°Co gamma rays, whole body uniform
"Co gamma rays, whole body (midhne dose
25 percent of surface dose)
X rays, whole body uniform
X rays, abdomen shielded
X rays, abdomen irradiated, rest shielded
X rays, whole body
X rays, upper body
X rays, lower body
X rays (250-kVp), whole body
X rajs (2 jO-kVp -f 50-kVp), whole body
X rays (250-kVp + 50-kVp), whole body
X rays (1,000-kVp), whole body
X rays (1,000-kVp), upper 54 percent of
body
X rays ^,000-kVp), lower 46 percent of
body
Protons (400-MeV), whole body
Protons (138-MeV), whole body
Protons (55-McV), whole body
Protons (32-MeV), whole body
EXPOSURE
(K or rads)
830
2590
700
1550
1,025
750
1,750
1.080
275
1226
3,205
250
1,775
855
585
516
~1,150
1,600
INTEGRAL
DOSE
(kg-rads)
170
260
175
275
134
150
130
116
2550
2,580
3,880
2,500
9,600
3.900
—
—
—
—
In general, the most radioresistant tissues are those that are rapidly dividing such as
hematopoietic and germinal tissues. As is the case with most generalities, however, there
are exceptions. For example, with the onset of mitosis, germinating wheat seedlings be-
come more resistant to the growth retarding effect of X radiation and the sensitivity of
fruit fly eggs does not exactly parallel the rate of division.
A. 4. 3 NON-LETHAL EFFECTS
Since most of the experimental organisms to be used on a Space Base are more radioresistant
than man, and man is of primary interest in any safety study, it is perhaps of more relevance
to discuss sub-lethal effects that may invalidate bio-experiments concerning weightlessness.
Some of these effects for various radiation levels are given in Table A-17. A recently
discovered (Ref. A. 4.4) example of high radiosensitivity involves altered behavior in the
rhesus monkey. Sixty {60) mr/sec of x-rays directed to the head is sufficient to cause an
immediate alteration in bar pressing behavior. A six minute lag is required for 6 mr/sec,
and the threshold for response is 4 mr/sec.
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Table A-17. Sublethal Radiation Effects
I BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS
TEST MATERIAL
GRASSHOPPER (NEUROBLASTI
FROG (SPERM)
MOUSE ITESTIS)
MOUSE (THYMUS)
MOUSE (SKIN)
RAT (RETINA)
SALAMANDER EGGS
BLUEBOTTLE FLY (EGGS)
CHICK (FIBROBLAST
CULTURE)
FROG (EGGS, FERTILIZED)
GRASSHOPPER (EGGS, 1 DAY
OLD)
BROAD BEAN (ROOT)
FRUIT FLY (EGGS)
THYMUS (CELL SUSPENSION)
PINE TREE (P STROBUS)
RADIATION IN RADS
15-500
20-600
30-800
35-225
36-540
50
50-110
100
100-1000
125
140
190
200
275
EFFECT OBSERVED
DECREASED RATE OF MITOSIS
ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT (5-100%)
DAMAGE TO GERMINAL CELLS
WEIGHT LOSS
CELLS IN MITOSIS DECREASED
INHIBITION OF MITOSIS
LD50
DEATH OF CELLS AT NEXT
DIVISION
ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT
LD50
INHIBITION OF GROWTH
LD50
DEATH OF CELLS
SEVERE GROWTH INHIBITION
The principal site of damage to plants (as is the case with animals) by ionizing radiation is
the cell nucleus. The effect on plant growth can vary, considerably. The pine tree P. strobus
is about 500 times more sensitive than other higher plants. The main reasons for this large
difference is the large nuclear volume of pines and for chronic exposures, the long period
between production of the meiocytes and the maturation of the seed. A linear relationship
between nuclear volume and dose (log-log plot) has been shown (Ref. A. 4.5). Aradibopsis
3
which has a nuclear volume of 23 n is quite resistant, while Tradescantia with a volume3
greater than 1, 000 n shows a severe growth inhibition. In addition, Sparrow and Miksche
(Ref. A. 4.5) have shown a relationship between the total amount of DNA per diploid nucleus
and sensitivity. A better correlation, however, is shown between sensitivity and DNA quantity
per chromosome.
More recent studies of Sparrow and co-workers (Ref. A. 4.6) in which 79 different organisms
were compared corroborate the previous finding of a direct relationship between radios ens itivity
and chromosome volume as shown in Section A. 4. 6.
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Data from both plants and animals indicate that increasing degrees of ploidy confer increasing
degrees of resistance to radiation damage. There are exceptions to this as in yeast and at
certain stages of development of the parasitic wasp (Habrobracon). In addition to ploidy, there
is a fair amount of evidence that in diploids an increasing chromosome number (or number
of chromosome arms) has protective value. The above generalizations plus information on
the type and quality of radiation and dose protraction allow calculations of sensitivity in
organisms that have not been irradiated previously.
A. 4.4 RADIATION QUALITY
Examples of the relationship of biological effect to radiation energy is given in Table A-18
for mouse spermatogonia and oocytes, Table A-19 for breadmold and Table A-20 for human
leukocytes.
Table A-18. RBE of Proton to X-Rays and 14.1-MeV Neutrons to Co
y -Rays for Spermatogonial and Oocyte Killing
60
Radiation
Q
14. 1-MeV neutrons —
Cell type
Spermatogonia:
A
_
T Ota A —
Late A + In —
Spermatogonia :
T ofa A __ __
Late A + In —
Spermatogonia:
T ato A ___ _
Late A + In —
Lower 95%
confidence
limit
i A-[
9 I Q
2.11
O QQ
0 41
0.27
O n n
O KA
0 ^9
0.69
o ?n
RBE
Point
estimate
1 7£1 . I O
2 CO
2.38
0 47
O CA
0.68
0 9Q. &O
O QA• Ot
0 7 7
0.96
O fifi
Upper 95%
confidence
limit
9 7«
2 QQ
2.69
0 70
n Q^
1.40
O ^Q. t o
11 n
. J.U
1 11
1.34
1 ^
From Oakberg and Clark, 1961. (Ref. A. 4.7)
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Table A-19. RBE's for Cellular Inactivation and Mutation in Neurospora
(After DeSerres and Webber, 1963) (Ref. A. 4. 9)
Radiations
250 kVp X-ray-
39-MeV helium ions
101-MeV carbon ions —
Cellular inactivation
Inactivation
coefficients3
0.1145
0.0675
0.0839
bo. 0648
0.105
RBE
1.77
1.02
1.30
1.00
1.62
Mutation
3RRBE for ad-
mutation
(one -hit)
1.36
0.87
1.24
1.00
2.37
QTR
RBE for ad-
mutation
(two-hit)
1.47
1.00
1.30
1.00
1.81
EThe inactivation coefficients are the reciprocals of the medium lethal dose (e )
in kilorads.
Average of inactivation constants from four experiments is used for 250-kVp X-ray
inactivation constant.
Table A-20. Coefficients of Chromosomal Aberration Production for
Proton Irradiation of Human Leukocytes
(After Bender & Gooch, 1962) (Ref. A. 4.10)
Radiation
750-MeV protons
450-MeV protons
130-MeV protons
100-MeV protons
50-MeV protons
250-kVp X-rays
14-MeV neutrons
2. 5-MeV neutrons
1-MeV neutron
Coefficient of aberration
production
Deletions a
0 . 6 x 10-3
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.4
0.9 + 0.03
2 . 3 + 0 . 2
2.8 + 0.2
5.0
Rings and
dicentrics b
6.0 x 10-6
5.5
6.0
5.3
5.8
6.0 + 0.5
(e)
(e)
(e)
RBE e
0.7
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.4
d 1.0
2.6
3.1
5.6
a
From Y = a + bD; the coefficient is b, expressed in aberrations/cell/rad.
DFrom Y = cD2; the coefficient is c, expressed in aberrations/cell/rad2.
cCalculated from deletion coefficient only.
dfiy definition.
eFor purposes of comparison, these coefficients would be meaningless because the
kinetics of two-hit aberration production change in this LET range, becoming approxi-
mately linear for 2.5 MeV neutrons.
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Underbrink and co-workers (1970) (Ref. A. 4.8) have shown a wide range of RBE's for various
mutations in the wild blue flower (Tradescantia). With dose ranges of 0.163 to 24.4 rads
for 0.43 MeV neutrons and 11.5 to 432 rads for x-rays the following mutations were noted:
Mutation RBE
Blue Dwarf 23. 5
Rink 30.7
Colorless 39.1
Blue Giant 120. 5
A. 4. 5 EFFECTS ON BIOLOGICAL COMPOUNDS
A Space Base undoubtedly will be well stocked with various compounds to be used in the
conduct of experiments. Table A-21 gives the effects of radiation on some of these com-
pounds.
A. 4. 6 RADIOSENSnTVTTY AND CHROMOSOME VOLUME CORRELATION
The following data,Table A-22,have been assembled by Sparrow and co-workers (Ref. A. 4.5).
Cellular radiosensitivity (D ) has been computed from the e survival point, i.e., 37%
survival. When the survival curve is exponential as for viruses, one ionization on or very
near the target is sufficient to inactivate the target, and D corresponds to the dose required
to score an average of one hit per target. A radiotaxon is a regression group in which the
energies absorbed per chromosome at D are similar.
Correlation between D and chromosome volume are shown in Figure A-13. Points fitted
4
to slopes = -1. Chromosome volumes were multiplied by 10 to facilitate computing data.
2
The arrow indicates position at which chromosome volume equals one cubic micron (1 /LI ).
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Table A-21. Ionizing Radiation Effects: Biologically Important Compounds
d.deut.rons. e • electrons, n » neutrons, r « roenuens. a - alpha particles. •- beta panicles, i • gasama raye.
Material I Radiation | Doae
A
1
2
10
11
12
1)
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
21
24
25
26
27
28
29
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
39
40
41
42
41
44
45
46
47
48
49
SO
51
52
S3
S4
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
61
64
65
66
67
U.
CnH2n * I COOH (n .1-29)
Permlr (aqueous)
Acetic (aqueous deaerated 1 M)2
Capryhc (liquid)
Laurie (solid)
Palmitic (solid)
Glycohc, Ca salt (solid)
Oxalic (aqueous)
Bensoic (aqueous)
Methanol (liquid)
Ethanol (liquid)
Suc-ose (soUd)
Sucrose (aqueoua)
Propane- 1 , l~dithiol (aqueous)
2.3-Dimercapto-l-propanol(BAL)(hquid)
o- Ammobenioic acid (aqueous)
p- Aminobenxoic acid (aqueous)
p- Carotene (petroleum ether)
Choline chloride (solid)
N^cin (aauecm.t
a (Hn)
e (1 4 Mev)
d (4 Mev)
Y (Co'O
He**(»Mev)3
d (18 Mevl
a(Rn)
a (Rn)
a (Rn)
P (C1*)
X (2 5 Mev)
X (220 kv)
P <C'*>
He**(27Mev|l
He** (27 Mev)
He** (27Mev)>
X
X
X (250 kv)
X (250 kv)
e (1 Mev)
e (1 Mev)
X (3 Mev)
P ( C ' < >
e (1 Mev)
Glycine (aqueous)
Alamne (aqueous)
Serir.e (aqueous)
L-Serlne (aqueous)
Vallne IIC1 (solid)
Norvahne HC1 (solid)
Norleucine (solid)
Cysteme (aqueous)
Histldine HC1 (aqueous)
Cholestei ol (aqueous)
& *-Pregnen-l-(p)-ol-20-one (aqueous)
Cholic scid (aqueous)
(t)-Eatrone-b. (aqueoua)
Deaoxyribonucleic acid (aqueoua)
Yeast ribonucleic scid (aqueoua)
Sndium thymonucleate (aqueous)
Carboxypeptliiaae (aqueous)
Ferncytochrome c (aqueous)
Glutathione (aoueoua)
X (200 kv)
X (500 kv)
P (n a) Li
X (220 kv)
X (200 kv)
X
P (Cu)
P(C|4)
P ( C M )
X (250 kv)
e (1 Mev)
X (200 kv)
X (200 kv)
X (220 kv)
X (200 kv)
X (200 kv)
X (200 kv)
X (0 2 2 Mev)
Y (FU Co60)
a(Rn)
X(900 kv)
X 1180-200 kv)
X (250 kv)
1 «x 1020ev/ml
1 (x 1020ev/ml
1 75-2 54 x 107r
-* Ifl 'r
1 2 x 10^ r
10«-10sr
Alcohol..
5 94 i IOB r
500-5000 r
500- 5000 r
0 66 » 10* r
1 07 i I07r
0,17-5.28 x Ifl'j
Amino
1 66 x 10s r
8-20xl020ev/ml
1 66 x 10* r
8 2 x 106 r
4 01 x 107r
1 2 x ID6
 r
10s- 106r
Steroi
1 8x 106r
I06r
MUcella
500-5000 r
Intensity | Effect or Product
:ids
5 x 10* r/hr
0 2 ua
0 2|ia
2 ISO r/min
IWoIa
1 9-1 9xI021ev/aec
1 9-1 9xl02 lev/ee<
1 1-5 lElo21e»/.«
itea compounas
Acids
ISOOr/nun
J500r/min
1500 r/min
10* r/nun
la
1000 r/min
3000 r/min
eoua
3000 r/min
MOO r/min
419-1700 r/nun
COz
CO
H»
HjO
C H2n * 2
Loss of acid function
Loss of acid function
CO2
H*
COi
Sucrlnic acid
CM,
COj
Sucrinie acid
CH4
H2 COj.CO HjO. CK4,C2Ht.
H2 CO2.CO. H2O. n-CuH24
Hj.COj.CO. II2O n-C,}H)2
Decomposition
Loss of acid function
Pyruvic acid
o-C(,H4(OH) COOH
m-C6H4(OH)COOH
p-CAFli(OH) COOH
Decompoaltion
H2
HCHO
»2
CHjCHO
(CH2OH)2
Inveraion red colflr
Inveraion
Oxidation
Oxidation
Decarboxylation, loas of
amuie function
Decarboxylation loss of
amine function
Decomposition
Decomposition
Decarboxylation
H2. NH). HCHO(trace)
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pregnan - 20-one
!(•) 12(o)-DUiydroxy-7-
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NH,
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Molecules /1 00 ev
0 5-2 «
<0 5
<0 4
6 -2 »
0 -1 1
2
1
4
0
4
0 2(
0 12
0 01
0 19
0 59
0 II
11-77
4-*
1 0
12
1 4-4 1
1 7
1 8-1 2
0 7-1 7
0 7-1 1
II
11
0 16
490
L6
Non- linear
< 9 1
<l 7
Won- linear
Nan- linear
1-11
0 1
1 7
10
6-26
0-7
•**! (aerated)
2 5-5 (deaerated)
1 0-10
0 4
0 001
0 4
0 01
»0 04
0 0)
0 55
1 T
10
ll 1 In all aqueous madia radiolyais may yield H2 H,O2. and O2 dependent on conditions, suck data are not included here 111 Data far aerated
solution are more complex /]/ Rays of artificial (cyclotron) origin
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A. 5 RADIATION EFFECTS ON HUMANS
A. 5.1 GENERAL
The information concerning human radiation effects that is currently available has been taken
from several sources. Atomic bomb victims who are sublethally injured are still being
studied as are accident victims, patients given radiation therapy and radiologists who have
been exposed to radiation for several years. In addition to these observational studies,
considerable animal experiments have been performed which allow extrapolation to humans.
The major effects have been summarized in Table A-23. These effects may be broken into
two major groups:
1. Acute or early effects which occur only after relatively high doses (>50 rads)
delivered at relatively high dose rates (several rads/hr.). These effects are
generally threshold phenomena, are higher dose-rate dependent and the incidence
and severity increase nonlinearly with increasing dose.
2. Late or delayed effects are those that appear only after many months or years.
They are generally considered to be non-threshold phenomena, are less dose
rate dependent than early effects and their occurrence and severity generally
appears to be linear and probabilistic functions of the total accumulated dose.
A more detailed description of early and late effects and how these effects are modified
is given in the following sections. Dose protraction may be the most important modifying
factor with regard to space radiation risk assessment. Solar flares are generally about
several rads per hour. These rates may not be high enough to trigger the earliest (prodromol)
radiation effects. However, more information on dose rates and environmental factors
such as weightlessness is required before definitive predictions of dose-response relation-
ships in manned spacecraft can be accurately made.
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Table A-23. Human Radiation Effects
,-A
EARLY EFFECTS
PRODROMAL
HEMATOLOGICAL AND GERMINAL
SKIN
GUT
CNS
CAUSE IRADS)
40-400
100-600
200->2000
>1000
>6000
OBSERVANCE
FEW HOURS
DAYS-WEEKS
HOURS-WEEKS
DAYS -WEEKS
IMMEDIATE
DELAYED EFFECTS
LEUKEMIA
LIFE SHORTENING
CATARACTS
GENETIC
CAUSE
2/106 MAN-YEAR-RAD
~ 6 DAYS/RAD
150-200 RADS
~100 RADS
EFFECT MODIFICATION
• DOSE
• DOSE RATE
• ENERGY
• RADIATION TYPE
• DOSE PROTRACTION
• DOSE FRACTIONATION
• RECOVERY RATES
• RESIDUAL DAMAGE
A. 5. 2 RADIATION LEVELS AND LIMITS
*
Terrestrial radiation levels vary over a rather wide range as shown in Table A-24 (Ref.
A. 5.1). When these levels are compared with space radiation there is some overlap at the
lower levels. Furthermore, the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP)
recommended limits for members of the public (lower ICRP limit in Table A-24) and for
radiation workers (upper ICRP limit in Table A-24) are exceeded. The upper limit for the
general public is 0.5 rem/yr and 5 rem/yr average is generally accepted for radiation
workers. Further detail on limits for ground radiation workers is shown in Table A-25 as
recommended by the Code of Federal Regulations (Ref. A.5.2)and more recently by'the
National Committee for Radiation Protection (Ref. A. 5.3\ Radionuclide limits are given
in the supporting data of Section A. 5.4. 3.
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Table A-24. Radiation Level Comparison
LOCATION
MID-ATLANTIC
NEW YORK CITY
STOCKHOLM,
OUTDOORS
HOUSES
TRAVANCORE, INDIA
GUARAPARI. BRAZIL,
HOUSES
BEACH, AVERAGE
BEACH, HOT SPOT
RADIATION
MICROREM/HR
6
8-15
14-17
17-59
900
103
140
2,000
LEVEL
MILLIREM/YR
55
70-130
120-150
150-520
8,000
900
1,200
17,500
/ / / / / , / / / / / / / / , / / /
RAD I AT ION
I
/////, GALACTIC RADIATION
ICRP RECOMMENDATIONS
SEA LEVEL BACKGROUND
1 10 102 103'1 10 102
MICROREM/HOUR MILLIREM/HOUR
10 10? 103
REM/HOUR
Table A-25. Dose Limits for Ground Radiation Workers
Currently in Use (10 CFR 20) Reference 4-4
(Ret A. 5 1)
Exposure
• WHOLE BODY - Head, trunk.
active blood forming organs,
gonads, lens of eye
• SKIN - of whole body
• HANDS - and forearms, feet
and ankles
Condition
Accumulated
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18 yr)
1.25
30.00
7.50
75.00
18.75
-
Recommended (NCRP-39) Jan. 15, 1971 Reference 4-5
Exposure
• WHOLE BODY
• SKIN
• HANDS, FEET 6 ANKLES
• FOREARMS
• OTHER ORGANS
Condition
Long Term
Accumulated
Year
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18yr)
5/year
15
75
25
30
10
15
5
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Table A-26. Crew Radiation Limits (rem) Space Station/Base,
Sky lab, Shuttle
PRaiMINARY
'AREA
DEPTH
SKIN (0 1 MM)
EYE (3 MMI
MARROW 15 CM)
30 DAY
150
75
25
YEARLY
240
120
40
CAREER
2 400
1.200
400
NAS SUGGESTED LIMITS
AREA
DEPTH
SKIN (0 1 MM)
EYE (3 MM)
'TESTES 0 CM)
MARROW (5 CM)
1 YR AVG
DAILY
0 6
0 3
0 1
0 2
30 DAY
75
37
13
25
QUARTERLY'-
105
52
18
35
YEARLY
225
112
38
75
CAREER
1 200
600
200
400
"THESE DOSE AND DOSE RATE LIMITS ARE A PPL I CABLE ONLY WHERE THE POSSIBILITY OF
OLIGOSPERMIA AND TEMPORARY INFERTILITY ARE TO BE AVOIDED
"MAY BE ALLOWED FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE QUARTERS FOLLOWED BY SIX MONTHS OF RESTRICTION
FROM FURTHER EXPOSURE TO MAINTAIN YEARLY LIMIT
In view of the radiation levels encountered in spacecraft, it became obvious that normal
terrestrial limits could not be used unless excessive amounts of shielding were utilized for
manned flights. The limits shown in Table A-26 were tentatively released by NASA (Ref.
A. 5. 4, A. 5. 5, A. 5. 6, A. 5. 7), based on information obtained from the Radiobiological
Advisory Panel of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). However, this panel subsequently
issued its suggested limits officially in Reference A. 5. 7. These limits are those shown in
Table A-26. They have subsequently been revised to eliminate the testes dose as a primary
criterion. If adopted by NASA, these new values will constitute the allowable exposure limits
for use in hazards evaluations.
£
A. 5. 3 ACCIDENTS
Since accidents such as a reactor failure may occur, consideration must be given to such
failures that might exceed the normal limits given above. The accident exposure limits to
be used for evaluating the potential hazards to the general populace in case of a nuclear
accident are shown in Table A-27. These limits represent what is currently in widespread
use in performing terrestrial hazards evaluations associated with reactor site safety, Ref.
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Table A-27. Accident Exposure
Guidelines General Populace
EXTERNAL EXPOSURE
• WHOLE BODY
INTERNAL EXPOSURE
• 70-YEAR BONE DOSE
• THYROID
• LOWER LARGE INTESTINE
25REM'
150REM'
300 REM'
75 REM'
•CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (10 CFR-100)
•DEPT OF MATERIALS AND LICENSING IDML-DOCKET 50-268)
A. 5. 9 and A. 5.10. These doses represent
once-in-a-lifetime exposure limits. The
internal doses are associated with the intake
of various radioactive materials (fission
products) into the body and considers the
fact that the body can retain certain of
these radioactive elements for various
lengths of time.
It should also be pointed out that alternate
approaches to specifying accident exposure
limit criteria for the general populace are
currently under study. However, until
such criteria became available, the limits
specified here will be utilized in subsequent
terrestrial hazards analyses. No similar abnormal-situation guidelines have been set for
t-
space vehicle crews. Figure A-14, however allows an assessment of mission performance
as a function of radiation dose. This figure is a graphical display of some typical early
response data which shows the mean time of occurrence for a particular effect as a function
of acute whole body exposure. The figure has been constructed such that an estimate of the
capability of an individual as a function of time after exposure can be identified for various
radiation doses. 50 rads was taken as the limit below which no debilitating effects would
occur. Vomiting, on the other hand, was taken as the earliest effect which could incapacitate
and individual, at least in particular situations such as EVA. The 10% and 99% vomiting
curves are still open to question as a function of modifying factors such as dose protraction,
but offer an estimate of the time available for useful performance following acute radiation
exposure.
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0.1
Figure A-14. Early Time Effects - Acute Whole Body Exposure
A. 5. 4 HUMAN RADIATION EFFECTS CONSIDERATIONS
A. 5.4.1 Acute Radiation Effects
Table A-28 gives the expected early effects of acute whole-body radiation. The latency
periods and relative duration are dependent upon the penetration, quality factors, total dose,
dose distribution and intensity of exposure. Furthermore, it should be noted that this table
was generated from terrestrial data. One can only speculate how the dose-response relation-
ship may be altered by weightlessness and the other possible stresses of prolonged space
flight. Langham in Reference A. 5.12 has suggested that radiation and weightlessness would
act additively or synergistically, yet the results (with invertebrates and plants) of the Bios
n flight suggest interactions ranging from antagonistic to synergistic.
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Table A-28. Expected Early Effects From Acute Whole-Body Radiation on Earth
(Modified from Glasstone, 1962) (Ref. A. 5.11)
DOSE IN RADS PROBABLE EFFECT
0-50
50-100
100-200
200-350
350-550
550-750
1,000
5,000
No obvious effect, except, possibly, minor blood changes
and anorexia.
Vomiting and nausea for about 1 day in 10 to 20% of
exposed personnel. Fatigue, but no serious disability.
Transient reduction in lymphocytes and neutrophils.
/
Vomiting and nausea for about 1 day, followed by other
symptoms of radiation sickness in up to 50% of personnel;
5% deaths anticipated. A reduction of approximately
50% in lymphocytes and neutrophils will occur.
Vomiting and nausea in 50 to 90% of personnel on first
day, followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness,
e.g., loss of appetite, diarrhea, minor hemorrhage;
5 to 90% deaths within 2 to 6 weeks after exposure;
survivors convalescent for about 3 months.
Vomiting and nausea in most personnel on first day,
followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness, e.g.,
fever, hemorrhage, diarrhea, emaciation. Over 90% deaths
within 1 month; survivors convalescent for about 6 months,
Vomiting and nausea, or at least nausea, in all
personnel within four hours from exposure, followed by
severe symptoms of radiation sickness, as above. Up to
100% deaths; few survivors convalescent for about six
months.
Vomiting and nausea in all personnel within 1 to 2 hours.
Probably no survivors from radiation sickness.
Incapacitation almost inmediately (several hours).
personnel will be fatalities within one week.
All
Prodromal Sequelae - The earliest signs and symptoms of high-intensity radiation exposure
are those of the prodromal reaction (anorexia, nausea and vomiting). These signs and
symptoms may begin to appear m less than 1-2 hours of exposure and may subside in less
than 1-2 days. Estimated absorbed doses to produce these sequelae for a 26 cm sphere
in the mid-epigastic region is given in Table A-2 9.
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Table A-29. Estimated High-Intensity Radiation Dose Levels for Production
of Early Prodromal Response
(After Langham, ed., NAS-NRC, 1967) (Ref. A. 5.12) - -
CLINICAL SIGNS
Anorexia
Nausea
Vomiting
Diarrhea
ABSORBED DOSE
10%
40
50
60
90
FOR PROBABILITY
50%
100
170
215
240
OF RESPONSE
90%
240
320
380
390
(RADS)
Hematological Effects - Hematological responses to radiation are largely dependent on
damage to the marrow and lymphoid tissue. Inhibition of cell division results in decreased
blood counts as seen in Figure A-15. The time course of changes in most of the peripheral-
blood elements is fairly well correlated with the dose of radiation of the bone marrow:
1. Survival almost certain - < 100 rads
2. Survival probable - 100-200 rads
3. Survival possible - 200-500 rads
4. Survival very improbable > 500-600 rads
The principal locations of active bone marrow are the pelvis, spine, ribs and proximal ends
of the bones of the extremities. The depth of the marrow varies from 1 to 15 cm. For
calculation of assessment of dose to the blood forming tissues, the average effective depth is
given as 5 cm. Figure A-16 shows the relationship between dose survival in man and points
out that the hematopoietic system is the most sensitive to radiation, followed by the gastro-
intestinal tract and the central nervous system.
Skin and Germinal Epithelium Reactions - A summary of skin radiation damage is given in
Table A-30. The doses required to produce effects are decidely in the lethal range, but
penetration need only be very slight (usually given for a 0.1 mm depth). It is possible to
A-94
(After Langham, ed., NAS-NRC, 1967) (Ref. A. 5.12)
• B> 19 M> 13 40
TrtlE AFTER EXPOSURE (DAYS
49 M
a. Smoothed Average Time-Course of
Lymphocyte Changes in Human Cases
from Accidental Radiation Exposure
as a Function of Oose.
19 to M M M 40
TME AFTER EXPOSURE (DAYS)
«S M
Smoothed Average Time-Course of
Neutrophil Changes in Human Cases
from Accidental Radiation Exposure
• • Function of Dose.
to B tO 13 30 »» 40
TINC AFTER EXPOSURE (DAYS)
4»
Smoothed Average Time-Course of
Platelet Changes in Human Cases
from Accidental Radiation Exposure
a* a Function of Dose.
• 4
DDK (to**** of RAOS)
Idealized Average Dose-Response
Refetionship for Lymphocytes,
Nmrepntte, and Platelets in which
tt» Nadir of Each Blood Element
b Plotted Against Dose.
Figure A-15. The Time Course of Blood Changes After Different Doses
of Radiation of QF = 1
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have a very high skin dose and a very low
marrow dose (5 cm) if the radiation has a
low penetration, as may be the case with
alpha particles.
The rapid division rate of the gametogenic
epithelium makes this tissue quite sensitive
to radiation. Damage to male gonads is
given in Table A-31.
This curve is extrapolated from animal studies
and very few human studies. It holds only for
acute total body radiation. Note spread of data.
(After Grahn, 1964) (Ref. A. 5.13)
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A. 5.4.2 Delayed Radiation Effects
Ocular Lens - About 150-200 rads is the
minimal cataractogenic single-exposure dose.
Six hundred and fifty to seven hundred and
fifty (650-750) rads may give a cataracto-
genic probability approaching unity. The
time of appearance of cataracts is highly
variable and may range from as early as six months to several years after exposure.
Figure A-16. The Relationship Between
Mean Survival Time and Acute
Radiation Dose for Man
Skin Effects - Depending on total dose and protraction, late radiation changes in skin vary
from minor telangiectasia of cosmetic interest only to development of the most serious
sequela, metastatic carcinoma. However, quantitative dose-response relationships for the
various manifestations of chronic radio-dermatitis do not exist. There seems to be a correla-
tion, however, between production of an early desquamation reaction and manifestations of
minimal late effects (telangiectasias, mottled pigmentation) in that clinically-evident perma-
nent changes are observed regularly after early desquamation. Based on this premise, the
single-exposure dose-response relationship for production of minimal late changes in the
skin would be parallel to and approximately the same as that for early moist desquamation.
Back extrapolation from protracted dose schedules suggest a single-dose equivalent of ~
2
2, 800 rads (small exposure fields ~ 10 cm ) for production of 50 percent probability of late
necrosis.
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Table A-31. Radiation Damage to Gonads
DOSE RESPONSE
15-100 rad
200-300 rad
400-500 rad
500-600 rad
Progressive reduction in fertility with dose
reduced sperm count (oligospermia) and in-
creased frequency of abnormal sperm. Above
100 rads, azoospermia is usually evident at
10 weeks.
Temporary, absolute sterility (azoospermia)
for approximately 12-15 months after 10 weeks.
Temporary sterility for 18-24 months.
Probably permanent sterility, if individual
survives.
Life Shortening - In view of the lack of human data on the effect of radiation on life shortening,
estimates must be made from animal studies plus some data available on the mortality rates
of American radiobiologists. These data are summarized along with leukemia incidence
(which contributes to life shortening) in Tables A-32 and A-33 and Figures A-17 and A-18.
Table A-32. Suggested Reference Radiation Dose-Response Relationships"
for General Life-Shortening and Increased
Incidence of Leukemia
(After Langham, ed., NAS-NRC, 1967) (Ref. A. 5.12)
RESPONSE
HIGH INTENSITY
EXPOSURE*
LOW INTENSITY
EXPOSURE**
Life Shortening
Leukemia
~ 10 days/rad
2-4 per 10 man-yr/rad
"•3 days/rad
1-2 per 10 man-yr/rad
*Assumed to be 50 rads/day and greater
**Assumed to be 1 rad/day and less
***Site of interest for dose estimation, 5 cm depth; whole-body exposure
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Table A-33. Estimates for Life-Shortening of Man From Exposure
to High-Let Ionizing Radiation
(After Schaefer, 1966) (Ref. A. 5.17)
TYPE OF RADIATION
Low LET
(Electrons, x- or gamma rays)
High LET
(Low-E protons or neutrons, v
medium and high-E heavy
nuclei)
Extremely high LET
("Microbeams" of heavy
nuclei enders)
LIFE SHORTENING, DAYS/RAD
ACUTE EXPOSURE
12
24
?
CHRONIC EXPOSURE
3
24
?
Genetic Manifestations - The National Re-
search Council Committee on Genetic
Effects of Atomic Radiation recommends
that the dose be kept below 10 rads/genera-
tion, or about 0.3 rads/year (Ref. A. 5.18,
A. 5.12). The International Commission on
Radiological Protection recommends about
0.17 rads/year (Ref. A. 5.19). An astro-
naut undoubtedly receives gonad doses
greater than these. The probability of a
new mutation in immediate offspring (based
on animal data) is considerably less than 1%
for a dose of 100 rads. Thus, the genetic
risk is rather low. Since the mutation rate
in the advanced germinal cell stages of the
mouse is 2-3 times that observed in the
spermatogonia, it can be recommended
that conception of offspring be avoided
(After Langham, ed., NAS-NRC, 1967)
(Ref. A. 5.12)
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(After Langham, ed., NAS-NRC, 1967)
(Ref. A. 5.12)
I"
1:
*;
* 6
S 5
& *
8 3
1
-
/
£-
/
/
_/L
.'*
X
/
..»»
»'
A/•/•
HIGH ID
t
TENSIT'
x
 INTERMEDIATE OR
MIXED HIGH AND
LOW INTENSITY
4^-LO
i
V"
*wm
i
,-"•
JITY (£
(2 50
,»•
1 RAO/I
IAOS/Q
^W^"
*^
AY)
») "
-
-
-
-
-
2 3 4 S 6 7
ACCUMULATED DOSE (hufwlrt*! of PADS)
during the post flight stages in which
irradiated postgomal cell stages are still
present (Ref. A. 5. 20).
A. 5.4.3 Radiation Quality Type
The unit of absorbed dose is the rad, which
is equal to an energy deposition of 100 ergs/
g. (One roentgen is equivalent to 93 ergs/g
of soft tissue). The absorbed dose is im-
parted by lonization per unit mass of
irradiated material. The average ionization
energy in tissue = 5.82 x 10 erg/ion pair
12
or 1. 72 x 10 ion pairs/g of tissue-rad.
The energy expended in producing one ion
pair in tissue is about 35 eV. Since radia-
tions of different type and quality (mass,
charge, energy) produce different spatial
distributions of energy deposition in tissue,
different biological responses per unit of absorbed dose are to be expected. Two terms
are currently used to account for these differences. The .older term is relative biological
effectiveness (RBE); which is defined as the ratio of the dose (m rads) of high energy X or
gamma rays required to produce a specific level of biological effect to the dose (in rads) of
another radiation required to produce the same level of effect. RBE is mainly a function of
the ionization energy per micron of tissue - linear energy transfer (LET). However, the
state of the tissue (metabolic rate, oxygenation, etc.) can modify the tissue response. In
order to allow radiation protection calculations based on LET, the term quality factor (QF)
has been introduced. The product of the absorbed dose (in rads) and QF gives,the dose equiva-
lent (DE) in rems. The National Committee on Radiation Protection (Ref. A. 5.21) has pro-
posed the QF-LET relationship shown in Table A-34. The QF values given refer to late or
delayed effects of low dose-rate exposure. These effects are usually more dependent on LET
than large doses delivered at high dose rates. To a first approximation, the relationship for
Figure A-18. Relationship of
Accumulated Dose and Intensity of Reference
Quality Whole-Body Radiation to
Increased Probability to Leukemia'
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Table A-34. Values of QFL for Late or
Delayed Effects as a Function of
Average LET
(Ref. A. 5.21)
delayed effects of low dose-rate exposure
is: QF = 0. 8 + 0.16 L, where L is the mean
LET in KeV/M (Ref- A. 5. 22). For large
doses at high dose rate QF = 0. 9 + 0. 05 L.
The QF values given in Table A-35 have
been suggested by NAS-NRC for space
radiation. Table A-36 gives QF values for
several types of radiation for low dose
rates. Although QF values of around 10 for
late effects are assigned to protons of 0.5
MeV and less, Schaefer (Ref. A.5.23, 24,
25, 26, 27) has shown that the mean local
QF values for space protons and alpha
particles behind moderate shielding can
never greatly exceed unity because of the
small fraction of the total dose delivered at high LET. For solar flare protons with light
2
prefiltration (2 g/cm ), a maximum QF of 1.46 for late effects occurs at the surface of the
target and approaches unity as a function of depth. QF values of fission neutrons (0.5 -
1 MeV) for production of early response range from ~ 1 to ~ 3 based on animal studies.
LET
(KeV/fi In Water)
X Rays and Electrons in
any LET
3.5 or less
3.5 - 7
7 - 2 3
23 - 53
53 - 175
QF
1
1
1 - 2
2 - 5
5 - 1 0
10 - 20
Internally Deposited Radiosiotopes
Internal radiation poses a somewhat different problem than external radiation as discussed
above. Two different criteria are used depending on the type of isotope under consideration.
90 227 232 231 237 239For bone-seeking radioisotopes such as Sr, Ac, Th, Pa, Np, Pu, etc.,
which emit alpha or beta radiation, the maximum permissible body burden is based on a
OpC
comparison with Ra and its daughters. 0.1 [ig of radium in equilibrium with its decay
"* r,
products gives a dose equivalent to the bone of 0.56 rem/week. A QF of 10 is assumed m
computing this DE - other bone seekers may have a lower QF which is attributed to the
greater degree of non-uniformity of deposition of the other bone seekers. For this reason,
another factor, called the relative damage factor (DF) is used as a multiplier of QF. This
factor has a value of 5 for alpha or beta radiation, except where the corpuscular radiations
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Table A-35. Suggested QFg Values for Early Effects of
High-Intensity Space-Radiation Exposure
(After Langham, ed., NAS-NRC, 1967) (Ref. A. 5.12)
COMPONENT QF
Skin Responses
Prodromal Syndrome
Hematological Responses
Lethality, Hematological
Synd rome
Lethality, Intestinal
Syndrome
Atrophy of germinal
Epithelium
Low Let (43.5 KeV/ji)
High Let (>3.5 KeV/p)
Total Flux
Total Flux
Total Flux
Low Let (£3.5 KeV/p)
High Let (> 3.5 KeV/p)
Low Let (^ 3.5 KeV/p)
High Let (^ -3.5 KeV/p)
Table A-36. Typical QFj, for Late Effects at Low Dose Rate
in Ground-Based Exposure
TYPE OF RADIATION
X-rays
Ganma Rays
Beta Particles, 1.0 mev
Beta Particles, 0.1 mev
Neutrons, Thermal Energy
Neutrons, 0.0001 mev
Neutrons, O.OOS mev
Neutrons, 0.02 mev
Neutrons, 0.5 mev
Neutrons, 1.0 mev
Neutrons, 10.0 mev
Protons, greater than 100 mev
Protons, 1 0 mev
Protons, 0.1 mev ,
Alpha Particles, S mev
Alpha Particles, 1 mev
RBE or QF
1
1
1
1
2.8
2 2
2.4
5
10.2
10.5
6 4
I - 2
8 5
10
15
20
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are due to a decay chain whose first member is radium. When radium is the first member
of the chain, DF = 1. The energy dissipated in the bone by Ra and the daughters that
i 226
remain in the bone is MeV/disintegration or 110 MeV with a QF of 10. Since 99% of the Ra
body burden is in the skeleton, the burden for any other bone seeker equivalent to 0. 56 rem/
week is:
*
O . l M Cix 0.99 110 MeV/d _ 11
q
 f X E MeV/d f_E
2 &
where E is the effective corpuscular energy per disintegration of any other bone seeker and
90f is the fraction of the total body burden of bone seeker in the skeleton. In the case of Sr -
^90y, where the average energy = 1.12 MeVAour , QF = 1 and DF =5, q = 2 \i Ci. However,
90
since the effective half life of Sr is 18 years, 50 years will be required for an 86% equilibrium
(Ref. A. 5.28). For non bone-seekers, the matter is similar to external radiation. If the
permissible body burden and information regarding metabolism are known, the concentration
in air and water that would produce a certain dose may be calculated. Table A-37 gives
radioisotope burdens based on 100 mrem/week to the total body, gonads or hematopoietic
system or 300 mrem/week to other organs.
A. 5.4.4 Chemical and Biological Protection
1. Pre-irradiation Treatment with Chemical Agents (Prophylaxis)
Several reviews of chemical protection are available (Straube and Patt, 1963;
Schubert, 1964, Bacq. 1965). Unfortunately, no work has been done on humans
- most of the testing has been done on mice, with only a few studies with larger
animals. A large number of compounds probably protect by reducing the oxygen
pressure in tissues. Morphine, ethanol, carbon monoxide, p-aminopropriophenone
(PAPP), epinephrine, sodium nitrate, histamine, methacholene and 5-hychoxytryptamine
(serotonin) are examples of materials that protect mainly via hypoxia. Of these
compounds, PAPP and serotonin appear superior, giving a dose-reduction factor
of about 1.5 to 1.6. Where the dose reduction factor is defined as:
LD50-30 (protected)
LD50-30 (C°ntrol)
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Table A-37. Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for
Occupational Exposure
(After Cember, 1969) (Ref. A.5.28)
Radionucltde and type of
decay
!H8(H'0) 05-)
(Sol)
(HJ) (Immersion)
VC(COO On
(Sol)
(Immersion)
•IP (ft-)
(Sol)
(Insol)
iJCa (ft-)
(Sol)
(Insol)
JiCr (ec, y)
cs n
' '
(Insol)
;;co(js-.y)
(Sol)
(Insol)
Organ of reference'"
(critical organ in
bold type)
("Body tissue
LTotfll body
Skin
fFat
< Total body
I Bone
Total body
{BoneTotal bodyGI (LLI)Liver
Brain
/Lung
\GI (LLI)
("Bone
\ Total body
LGI (LLI)
/Lung
IGI(LLI)
Gl (LLI)
Total body
, Lung
Prostate
Thyroid
Kidney
"Lung
' GI(LLI)
'GI (LLI)
Total body
Pancreas
" Liver
Spleen
Kidney
f Lung
\ GI (LLI)
permissible
burden in
total body
?(/*)
10'
2 x 10'
300
400
400
6
30
50
300
30
200
„
800
10'
2 x 10>
4 x 10'
8 x 10»
10
70
90
200
200
Maximum permissible concentrations
For 40-hr week
(MPQ.
jiCi/cm*
01
02
002
003
004
5 x 10-*
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
002
7 X 10-'
3 x 10—
2 x 10-'
001
5 x 10-'
005
06
1
2
3
6
005
io-«
4 x 10-'
002
003
005
007
10-
(MPQ.
MCi/cm*
2 x 10-
2 x 10-
2 x 10-'
4 x 10-
5 x IO-«
6 x 10-
5 x 10-
7 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
3 x 10-
» x 10-
10-'
3 x 10-
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-
10-'
9 x 10-'
10-
10—2 x 10-
3 x 10-
6 x 10-
10—2 x 10-
8 x 10-
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
2 x 10-
10—4 x 10-
6 x 10-
9 x 10-
2 x 10-'
For 168-hr week""
(MPQ.
^Ci/cm'
003
005
8 x 10-'
001
001
2 x 10-
9 x 10—
9 x 10-
2 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
2 x 10-
9 x 10-
7 x 10-
4 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
002
02
04
05
1
2
002
5 x 10-
10-
7 x 10-'
9 x 10-'
002
003
3 x 10-
(MPQ.
/iCi/cm'
5 x 10-
7 x 10-
4 x 10-
10-
2 x 10-
2 x 10-'
10-
2 x 10-
10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'io-«
3 x 10-
4 x 10-
io-«
9 x 10-
10-
4 y 10-
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-
4 x 10-
8 x 10-'
10"'
2 x 10-
4 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
3 x 10-
10-'
10-'
6 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-
3 x 10-
6 x 10-
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Table A-37. Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for
Occupational Exposure (Cont'd)
Radionuclide and type of
d<y*fiv
:;zn03+,«,
 y)
„
Sol)
(Insol)
: :AS OJ-,
 y)
,_ ..
' °'
(Insol)
•jSr (j8~)
(Sol)
(Insol)
**Sr (B~\
(Sol)
(Insol)
IJZr fll-. y. e-).
(Sol)
(Insol)
IJNb(/J-,y)
(Sol)
Organ of reference"
(critical organ in
fwiift tvn^^VU11B •J'PC/
'Total body
Prostate
Liver
Kidney
, GI (LLI)
Pancreas
Muscle
Ovary
Testis
.Bone
'Lung
GI (LLI)
fGI (LLI)
1 Total body
X Kidney
Liver
f GI (LLI)
^Lung
fBone
4 GI (LLI)
iTotal body
/Lung
\GI (LLI)
rBone
J Total body
1 GI (LLI)
/Lung
\GI (LLI)
"GI (LLI)
Total body
Bone
Kidney
Liver
Spleen
'Lung
GI (LLI)
'GI (LLI)
Total body
Liver
Kidney
Bone
Spleen
permissible
burden in
total body
60
70
80
100
200
200
300
400
700
20
20
40
4
40
2
20
20
30
30
40
40
40
60
60
80
80
Maximum permissible concentrations
For 40-hr week
(MPQ.
/iCi/cm*
3 xlO-»
4 x 10-'
4 x 10-*
6 x 10-*
6 x 10-*
7 x 10-'
001
001
002
004
5 x 10-*
6 x 10-4
0.4
06
I
6 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
10"*
2 x 10-*
8 x 10~4
4 x 10-*10-*
10"'
10-'
2 x 10-'
3
4
4
6
7
2 x 10-*
3 x 10-'
10
20
20
20
20
(MPQ.
MCi/cm»
10-'
10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
10"*
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
10~4
6 x 10-*
9 x 10-'
10-'
5 x 10-*
8 x 10-'
10"*
10-'
6 x 10-'
3 x 10-*
3 x 10-'
2 x 10-' ^
4 x 10-«
10-'
3 x 10-"
9 x 10-"
3 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
6 x 10"
5 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
9 x 10-'io-«
For 1 68-hr week"»
(MPQW
MCi/cm'
10~'
10"" '
10~'
2 x 10-*
2 x 10-*
3 x 10-*
4 x 10-*
4 x 10-*
6 x 10-'
001
2 x 10-*
2 x 10-4
01
0.2
04
2 X 10~4
10"4
4 x 10-4
7 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
10-4
4 x 10-*
5 x 10-4
4 X 10-4
6 X 10-4
1
2
2
2
2
6 x 10-4
10-'
4
6
6
7
7
(MPQ.
/*Ci/cm*
4 x 10-«
4 x 10-«
5 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
9 x 10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
2 x 10->
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-4
5 x 10-«
3 x 10-«
2 x 10-'
10-'
9 x 10-'
6 x 10-"
10-'
5 x 10-'
10-"
3 x 10-"
10-'
2 x 10-*
6 x 10-'
10-'
4 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
9 x 10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
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Table A-37. Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides ,in Air and in Water for
Occupational Exposure (Cont'd)
Radionuclide and type of
decay
(Insol)
Y.'Ru (P~, y) (Son\h*WI/
(Insol)
Y.'I (J3-, Y, e-)
(Sol)\tnjif
(Insol)
V.'Cs (p. Y, e-)
(Sol)
(Insol)
'.VCe (a. f. Y)
(Sol)
(Insol)
Y.'Pm (a. 0-)
(Sol)
(Insol)
V.'Ta (P-, r)
(Sol)V*""/
Organ of reference'"
(critical organ m
bold type)
/Lung
\GI (LLI)
fci (LLI)
] Kidney
1 Bone
[Total body
/Lung
\G1 (LLI)
("Thyroid
•< Total body
LCI (LLI)
fGf (LLI)
[Lung
'Total body
Liver
Spleen
Muscle
Bone
Kidney
Lung
GI (SI)
/Lung
\GI (LLI)
rGI (LLI)
Bone
• Lhcr
Kidney
.Total body
'Lung
GI (LLI)
fGI (LLI)
Bone
4 Kidney
Total body
I Liver
/Lung
\GI (LLI)
"GI (LLI)
Liver
, Kidney
Total body
Spleen
Bone
permissible
burden in
total body
90*0
3
10
10
07
50
30
40
50
50
100
100
300
f
5
6
10
20
60
200
300
300
7
20
20
30
50
Maximum permissible concentrations
For 40-hr week
(MPQ.
MCi/cm'
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-4
001
004
006
3 x 10-4
6 xlO-»
5 x 10-'
003
2 xlO-'
4 x 10-4
5 x 10-4
6 x 10-4
7 x 10-4
10-'
10"'
5 x 10-'
002
10-'
3 x 10-4
02
03
05
07
3 x 10-4
6 x 10-'
1
4
7
8
6 x 10-'
io-»
09
2
2
4
6
(MPQ.
/»O/cm'
10-'
5 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
10-'
5 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
9 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
9 x 10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
10"*
10-'
2 x 10-'
3'X 10-'
6 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
10-*
6 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'10-'io-»
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
8 x 10-«
9 x 10-'
10-'
3 x 10-'
For 168-hr week<M
(MPQ.
MCi/cm'
10"
io-4
4 x 10-'
001
002
10~4
2 x 10-*
2 x 10-'
001
6 x IO-4
2 x IO-4
2 x IO-4
2 X IO-4
2 x IO-4
5 x IO-4
5 x IO-4
2 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
4 x IO-4
IO-4
008
01
02
03
IO-4
2 x 10-'
05
2
2
3
2 x 10-'
4 xlfl-*
03
07
07
1
2
(MPQ.
f«Ci/cm'
3 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
2 x I0-e
10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
8 x 10 '
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
5 x ;o-»
8 x 10-'
3 x 10-"
3 x 10-»
4 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
7 x 10-'
10-'10-'
3 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
9 x 10-'
10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
9 x 10-"
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Table A-37. Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for
Occupational Exposure (Cont'd)
Radionuclide and type of
decay
(Insol)
V/Irtf-.y)
(Sol)
(Insol)
V.'Au (f, y)
(Sol)
t
(Iiuol)
Y.'Rn'O (a. ft y)
Y.'Ra («, /h, y) (Sol)
(Insol)
V.'U (a, f. y)
(Sol)
(Insol)
V.'U (a, Y, e~)
(Sol)
(Insol)
'.VPu (a. y)
(Sol)
(Insol)
Organ of reference'"(critical organ in
bold type)
/Lung
\CI (LLI)
fGI(LLI)
Kidney
• Spleen
Liver
1-Total body
/Long
\GI (LLI)
fGl (LLI)
Kidney
4 Total body
Spleen
I- Liver
fGI(LLI)
\Lung
Lung
("Bone
•< Total body
LCI (LLI)
GI (LLI)
fGI (LLI)
J Kidney
j Bone
^Total body
/Lung
\ GI (LLI)
rGl (LLI)
J Kidney| Bone
I Total body
/ Lung
\ GI (LLI)
fBone
Liver
•< Kidney
GI (LLI)
L Total body
(Lung
\GI (LLI)
lOf fiv jmtifnmmuiiius
permissible
burden in
total body
fO*)
6
7
8
20
20
30
60
80
01
0.2
003
006
04
5 x 10-'
006
05
004
04
05
04
Maximum permissible concentrations
For 40-hr week
(MPQ.
MCi/cm'
io-«
io-«
4 x 10-'
4 x 10-»
5 x IO-«
0.01
10-'
2 x 10-»
007
01
02
03
10-'
4 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
io-«
9 x 10-4
8 x 10-4
001
001
004
8 x 10-4
io-«
2 x 10-'
001
004
io-« -»
io-4
5 x 10-4
7 x 10-4
8 x 10~4
io-«
8 x 10~4
(MPQ.
MCi/crn*
2 x 10-«
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
10-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
3 x 10-«
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-«
4 x 10-«
8 x 10-«io-»
2 x 10-'
6 x 10-'
3 x 10-'
3 x 10-"
5 x 10-"
3 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
5 x 10-"
6 x 10-"
2 x 10-"]0-io
10-'
2 x 10-'
7 x 10-»
6 x 10-"
2 x 10-'jO-io
2 x 10-'
2 x 10-"
7 x 10-"
9 x 10-"
2 x 10-'
10-"
4 x 10-"
2 x 10-'
For 168-hr week'"
(MPQ.
/»O/cmf
4 x 10-*
4 x 10-410-'
10-'
2 x 10-'
4 x 10-'
4 x 10-«
5 x 10~4
002
004
0.07
01
5 x 10-*
]<V-7
2 x 10-'
5 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
4 x 10-'
5 x 10-'
001
3 x 10-4
4 x 10-4
6 x 10-4
5 x 10-'
001
4 x 10-4
5 x 10-»
2 x 10-4
2 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
3 x 10-4
(MPQ.
/»Ci/cm*
7 x 10-«
7 x 10-«
9 x 10-«
4 x 10-'
5 x I0~»
6 x 10-'
10-'
9 x 10-*
6 x 10-«
10-'
9 x 10-'
2 x 10-'
3 x 10-«
4 x 10-'
8 x 10-«
2 x 10-'
io-«
10-"
2 x 10-"
10-'
6 x 10-«
6 x 10-'
2 x 10-">
2 x 10-'°
6 x 10-'°
4 x 10-"
5 x 10-'
8 x 10-'
3 x 10-"
2 x 10-"
6 x 10-"
5 x 10-"
6 x 10-'
6 x 10-"
2 x 10-"
3 x 10-"
6 x 10-'
5 x 10-"io-»
5 x 10-'
<•> The abbreviations GI, S, SI, ULI, and LLI refer to gastrointestinal tract, stomach, small intestines, upper large
intestine, and lower large intestine, respectively.(M
 It will be noted that the MPC values for the 168-hr week are not always precisely the same multiples of the MFC
for the 40-hr week. Part of this is caused by rounding off the calculated values to one digit, but in some instances it is
due to technical differences discussed in the ICRP report. Because of the uncertainties present in much of the biological
data and because of individual variations, the differences are not considered significant The MPC values for the 40-hr
week are to be considered as basic for occupational exposure, and the value for the 168-hr week are basic for continuous
exposure as in the case of the population at large
<c)
 The daughter isotopes of """Rn and 3J3Rn are assumed present to the extent they occur m unfiltered air For all
other isotopes the daughter elements are not considered as part of the intake and if present must be considered on the
basis of the rules for mixtures
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on is the dose required to kill 50% of the population in 30 days.
-JU
Thiols such as aminoethyhsothiuromum (AET) and mercaptoethylamine (MEA)
are effective as free-radical scavengers and can also form mixed disulfides to
protect cellular sulfhydryls. They also can bind heavy metals, which in turn
can inhibit cellular oxidation. Protection by the aminothiols cysteme, ME and
AET as summarized by Langham (1967) (Ref. A. 5.12) give a dose reduction
factor of 1. 6 to 2.0 for mice. However, the protection is not absolute, these
compounds are highly toxic to man, the dose reduction factor decreases with
increasing LET, offer little protection against chronic irradiation and are of
doubtful value when delayed effects are considered.
2. Post-irradiation Treatment (Therapy)
The mechanisms of morbidity and death from high intensity radiation doses near
the midlethal level are infection and hemorrhage, both of which to a large extent,
are the result of bone marrow damage. The current approach to therapy is to treat
the injury symptomatically (antibiotics, transfusions, etc.) and to use bone marrow
transplants only if the symptomatic approach appears destined to fail. Bone marrow
injections have given dramatic results in mice using isologous (same strain) marrow.
The effect is lessened with homologous (different strains) and heterologous (different
species) bone marrow. In dogs, the best results were obtained using autologous
marrow, i.e., obtain marrow pre-irradiation and inject post-irradiation. In view
of the immunological problems, the latter may be the most feasible method for space
flight - provided adequate medical facilities including a physician are available.
A. 5.4. 5 Risk Considerations
1. Ground Personnel
Permissible doses have been necessarily changed as new data becomes available.
The maximum permissible doses for all ground personnel as recommended by the
Code of Federal Regulations (1968) Reference A. 5. 2 and the National Committee for
Radiation Protection - (NCRP) (1971) in Reference A. 5. 3 is given in Table A-38. It
is anticipated that the recommended doses by the NCRP will be used in the near
future and therefore are recommended for use in the Space Base Study.
2. Flight Personnel
It is apparent that the limits suggested for ground personnel must be exceeded by
flight personnel for any prolonged flight. Consequently, the NAS-NRC (Ref. A. 5.12)
has suggested that space radiation risks be evaluated in the following terms:
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Table A-38. Dose Limits for Ground Radiation Workers
Currently in Use {10 CFR 20) Reference 4-4
Exposure
• WHOLE BODY - Head, trunk.
active blood forming organs,
gonads, lens of eye
• .SKIN - of whole body
' »
r
 HANDS - and forearms, feet
and ankles
Condition
Accumulated
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18 yr)
1.25
30.00
7.50
75.00
18.75
Recommended (NCRP-39) Jan. 15, 1971 Reference 4-5
Exposure
• WHOLE BODY
• SKIN
• HANDS, FEET 6 ANKLES
• FOREARMS
• OTHER ORGANS
Condition
Long Term
Accumulated
Year
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Year
Quarterly
Dose (rem)
5(N-18yr)
5/year
15
75
25
30
10
15
5
(a) Immediate or early performance decrement (early responses) occurring
within a few hours to one month following a major exposure.
(b) Progressively increasing performance decrement or serious loss of
performance over long periods of flight as a result of an accumulating
exposure (progressive injury to the blood-forming system).
(c) Probability of delayed or chronic radiation response that may require
interrupting a planned series of flights and which may limit an astronaut's
career.
Within each of these categories, the significant clinical symptomatology or responses
must be defined on the basis of importance to crew safety and mission success.
The relative significance of responses will be mission-dependent. The following
suggestions may assist in identification of the important responses and in evaluation
of their significance for each specific mission.
(a) Any amount of radiation exposure should be considered as potentially
detrimental and, therefore, the exposure should be kept at a minimum
consistent with the risk versus gain philosophy.
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(b) Radiation guides should be set below the level that might result in an
unacceptable probability of in-flight response capable of jeopardizing
crew safety.
(c) Elapsed time between recurrent or repeat use of an individual or crew
should take into consideration the nature and extent of previous exposure,
the predicted exposure risk of the contemplated mission, and the degree
to which mission success may depend on individual or crew experience.
(d) The dose or doses established for early effects automatically entails
acceptance of certain probabilities of occurrence of generalized life
shortening, leukemia, and other late manifestations.
(e) The radiation responses may be subdivided into "in-flight" and "post-flight"
categories. Although this subdivision is somewhat arbitrary, it is time-
dependent and may be important under special circumstances, for which
certain higher risks may be acceptable if it is clear that the latent period
for expression of injury will automatically cause the response to occur
post-flight.
The NAS-NRC also suggests that DE in rems be replaced by reference equivalent
space exposure (RES) in reference equivalent units (reu). The method of evaluation
is the same as that employed in conventional radiation protection:
RES (reu) = D (rads) x QF x (f • f • • • f ), where\ £ n
f i • • • ffl are modifying factors for Adjusting the space-radiation exposure for
relative differences in response per unit dose resulting from differences in
"reference" and "space exposure" conditions.
Roth (Ref. A. 5. 29) in reference to J. E. Pickering gives the operational dose
limits for SKYLAB:
(a) Planning Operational Dose (POD) - The dose which should not be exceeded
without requiring a mission modification of some degree. The degree of
modification will be a function of the magnitude of the excess dose and will
be formulated by mission rules. This dose will be used for mission planning
purposes to determine if proposed trajectories and time lines are acceptable.
(b) Maximum Operational Dose (MOD) - The dose which should not be exceeded
without specific modification of the mission to prevent further potentially
' harmful in-flight response in terms of crew safety and post-flight response
in terms of delayed radiation injury.
Provisional limits for POD and MOD as cited by Roth (Ref. A. 5.29) are given in
Table A-3 9.
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Table A-39. Provisional Radiation Dose Limits Suggested for Preliminary
Evaluation of a 30-60 Day Mission
TISSUE
Skin
Eye
Bone Marrow
DEPTH
0.1 ram
3 .0 mm
5.0 cm
POD
2.5 rads/day
1.25 rads/day
0.6 rads/day
MOD
5 rads/day
2.5 rads/day
1.0 rad/day
More recent information from NASA-MS C (Ref. A. 5.4) give the following limits
for earth orbiting manned vehicles (Space Station/Base, Sky lab, Shuttle). (See
Table A-40).
The rate limit for radiation from all artificial sources should not exceed 0.15
rem/day, average.
Table A-40. Crew Radiation Limits (rem) Space Station/Base,
Skylab, Shuttle
DEPTH
Skin (0.1 mm)
Eye (3 mm)
Marrow (5 cm)
CAREER
2,400
1,200
400
YEARS
240
120
40*
30 DAYS
150
75
25
*This limit may be doubled if the crewman is not exposed to any
further radiation for the succeeding 12 months following the
one year counted for exposure, i.e., no more than 80 rem in a
24 month period.
Except for marrow dose, the 30-day limit is identical to the MOD limit given in
Table A-39. A revision to this data upon Rose (telecon 31 August 1970) recommenda-
tion from the National Academy of Sciences (Ref. A. 5.1) reduces the skin and eye
doses by-about 1/2 and add a 3 cm (Testes) dose that will be-about 1/2-the marrow
dose (Table A-41). These reductions are in light of new evidence that low dose
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rates are more dangerous than previously thought. These new data have been
amended (Ref. A. 5. 8) to eliminate the testes dose as a primary design criterion.
The testes dose is recommended to be applicable only where the possibility of
ohgospermia and temporary infertility are to be avoided. For most manned space
flights, the allowable exposure accumulation to the Germinal Epithelium (3 cm)
will be the subject of a risk/gain decision for the particular program, mission, and
individuals concerned.
Table A-41. Anticipated Radiation Limits
CREW RADIATION LIMITS (REM)
AREA
DEPTH
SKIN(Q.1MM)
EYE (3 MM)
TESTES (3 CM)
MARROW
(5 CM)
1YRAVG
DAILY
0.6
0.3
0.1
0.2
30
DAY
75
37
13
25
QUARTER
105
52
18
35
YEAR
225
112
38
75
CAREER
1200
600
200
400
•NOT A PRIMARY DESIGN CRITERIA
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SPACE BASE PROGRAM REFERENCE MISSION
B.I GENERAL
The reference mission used in this safety study is presented in this Appendix and is briefly
summarized below. The principal reference material used was that of the Phase A Space
Base Definitions by NAR and MDAC (Reference 1 and 2).
The Space Base Mission is defined to begin with the arrival of the first flight hardware at the
launch facility - the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and culminates in the End of Mission
(EOM) disposal shutdown and/or recovery of program hardware. The program consists of
several major pieces of hardware which comprise the Space Base or interface with and/or
provide operational support. The program hardware is summarized in Table B-l.
Table B-l. Major Program Hardware
• SPACE BASE VEHICLE
Zero-g Modules
Artifical-g Modules
Reactor Power Modules
Extendable Booms
Attached Experiment Modules
Maintenance Facility
Docking Ports
Experiment Pay load
• DETACHED "FREE FLYING"
EXPERIMENT MODULES
• LOGISTIC/BOOST VEHICLES
Saturn INT-21
S-II Kick Stage
Space Shuttle
Space Tug
• OTHER INTERFACING VEHICLES
Reusable Nuclear Shuttle
Orbital Propellant Storage Depot
Comm. Relay Satellites
• GROUND FACILITIES
Launch Complex 39
Vehicle Assembly Building
Mobile Launcher
Nuclear Assembly Building
Base Assembly Facilities
Transport Vehicles
Mission Control Center
Range
Recovery Equipment
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For purposes of the study, the mission was subdivided into the four distinct phases shown
in Table B-2.
A series of INT-21 launch vehicles will boost the Space Base Modules into a 500 km 55° or
30 inclination circular orbit where buildup operations take place. The INT-21 is also used
to boost the reactor power modules to rendezvous with the awaiting orbiting Base. Space tugs
will perform the final docking to the Base booms. After a brief checkout period, the power
modules will be brought to operating power (50 kWe each) and full Base operations with the
nominal 48-man crew are initiated. The ten year operational phase incorporates an exten-
sive experimental program with periodic resupply of expendables, replacement hardware and
the crew by the Space Shuttle.
The end of equipment lifetime or closeout of the Base is characterized by the safe disposal
and/or recovery of the nuclear hardware.
B.2 TRAJECTORY/ORBIT PARAMETERS
The reference launch site is Launch Complex 39 at KSC. The INT-21 Space Base launch
trajectory and orbit parameters used in the study are shown in Figure B-l with orbital inser-
tion of the payload occurring near Australia.
B. 3 MISSION PHASE DESCRIPTION
The phase description presented is limited to the events associated with the nuclear system
safety of the program. A general mission time-line is shown in Figure B-2. The build-up
of the Space Base comprises activities of several mission phases and is assumed to encom-
pass a 105 week period. Build up is followed by a ten year operational period during
which a nominal 48-man crew conducts the experiment program in both zero-g and artificial-g
environments.
B. 3.1 PHASE 1. 0 PRELAUNCH
The prelaunch phase, encompassing the period from arrival of the flight hardware at the
launch facility through to completion of the countdown is separated into five subphases:
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1. Transportation
2. Receipt, Inspection, Storage
3. Checkout and Assembly
4. Integration
5. Countdown
B. 3.1.1 Transportation
The transportation description of the Reactor Power Module (PM) at KSC is based on the
assumption that the Power Module will be shipped to KSC in a nearly completely assembled
configuration. All NaK loops will be filled before the final acceptance testing at the factory
and will remain filled throughout all subsequent operations. The Power Module would arrive
in an environmentally controlled shipping container which provides the proper monitoring
equipment and ensures a clean, dry atmosphere. Previous operation of the reactor was
limited to near zero power critical tests, therefore radiation levels around the reactor
would be very low (maximum of 30 kW-hours).
The Power Module will be taken from the arriving airplane (or barge) by land transport to
the Receipt and Inspection area (Nuclear Assembly Building) which is presently an undefined
facility at KSC.
Three reactor Power Module units will be delivered, the third Power Module serving as the
backup. Subsequent Power Module units will be delivered to KSC to serve as replacements
during the mission. The first Power Module will be delivered approximately 90 days prior
to launch, the second - 60 days, the third - 45 days. Transportation at KSC will be by
truck/transporter trailer between the port of arrival, and Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB),
the VAB and/or Complex 39.
The transportation of isotopes from the airport, trucking or rail facility will be by truck or
automobile utilizing appropriate shipping and radiological procedures. Dose rates and
integrity of the shipment are checked upon arrival and cooling provisions are maintained.
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B.3.1.2 Receipt, Inspection and Storage
The transporter and Power Module will receive a comprehensive receiving inspection for
proper configuration, visual damage and monitoring of instruments designed to record
shock loads, environmental conditions such as humidity, air chemical composition and radia-
tion. The transporter will be opened and an inspection made of the Power Module for visual
damage, fluid leaks, system integrity and electrical harness and umbilical connections.
Provision is made for the discharging and purging of the liquid metal systems such that if a
leak were detected, the system could be safed for shipment back to the factory. Reactor con-
trol safety devices will be checked. Consideration is given to the use of the transporter during
all phases of inspection, checkout and storage;providing a universal piece of hardware equipped
»
with proper status and safety instrumentation.
Storage of three Power Module units is to be provided with storage times of at least one year.
In addition to the two Power Module units on the Space Base in orbit, a minimum of two re-
placement Power Module units are stored in a ready condition during the operational mission.
i
Routine airborne and surface radiation and contamination measurements are made while the
hardware is in storage. Periodic (180 days) power module verification checks are also made.
Preparation for storage will involve enclosing the entire Power Module within the transporter
under a protective cover of dry gas (argon or N ). Purging of the container is required whenw
£
ever the enclosure is opened. Therefore, status monitoring provisions will be made through
the container walls to enable periodic checkout without opening the enclosure.
Isotopes undergo a receiving inspection which includes a check of integrity, radiation, gas
sampling and temperature. Cooling requirements must be met under all conditions. Isotopes
are stored in their shipping containers within the designated facility until their use on the
Space Base or in checkout operations. (The provisions and procedures for an Isotope Brayton
Power System are similar to that proposed in the Separately Launched Power Module Study
Document - Reference 3.)
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B. 3.1.3 Checkout and Assembly
Prior to integration with the booster or placement in storage, a series of subsystem verifica-
tion tests will be performed to assure the integrity and functional operation of the Power
Module. The nuclear facility utilized for storage would also serve as the checkout and
assembly area. Consideration is given to the performance of tests on the transporter in con-
junction with a series of semi-portable test equipment. Continuity tests will be given elec-
trical connections and harnesses. Pressure and leak tests will be made and the Power Module
coolant system will be operated to verify functioning of the PCS, valves, TEM pumps, and
liquid lines. Minimum loop flow tests will be made which will require the use of strip heaters
to provide sufficient thermal energy for operation of the NaK pumps.
Individual reactor control drums will be checked to verify operation and response characteristics
and safing devices checked and installed. No criticality test is made. A Power Module systems
test will then be performed where booster and spacecraft interface electrical signals can be
sent, received and sequenced for prelaunch and in-flight simulation. Mechanical and elec-
trical interfaces will be checked to ensure compatibility with the launch vehicles and space-
craft. Booster interface rings and shrouds are used to check for mechanical interface con-
formance. As in the case of all subsequent tests, nuclear safety regulations are to be followed.
Materials and personnel within the prescribed test areas must be controlled. Actual testing
within the facility will comprise a minimum of ten days. After prelaunch tests the Power
Module will be prepared for transportation to the VAB or Mobile Launcher (ML) for integra-
tion with the launch vehicle or put in interim storage. This operation includes the addition
of the module radiator shrouds and the installation of special instrumentation, safing and
ordnance devices.
B.3.1.4 Integration
The nature of the launch vehicle integration tests to be performed are dependent on the selec-
tion of the launch vehicle and facility safety constraints. The reference baseline launch
vehicle is the INT-21. The possibilities exist of integrating the power module within the
«•
VAB or performing all integration tests at the Launch Pad Complex 39. In either case,
the Power Module should be scheduled as late in the sequence as possible. For purposes
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of the safety analysis, integration of the Power Module units within the VAB is considered.
Launch vehicle integration involves the mating of the hardware and the performance of those
interface and combined systems tests to assure launch readiness. Countdown demonstrations
are performed and certain post-launch conditions are simulated such as Power Module separa-
tion, umbilical disconnect and instrumentation and power transfers.
Initial mating/loading checks with the booster and the handling devices will be performed uti-
lizing a dummy payload. Electrical and mechanical interfaces are simulated. A simulated
systems launch readiness and countdown test is performed with this configuration to ensure
compatibility of instrumentation, environmental and support systems.
At approximately T-27 days, the reactor Power Module is transported to the VAB or the
launch pad for mating to the INT-21 launch vehicle on the Mobile Launcher. Electrical and
mechanical connections are made, the launch shroud is installed and combined systems tests
are performed. Separation, umbilical disconnect and instrumentation tests are made, culmi-
nating in a flight readiness demonstration and simulated countdown. A controlled environment
is provided.
Isotopes are contained in experiment and payload accommodation modules of the Space Base.
The baseline does hot identify the placement of isotopes in the Space Base Modules. However,
certain experiments will contain isotopes and tracer elements and due to the confinement of
some hardware, the necessity may exist for small quantitites of isotopes to be on-board
throughout the VAB activities. Isotopes possibly contained within thermal control subsystems
would consist of small capsule heaters of 5 to 50 watts. Where possible, the isotope instal-
lation should be scheduled for the launch pad. Environmental control/cooling provisions
will be maintained.
At approximately T-8 days the Space Vehicle complete with Reactor Power Module(s) is
delivered to Launch Complex 39 via the Mobile Launcher Crawler. The shroud is maintained
in position around the Power Module at all times. Power Module instrumentation monitored
includes umbilical and separation circuit connections, radioactivity, environmental conditions
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and control circuit continuity. Telemetry radio frequency interference and range verification
tests are made. Simulated countdown, propellant loading, and pressure tests are made.
B.3.1.5 Countdown
The countdown is initiated on the INT-21 at T-2 days where flight readiness and functional
checks are given major subsystems. Special cryogenic and spacecraft fuel tanks are loaded.
Ordnance (including disposal rockets) are installed (T-15 to T-10 hours) prior to launch
vehicle cryogenic loading. Pad accessibility is very much limited at this point. (The instal-
lation of an isotope-Brayton Power System should occur prior to this time period.) Continuous
monitoring of systems is provided throughout the final phases of the countdown. The terminal
countdown is initiated at T-l hour with the completion of all flight readiness checks and the
propellant loading sequences. An automatic sequence for the start of the engines is initiated
at T-l87 seconds. Swing arms are around the vehicles until the automatic sequence is ini-
tiated, however, the removal of some upper service arms would be permissible at an earlier
hour to afford abort potential. This phase terminates with ignition of the S-IC booster engines.
B.3.2 PHASE 2.0 LAUNCH AND ASCENT
The Launch and Ascent Phase is assumed to begin at lift-off and terminate with the docking of
the payload. Four subphases are identified:
1. Launch
2. S-IC Boost
3. S-E Boost
4. Rendezvous and Docking
B. 2.2.1 Launch
The INT-21 launch vehicle will be used to boost the reactor Power Module(s) to orbit from
Launch Complex 39. The Power Module is dormant during the Launch and Ascent Phase.
However, a small amount of power may be supplied from a temporary source to provide a
minimum flow of NaK in the coolant loops. This flow prevents localized freezing of the NaK
during ascent and prior to reactor startup.
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The Space Base Mission requires insertion of the payload into a 500 km (273 nm) circular
orbit inclined 55 degrees to the earth equatorial plane. The launch azimuth for this orbit
is 46 degrees, measured east of north, as a result of current range safety requirements
at the Eastern Test Range (ETR), This azimuth is not compatible with the desired orbit
inclination, therefore, a plane change of 6-degrees (S-II stage yaw) is employed when the
impact points pass Newfoundland, providing
sequence is shown in Table B-3. (Ref 4,5).
 a new azimuth of ~ 40 . A typical INT-21 flight
B.3.2.2 S-IC Boost/Ascent "
The reference trajectory assumes a Hohmann Transfer technique with a 185 x 500 km orbit
circularized to 500 km.
At first motion,the launch vehicle begins a rise of 138 meters to clear the launch umbilical
tower. Following tower clearance a pitch program induces a turning rate on the launch
vehicle. The pitch program continues until 41 seconds after first motion. At this time the
launch vehicle begins a gravity-tilt profile which continues until tilt arrest at 153 seconds
after first motion. Tilt arrest is maintained during S-IC/S-H staging and continues through
the remainder of the atmospheric portion of flight.
The fueled operations of the prelaunch and early boost phases of the mission present
conditions most conducive to fire and explosive accidents. No payload abort or ejection
hardware is provided.
Maximum dynamic pressure occurs at ~ 75 seconds after lift-off and maximum axial accelera-
tion is limited to ~ 4. 5 g by an early center engine cutoff.
B.3.2.3 S-II Boost/Ascent
The S-II boost, initiated at~ 160 seconds, delivers the payload to either the final circular
orbit or to a parking orbit (185 x 500 km). The payload shroud is jettisoned at ~ 195 seconds
after first motion. Atmospheric flight is terminated ~ 4 seconds later. Vacuum flight and
the Iterative Guidance Mode (IGM) ar£ initiated at~ 199 seconds with the IGM providing both
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Table B-3. Sequence of Events for Typical
INT-21 Launch from KSC
55 Inclination
~500 Kilometer Altitude
Seq. No.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Event
Ignition
Lift-Off
Initiate Tiltover
End Tiltover- Begin Gravity Turn
S-IC Center- Engine Cutoff (CECO)
S-IC Burnout
S-IC-SII Separation
S-II Ignition
Interstage Jettison
Shroud Jettison
S-n-CECO
Guidance Cutoff
Orbit Insertion
Time (Sec)
Max Payload
-9
0
11
41
139
157
159
161
189
195
458
547
557
86t Payload
-9
0
12
35
149
161
163
165
193
544
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pitch and yaw steering commands during the remainder of the ascent to orbit. The engines
are subsequently cut-off and the S-II stage is separated. Two perigee passes are allowed
before the S-II kick stage fires and circularization and final orbit adjustments are made. The
S-II/IU kick stage is initially loaded with about 5.41 (12 klb) of hypergohcs. Firing time for
the kick stage can range from 3 to 15 minutes.
B.3.2.4 Rendezvous and Docking
It is assumed that a "Space Tug" will be used to rendezvous and dock with the reactor Power
Module and subsequently perform the final rendezvous and docking operations with the Space
Base. The tug is considered of limited capability and can fit within the Shuttle cargo bay when
in a 12-man delivery configuration. Its mass is ~ 9.7 t (21. 5 klb) with a 2 man crew and
usable propellant of ~ 5.5t. Maximum closing velocities are not to exceed about 1. 5 m/sec
(5 ft/sec) as shown in Figure B-3.
B. 3. 3 PHASE 3. 0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
The orbital operations phase consists of a
105 week Space Base build-up period which
involves several INT-21 and Space Shuttle
launches and carries through the 10 year
operational mission.
The five subphases identified for the orbital
operations are:
« Orbital Buildup
• Checkout
• Start-up
• Operational Mode
• Contingency Operation
HORIZONTAL DISPLACEMENT
V « 5 FT/SEC
GATE 3
r_ = 1500 FT
GATE 2
s 20 FT/SEC
GATE 1
r = 6000 FT
NOTE
ENGLISH UNITS
NOTE BRAKING GATE AV'S
APPLIED ALONG
(REFERENCE 1) LINE-OF-SIGHT
Figure B-3. Terminal Rendezvous
Braking Gates Relative to Target
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B.3.3.1 Orbital Buildup
The zero g core modules are assembled first during an~ 52 week period, after which the
reactor Power Modules are launched and docked to the Space Base power module booms.
Docking is assumed to take at least 50 minutes with about 30 minutes spent by the tug near
the power module boom interface. Docking of the PM with the Base will be followed by a
manual IVA (2-man operation) connection of the electrical and control circuits at the boom
interface. At the time of installation of the reactor power modules the Base would be manned
by a minimum of 24 crewmen. The initial manning of the Base is accomplished by 12 man-
Space Shuttle launches. Full artificial g habitation and zero g core operation with a nominal
crew of 48 is achieved after 105 weeks. Normal crew rotation by the Space Shuttle will be
every 90 to 180 days.
B.3.3.2 Checkout
Prior to delivery of the reactor Power Module, consideration should be given to the launch
of a simulated Power Module for purposes of proving rendezvous and docking procedures
(prior to T + 52 weeks). Following the docking of the operational PM's, the Tug or Space
Shuttle will perform a fly-by inspection for exterior damage. The PM circuits are monitored
in the control room and continuity checks are made. Power Module systems are activated
with auxiliary power. Power Module system functional tests are made and instrumentation
systems are verified operable. Control system operation is verified, and interlocks (if
provided) are removed to allow control durms to assume pre-startup positions. Functional
tests of the power distribution and conditioning systems are performed with auxiliary power.
These Power Module readiness tests should require less than four hours for each reactor
and would be performed from the control module. When readiness is achieved, the Power
Module booms are extended into the normal operating position.
B. 3.3.3 Start-up
The initial start-up of the individual nuclear PM units will be performed immediately after
checkout and communications tests. The startup sequence is performed after the booms
have been extended with the thermal shrouds around the radiator. The automatic sequence
is initiated from the control room with the sending of the reactor coded and sequenced start
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command. A controlled speed stepping sequence individually single steps the drums in
sequential order. As cnticality approaches, as planned into the program, the stepping
speed is reduced, the reactor brought slowly through cnticality and up to operating tempera-
ture and power, as described in Section 2. Current operation conditions are controlled by
temperature measurements of the working fluid. The reactor is not designed to be load
following. It will operate at the designated 330 kWt condition regardless of the electrical
power drain. Power for these start-up operations comes from the Space Base auxiliary
power system. The thermal shroud is incrementally retracted as fluid temperature is at-
tained. The entire start-up sequence requires about 4 hours, with an additional 4 hours
allocated for system stability. Start-up of both reactors can be accomplished within a
12-hour period.
Switch-over from auxiliary to reactor power will allow the reactors to assume the electrical
load of the Space Base and the initiation of additional experimental activities. Roll-up of
the solar array power system is accomplished after stabilization is achieved. Full power
operation of over 50 kWe is not required immediately but is built up as the Base is expanded.
(Power requirements are increased from approximately 40 kWe initially to a nominal 100
kWe when fully operational capability is achieved. During this entire time period, each
reactor is operating at 330 kWt, however adjustments m the gas management system can be
made for long off-power operations.
B.3.3.4 Operational Mode
Orbital operations of the Space Base actually are initiated with the arrival of the first 12-man
crew in orbit T + 2 days into the flight program. Completely operational orbital operations
of the nominal base are not initiated however, until the 48 crew and full complement of Base
modules are in orbit.
The first ~ 110 weeks of the mission are operationally unstable in that conditions and opera-
tional routines are changing. Crew living quarters are expanded with the addition of habitation
modules and the experiment program increases as sub satellites are launched and experiments
are activated within the basic core modules. At approximately the 110th week so called
"stable operations" exist.
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During the operational mode the nominal Shuttle logistic mission frequency is assumed to be
16 per year. A Shuttle ascent profile is shown in Figure B-4. (Reference 1).
Crew types expected on such a mission are listed in Figure B-5 (Reference 6). An estimated
averaged time and location of the crew throughout a typical day is also shown in Figure B-5
for a 48 and a 60 man crew.
Additional operational activities during this phase include logistic support, experiment support,
routine maintenance, and occasional support of the Resusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS) and the
Orbital Propellent Storage Depot. A major logistic requirement is the replacement of all or
portions of the power module. For purposes of this baseline, it is assumed that replacement
power modules or their components are launched on the Shuttle (recognizing present size
incompatibilities). Replacement is considered feasible with the other power module operating.
Normal power module replacement is anticipated every 5 years. Replacement of the Brayton
Power Conversion System Module can occur after 2.5 years.
During normal operations, only limited monitoring of the PM is required which can be done
from the Base or the MCC. These operations can be performed periodically or on command
by an onboard checkout and monitoring system. A degree of fault isolation will be provided
via instrumentation to enable the crew to rapidly diagnose and correct the situation. The
most important function of the onboard systems is to monitor life and mission-critical func-
tions continuously to provide advanced warning and allow for maintenance preparations. Imme-
diate and in some instances automatic corrective actions such as PM shutdown should also be
provided if conditions arise which cannot wait for crew intervention.
Planned PM shutdowns require several steps including the activation of the back-up solar
array power system. The shutdown commands to the reactor cause the control drums to
step outward at the 3-second stepping rate. The neutron radiation drops to about 1 percent
in 3 minutes at this rate and in about an hour the reactor coolant temperature will have
o odropped to below 425 K (300 F). The reacto
around the radiator to prevent NaK freezing.
r radiator thermal shrouds are then repositioned
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220 Km
2 (120
148 Km
1 (80nm)
480 Km
4 (260 am)
500 Km
6 (270 am)
500 Km
6 (270 nm)
220 Km
2, 3 (120 nm)
148 Km
1 (80 nm)
480 Km
4 (260 nm)
MODE 1 MODE 2
KEY:
1. 148 X 220-Km ORBIT INSERTION
2. PHASING ORBIT INSERTION MANEUVER
3. HEIGHT ADJUSTMENT MANEUVER
4. CQELLIPTIC MANEUVER
5. TERMINAL PHASE INITIATION
6. RENDEZVOUS
AV (PHASING ORBIT INSERTION TO TERMINAL
PHASE INITIATION = 170 M/SEC
AT = 44.1 MIN
1, ft
AT0 = 45. 8 - 47.1 MIN3,4
AT -- 47. 1 MIN4, 5
AT , = 36. 7 MIN5,6
Shuttle Ascent Mission Timelines
Event
Boost to 148 x 220 km Orbit
Coast to Apogee
Phasing Orbit Coast
Transfer to Coelliptic Orbit
Coast in Coelliptic Orbit
Terminal Phase Transfer
0. 5 Rev in Phasing Orbit
Event
Duration (hr)
0. 170
0.735
0.741
0.786
0.786
0.611
Cumulative
Time (hr)
0.170
0.905
1.646
2.432
3.218
3.829
16. 5 Rev in Phasing Orbit
Event
Duration (hr)
0.179
0.735
25.212
0.764
0.786
0.611
Cumulative
Time (hr)
0.170
0.905
26. 117
26.881
27.667
28.278
Figure B-4. Shuttle Ascent Profile (Reference 1)
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Figure B-5. Typical Day Averaged Crew Locations
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B.3.3.5 Contingency Operations
A number of unplanned situations can occur during the in-orbit operational phase. Contingency
a.
plans must be available to minimize the effect on the mission and the crew. Some of the
identified contingencies are listed below.
1. Loss of one power module - necessitating operation from the other at either 600
kWt (100 kWe) or at normal power.
2. Shuttle or support hardware malfunction not allowing a replacement of the crew in
designated time period. This could result in an additional 12 men in orbit for
several weeks.
3. Forced closure of one or more modules due to equipment damage or contamination.
4. Complete zero g operation of the Base.
5. Failure of total reactor power system necessitating operation of the Base on
back-up power of ~ 18 kWe. Rapid return of a number of the crew may be required
(0.6 kWe assumed for support of each crew member).
6. Inability to dock logistic vehicles and crew resupply modules.
7. Loss of pressure in pressurized modules.
8. Loss of cooling for isotope heat sources.
9. Collisions of interfacing vehicles or other sizeable objects with the Base and or
power modules.
10. High intensity solar flare.
11. Loss of internal and/or external communications.
12. Loss of reactor power module computer control.
13. Failure to maintain Base stabilization.
14. Environmental malfunction or contamination.
15. Rapid unplanned Base abandonment (close-out).
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B.3.4 PHASE 4. 0 END OF MISSION
The end of mission or end of life of particular hardware, two separate operations are involved:
(1) Power Module Disposal or Recovery and (2) Space Base Closeout and recovery of nuclear
hardware.
B.3.4.1 Reactor PM Disposal
At the end of the normal lifetime of the reactor or after any accident which permanently or
severly damages the reactor or power conversion system, the PM will be boosted into a
nominal 990 km (535 nm) circular orbit where the fission product inventories will be allowed
to decay to acceptable levels over a minimum 250 years prior to eventual reentry. The
sequence of events include an on-board checkout of the Disposal System (Reference 7) and
PM shutdown status. After shutdown is confirmed and systems have been verified the PM
is separated from the Base at approximately 0.6 m/sec (2 ft/sec) by a spring eject system.
v-
The PM guidance and control system will orient the PM for the disposal rocket burn. When
the preselected separation distance of several kilometers is attained, the rockets are fired by
remote control from the Base, the MCC providing a backup capability. Alternatives to the
high earth orbit disposal approach are identified in Section 7 and in Volume IV Part 1.
B. 3.4.2 Space Base Closeout
The termination of the Space Base Mission either planned or unplanned (possibly caused by
malfunctions) will result in its eventual return into the earth's atmosphere. Power modules
are planned for separate disposal but isotopes on-board the Base must be handled separately.
It is assumed that a systematic close down of the Base is attempted which includes shutdown
and possible return of certain hardware including the return of radioisotopes by the Shuttle.
Failures in this procedure could result in re-entry of some of this hardware.
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APPENDIX C
SPACE BASE POWER MODULE FAULT TREES
C.I GENERAL
The purpose of this Appendix is to present the preliminary fault trees for the Reactor Power
Modules in the Space Base Mission.
Fault trees are constructed by showing all possible faults which either singly or in concert
result in a given undesired event. Each of the contributing faults are, in turn, similarly
developed. This sequence is continued until conditions are reached which cannot or need
not be further developed. Contributing faults are connected via logic gates which indicate
whether any one of the lower level faults is sufficient to cause the next higher level fault to
occur (the "or" gate), or whether they are all necessary and sufficient to cause the higher
level fault (the "and" gate). In this way, a hierarchy of faults is developed with the primary
undesired event appearing at the apex of the fault tree. In this qase the primary faults are
the nuclear hazards developed during the analysis.
1. Release of fission products
2. Release of activated materials
3. High radiation field around reactor, and
4. High radiation field around power system components
Figure C-l shows the various symbols used in constructing the fault trees. The nuclear
hazards are identified by diamonds, the ellipses denote safe conditions, and the rectangles
indicate primary accidents.
C.2 FAULT TREES
Figures C-2 through C-5 present the preliminary fault trees for the four basic nuclear
hazards down to the level of unsafe conditions. Figures C-6 through C-22 develop each of
the unsafe conditions down to the primary accidents that caused the unsafe conditions. The
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following pages are devoted to a brief explanation of the preliminary fault tree construction
for each of the nuclear hazards. i
C.2.1 RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS
Five basic unsafe conditions have been identified which result in a release of in-core fission
products. It should be emphasized that none of these unsafe conditions can arise from a
single failure of the reactor power module. For a release of fission products to occur, the
fuel element cladding must be breached or ruptured allowing the fission products to be re-
leased from the fuel element together with an external failure of the reactor power system
thus providing a means for the fission products to escape to the external environment. The
five unsafe conditions that have been defined for the release of fission products are:
1. Disassembly or destruction of the reactor accompanied with damaged or
destroyed fuel elements.
2. Release of fission products to the primary coolant and a breach of the primary loop.
3. The presence of fission products in the intermediate loop with a breach of the
intermediate loop.
4. The presence of fission products in the secondary or PCS gas loop with a breach
of the loop.
5. The presence of fission products in the primary heat rejection loop with a breach
of the loop.
Figure C-6 shows the primary accidents that can result in disassembly of the reactor with
fission product release. Primary blast and/or fragmentation refers to the explosion of the
launch vehicle (INT-21) with the subsequent release of the fission products that have been
generated during the zero power criticality testing prior to shipment to KSC. Secondary
blast and/or fragmentation refers to either a collision during transportation and handling
prior to launch or a collision with a meteor, logistic vehicle, satellite, or orbital debris
while in orbit. Reactor disassembly upon earth impact can occur following orbital or sub-
orbital re-entry (reactor impact at terminal velocities) or possibly from a fall from atop
the launch vehicle. Meltdown leading to a. release of fission products can arise from an
external fireball or from excessive reactor core temperatures.
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A breach of the primary reactor loop (Figure C-8) can be a breach of the reactor pressure
vessel, primary piping, primary heat exchanger, NaK accumulator, or primary pump assem-
bly. This would result in a release of the activated primary coolant which in this case con-
tains fission products released from the fuel elements.
In order for fission products to be released to the intermediate coolant loop, a clad failure
must first occur followed by an internal failure of the primary heat exchanger which allows
primary coolant containing the fission products to leak into the intermediate NaK coolant
4 -•
loop. If the intermediate loop is subsequently damaged or has previously been damaged but
has gone undetected, then the fission products may be released external to the reactor.
With fission products present in the intermediate loop, there is a possibility that they could
get into the secondary or gas loop via a damaged heat source heat exchanger (HSHX). If the
leak is large enough to allow considerable amounts of NaK to enter the gas loop, the effect
of this liquid metal striking the turbine blades immediately downstream of the heat exchanger
could result in severe mechanical damage that might breach the loop. On the other hand,
if the leak in the HSHX allows only droplets of liquid metal to penetrate the gas loop, the
result might still be mechanical damage, to the loop, but over a longer period of time (in-
creased corrosion rates, for instance). 'Depending on whether the loop were damaged either
by the mechanical damage caused by the NaK or by some other means, the fission products
could then be released to the surrounding environment.
Still another possible means of fission product release is a damaged heat rejection loop
(HRL). For fission products to get into the HRL, the copper bus between the cold and hot
throats in the primary thermoelectric pump assembly must be damaged allowing the primary
coolant containing the fission products to leak into the heat rejection loop. A damaged HRL
will then allow the fission products to escape to the external environment.
C. 2. 2 RELEASE OF ACTIVATED MATERIAL
Eight unsafe conditions have been defined for the release of activated materials (Figure C-3).
Five of these are identical to those just discussed for the release of fission products except
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that for this case, the fuel element cladding is not breached and there is no release of
fission products. The activated materials that are of interest are (a) bare fuel elements,
(b) activated structural debris, (c) activated coolant, and (d) activated vapors, gases, and
particulates. The destruction or disassembly of the reactor may result in the release of all
of these activated materials, whereas a breach of the primary loop will result only in a re-
lease of activated coolant.
The remaining three unsafe conditions not previously discussed are (a) disassembly of the
power conversion system either upon re-entry, accidental collision, earth impact, etc.,
in which all or any of the following activated materials could be released: activated struc-
tural debris, activated coolant, and activated vapors, gases, and particulates; (b) damaged
LiH reactor shield resulting in the release of radioactive tritium that has built up in the
shield during the normal operation of the reactor; and (c) the diffusion of radioactive tritium
through an undamaged LiH shield. Since tritium is primarily an internal exposure problem
resulting from its inhalation or ingestion in contaminated food and water, it is not an orbital
operational hazard since the tritium would escape to space and not enter the Space Base in-
ternal environment.
C. 2. 3 HIGH RADIATION FIELD AROUND REACTOR
r
Three unsafe conditions resulting in a high radiation field around the reactor have been
identified (see Figure C-4). They are:
1. A reactor excursion either while operating or shutdown, in orbit or at ground level.
2. A damaged reactor shield while the reactor is either operating or shutdown, in
orbit or at ground level.
3. A quasi-steady state operating reactor, ground level.
The first two unsafe conditions should be rather self-explanatory. A reactor excursion
(destructive or nondestructive) can result in a high radiation field produced by the prompt
radiation either prior to launch, during normal reactor operations in orbit, or after earth
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impact following reentry. Likewise, a damaged reactor shield can result in a high radia-
tion field around the reactor caused by prompt radiation during normal operations.
Quasi-steady state critical operation refers to the reactor periodically going critical and
subcritical due to water surging in and out of the reactor core. This can occur after water
impact and immersion, and also after land impact and subsequent immersion in a water
filled crater.
C. 2. 4 HIGH RADIATION FIELD AROUND POWER MODULE COMPONENTS
*
This last nuclear hazard (see Figure C-5) is concerned only with the normal in-orbit opera-
tion of the reactor. Four unsafe conditions have been identified, two of which require the
presence of fission products and/or activated coolant in either the intermediate coolant loop
or the heat rejection loop. Since both of these loops are external to the reactor shielding,
a radiation field will be present due to the radioactive decay of the fission products and/or
/S
the activated coolant.
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LIST OF FAULT TREES
Figure
C-2 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Release of Fission Products)
C-3 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Release of Activated Material)
C-4 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (High Radiation Field Around Reactor)
C-5 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (High Radiation Field Around Power
System Components)
C-6 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Reactor Disassembly/Breached
Fuel Cladding)
C-7 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Breached Fuel Cladding)
C-8 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Breach of Primary Loop)
C-9 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Damaged Primary Heat Exchanger -
Leak from Primary to Intermediate Loop)
C-10 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Breach of Intermediate Loop)
C-ll ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Damaged Heat Source Heat Exchanger -
Leak from Intermediate to Secondary Loop)
C-12 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Breach of Secondary Loop)
C-13 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Damaged Primary TEM Pump - Leak
from Primary to Heat Rejection Loop)
C-14 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Breach of Heat Rejection Loop)
C-15 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Reactor Disassembly)
C-16 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Activated Coolant in Primary Loop/
Breach of Primary Loop)
C-17 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Power Conversion System Disassembly)
C-18 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Damaged LiH Reactor Shield)
C-19 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Reactor Excursion)
C-20 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Damaged Reactor Shield)
C-21 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Reactor Excursion in Orbit)
C-22 ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Damaged Reactor Shield in Orbit)
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NUCLEAR HAZARD
UNSAFE CONDITION
PRIMARY ACCIDENT
Q "OR" GATE. ANY ONE OF THECONTRIBUTING FAULTS ARE BYTHEMSELVES SUFFICIENT TO
CAUSE THE NEXT HIGHER FAULT.
"AND" GATE. ALL CONTRIBUTING
FAULTS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE
NEXT HIGHER FAULT TO OCCUR.
TRANSFER GATE. THE NUMBER
REFERS TO THE FIGURE WHERE THE
BRANCH IS FURTHER DEVELOPED.
Figure C-l. Legend of Fault Tree Symbols
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Figure C-6. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Reactor Disassembly/Breached Fuel Cladding)
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Figure C-7. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Breached Fuel Cladding)
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Figure C-8. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Breach of Primary Loop)
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Figure C-9. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Damaged Primary Heat Exchanger (Leak from Primary to Intermediate Loop))
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Figure C-10. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Breach of Intermediate Loop)
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Figure C-ll. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Damaged Heat Source Heat Exchanger (Leak from Intermediate to Secondary Loop))
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Figure C-12. ZrH Reactor Bower Module Fault Tree
(Breach of Secondary Loop)
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Figure C-13. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Damaged Primary TEM Pump (Leak from Primary to Heat Rejection Loop))
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Figure C-14. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Breach of Heat Rejection Loop)
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Figure C-15. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree (Reactor Disassembly)
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Figure C-16. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Activated Coolant in Primary Loop Breach of Primary Loop)
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Figure C-17; ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Power Conversion System Disassembly)
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Figure C-18. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Damaged LiH Reactor Shield)
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Figure C-19. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Reactor Excursion)
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Figure C-20. ZrH Reactor Power Module Fault Tree
(Damaged Reactor Shield)
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APPENDIX D
REACTOR POWER MODULE (PM) MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIR OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
The following sheets were used in identifying hazards associated with Reactor
Power Module maintenance and repair.
Maintenance and Repair Subsystem/Component
Reactor Disposal System
Auxiliary Heat Rejection Loop/All Coolant Components Except Radiator
Heat Rejection Loop/Radiator and Components
Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Parasitic Load Resistor
Brayton Power Conversion Loop (BPCL)
Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Control System Components
BPCL-Instrumentation Sensors
BPCL/Turbine Bypass and/or Shutoff Valve
Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Gas Management System
Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Brayton Rotating Unit (BRU)
Reactor Intermediate Loop/Isolation Valve
Reactor Intermediate Loop/EM Pump and Accumulator
Reactor Disposal System
Reactor Primary Loop
D-2
D-3
D-4
D-5
D-6
D-7
D-8
D-9
D-10
D-ll
D-12
D-13
D-14
D-15
D-l
PM MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Reactor Disposal System
• LOCATION Aft of Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 18-20 mrem/hr at r^f 10m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
Periodic checkout of electronic systems through fault detection
and isolation system.
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
Replace "black box" electronic equipment and sensors as required
by fault detection system.
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Reactor radiation levels
Normal hazards imposed by IVA operations
Remote possibility of disposal engine ignition
RECOMMENDATIONS
A pressurized and temperature controlled engine room of the type
used for the Power Module engine room should be considered in
future designs.
- Provisions should be considered for cases where repairs must be
effected on the disposal system after it is released from the
Space Base.
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PM MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Auxiliary Heat Rejection Loop/All Coolant Components
(Except Radiator)
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
e MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
Removal and replacement of defective components.
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
- Proximity of NaK coolant
All engine room hazards present during power system operation
- previously noted.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Mechanical joints in the auxiliary heat rejection loop would facili-
tate component replacement and lesser time spent in unsafe environment.
- Power module may be operating or shut down. Auxiliary heat rejection
loop is shut down.
Location of components in engine room would facilitate repair
operations.
Repair feasible since cooling~fluid~is 'organic.-
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PM MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OPERATIONS
i
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Heat Rejection Loop/Radiator and Components
• LOCATION Engine Room (Except Radiator)
• ACCESSIBILITY Components internally accessible/Main radiator
may require EVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr in engine room -
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
REPAIR OPERATIONS
- Repair to radiator itself is considered impractical due to NaK
hazards and requirement for EVA.
Components such as sensors and detectors can be considered repairable
provided the repairs do not ^ result in breeching a NaK line.
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
- Proximity of NaK coolant
- Rotating machinery
- Radiation levels
- High temperatures
RECOMMENDATIONS
- The main radiator should be designed to be redundant.
- Repair of NaK lines is considered impractical even more so in the case
of the radiator since it probably will require EVA.
- Other components such as sensors and detectors require redundant"fail
safe" design philosophy.
- A modular design should also be considered for ease of replacement
where possible.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Parasitic Load Resistor
LOCATION Engine Room or Radiator Surface
ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible or EVA
ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
REPAIR OPERATIONS Replace defective load resistors.
NOTE: The type of parasitic load used on the Space Base Power Module
has not been established. For purposes of this study we have assumed
passive load resistors that reject their heat by radiating directly to
space. It is also assumed they are located on the outside surface of
the power module.
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Replacement requires EVA operations
High voltages may exist
Natural and reactor radiation environments
RECOMMENDATIONS j
~ Repair is considered very hazardous. Hazards may be precluded by use
of design redundancy and effective circuit design, parallel, series-
parallel, etc.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Brayton Power Conversion Loop (BPCL)
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
REPAIR OPERATIONS
Repair of gas containment wall fracture or puncture by patch welding.
- Replacement of component by cutting and rewelding a gas containment
duct.
• UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Proximity of NaK coolant
All engine room hazards present during power module operation
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Repair to gas lines in BPCL is considered practical. Use of standby
piping loops may be feasible through redundant design of appropriate
valve and piping configurations.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Control System
Components
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
Periodic check of operation of modular electronic and electrical
components in standby BPCL's.
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
- Replace defective modular components
,UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
- Proximity of NaK coolant
All engine room hazards present during power module operation
previously noted.
- Possible electrical hazard
RECOMMENDATIONS
Power Module may be operating or shut down. BPCL is shut down.
- Provide modular "black box" design approach to facilitate replacement.
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PM MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - BPCL-Instrumentation Sensors
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
*/
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
- Periodic check of instrumentation sensor operation.
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
Replacement of defective sensor(s)
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Proximity of NaK coolant
All engine room hazards present during power module operation
previously noted.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Power Module may be operating or shut down. BCPL is shut down.
Where possible, sensor design and location should preclude
requirement for breach of BCPL gas containment.
Provide "fail safe" redundant sensors.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - BPCL/Turbine Bypass and/or Shutoff Valve
• LOCATION „ Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
Periodic check of mechanical operation of valve(s)
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
»
Replace valve actuator(s)
Replace entire valve
• UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Proximity of NaK coolant
All engine room hazards present during Power Module operation
previously noted.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Power Module may be operating or shut down. BPCL is shut down.
Actuator should be designed so that its removal and replacement does
not breach BPCL gas containment.
Design repair requirements into valves which reduce complexity and
time required for replacement operations.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Gas Management System
LOCATION Engine Room
ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
- Resupply of working gas reservoir may be required depending on system
leak rates and number of start-ups.
- Periodic start-up of standby units may necessitate gas replacement by
REPAIR OPERATIONS Shuttle resupply.
Repair gas line leaks
Replace components , pressure regulators , sensors and detectors
UNSAFE CONDITIONS /POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Proximity of NaK coolant lines and rotating equipment
High gas pressures
- Relatively high temperatures
RECOMMENDATIONS
Provide design redundancy such that gas management systems for all
PCS's are equipped with common valving and piping systems.
Sensors and detectors should be designed with redundant philosophy.
System components should be designed on modular basis for easy
replacement.
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PM MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Brayton Power Conversion Loop/Brayton Rotating Unit
(BRU)
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
The standby BRU's should be designed to allow for periodic
operational checkouts.
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
Replace entire BRU assembly
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Corrosive NaK coolant
Possible presence of fission products/activated coolant
- Possible NaK fire
All engine room hazards, etc.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Power module may be operating or shut down. BRU is shut down.
Heat exchanger designs in BPCL that allowed BRU replacement without
cutting or disconnecting NaK lines would greatly increase safety of
replacement operation.
Mechanical assist devices would be required for controlled physical
handling of complete BRU assembly.
- The BRU should be 'designed as a modular package such that it can be
disconnected from the heat rejection loop and intermediate loops with-
out having to cut into NaK lines. Gas line interfaces with low helium
leak rates are pfeferrecT~over systems" requiring welds. - -
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Reactor Intermediate Loop/Isolation Valve
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
REPAIR OPERATIONS
- Maintenance repair of valve actuator
- Cut out complete valve and weld new one in place.
• UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
- NaK toxicity
- Possibility of NaK activation (radioactivity)
- Possibility of NaK fire
- High temperature levels
RECOMMENDATIONS
Repair of NaK lines considered impractical in zero "g" environment.
- Redundant NaK lines should be considered for all NaK loops.
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PM MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Reactor Intermediate Loop/EM Pump and Accumulator
• LOCATION Engine Room
• ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
• REPAIR OPERATIONS
Cut out defective pump and/or accumulator and weld new unit in place.
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
- NaK toxicity
Possibility of radioactive coolant
- Possibility of NaK fire
Possibility of radiation dose from fission products
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Repair of NaK pumps is considered impractical if it requires cutting
into a NaK piping system. Repair of the electrical portions of the
pump may be feasible.
- Past experience (SNAP-IDA) in the use of accumulators indicates the
bellow type to have a relatively high failure rate.
Design redundancy is highly recommended for NaK pumps and accumulators.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Reactor Disposal System
LOCATION Engine Room
ACCESSIBILITY Internally Accessible - IVA
ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE Space Ambient
RADIATION DOSE LEVEL ' 39 mrem/hr at 8m from reactor
ATMOSPHERE Space Ambient
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
Periodic check of operation of modular electronic components
REPAIR OPERATIONS
Replacement of defective modular component
\
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Possible electrical hazard
Proximity to reactor intermediate NaK loop
Possible high radiation levels due to fission products/activated
coolant in intermediate loop
Rotating machinery
Localized high temperature levels
RECOMMENDATIONS
Modularized black boxes should be designed for easy, rapid disconnect
and plug in.
- Design "fail safe" control system.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS
• SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT - Reactor Primary Loop
• LOCATION
• ACCESSIBILITY
• ENVIRONMENT
TEMPERATURE
RADIATION DOSE.LEVEL
ATMOSPHERE
Gallery
EVA Only
Space Ambient
600 mrem/hr at 1.8 m from reactor
Space Ambient
• MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS None
REPAIR OPERATIONS None considered practical.
UNSAFE CONDITIONS/POTENTIAL HAZARDS
High radiation dose levels (200 rem/hr 24 hours after shutdown).
Corrosive NaK coolant
- All EVA hazards
High temperatures
RECOMMENDATIONS
Repair to primary loop is considered highly impractical due to the
severity of the potential hazards. Design redundancy is strongly
recommended.
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APPENDIX E
CALCULATIONS FOR SPACE BASE REENTRY SYSTEMS
E.I GENERAL
Analysis of disposal techniques for the Space Base Power Modules requires a series of orbital
mechanics calculations to determine long life orbit requirements and to assess the consequences
of system malfunction during the disposal maneuver. This Appendix provides the results of
calculations that were conducted.
Basically, the calculations are organized into the following tasks:
1. Disposal Propulsion Requirements
2. Orbit Lifetime
3. Reentry Characteristics
Design information used for this analysis is listed below:
2
1. Free molecular ballistic coefficient (W/Ci>A) of Power Module is 1905 Newton/m
(39. 8 Ib/ft2)
2. Free molecular ballistic coefficient (W/Cj)A) of Reactor/Shield configuration is
16,.853_Newtons/m2 (352 Ib/ft2) . _ _
3. Reference orbit has a 500 km (273 nm) altitude inclined at 55
E.2 ANALYSIS
E. 2.1 DISPOSAL PROPULSION REQUIREMENTS
Assuming that the Power Module (PM) has been successfully separated from the Space Base
and positioned for transfer to a high disposal orbit, propulsion requirements have been
identified for transfers from the reference orbit to various disposal orbits. The transfer
consists of two propulsive maneuvers - a thrust at the reference orbit which results in transfer
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to the disposal altitude, and a thrust at
apogee to effect circularization at the dis-
posal altitude. Figure E-l displays (1) AV
required to transfer (AV ), (2) AV required
It
to circularize (AV ), and (3) total AV as a
c
function of final circular disposal orbit.
Since the indicated AV is assumed to occur
instantaneously, it is independent of the mass
to be transferred and the means by which the
propulsive maneuvers are accomplished.
For purposes of comparison, Figure E-l
shows that to reach a circular disposal
orbit of 1290 km (700 nm) a AV of 400 m/sec
(1315 ft/sec) is required; whereas, it has
been calculated that to achieve Earth escape
requires 3140 m/sec (10,300 ft/sec.)
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Figure E-l. Propulsion Requirements
for Transfer^from 500 km (273 km)
Circular Orbit
Also, the amount of propellant necessary to boost the PM from the reference orbit to a
higher disposal orbit is presented in Figure E-l. Propellant mass is given by the expression,
M + Mf PM _ AV/glsp
^ — 6MPM
where:
M = Propellant mass
M = Mass of Power Module
AV = Total AV required to perform maneuver
g = Gravitational acceleration
I = Rocket engine specific impulse
sp
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The propellant mass shown in Figure E-l was based on a rocket engine specific impulse of
260 sec., which is characteristic of solid propellants. The propellant mass required to
achieve Earth escape of the PM is 76t (168.5 klb) of solid propellant or 35t (78.2 klb) of
liquid propellant with a characteristic specific impulse of 425 sec.
E.2.2 ORBIT LIFETIME
This task provides a calculation of lifetime of those orbits in which the PM or Reactor/
Shield configuration may be placed during the disposal maneuver. The calculational pro-
cedure is discussed in Reference 1.
It should be noted that this method of predicting orbit lifetime results in significantly higher
lifetimes than those predicted by the TRW Space Handbook and some unauthenticated curves
appearing in various technical documents. Without attempting to resolve entirely this apparent
conflict, a possible cause for the discrepancy will be proposed. For orbits of 275 km (150
nm) or greater the eleven-year cyclic function of solar flux intensity has a significant in-
fluence on drbit lifetime. The effect of solar flux on atmospheric density, hence orbit life-
time, can be described by the parameter,
S = 25 + 0. 8 F + 0 . 4 ( F -F ) + 10 K
where F--— is-the-daily-value of the 10.7 cm. solar flux,- F is.its yearly_average,_and
-LO• Y 1U» i
K is the geomagnetic index (having a range of 0-9). The parameter, S, is directly pro-
portional to atmospheric density and inversely proportional to orbit lifetime. Figure E-2
displays the observed value of S for 1958 to 1966 and supplies a predicted value of S along with
corresponding 2cr limits from the nominal for the period 1966 to 1974. The horizontal line
shown on Figure E-2 represents the value of S assumed in the 1959 ARDC atmospheric model.
Consequently, if an orbit lifetime calculation is based on the 1959 ARDC atmospheric density
model, the assumed solar flux and density are significantly greater than the average values
observed over a complete solar flux cycle. The predicted orbit lifetime would, therefore,
be significantly less than that predicted by a model that assumes a time-varying atmosphere.
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The procedure selected for this analysis is
provided in Reference 1 and is summarized
by the expression,
Mlifetime (days) = L x . x f x f
where L is a factor obtained as a function of
apogee and perigee altitude, M/C A is
ballistic coefficient in kg/m , f is a&
 iw
correction factor given as a function of
initial inclination and argument of perigee,
and f, is the solar flux correction factor as
a
a function of inclusive calendar dates that the
satellite remains in orbit and initial perigee
altitude. The factors, L , f. , and f, can1 iw d
Figure E-2. Solar Flux as a
Function of Time
be obtained from Reference 1. Since f, cannot be predicted exactly because of the uncertainly
with which S is predicted as shown in Figure E-2, curves of 2a upper and lower limits of fd
have been generated in Reference 1.
Orbit lifetimes were subsequently calculated
for the range of orbits that are most likely
to be attained as a result of a disposal maneu-
ver. Figure E-3 presents the orbit lifetime/
ballistic coefficient ratio for circular orbits
as a function of altitude and for elliptical
orbits as a function of apogee altitude with
perigee altitude of 500 km. Elliptical orbits
result if the transfer impulse is accomplished
at the reference orbit, but the impulse which
is applied at apogee to effect circularization
fails. The band in Figure E-3 was constructed
Figure E-3. 2-Sigma Limits on Orbital
Lifetime for Orbit of 500 km
(273 nm) Perigee
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as the 2 a upper and lower limits on pre-
dicted lifetime. The 2a lower bound on
predicted orbit lifetime is presented in
Figure E-4 for the PM and Reactor/Shield
configuration in circular and elliptical
orbits.
E.2.3 REENTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Modifications were made to the existing
Transorbit Trajectory computer code in
order that entry conditions at 122 km
(400, 000 ft) could be determined as a result
of specified burnout characteristics at high
altitude. The purpose of this task is to
estimate the velocity and flight path angle
of the PM at 122 km assuming a guidance mal-
function along with complete propellant deple-
tion by the disposal engine. A map of entry
velocity and flight path angle was constructed
o oby varying the thrust vector from 0 to -180
from the horizontal.
For the case of disposal engine misfire at
the reference orbit, Figure E-5 presents the
map of entry conditions. The indicated AV's
of 130, 225, and 400 m/sec (425, 740, and
1315 ft/sec) represent the total AV necessary
to achieve circular disposal altitudes of 735,
920, 1290 km (400, 500, and 700 nm), respec-
tively.
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Figure E-4. Orbital Lifetime of Power
Module and Reactor/Shield
Combination
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z 25,900
AV - 400WSEC (1315 FT/SEC)
AV 225 M/BCC (T40 FT/SEC)
INTENDED DBPOBAL
ALTITUDE (NM)
735 (400)
920 (500)
1290 (700)
REQUIRED AV
n/srcirr/KC)
no (425)
225 (740
400 (1315)
INERTLAL FLIGHT PATfl ANCLE FROM
HORIZONTAL DEGREES
Figure E-5. Entry Conditions at 400, 000
Feet Resulting from Disposal Engine
Misfire at 273 nm Circular Orbit
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The second case considered is that in which successful transfer of the PM from reference
orbit to the disposal altitude is accomplished, but the instantaneous thrust to effect circulariza-
tion at the disposalaltitude fires at the improper angle. If the AV to circularize is fired at
any angle from a 735, 920, or 1290 km apogee, direct entry to 122 km will not occur. The
decrement in energy caused by engine misfire does not provide sufficient energy for the
elliptical orbit to degrade to an orbit which penetrates the atmosphere. Consequently, such
a high altitude misfire will result eventually in an Earth orbit decay type reentry.
E.2.4 SUMMARY
The preceding calculations were intended as a basis for additional disposal maneuver and
reentry analysis. The propulsion requirements for placing the PM and Reactor/Shield con-
figuration into a disposal orbit and subsequently determining the reentry conditions as a
result of engine misfire form the basis for the reentry analysis portion of disposal maneuver
safety considerations.
In addition, estimating orbit lifetimes for those orbits that may be achieved during the dis-
posal maneuver is fundamental to selecting a desirable disposal orbit and sequence of dis-
posal operations.
REFERENCES
1. Richards, T. J., "A Graphical Method for Predicting Satellite Lifetime Based on a
Time-Varying Atmospheric Density Model", MSFC Contract NAS8-11121, 1966.
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CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units
2
m/sec
2
m
Kg/m2
Joule
Newton
m
Kg
watt
oNewton/m
m/sec
K
m3
English Units
2ft/sec
ft2
in2
lb/ft3
lb/in3
Btu
Ibf
ft
nm
Ibm
Btu/ sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Atmosphere
lbf/in2
Ibf/ft2
ft/sec (fps)
F
in3
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10~2
3.610 x 10 ~5
9.479X10"4
2.248x 10'1
3.281
5.399X 10~4
2.205 '
9.488X 10"4
5.691 x 10~2
3.413
3.413
1.451 x 10"4
2.088x 10-2
3.281
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
6.097 x 104
35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Criticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Xisimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or Imminent
degradation or failure of hardware (In'the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and partlculates released to the air
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement In semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion )
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality
A gas blanket used to provide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations
12An event having a relative or cumulative probability of oecurence of > 10
fL
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of 'relative probabilities" of the individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree)
Same as "Breached"
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc (e g , washing, filtering, chipping)
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied bj a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
partlculates
Nuclear hardware (e g , reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a cri t ical mass
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface following impact or
destructive excursion
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety anal)sis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation
II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
mpact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
[mpact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
ntact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
nterfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-notse ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System.
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after intended lifetime
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula
tory agencies or limits uhich preclude equipment damage
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nuclide such
as U-235 or Pu-239
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioi so topes in a heat source used in producing energy
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment
The location and/or origin of the hazard
Very early reentry of th'e reactor (e g , misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting in 1-2 day reentry)
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or In a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
lonlzatton Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credJble *
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage In materials (e g., the fogging of film).
Nuclear hardware which Impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early In the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and Interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
Material used In a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors in a thermal reactor
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid
Represents no hazard to the general populace
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10
not worthy of concern
-12 Considered
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor criticallty under all foreseeable circumstances
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a realtor
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacticity Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison"
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical (Usually ex-
pressed in multiples of a dollar )
IV
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Reactor Falls to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair/Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield Is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing Individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating, radiation shield may be damaged
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result In a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-1A)
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program (
All aspects of the Space^Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or in orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space, these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first.,
stage thrust
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode
Material In which isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process.
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